Not every problem, nor every thesis, should be examined, but only one which might puzzle one of those who need argument, not punishment or perception. For people who are puzzled to know whether one ought to honour the gods and love one’s parents or not need punishment [kolasis, "pruning," correction], while those who are puzzled to know whether snow is white or not need perception.” (Topics I 105a3ff. Pickard-Cambridge trans.)

“Not every problem, nor every thesis, should be examined, but only one which might puzzle one of those who need argument, not punishment or perception. For people who are puzzled to know whether one ought to honour the gods by teleology; as the ultimate final causeand love one’s parents or not need punishment [kolasis, "pruning," correction], while those who are puzzled to know whether snow is white or not need perception.” (Topics I 105a3ff. Pickard-Cambridge trans.)

No, the god of Aristotle does not will or command, and so its commands can’t be trangressed: “God is not a ruler in the sense of issuing commands, but is the End [hou heneka, for-the-sake-of-which, final cause] as a means to which wisdom gives commands. … since clearly God is in need of nothing.” Eudemian Ethics VII 1249b13ff, Loeb Classical Library trans.) Aristotle doesn’t have as elaborate an idea of natural law as the Stoics, but, arguing that the polis should not be too large, he ascribes cosmic order to his god: “Law is a form of order, and good law must necessarily mean good order; but an excessively large number cannot participate in order: to give it order would surely be a task for divine power, which holds even this universe together.”(Politics 1326a30ff) Aristotle’s ontology notoriously includes his god, the best thing there is (Metaphysics XII).

He deems an established cultus a primary necessity for the best polis (1328b12f), with priesthood only for citizens of venerable age. The philosopher’s life, the best life and that chosen by Aristotle himself, is the most godlike (Nicomachean Ethics X 1178b7ff and 117913ff.) It is futile to invoke Aristotle’s naturalism as if it squared with present-day tendentious godlessness, since his nature is to be explained above all by teleology and his god is the ultimate final cause of everything, most of all the good insofar as it is good.

Indeed they have:

Bipolar, or manic-depressive, disorder is a condition that afflicts millions. Characterized by cycles of elation followed by bouts of profound depression and despair, the disorder can wreak havoc on both the sufferer and his or her loved ones, particularly if it goes undetected and untreated for an extended period. Though the condition is estimated to affect, in one form or another, 5 percent of the world’s population, Monday marks the first time it has been diagnosed in a major deity.

From The Onion. (Where else?)

Of course, the problem is that by iffing your way to God, you might be f-ing up your life, since it would seem that there is no substance to this wager, and the behavioral changes demanded by your bet by the theocrat certainly don’t seem entailed by the ontololgical question. To tell you the truth, I see no reason for thinking that, if there is a God, I am morally worse than him/her. Why shouldn’t I be morally better? I certainly have never chopped off the head of my father, which Zeus did, or committed the carnal act with a swan (yes, it’s a drab life). As for Jehovah, I know that I, at least, have never ordered the slaughter of every man, woman and child in any town or city, at least while sober. And I’m so opposed to drowning the whole world that I’m for much stronger versions of the Kyoto treaty. So, I figure that, if anything, God might take a few moral lessons from me.

If something is good because god says so, what if god says you should torture all the slaves? Etc.

“To reject God’s will is not to reject the arbitrary rule of a tyrant, but to reject the most loving overtures of the creator who has made us for the only lasting happiness, eternal happiness with him.”

But of course the same problem applies. That’s not as self-evidently true as Helen Brown appears to think it is.

But actually, I’m not so sure that it is, necessarily. Suppose that God had created human beings to be unhappy (which seems on the face of it as likely as the contrary assumption). Then a rational person (who presumably wants to be happy) would need to *disobey* God’s will.