God is both p and not-p, okay?
So I’m not the only one who found Terry Eagleton’s review of Dawkins’s book more than slightly incoherent, especially the ‘God is not a person God is not a celestial super-object or divine UFO but then again God is an artist who did it for the sheer love or hell of it God is the condition of possibility’ stuff. Others have had the same reaction. Good. A C Grayling for instance.
Terry Eagleton charges Richard Dawkins with failing to read theology in formulating his objection to religious belief, and thereby misses the point that when one rejects the premises of a set of views, it is a waste of one’s time to address what is built on those premises…Eagleton’s touching foray into theology shows, if proof were needed, that he is no philosopher: God does not have to exist, he informs us, to be the ‘condition of possibility’ for anything else to exist. There follow several paragraphs in the same fanciful and increasingly emetic vein, which indirectly explain why he once thought Derrida should have been awarded an honorary degree at Cambridge.
James Wood for another instance.
One doesn’t need to have Richard Dawkins’s level of certainty to find Terry Eagleton’s Catholic sermon utterly incoherent. On the one hand, according to Eagleton, God is transcendent, invisible, not a principle nor an entity, not even ‘existent’: indeed, ‘in one sense of that word it would be perfectly coherent for religious types to claim that God does not in fact exist.’ This God is neither inside nor outside the universe, but is mysteriously ‘the condition of possibility’. On the other hand, Eagleton just happens to know that this God chose to reveal himself in Jesus Christ, that he created the world ‘out of love rather than need’, and because this act was gratuitous God is ‘an artist who did it for the sheer love or hell of it’.
Well exactly. What I said. How does he know all this? Divine insertion, or what?
Eagleton mocks Dawkins’s mockery of ‘a personal God’ (‘some kind of chap’), but how is this gratuitously loving and unneurotic but possibly rather cross and murderously neurotic modernist artist who speaks to us via Jesus not a personal God? It would not be obnoxious of Richard Dawkins to ask how Eagleton knows these things. The reply, I think, would be threefold: Eagleton was brought up a Catholic and is reverting to his roots; God or Christ has somehow ‘spoken’ to Eagleton at some point in his life; and Eagleton just has ‘faith’ that his assertions are true. These are all forms of irrationality, however understandable or even magnificent we find them, and it is not overweening for rational atheism to expose this irrationality, as it always has done.
I don’t find them magnificent, especially not in the sneering-dogmatic form Eagelton presented them in, and I don’t really even find them all that understandable, coming from someone with Eagleton’s pretensions to insight and general all-round cleverness.
It would be uncautious of me to say that I *understand* what Eagleton means when he says that on a particular level, God does not exist – but I do understand what he is getting at. As all the common-sense forms of existence we are used to are contingent ones: we exist locally in space and time, we may one day not exist, and the same goes for this rock, this chair, etc. What Eagleton is getting at is the old theological argument that if God exists, he exists necessarily. Now, the whole concept of necessary existence may be nonsensical. But if it is, it has to be argued to be. Simply saying that Eagleton is being incoherent won’t do – at least from where I’m at, he isn’t.
But — if we are going back to old theological arguments, and I must confess I have a certain fondness for the “Golden Oldies” — let’s not forget the riposte: what is wrong with there just being contingent beings? After all, aren’t they the only ones we know of? Why does their existence require a “necessary being” to exist? I think dear old St. Thomas’ argument for that position was laid to rest some time ago, but I’m always willing to see an attempt to resuscitate it. But just parroting Angelic Doctor Tom’s words, which Eagleton seems satisfied to do, won’t suffice.
But, if Eagleton is saying “god” doesn’t exist. that’s the end of it, surely?
They’ve surrrendured, and we’ve won!
Now all we have to do is pesuade the followers of Mahmud the deranged, that:
La il’allah (There is no god)
– someone correct my Arabic, if I’ve got that wrong, btw ……
“when one rejects the premises of a set of views, it is a waste of one’s time to address what is built on those premises”
This isn’t the case with the Luminoferous Ether so I don’t see why it – oh wait.
“Eagleton mocks Dawkins’s mockery of ‘a personal God’ (‘some kind of chap’), but how is this gratuitously loving and unneurotic but possibly rather cross and murderously neurotic modernist artist who speaks to us via Jesus not a personal God?”
Exactly.
The God Of Smart People exists only to slow down reason long enough for them to talk to their chap. He is the marketing campaign, not the product. He is for people who would otherwise be into Marx or Dungeon’s & Dragons.
GT. God doesn’t ‘exist’, but unless you have spent your entire lifetime studying the texts, you don’t have the sufficient knowledge to criticise apparently.
God doesn’t ‘exist’!=God doesn’t exist. That’s what the quotes are meant to indicate. I think Merlijn gave quite a good accounting of the ‘exist’-in-quotes thing.
I think he (Merlijn) is wrong to then conclude Eagleton is not being coherent, though. As wrong as GT is to wave his victory flag.
JonJ: the old argument (by Anselm, not Thomas, I think – but I may be mistaken) was criticized heavily by Kant, but it has also been defended in the past century by Findlay, Hartshorne and others. Findlay interestingly regarded it as an argument for atheism, i.e. the incoherence of the very idea of God. The knife cuts both ways. In any event, perhaps there is only contingent existence – but then there would be no God. There’s probably arguments that all contingent existence must have a necessary existent at its root, but I haven’t acquainted myself with them yet.
In any event, the context Eagleton was making the point in was the “God-as-object-of-natural-science” which Dawkins was attacking. In that context, it seemed very appropriate. That said, there is the apparent chasm between the transcendent and the personal, involved nature of God which OB has been attacking as well, and that’s another problem.
Eagleton clearly wanted to trounce Dawkins with his review. Did he achieve that aim? Do even those who point out that some criticism of Eagleton is not flawless think that he made his case? If not, why seek out those points where Eagleton was not having his cake while eating it? If the case for religion were as strong as some of Dawkins’ critics make out, they could ignore him and just point out everything that backs up religion’s claims. You know, like scientists do with evolution, instead of debating creationists or IDers…
The problem with comparing the defense of evolution with the defense of religion is that evolution is a more or less sharply delineated set of scientific claims – while religion as such is not a unitary set of claims at all. We’ve run quite a bit into the difference between religion-as-philosophical-theism and ‘folk religion’ on these pages, and I have the impression that quite a few attacks on religion do not make this distinction at all. Claims made within the framework of religion run the gamut between millenarian Christian fundamentalism to Deism. In other words, there is not a single ‘case for religion’ which is strong or weak, there are various cases for various forms of religion, some stronger, some weaker.
Additionally (if you allow me a slight detour), I’d say the most powerful argument against Creationism and ID is *not* to point out the strength of evolution and the claims that back it up. Because ID as an ostensible scientific theory would still be wrong, even if there were *no* strong claims to back up evolution. Which is one point on which I would disagree with Dawkins, who seems to regard the Argument from Design as the strongest argument for theism, and the demolishment of it as grounds to be an ‘intellectually fulfilled’ atheist. But the *scientific* pretensions of the Argument from Design are vacuous regardless of the alternatives. Paley’s watch would be an argument for design in as far as we know about watches, or about metalworking – but it would probably be a mystery to Homo Habilis. Without independent arguments for the identity and the limitations of the designer, no Argument for Design. Regardless of whether Darwinism has a strong case or not. Scientifically, evolution wins out by default – it’s evolution, or ‘we don’t know this (yet)’.
And I think the proper line of attack for defenders of evolution would be to point out this central weakness of ID, rather than to point to the evidence backing up evolution – which is already granting too much to ID.
“As wrong as GT is to wave his victory flag.”
Oh dear, it hasn’t been a good day for people spotting irony today, has it?
Pity, though, as, IF it were true, then it would be true – if you see what I mean …..
Actually, I think Eagleton has bullshitted himself into a very tight corner, and I suapect most of you think so as well.
BUT
Will he admit it – since he is a catholic, we can be fairly sure the answer to that will be no.
“while religion as such is not a unitary set of claims at all”
Well, it is and it isn’t. The trouble is, too often it seems to be the case that it isn’t when people want to do fancy dances, then it is when they want to chide people for not being religious. In other words the non-unitary aspect is too often more rhetorical than epistemic or ontological – too often just a dodge. That’s one reason people like me get cross with it – the old wrestling an octopus thing.
Dawkins has pointed out that evolution is so far the only workable theory that accounts for what we are able to observe. I agree with you, Merlijn, about any claims which might tend to suggest that one could not have been an intellectually fulfilled atheist before Darwin. Also that by saying the argument from design has any strengths at all, Dawkins is making a concession that is uncalled-for. You point out that “religion as such is not a unitary set of claims at all.” Which is arguably true; a lot of different things hide behind the label “religion” or have had it affixed to them. And, as OB points out, some sneaky buggers (or maybe some of them do it in genuine sincerity) use this to help them avoid being nailed down to clear claims when they want to win an argument. I, for one, find it problematic in the extreme when someone, under the guise of philosophical sophistication, ends up giving comfort to those who not only believe I am going to hell, but would like nothing better than to speed me on my way.
Well, it isn’t a unitary set of claims in my view. I see no reason to chide people for not holding religious views, and I regard neither religion nor absence of it as possessing some kind of intrinsic virtue. The non-unitary claim *may* be used as a dodge – but it isn’t always, or necessarily so. I’d happily get cross with people who aren’t consistent in this respect, too.
Eleven seconds of separation.
If you want to get irritated, listen to the audio of that chat between John Humphrys and Jonathan Sacks. Dear me but the rabbi is annoying – such sonorous windbaggery, such orotund nonsense. He sounds so Deep yet what he says is such blather.
“I regard neither religion nor absence of it as possessing some kind of intrinsic virtue”
But looked at the other way round, if the claims (whatever, unitary or not) made by religion are false, then the presence of religion veers rather sharply towards the negative (whereas its absence will be neutral). I am obviously speaking of a situation in which truth is given a positive value and falsehood a negative; I realise that this is not always the case in practice, no matter how much one thinks it should be.
Another way of putting it is to say that religion is epistemically dubious, and then to wonder whether and how epistemically dubious relates to morally dubious – if it is morally dubious to believe improbable things on the basis of no evidence. (Bertrand Russell starts an essay by saying it is.)
Good point. One could extend that and place belief in you-know-what on a similar footing to believing something unpleasant about someone one doesn’t like on the basis pure hearsay. Except with you-know-what it’s supposed to be something pleasant, except that even that isn’t so simple when you take a closer look.
“Dear me but the rabbi is annoying – such sonorous windbaggery, such orotund nonsense. He sounds so Deep yet what he says is such blather.”
Reminds me of what James Wood wrote in his superb essay ‘The Broken Estate: The Legacy of Ernest Renan and Matthew Arnold’ critiquing Paul Johnson’s The Quest for God. Wood beautifully describes Johnson’s style as one in which “syntactical pomposity substitutes for the motion of true thought, and in which no sentence is exactly slipshod, nor truly alive”.
The problem is that where there’s a demand for pretentious non-thought of this kind there will always be a supply of pretentious non-thought. I’m sure 90% of those who tuned in to the Humphrys-Sacks chat show consider Sacks to be one of the finest minds of his generation. Depressing.
‘Simply saying that Eagleton is being incoherent won’t do – at least from where I’m at, he isn’t’
I disagree but thats ok.:-)
‘God-as-object-of-natural-science’
These are ideas are somewhat baffling. All people know is the natural world we know of nothing outside of it. If God exists he is part of our world or we simply cannot reach him or he us.
‘religion-as-philosophical-theism and ‘folk religion’ ‘
I would argue they are not different at all other than in degree.
“‘religion-as-philosophical-theism and ‘folk religion’ ‘
I would argue they are not different at all other than in degree.”
They are a shell game.
The former is the tax dodge for the extensive holdings of the latter.
dirigible – do you write comedy ?
Oh, Nick, how could you suspect dirigible of encroaching on Eagleton’s turf?
Heh.
JimC: “These are ideas are somewhat baffling. All people know is the natural world we know of nothing outside of it. If God exists he is part of our world or we simply cannot reach him or he us.”
Well, that is exactly what is disputed in theistic (but not only theistic) discourse. So any argument against theism cannot simply include it as a premise as it is not one on which both sides agree – it would have to argue for it. Saying “All we know of is part of the natural world, therefore, if God exists, he is part of the natural world, therefore he is an object of natural science” as for example GT does is logically correct, but irrelevant. And Eagleton is not the only one to take Dawkins to task for this one – Nagel does so as well.
OB: “Another way of putting it is to say that religion is epistemically dubious, and then to wonder whether and how epistemically dubious relates to morally dubious – if it is morally dubious to believe improbable things on the basis of no evidence. (Bertrand Russell starts an essay by saying it is.)”
I would *most strenuously* object to the thesis. Simply because I do not think thoughts or beliefs can have any moral value in and of themselves – only actions can.
In my opinion, placing a moral value on disbelief in a way is tantamount to rejecting religion but keeping the bad parts. Like placing a moral value on faith, it risks making a shortcut to either faith or atheism without considering the crucial question of truth.
The problem being here that the improbability of a Deity is highly disputable (I don’t think it can be specified, and am extremely suspicious of theological attempts, see Swinburne, to do so); and even what is considered as “evidence” is highly disputable (see exchanges between me and GT on this). Some time ago I raised that also the criteria of truth and plausibility as applied to metaphysical issues may be different between theists, atheists and (agnostic) skeptics. I don’t think these questions can ultimately be solved (at best, however, arguing them can help refine the argumentation of both the atheist and the theist).
However, application of the thesis in questions of religion vs. atheism will typically skip these issues, as Steward’s analogy with believing unpleasant hearsay illustrates.
You want comedy? Here’s all you need to know about religion (choice quote: ” It’s the beliefs about what should happen that override the actual visual input.”):
http://www.livescience.com/othernews/061120_magic_brain.html
This will probably not read as coherently as I would like because I’m writing nearly as fast as I’m thinking. Many of the things Merlijn writes are all well and good, as far as they go, but when I read some of them, a voice nags at me from inside and says “But you haven’t justified postulating a god in the first place, so how do you even get to the high philosophical level without that first step?” And then I remember: none of this started with philosophers discussing whether thoughts, beliefs or actions can have moral value, or criteria of truth and plausibility. Had it begun that way, an idea such as god might never have arisen at all. The philosophers of the last few thousand years did not begin in a vacuum, the starting point from which they all had to begin was human society, riddled with belief in a god or gods. Such ideas may have been refined a lot by the time the philosophers came on the scene, but they must all have started off as completely unsophisticated ideas about very human or animal-like beings that caused things to happen, because things just happening without intentional causation was not what we had evolved to detect. Later thinkers weren’t able to start from scratch as if these ideas had never ruled. A prominent item on the philosophical menu card is god, but before debating the pros and cons of her, his or its existence, oughtn’t we to look at how she, he or it got there in the first place? Is there really a much better reason out there than the fact that this idea is part of our cultural baggage (and that may only be the case because our ancestors’ powers of ratiocination were a lot simpler than what are capable of today)?
Putting the previous a bit more clearly: it seems to me that placing a moral value on epistemological issues is placing the cart before the horse. Assumably, both OB and I and Steward would share most of our moral principles: “Do not unto others…” is, I think, a religious expression of a very basic, universal moral truth rather than the other way around. I would also assume that we would agree moral truths such as that the killing of women and gays is morally wrong are universal. But – these would seem to me to be based on shared philosophical viewpoints (equality of people, autonomy of the individual, individual freedom). Suppose we are challenged by someone who extends the same right humans have to mosquitoes: I would suppose we would argue that mosquitoes are, if sentient, much less so than humans are, etc. Likewise, questions such as abortion cannot be *entirely* divorced from the question of when a foetus is becoming a person.
So therefore, I would strongly argue to keep epistemology (and philosophy to the extent to which it is concerned with “what *is*”) autonomous from morality. Of course, epistemology remains normative. It’s quite possible to say: “It is *wrong* to believe in this and this proposition without that and that evidence” just as it is possible to say that fallacious reasoning is wrong. But this does not mean they are *morally* wrong.
Steward: I think debating the roots of a belief in God is well and good – but I don’t think we necessarily disagree a lot there. Thing is, though, that the roots of a belief in God have strictly taken no bearing on the truth of that proposition. I have gone into the justification of my own beliefs here in the past – the problem is that doing so will take a *lot* of time, and I don’t want to test OB’s patience too much. Perhaps I will put something up on my own near-dormant weblog.
Merlijn,
Sure, I would share the idea of not doing unto others etc., as a very basic guiding principle, but maybe not for the same reasons you suggest. “… a religious expression of a very basic, universal moral truth rather than the other way around” To me, that phrasing smacks of a morality that exists independently of whether we do or not (exist, that is) and I’m not at all sure that that makes sense to me. The level of thought of which the performer of any act is capable seems to me crucial in establishing the morality of that act. If a gazelle suffers pain being killed, but the lion that tears it to bits has no awareness of that pain, surely it is different from a case in which I would do the same thing to the gazelle with a knife, with full knowledge of that pain and a capacity for empathy. I don’t think it’s a question of discovering a pre-existing morality by reaching a certain level; rather, I tend to feel that absent beings at that level, morality does not exist at all. Our thought processes do not discover morality; they create it. Ex nihilo, if you will. Taking it a little further than you do, I would like to suggest that saying our agreeing gays deserve equals rights but mosquitoes don’t are questions of degree vis a vis the in-group/out-group business. Is it alright to take a life if no suffering is involved? Is the point that a being is sentient, a la Terri Schiavo?
All that said, beliefs without results deriving from those beliefs (possibly too theoretical a situation) probably remain pretty amorphous, from a moral standpoint.
“the roots of a belief in God have strictly taken no bearing on the truth of that proposition”
But if I take that absolutely seriously, then you must seriously answer why you don’t place the orbiting teapot or Flying Spaghetti Monster on the same level. If you say that I introduced the teapot as a philosophical gambit and the FSM as a joke, then you are, are you not, maintaining that the roots of belief in them do have a bearing on how we relate to them.
Merlijn writes:
“I would strongly argue to keep epistemology (and philosophy to the extent to which it is concerned with “what *is*”) autonomous from morality.”
Merlijn (if I interpret correctly what you are driving at), you might as well be talking to the wall. Epistemology? ‘Is’ versus ‘ought’? They just don’t get it. Hume got it. Nietzsche got it in a really big way. Most of us don’t, or we think we do, but we haven’t. For example, people who disapprove or approve of capital punishment think it’s a fact that they are morally right and that the others are morally wrong (and probably evil and malevolent as well). Honest, try it out on any liberal (or any reactionary, if such entities still exist).
Like it or not, man is the ‘valuing animal’ (Nietzsche again). Read ‘Beyond Good and Evil’, or at least the concentrated ‘Cliff’s Notes’ version. Ekshelly I must get round to reading it myself — some day when I’ve finished red-marking every line that Schopenhauer has ever written.
Steward: the reason I reject the Flying Spaghetti Monster or the orbiting teapot is not that they were introduced as a joke, but that they are (presumably) unproven, yet natural entities – and that therefore the analogy with the God of theism fails. I just don’t think we can coherently state that a transcendental, omnipresent Deity is made out of spaghetti. Or flying, for that matter (flying in what medium?). This, and not the jocular origin, would be my reason for rejecting them.
Then again, metaphors are just metaphors. I don’t particularly care whether one calls God God or Wotan or Jupiter or Ahura-Mazda. I’ve considered the Nordic goddess Hel to be, metaphorically, a quite apt depiction of the kind of God whose existence I’d consider. I still think she’s pretty cool. Purely metaphorically, perhaps there is a case for the Flying Spaghetti Monster as well.
OB – can I call dibs on having pointed the accusatory finger at Sacks’ soft-and-slow-voiced meanderings…?
:-)
Steward: “To me, that phrasing smacks of a morality that exists independently of whether we do or not (exist, that is) and I’m not at all sure that that makes sense to me”
That’s a key point which I kind of failed to elaborate upon. I think it is possible to state that morality is objective, existent independently from people, of Divine origin, etc. This is an answer which a lot of theists give – it should not be confused with stating that only religious people can be truly moral. However, it is also possible to state that morality is ultimately dependent on humans but that nonetheless moral relativism is wrong: moral rules form a system which it is impossible to ‘step outside of’, morality cannot be reduced to, say, neurochemistry (as an ought cannot be reduced to an is). At the same time, it may be (metaphysically) taken to be of natural origin. We’d then have an analogy with language, reason, etc. I’d guess an atheistic moral antirelativist would go for the second answer.
“and that therefore the analogy with the God of theism fails. I just don’t think we can coherently state that a transcendental, omnipresent Deity”
I still just keep breaking a tooth on this kind of thing. I just don’t get it. I don’t see how we can say anything (other than pure untethered speculative babbling that has nothing much to do with coherence) about a transcendental, omnipresent Deity or rather deity (if it’s transcendent, surely it won’t mind if we don’t capitalize the noun by which we refer to it, will it?). I also have a very difficult time figuring out how we would go about distinguishing between dignified coherent speculation about such a deity (or Deity) and pure tricksiness and ground-shifting. Deity transcendent when we don’t know what to say, cendent when we want to claim it loves us and wants us to stone adulterers.
I suppose the latter is me. But why does the system you describe seem to be a constant? I don’t think I have to elaborate all the plausible or possible evolutionary ansers. But, surely, one of the calculations made by the organisms built by the selfish gene would be not only to do unto others etc., but also not to do unto others etc., because of one’s own vulnerability. Could an invulnerable being (with sufficient brain power) be “moral”? How about a god? But that, obviously, is more of a diversionary speculation than anything else.
On the earlier reply, if you are wrong in your presumption that teapot and FSM are natural entities, do you withdraw your objection to the analogy? But does that answer how god ever got considered for discussion (if the roots of the idea are no good reason)? We have one bunch of people saying they perceive a universe and are trying to figure out how it works etc. Another bunch perceives the same universe and says they have the answer and it’s all down to a magical being. Why is there no third group saying they believe there’s a magical being who created everything, but something created that being and that’s what they worship? In a sense there is precisely that, because, after all, we know the first magical being was invented because no natural laws were yet known. Now we do have a kind of a third group who acknowledge and accept everything science discovers but continue as believers in dogma that was never put to any kind of acceptance test (other than, shall we say, social). The discovered laws of nature substitute for the first magical being and the ueber-being who created them is worshiped. It’s like monotheists saying there’s something wrong with polytheists. If you’re going to regress and say there must be something we can’t detect that created what we can detect, why, really, stop at one generation? Why isn’t the “real” god the one seventeen generations back who created the one sixteen back, who created etc. till we get to the one who created the universe? Where does anyone get off making rules for things that are undetectable? (send me your account number, Tingey, and I’ll transfer your royalty fee). One of my bottom lines with all this is that, despite the intellectual exercise the little grey cells get, there’s something deeply dissatisfying about ignoring things we do know (or as close as our equipment will get us to knowing) in order to spar about the unknowable attributes of an entity we can be pretty sure was postulated as a direct result of our former ignorance. As I said before, the cool-sounding philosophy about god came later, after the simplistic anthropomorphic models were well-established. If it could be convincingly demonstrated that it was the other way round, that literal sky-daddy developed from a more abstract concept (as Jesus Christ may well have done, but he’s hardly the beginning in this story), I think my attitude might be different, but I don’t think that’s what the evidence at hand shows, nor, given our knowledge of our development, is it likely or logical that the abstract preceded the material in our ability to grasp them.
Did I just write all that? Sorry.
“till we get to the one who created the universe”
That’s the turtle, of course.
“there’s something deeply dissatisfying”
Much what I was saying. We seem to have both bumped up against the same frustration at the same time. It is deeply dissatisfying, it is difficult not to keep breaking a tooth on it. I do get tired of being informed that god can be both this and that and t’other besides and that that’s not incoherent and Eagleton was talking good orthodox whatever the hell. I don’t believe a word of it.
No, Ophelia, of course you don’t believe a word of it.
Like me you want evidence.
I may have been an engineer, and as far as I can make out your background-training is/was completely different, but “faith” is not for us.
We want some proof.
Is Merlijn listening?
Well it’s not that I think speculation is useless; I don’t think that; but when it becomes a matter of what we can and can’t say about this utterly speculative god – for me it all crumbles into a sort of bossy gibberish, and I break a tooth and give up.
Excuse me for the length of the following reply. Good questions deserve considered answers.
Stewart: “I suppose the latter is me. But why does the system you describe seem to be a constant?”
I have nothing against an evolutionary account of the origins of morality – but it seems to me that such an account would not explain the *why* of morality itself, in the sense that *replacing* “do not unto others” with a type of reasoning like “if I hurt X, she may hurt me back” would remove the whole normative “ought” of moral reasoning. Would it be allright to kill if there is no reasonable chance that we get punished for it in our lifetimes? Of course not.
As for your speculative reasoning – it may be more to the point than you realize. I think there *are* problems with positing the timeless, all-powerful, invulnerable God of classical Theism as a loving God – as to love presupposes to be affected, to be “vulnerable” to love or the absence of love.
Stewart: “On the earlier reply, if you are wrong in your presumption that teapot and FSM are natural entities, do you withdraw your objection to the analogy?”
If you can argue that a Deity can be made of spaghetti and still be transcendent with regards to the universe itself – and I don’t think you can (see below!) – then sure.
Stewart: “Why is there no third group saying they believe there’s a magical being who created everything, but something created that being and that’s what they worship?”
Because if God is a) transcendent with regards to the universe, and therefore at least partially “outside” the universe, then he cannot be a limited being inside that universe; b) a necessary being in the sense of what Eagleton calls “the condition of possibility”, then there can be no other Gods, by definition. Which is why monotheism is of a radically different kind than say the polytheism of the Greeks and the Romans – where the Gods are immortal, but otherwise very limited beings.
Now, particularly if b) is true, the existence of the Creator would be contingent upon the (necessary?) existence of something else. Hasn’t something like that been proposed within Gnosticism? But to me, that would seem to complicate matters enormously without adding explanatory value. Whereas I would regard a simpler God hypothesis *as* potentially having explanatory value.
“Where does anyone get off making rules for things that are undetectable?”
‘Undetectable’ is not a synonym for ‘unarguable’. G. Tingey elsewhere compared the existence of God with the luminiferous aether. His analogy was wrong, because the luminiferous aether was posited as an explanans within the framework of natural science, and therefore subject to the laws of nature. And in natural science, the explanations stop there: natural laws etc. may be reduced to simpler, more all-encompassing natural laws, but the existence of causality and natural laws themselves by definition cannot be reduced to something else (e.g. teleology) as long as you want to stick to scientific method. But in the case of theism vs. atheism, dualism vs. materialism, etc. the explanandum is much wider. It involves the existence of natural laws as well as whatever is under their sway, the existence of mind, ideas, reason and so forth.
In that light, it becomes clear that one cannot either argue for or against God on the basis of detectability as used within the natural sciences. But this does not mean the reasoning involves becomes a free-for-all. Theism as well as other -isms can be argued for or against on whether they are comprehensive or leave obvious matters of fact outside unexplained; whether they are coherent or suffer from internal contradictions, etc. Not anything goes, even though proof and refutation do not reach the same level of certainty as they do in e.g. chemistry.
OB: “I do get tired of being informed that god can be both this and that and t’other besides and that that’s not incoherent and Eagleton was talking good orthodox whatever the hell. I don’t believe a word of it.”
I’m sorry you’re getting tired, OB – but I’m not pulling your or anyone else’s leg over this. I am being sincere. Eagleton’s position of God ‘existing’ as the condition for the possibility of anything else to exist is a substantial argument. It’s not necessarily *correct*, mind you – but it’s not waffle. It can be attacked. It can be argued that the whole idea of necessary existence is nonsense (as I think Kant, Russell and others have done). But a philosophical idea can be wrong without being waffle.
The idea of God being neither inside or outside of the universe seems, to me, to follow quite understandably from conceptualizing God as transcendental – ‘encompassing’ the universe but not being contained within it. Not being local in space and time. Again, it may be wrong – but it’s not obviously meaningless. I’m aware that I’m using the term “transcendence” much more often than I’m comfortable to, but there you go. Still, I do believe the term is meaningful, and applicable to other relationships than God-world.
And I am not so much ‘informing’ you that God can be both this and that – that would be too presumptious. I do not intend to come across as arrogant. My claim would be that “it is arguable” that God can be both this and that.
I am not entirely happy with the way Eagleton presented his case. It seems to me that he brushes along too many arguments that need elaboration, and that he could have been more focused. But I must insist that he is not (obviously) incoherent. Which does not mean he is correct, mind you.
Merlijn,
I know you’re not pulling my leg! And you’re very polite not to snap back at me. I just have a hitting-wall sensation at times.
“Eagleton’s position of God ‘existing’ as the condition for the possibility of anything else to exist is a substantial argument.”
But what I took issue with was the combination of saying god’s existence or non-existence is a non-issue and then a couple of paragraphs later offering a lot of factual detail about god or Jesus (who is god). You can’t say god doesn’t exist and it loves peanut butter – that’s a contradiction.
One can’t, I mean, not you personally. Not that you would.
Heh.
That is indeed too long to start picking apart and querying, but thank you for putting it down. To stand way back and see what’s going on here at the Dawkins-Eagleton level, isn’t it that Dawkins says there’s no evidence and has written a book to elaborate, which Eagleton has reviewed with a tone of “I don’t need evidence, I have arguments and what’s more, evidence or no evidence, you haven’t mastered my arguments and saying there’s no basis on which to commence the arguments just isn’t a good excuse for not having done so.” Isn’t that – somehow – it? Don’t mean to be impolite, but I think that’s all I can take time out for today.
OB: If I understand Eagleton correctly (and I think I do), I think he was wrong to put the question of God’s existence in the way he did. Because I admit that it adds more confusion than it solves. If God necessarily exists, as the “condition of possibility”, it suffices to say he exists, as it is already clear enough he doesn’t exist in the same way as my table does.
I don’t think that God necessarily-existing and loving peanut butter and all that is necessarily (sorry!) a contradiction. But I do agree Eagleton puts the matter a bit too starkly, and with way too much certainty. The whole problem of evil, God’s putatively loving nature, and all that; and the dog’s dinner some theologians (see Swinburne) have made of it; means that it needs a bit more argumentation than Eagleton is providing. I can’t fault you for being less than impressed on this one. I’m very troubled by the issue myself.
Stewart: “Isn’t that – somehow – it? Don’t mean to be impolite, but I think that’s all I can take time out for today.”
My *impression* – but it is wholly based on reading reviews of Dawkins’, I haven’t read the book myself, and have a serious backlog to work through – is that Dawkins is not so much saying there’s no basis to commence the arguments but that he knocks down an argument no one is making.
“I don’t think that God necessarily-existing and loving peanut butter and all that is necessarily (sorry!) a contradiction.”
No, neither do I, it’s god’s not existing that is a contradiction with its loving peanut butter. Eagleton doesn’t get to say on the one hand god doesn’t exist and on the other hand offer a wealth of facts about god – and that’s what he did.
Ah well – having looked at the wretched Eagleton review again – if I work very hard I can make out that he’s saying what you say he’s saying, so okay, he wasn’t contradicting himself in the way I said he was. He was being very damn slippery and evasive and opaque, but you probably agree with that, and he wasn’t saying exactly what I said he was. Nemmine.
Stewart,
Concretely, what Nagel and Eagleton are charging Dawkins with is that he mis-conceptualizes God as a hideously complex but natural inhabitant of a natural world, and therefore regards the existence of God as a “scientific hypothesis”. You’ve read Dawkins’ book. Are Nagel and Eagleton misrepresenting Dawkins’ position here? I don’t know – and I know little of Eagleton, but I have a lot of time for Nagel.
Some more remarks, as your last post confuses me on some points. You remark that “I think it’s legitimate to ask whether any other idea with the same amount of supporting evidence gets to hog our attention the way this one does and because we all know the answer, the next question does become “why?”
But here again there is the risk of supplanting a question about a knowledge claim with an analysis of how the knowledge claim came about. The latter does in no way vacate the former. One could even argue it is to some extent dependent on the former: *if* a personal God exists, then it could be argued that the existence of God influenced the emergence of belief in him in various ways. I’m not saying this was the case, mind you. Likewise, a sociological explanation of religion may subsume the former to the extent that it may be predicated on certain theories of mind – which need to be made clear (but on my impression often aren’t). I’m wary of positing a sociological explanation of religion and a theistic explanation of the universe as mutually exclusive. I’m likewise wary of replacing the one with the other.
Second, you use the word “evidence” here. Previously, you counterposed the concepts of “evidence” with “argument” leading me to think you mean scientific evidence in the former, philosophical argument in the latter case. Now, on one interpretation of the Argument from Design, it does purport to provide physical evidence. But it only does so in as far as it posits a scientifically “manageable”, very powerful yet limited super-creature as a Designer. And that’s exactly where it goes wrong.
But your insistence on evidence here leads me to think you regard evidence as superior to argument. Is this indeed the case? I think that’s a risky position to take. Because whereas scientific reasoning may lead to a level of confidence philosophical argument can only dream of – it is only in the context of argument that evidence becomes evidence. Now, I know I seem to be hammering the same drum a lot, but it seems to me that the position that the lack of scientific evidence for a Deity justifies a lack of belief in him needs to be spelled out with all the philosophical argumentation that goes with it. Because it may be valid – but only within a certain framework on “all that exists and how it works”.
I am troubled about some statements in your last paragraph: “And there’s one thing he really does avoid relating to: sure, there may be dozens of really interesting philosophical arguments Dawkins has never even read, but he is outspoken in what the practical aims of his book are. Those aims require a style that will not get bogged down in such arguments.” But the thing is, once you plan to attack theism, rather than ignore it, once you intend to argue against it, and argue that the God hypothesis is exceedingly unlikely – then you have to deal with the philosophical arguments in its favour. Now, Dawkins may well have done so, mind you. But saying that the aims require a style in which it does not get bogged down into philosophical arguments could be interpreted as a call for blithely ignoring what the “enemy” says.
Disregard of the subtlety and difficulty of some of the issues involved here, which does to me seem to characterize *some* atheists (and OB I do not mean you here, nor Stewart and all the Nicks, but the “spaghetti monster har-har-har” school of atheism), eventually may lead to one’s argument being only compelling to those already convinced by one’s central thesis, i.e. preaching before the choir.
On your last sentence: “An intimidating demand for respect, if not justified, requires a wrecking ball to wake everyone up. Anything else is playing by the rules the enemy made.” I agree about the problems with the demands for respect – however, I tend to think they are as patronizing to theists as they are to atheists. I’m troubled by your usage of the word “enemy”, though. Who is the enemy? Christian fundamentalists? The Vatican? Creationists? But Dawkins isn’t directing his ire just at them. Are theistic scientists such as Ken Miller or Conway-Morris or Collins the enemy? Or the vaguely-religious neighbour who goes to Church every sunday, more out of habit than out of everything else? This needs to be spelt out – because tribalism can be inimical to reason.
If there is any absolute first intellectual imperative, it must be to take a critical distance to one’s own beliefs, to realize and never forget the possibility that one may be mistaken. Religionists of a certain variety often forget this – but they don’t have a monopoly on it.
I think they both do some misrepresenting in general terms, but if I can find the time over the weekend, maybe I’ll do some comparing of actual passages to see what the answer is to your specific question. And if anyone else finds the time before I do, feel free to go ahead.
I’ll do so myself as well of course, but at the moment Dawkins’ website seems to be out of reach to me.
“Who is the enemy?”
One enemy is the harmonization crowd, so yes, to that extent theistic scientists such as Collins are the enemy – the ones who rely on woolly assertions to make their case. In general the people who as Steve Pinker put it treat ‘“faith” and “reason”’ as ‘parallel and equivalent ways of knowing’ so that ‘we have to help students navigate between them.’ As he goes on to say, ‘universities are about reason, pure and simple. Faith—believing something without good reasons to do so – has no place in anything but a religious institution.’ The enemy is everyone who tries to subvert that awareness.
Hmmmm… As for faith and reason, I think both the statement that they are parallel and equivalent ways of knowing *and* Pinker’s definition of faith as belief without evidence are mistaken. So I’d be in a third camp all of my own there: I don’t think faith is a way of *knowing* at all, or that faith and reason are in any way equivalent or even comparable. The opposite of reason is not faith, but unreason, lack of reflection: and I don’t think faith *is* faith if it isn’t seen as such by the person holding it. I know that faith is usually defined differently but the usual definition is wrong, methinks.
As for the other question though, I’m very much in the camp of the enemy. I’m against compartmentalization in the fideist or seperate magisteria way, and very much in favour of “harmonization” with the crucial addendum that full harmonization, and intellectual inertia, is undesirable.
But it isn’t Pinker and the rest of us who pair faith and reason, it’s the harmonizers who do that; it was the Harvard report that treated them as a pair and in some sense equivalent for the purposes of the report. But that’s an inane position for a university to take. Pinker didn’t say faith is the opposite of reason; he implied that it’s different, but not that it’s opposite. The comparison was forced on him – as it is often forced on all of us. I don’t want to talk about faith, I hate the very word, but it’s constantly being shoved down our throats, so that we have to respond if we’re not to acquiesce. I refuse to acquiesce.
Hmmm, fair enough. I obviously agree with Pinker about the position of faith at universities. And I would share at least partially your discomfort with the word ‘faith’, particularly as a synonym for ‘religion’. So by all means, do not acquiesce :-)
“particularly as a synonym for ‘religion'”
That’s the only reason I hate it. When it’s used soberly to specify the mental/emotional state in question, I don’t object to it in the least, it’s merely descriptive, an atheist can use it just as a theist can. But this new synonym – I just loathe it. I loathe the slyness of it. I really hate creepy dishonest tricksy sly language like that – it ‘offends’ me.
An attempt at some answers to Merlijn:
“the risk of supplanting a question about a knowledge claim with an analysis of how the knowledge claim came about”
I don’t want to supplant it, but I could find myself engaging in it when the knowledge claim refuses to go away despite not being able to demonstrate why it should be taken seriously.
On “argument” and “evidence:” I am of the opinion that the existence of some evidence should precede an argument, otherwise the latter isn’t about much. The proposal that what the argument from design bases itself on is physical evidence is not a proposal with which I agree. I don’t think you can get there without certain a priori assumptions that weight the field in favour of such an idea.
I do understand the drum you’re hammering, regarding evidence requiring argument, but I do not get what makes god a fitter subject for argument in the absence of evidence than anything else one might come up with.
On Dawkins not getting bogged down, he does relate to a lot of philosophical arguments and gives reasoned explanations (yes, he ridicules them when they seem to merit it) of why they do not alter the points he wishes to make. Dawkins is attacking all religious belief because the sum total of his life’s experience, whether or not he’s capable of encapsulating it in a book of moderate length, has led him to conclude that it is a phenomenon that is overwhelmingly harmful. It is understandable that his opponents in this endeavour would like nothing better than to blunt the message he wishes clearly delivered by getting it and him bogged down in arguments that are probably above the heads of many readers, though possibly also nonsense and only pretending to be high-flown (many people cannot tell the difference and let themselves be impressed). My experience of religion causes me to be supportive of Dawkins’ aim and, while I would object if he said something untrue even in aid of a cause I support, I feel he is justified in making his own decisions regarding the weight various considerations should be given in making his case. I may be biased, but in reading all I have since TGD came out, I get an impression that Dawkins is not trying to tell anybody they shouldn’t pore over religious texts. By all means, look at what’s in them and keep your critical faculties on high alert, he’s saying. I do not get the impression that Dawkins’ detractors are at all keen for their readers to read Dawkins’ book and make up their own minds. I think we do have a difference of intellectual attitudes here and one is much more open than the other.
I used the word “enemy” where I could easily have used “opponent.” I don’t dissociate myself from OB’s reply to the question. I was aware of the risks in using the word, because it can too easily be misunderstood in quite a nasty way. I think I chose it more than anything else for its military connotation. It is quite a battle, to start with, and both sides are using arguments to try to outflank each other. In addition, I find that the camp that wants to defend belief in god is continually switching fronts. When the argument is about fundamentalists killing people, they’re not representative and god’s existence is confined to an elitist level of philosophical musing. I was going to give three examples, but, you know what, just go to the Harris-Prager exhanges at the Dawkins site: http://richarddawkins.net/article,372,Why-Are-Atheists-So-Angry-A-Debate-with-Dennis-Prager,Sam-Harris
Science thrives on clarity, religious belief needs the opposite to thrive.
“In addition, I find that the camp that wants to defend belief in god is continually switching fronts. When the argument is about fundamentalists killing people, they’re not representative and god’s existence is confined to an elitist level of philosophical musing.”
I find this charge rather puzzling. Would you rather have moderate religionists defend or identify with fundamentalists who kill people? Many moderate religionists are sincere and consistent about rejecting fundamentalism. And they, with good reason, would reject any analysis which regards foaming-at-the-mouth fundamentalism as the only “pure” version of religion, and moderate versions as watered-down versions of it (watered down because, of course, of the encroaching advances of science).
What unites or divides here is not the belief in God as such. Nor even whether one’s beliefs are based on reasoning or faith – a virtually pure fideist like Martin Gardner could remain a hardcore skeptic in areas of inquiry, not because of some kind of dissonance but because he understood his faith to be just that. But it’s some kind of basic rationality and skepticism with regards to one’s own attitudes.
“Many moderate religionists are sincere and consistent about rejecting fundamentalism.”
Agreed, but, and this is a key point for several of the prominent writers on the subject today, allowing the irrational things nonetheless believed by religious moderates to go unchallenged makes it more difficult then to assail the position of fundamentalists. The moderates and the fanatics in this case are nurtured in the same ground and it is that ground that is rightly being scrutinised, as a root cause. Anything can be perverted and used as an inspiration for violence, but should we condone the existence, fostering and, in some cases, large-scale public funding, of even the moderate version of one such thing if there is good reason to think it isn’t even true?
I just read the Harris-Prager exchange. I think it’s pretty much bottom of the barrel. On both sides. Harris keeps attacking the “why not Zeus?” strawman, which makes me not so sure he actually thought about the matter a lot. Also, Harris seems to have the idea that to be a scientist means to be nothing but a scientist: to treat just about everything one encounters with the scientific method – see his lampooning of Collins and the waterfalls (1). Prager creates a festival of goof-ups (his argument from authority with regards to Collins: Collins’ and Prager’s arguments should stand on their own regardless of what eminent scientists believe; his ad hominem against Russell, and his rather offensive notion that religion is somehow necessary for morality).
(1) If Collins were to say: “God has a trinitarian nature, because when I came to believe in him, there were three waterfalls” then of course Collins would be a bit loopy. Quite another thing to say, however, is: “I believe in a trinitarian God, because when I had this-and-this religious experience, I saw these three waterfalls”. Context of justification, and discovery, in religious matters.
“Anything can be perverted and used as an inspiration for violence, but should we condone the existence, fostering and, in some cases, large-scale public funding, of even the moderate version of one such thing if there is good reason to think it isn’t even true?”
I think the notion that we are dealing with a moderate and a fundamentalist version of the same thing is highly mistaken. I believe the same goes for searching a “root cause” for fundamentalist terror solely within religion itself, as Harris seems to do – while the facile poverty/imperialism explanation is rightly rejected, there is quite a bit going on otherwise.
As for condoning the existence of religion – surely it is not up to you or to anyone else to condone or not condone the existence of any kind of belief system? I strongly disagree with, say, right-wing authoritarianism, leftist statism, deep environmentalism, certain brands of radical feminism, political Islam, political Christianity, Maoism, etcetera – but do I condone their existence? Nothing for me to condone or not condone.
Something else. You mention that “allowing the irrational things nonetheless believed by religious moderates to go unchallenged makes it more difficult then to assail the position of fundamentalists.”
I think the use of the word rational/irrational here is highly problematic. As I understand, rationality is usually used to denote logical thought, and the ability to undertake purposeful and effective action in a means-end relationship. Genuine irrationality, either genuinely illogical thought or actions that are meaningless with regards to their purpose, is extremely rare – if it even occurs.
But even taking a narrower definition (sound, generally reasoned thought, striving towards coherence of internal beliefs), I doubt all of religion can be regarded as fundamentally irrational. To someone with little understanding of science, it is *perfectly* rational to see the supernatural behind a lot of occurrences. Wrong, sure, but not irrational! There is nothing irrational about detecting agency – to the contrary. Belief in astrology is mistaken – but it is only irrational in as far as it conflicts with other beliefs held by a subject. And with regards to the philosophically more matured versions of theism – these tend to use logic to the breaking-point, rather than ditch it.
But furthermore, I think I disagree with your whole premise. I strongly doubt that Richard Dawkins’ all-out attack on religion is any more effective than, say, Ken Miller’s attacks on Creationism. To the contrary. Miller and other theistic scientists may be much more effective in turning fundamentalists to a more moderate, science-friendly version of religion.
Thing is, that reasoning like that may again run into the risk of supplanting telling the truth with tactics. If Dawkins believes that he is correct – and he seems to – then by all means he should write books about it. If it is the truth that all religion is based on the same irrational ground (which I believe it isn’t, of course) then it should be told. Even if telling so were to stimulate fundamentalism, rather than corrode it.
“I think the notion that we are dealing with a moderate and a fundamentalist version of the same thing is highly mistaken.”
That is very interesting and maybe something on which OB should open a new thread. Is one of them religion and the other something else? And if so, which one? Clearly, that they share a common ground is the premise that Dawkins, Harris et al are depending on. I grant that from a certain point of view they may appear to be completely different, unrelated things, but wouldn’t that point of view require a concerted ignoring of a great many things they have in common?
Some of those opposing an attack on religion make a point of knocking over a strawman that has atheists claiming a world without religion would be a world without violence. Not only don’t they claim that, but surely it is true, by definition, that a world without religiously-inspired violence would be a world without religiously-inspired violence. And, even if one allows for some of today’s religiously-inspired violence finding other excuses and still happening, surely one can’t claim that none of the violence done in the name of religion is actually being done in the name of religion. That becomes absurd.
“Condone” is a word frequently brought into play for phenomena one considers negative, usually violence. By all means, axe the word “condone” if you wish, but I still say it is to be expected that people will fight against situations they consider negative, e.g. Dawkins against the position enjoyed by religion among human beings on this planet at this time.
I appreciate that rational or not will depend on one’s definition.
You make it clear that you do think truth should be told regardless of consequences. Part of what seems like disagreement between us is because of definitions and I grant you are far better versed in certain areas than I am. But I think we do have a disagreement regarding, shall we say, the wisdom of Dawkins tactics and the truth of what lies behind them. I guess we’ll just have to live with that. A large part of his stated aim is consciousness-raising and I must say that the air I breathe has become fresher since such a prominent voice has been ringing through it saying there is no such thing as respect which does not have to be earned.
Just to enlarge slightly on what I suggested might merit its own thread, if moderate and fundamentalist religion are not two completely different things, but achieve a perception that they are, it is an alarming prospect, as it would mean deniability by the source for the most radical acts it inspires.
“That is very interesting and maybe something on which OB should open a new thread.”
By pure coincidence, I think I just did. I think that is much what Giles Fraser is claiming – but given that so much of everyday ordinary visible detectable religion is not like that – is not full of doubts and uncertainties but is instead full of ‘faith’ – it is difficult to believe him.
“I grant that from a certain point of view they may appear to be completely different, unrelated things, but wouldn’t that point of view require a concerted ignoring of a great many things they have in common?”
And also ignoring the plain utility of claiming they are completely different for purposes of arguing with atheists and then dropping that conceit all the rest of the time. I think it’s important never to overlook the role of rhetoric and deception and maneuvering in this ‘two religions’ thing.
i have never heard more bullshit than here in these comments especially from merlin de smit. Your discussion about god is not only loosing valuable time but have you nothing to DO instead of argumenting about an IDEA. In the best way you can put that god is nature so science is the real theology. And there it’s stops. You forget that in the REAL world people MUST work for their survival not produce nonsense. Bah.