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  • The Ancient World As Seen By Afrocentrists

    Introduction


    At some schools and universities in the USA today students are learning a version
    of ancient history that is strikingly different from what is being taught to
    their counterparts in Europe.[1] This new narrative cannot be reconciled with
    the traditional account, which is still being taught in the vast majority of
    schools and universities. Advocates of the revisionist version ("the Afrocentric
    narrative") claim that because of their inherent prejudice against Africans
    and peoples of African descent, the traditionalists have ignored a significant
    body of evidence. Advocates of the traditional version of ancient history insist
    that their version ("the Eurocentric narrative") offers the best available
    account of the known facts. Thus in the debate between the two groups there
    is more is at stake than historical accuracy. There is a question of ethics
    as well: the traditionalists deserve to be discredited if they have misrepresented
    history, particularly if they have done so out of racist motives. But it also
    follows that the revisionists should be prepared to moderate their claims if
    they have misrepresented history or misunderstood the motives of the traditionalists.


    In this article I shall offer a summary of the revisionist "Afrocentric"
    narrative, along with the traditional "Eurocentric" narrative that
    it is designed to replace. I shall then describe the evidence used to support
    each account, and attempt to explain where the advocates of each narrative have
    misunderstood the other, or have failed to pay sufficient attention to other
    possible interpretations. In the end, I shall argue that the Eurocentric Narrative
    offers the best representation of the known facts now available to us, and that
    the Afrocentric Narrative is based largely on an unscientific and now rightly
    discarded understanding of the nature of Egyptian civilization. But I wish to
    make it clear at the outset that I have not chosen the Eurocentric narrative
    out of a reluctance to imagine anything new, or out of a desire to misrepresent
    the achievements or capacities of African peoples.[2] Such motivations
    are both abhorrent to me, as they should be to all of us. Rather, I will insist
    that the Afrocentric narrative needs to be taken seriously by everyone who is
    interested in the ancient world. Despite its historical inaccuracies, the Afrocentric
    narrative reminds us of facts that have not been sufficiently emphasized in
    the study of ancient history: that the ancient Egyptians came originally from
    Africa and that their cultural and intellectual achievements in the second millennium
    were remarkable.


    Here then are summaries of the two narratives:


    The Afrocentric Narrative


    1. Prehistory: All civilization derives from Africa, and in particular
    from the African civilization of Ancient Egypt. It was from ancient Egypt that
    language and culture spread to the rest of Africa. The Egyptians invented science,
    medicine and philosophy, and they taught it to other peoples.


    2. Second millennium B.C: It is also from ancient Egypt that language
    and culture came to ancient Greece. The Egyptians under the Hyksos pharaohs
    invaded the Near East, and then came to Greece. A memory of this invasion is
    preserved in the story of Danaus and his fifty daughters, who came from Egypt
    to Argos. While in Greece, the Egyptians exerted influence on Greek art, architecture,
    science, and language. They built step-pyramids in Thebes and Argos. They founded
    the Eleusinian mysteries. Egyptian motifs appear in Minoan and Mycenaean art,
    and Egyptian objects are found in Greek sites. Half of the vocabulary of ancient
    Greek derives from ancient Egyptian. Some Greeks, such as Socrates, had African
    ancestors.


    3. First millennium B.C: Famous Greeks came to Egypt to study at the
    universities in the Egyptian Mystery System (EMS): Homer learned about religion
    and Pythagoras about life and death and mathematics, Solon studied law, Thales
    science; Socrates and Plato philosophy; Oenopides, Democritus, and Eudoxus astronomy.
    In 332 B.C., when the Greeks invaded Egypt under Alexander the Great, Aristotle
    raided the library of Alexandria. Later he pretended to be the author of the
    Egyptian books he had stolen. Ancient Greek philosophy is in reality stolen
    Egyptian philosophy. The Greeks did not have the capacity to write philosophy,
    because they were a contentious people. Cleopatra VII’s paternal grandmother
    was an African.


    The Eurocentric Narrative


    1. Prehistory: All human life appears to have originated in Africa,
    but in the course of thousands of years people migrated to other parts of the
    world. We know from recorded history that in the third millennium B.C. the ancient
    Egyptians had attained a high level of civilization. They had a system of writing,
    built impressive architectural structures, and were adept at certain types of
    mathematical calculation. They had theories about the operation of the human
    body, and recorded their methods for the use of other practitioners.


    2. Second millennium: Invaders from the East began to settle in Asia
    Minor, the Aegean islands, and mainland Greece. The Egyptians were in contact
    with peoples in these areas and other early civilizations through trade. During
    the hegemony of the Semitic "Hyksos" pharaohs, (ca. 1650-1550) Egyptians
    in Lower Egypt traded with Cyprus and Crete, and brought Minoan artists to Avaris,
    but here is no archaeological or linguistic evidence that Egyptians invaded
    mainland Greece or the islands.


    3. First millennium: Trade continued with other Mediterranean countries,
    but in the mid-seventh century the pharaoh Psamtek I ("Psammetichus")
    used Greek mercenaries, and a base for Greek traders was established in the
    Nile Delta at Naucratis. In 570 B.C. the pharaoh Ahmose II ("Amasis")
    used Greek mercenaries, and in 548 B.C. financed the rebuilding of the temple
    of Apollo at Delphi. After the Persians conquered Egypt in 525 it was difficult
    for Greeks to travel there, but we know that in the fifth century the Greek
    historians Hecataeus and Herodotus went there; others Greeks, like Solon and
    Thales, may have visited there as well. Greeks lived in Egypt after Alexander’s
    conquest, but stayed primarily in Alexandria and kept themselves separate from
    the native population. From 332 to 31 B.C., when Cleopatra VII was defeated
    by the Romans, all the pharaohs were Macedonian Greeks. Greeks founded the library
    at Alexandria in about 297 B.C. What we now know as Greek philosophy derived
    from the work of Greek thinkers in Asia Minor, and was developed in Athens by
    Socrates, his pupil Plato, and Plato’s pupil Aristotle.


    Discussion


    I shall now explain what evidence is used to support the different narratives
    for each of the three periods outlined above. I have suggested in endnotes where
    fuller discussions of particular issues may be found.


    1. Prehistory


    Both the traditional and revisionist accounts agree that all civilization comes
    from Africa, and that the Egyptians originally were an African people. Where
    the accounts differ is in emphasis: the Afrocentric account stresses the connection
    of the Egyptians to the rest of Africa; the Eurocentrics concentrate on the
    connections of Egypt to the Eastern Mediterranean, a part of the world that
    is more important for the development of European history. The Afrocentrists
    also pay particular attention to the racial characteristics of the ancient
    Egyptians. According to them, the Egyptians are indistinguishable from other
    Africans. But the traditionalists point out that the Egyptians distinguished
    themselves from the Nubians and other African and Mediterranean peoples in appearance
    and dress. Both the traditionalists and revisionists express a high regard for
    Egyptian accomplishments in science, medicine, and architecture, fields that
    are highly valued in European culture, though the revisionist account makes
    claims for Egyptian science that cannot be substantiated by the documentary
    or archaeological evidence. For example, there is no evidence that Egyptians
    invented gliders, and flew around in them.[3] They did not understand the relation
    of the brain to the nervous system . Nor did they have a real grasp of the function
    of the circulatory system: they thought that the network of vessels that emanated
    from the heart terminated in the anus (Harris 1971, 125; Palter 1996, 256).
    It is important to note that neither account pays much attention to the subject
    area which the ancient Egyptians thought themselves most important: the preparation
    of the individual for death and the afterlife. In this respect the focus of
    the Afrocentric narrative is as Eurocentric as the traditionalist narrative
    (Walker 2001, 128-129).


    2. Second millennium


    The revisionists argue that there was massive influence on Greece from Egypt
    in this period, brought as the result of an invasion of Greece by the Hyksos
    pharaohs. They believe that there is evidence of the invasion in the presence
    of many Egyptian word roots in Greek, and that the idea of an invasion is suggested
    by the story of Danaus and his fifty daughters, who came from Egypt to Greece
    and settled in Argos, and that the foundations of step-pyramids can be seen
    in Argos and in Thebes (Bernal 1991, 320-408, followed by Poe 1997, 323-26).
    The traditionalists have not been convinced by any of these arguments. They
    insist that Egyptian etymologies cannot be found for most Greek words, unless
    all known rules of vocabulary acquisition are disregarded (Jasanoff and Nussbaum
    1996, 179-84). They say that the myth of Danaus proves nothing about
    an invasion, because it is a myth, not history, and merely suggests what archaeological
    evidence confirms, that there was contact between Egypt and Greece during this
    period (Vermeule 1996, 276-77; Coleman 1996, 281-84; Tritle 1996, 319-20). If
    the myth could be accepted as a historical account, it would also suggest that
    Greece invaded Egypt, since Danaus’ ancestor Io came from Argos to Egypt and
    settled there (Lefkowitz 1996, 18-19). They point out that the remains of buildings
    identified by the revisionists as Egyptian have no distinctively Egyptian characteristics,
    and thus are almost certainly indigenous (Tritle 1996, 321-3). In particular,
    the structures known as "pyramids" in the neighborhood of Argos are
    located at some distance from each other; a careful study showed that they are
    in fact guard houses, dating at the earliest to the fifth century B.C. (Lord
    1938, 481-527). The "pyramid" at Thebes is only a hill (Tritle 1996,
    321-323).


    Instead of the notion of invasion, the traditionalists believe that during
    this period there is evidence of increasing trade, and with it extensive cultural
    exchange among the peoples of the Eastern Mediterranean. At this time also successive
    waves of peoples gradually filtered into the area who spoke an Indo-European
    language that later became the prototype of Greek. These people absorbed into
    their language some of the vocabulary of the native populations of the area,
    but the identity and origin of these earlier peoples is now unknown. Some more
    specific items of vocabulary were added to Greek through trade with the Phoenicians
    (Burkert 1992, 34-40; West 1997, 12-14). Archaeological evidence shows that
    the inhabitants of the Greek mainland traded with Egypt, and were inspired by
    Egyptian decorative art; but the Hyksos pharaohs admired the indigenous art
    of Crete and brought Cretan artisans to Egypt to create wall paintings for buildings
    at Avaris in the Nile delta (Bietak 1996, 81). Since virtually no
    Egyptian words appear to have been absorbed into Greek at this period, it seems
    likely that there were no major exchanges of population, wars, or invasions
    between Greek and Egyptian peoples (Jasanoff 1997, 63-66).


    The evidence supports the traditional account, provided that traditional methods
    are employed in analyzing the available data. But the revisionists insist that
    traditional means of acquiring knowledge are all subject to question, especially
    if the motives of the producers of such "knowledge" can be regarded
    as one-sided or even racist in intention. Since no human being can be truly
    objective, isn’t it possible that the traditional methodology has been designed
    either inadvertently or deliberately to "protect" the data from alternative
    explanations? Why can’t myth represent history in this case, even if it does
    not in most other cases? How do we know that the same rules for adopting foreign
    loan-words into Greek apply to all languages in the same way? Couldn’t the Egyptian
    words have been transformed in a somewhat different way from, say, Phoenician
    words?


    To some extent the revisionists’ skepticism appears justified: certainly classical
    scholars have tended to concentrate more on the development of Greek culture
    during this period than they have on the development of other cultures. No modern
    scholar of the ancient world is opposed to the notion of a strong African influence
    on Greece in principle . Rather, the problem is that there is no evidence,
    either linguistic or archaeological, that supports the notion. For example,
    there is no reason to assume that the Danaus myth is any more "historical"
    than the Oedipus or any other myth. Scholars have known for more than a century
    the rules by which Egyptian loan words are brought into Greek, and have already
    catalogued such loan words as can be found (Wiedemann 1883; Jasanoff and Nussbaum
    1996, 201-3). In any case, if it is true that the nature of knowledge is determined
    by the intentions of the providers of knowledge, then the revisionists’ arguments
    also will be undermined by their own intentions. If they are determined to claim
    priority for African civilizations, as their approach to the evidence suggests,
    how can they in their turn be expected to offer a fair and unbiased account
    of the development of Greek civilization?


    3. First millennium


    The traditionalists believe that before the sixth century B.C., encounters
    between Egypt and Greece were limited, though Greeks traveled there, and served
    as mercenaries under Ahmose II in 570B.C. They set up a trading post at Naucratis
    in the Nile Delta. Here they appear to have followed a Mesopotamian practice,
    since there were trading posts along the Egyptian border (Dalley and Reyes 1998,
    97). But Greek contact with Egypt was restricted after the time of the Persian
    conquest of Egypt in 525 B.C. until Alexander’s invasion in 333/2. Herodotus
    was able to travel in Egypt because he was a native of Halicarnassus, a city-state
    that was under Persian domination. Most classical scholars who have studied
    the evidence doubt that most famous Greeks went there, and suggest that even
    if they did go there, they did not learn anything about religion or philosophy
    (Brisson 1987, 153-68; Lefkowitz1997, 75-85). Nothing in either the
    Iliad or the Odyssey suggests that Homer had any first-hand knowledge
    of Egypt; he assigns to it no special characteristics that could distinguish
    it from any other foreign country that he describes (Lefkowitz1997,
    74-5). Although Herodotus sought to establish connections between Egyptian and
    Greek religion and ritual, in reality the similarities he found were few and
    superficial. He is, for example, mistaken when he claims that Pythagoras derived
    his ideas about the transmigration of the soul from Egypt (Lefkowitz1997,
    62-71) In fact the Egyptians did not believe that the souls of the dead transferred
    themselves to new bodies, but designed their rituals and incantations to ensure
    that the life of the individual continued after death.


    Philosophy in particular appears to be a purely Greek invention. Although Greek
    creation myths may have been remotely inspired by the Babylonian Creation Myths,
    the account of origins of the universe and its components given by Plato and
    Aristotle is expressed in non-theological terms and in a generalized, abstract
    vocabulary that has no analogy in the Egyptian language (Burkert 1985, 303-11).
    In any case, Egyptian texts corresponding to Greek philosophical texts have
    not yet been discovered, nor is it very likely that they ever will be, because
    the Egyptians were not interested in exploring such subjects as the nature of
    the good, or of justice, or of the soul. Rather than questioning what these
    were, they spent their time investigating how each individual might best conduct
    him- or herself appropriately in this life so as to be able to survive successfully
    after death.


    The only philosophical texts produced on Egyptian soil are the so-called Hermetic
    treatises, which contain dialogues in Greek between a god and a disciple. Although
    they purport to have been written in Egypt at the beginning of time, the Hermetic
    treatises were in reality composed during the early centuries A.D., long after
    the Greek settlement was established in Alexandria, and Greek had become the
    language of government, the courts, and international trade(Fowden
    1984, 3-4; Copenhaver 1992), xliii-xlv). Egyptologists have now discovered an
    Egyptian-language dialogue of Thoth (the Egyptian god associated with Hermes)
    that also dates from this late period. But even though it appears to have the
    same outward form as the Greek-language treatises, ideas are expressed and topics
    discussed in an entirely different way from that of the Greek texts, which use
    abstractions and deal with the kinds of issues raised in the Greek philosophy
    of that era (Jasnow and Zauzich 1998, 617-18).


    Thus even if the Greek philosophers had gone to Egypt to study with Egyptian
    priests, as later writers suggested that they did, they would not have learned
    about philosophy. Even though it is theoretically possible that Plato may have
    visited Egypt, there is no indication in his surviving works that he knows anything
    about Egypt that he could not have learned from Herodotus. Plato tells us that
    Socrates never left Greece, and no ancient source says that Aristotle ever went
    there. In any case, he could not have sacked the library at Alexandria, because
    it was not built until about 297 B.C. and Aristotle died in 322 (Lefkowitz1997, 137, 145)


    As for other sciences, the Greeks probably acquired some practical medical
    knowledge from the Egyptians over the course of time through their contact in
    trade, but they probably learned about mathematics and astronomy from the Near
    Eastern peoples with whom they came into frequent contact rather than from the
    Egyptians (Dalley and Reyes 1998, 104). Egyptian mathematics appears to have
    had very little direct influence on the work of other ancient Mediterranean
    peoples (Toomer 1971, 44-45; Palter 1996, 216, 255-56). The Greek
    method of mathematical calculation was different from that used in Egypt, and
    can be distinguished from that of earlier cultures because of its use of abstract
    terms. Where the Egyptian scribe would present a series of related specific
    calculations (showing that in principle they knew that they presented a related
    problem), the Greeks developed the use of theorems to express in abstract terms
    the principle behind the calculations (Gillings 1972, 233-4).


    By contrast, the revisionists claim that virtually everything that the traditionalists
    believe to have been invented or developed by the Greeks should in reality be
    attributed to the Egyptians. First of all, they argue, the Egyptians were a
    great civilization long before the ancestors of the Greeks emigrated to the
    Eastern Mediterranean. Since the Greeks clearly found Egyptian art inspiring,
    and copied it in their sculptures and architecture, they could have done so
    with scientific and philosophical ideas as well. They point out that Herodotus
    and other Greek writers believed that the names of the gods and certain Greek
    religious customs came to Greece from Egypt.[4] They make much of the claims
    by some ancient writers (although in every case writing some centuries after
    the fact) that famous Greeks studied with Egyptian priests.[5]The
    revisionists believe that Greeks came to Egypt to study at the universities
    that were incorporated into the Egyptian Mystery System, and that some of them
    were even initiated there in Lodges into the Egyptian priesthood.[6]


    The revisionists argue that the traditionalists have ignored what Greek writers
    have said, or have tended to regard their testimony as basically fictional,
    because of a characteristic Eurocentric unwillingness to give credit to an African
    civilization for the development of Western thought. To some extent, this criticism
    is justified. Some European scholars believed that the Egyptians must have been
    Europeans, or in any case of a different racial stock from other Africans, because
    they believed that ancient Egyptian civilization was clearly superior to (and
    therefore different from) other African civilizations of the time. Certainly
    some scholars of the ancient world have been racist and anti-Semitic. It is
    also true that Europeans have sought to connect themselves to the ancient Greeks,
    rather than to the ancient Egyptians, in their architecture, art, science and
    literature.


    But if today virtually all scholars of the ancient world no longer believe
    that the influence of Egypt on Greece was as great as Herodotus or later Greek
    writers supposed that it was, it is not because they are unwilling to give credit
    the Egyptians for these same achievements. It is now widely recognized that
    the European scholars who thought the Egyptians were Europeans were certainly
    wrong, and their work has been discredited. Most anthropologists and Egyptologists
    subscribe to that view that the ancient Egyptians originated from Africa. Scholars
    of the ancient world have ceased to take Herodotus and his successors au
    pied de la lettre
    about the debt of Greece to Egypt once they began to be
    able to read what the ancient Egyptians themselves had to say about their own
    religion, life, and connections with the rest of the ancient world. They could
    not have done so before the mid-nineteenth century, because it was only some
    time after the hieroglyphics had been deciphered (1822) and a grammar and dictionary
    of the Egyptian language could be published (1836), that Egyptian inscriptions
    and papyri could be read and analyzed. The revisionists’ notion of Egyptian
    culture clearly derives from earlier notions of Egypt, based primarily on Greek
    and Roman sources, which have been shown to offer a fragmentary and often misleading
    account of Egyptian civilization.[7]


    One reason why many people, both black and white, still believe that Egypt
    is the prototype of Greek civilization is that the idea of Egyptian origins
    has been preserved in Masonic ritual and mythology, and also in many books about
    pyramids and their mysteries that derive from these beliefs. The notion that
    there was an Egyptian mystery system derives from the Masonic initiation ritual.
    This ritual, although thought to be Egyptian in origin, in reality dates only
    from historical fiction composed in the eighteenth century. Its source is a
    description of Egyptian priestly training in Séthos, a novel published
    in 1731 by a French priest, the Abbé Jean Terrasson, who was a professor
    of Greek at the Sorbonne (Terrasson 1732). The novel, although now completely
    forgotten, was widely read in France, and almost immediately translated into
    English and German.


    At the time of its publication, and for at least a century after, the account
    of ancient Egyptian education and initiation in Father Terrasson’s novel was
    widely believed to be authentic, and the rituals he describes were adopted by
    Masons in Europe. One can get an impression from Schickaneder’s libretto to
    Mozart’s The Magic Flute of the nature of the initiation ritual, as well
    as a sense of why it attracted the sympathies of so many people. It is a test
    of character, an educational journey, and emergence from dark and despair to
    enlightenment and peace. Ignaz von Born, a member of the same Masonic lodge
    as Mozart, wrote a treatise exploring the connections between these rituals
    and ancient Egyptian practices, apparently without realizing that what he supposed
    to be the ancient evidence also derived from Father Terrasson’s account (Hornung
    1999, 121-132). Terrasson’s description was of course based primarily on ancient
    Greek and Roman sources, such as Apuleius’ The Golden Ass , which were
    the only descriptions of Egyptian religion and ritual available at the time
    (Lefkowitz1997, 110-21). Father Terrasson in his novel describes in
    exact detail the curriculum of an imaginary university system in second millennium
    Egypt, complete with such completely anachronistic appurtenances as laboratories
    and observatories. This educational system, he claims, became the source of
    many of the ideas and rituals later thought to originate only with the ancient
    Greeks. Terrasson portrays the ancient Egyptians as whites, as opposed to black,
    "savage," Africans (Terrasson 1732, II 25).


    Despite its fictional nature and historical anachronism, Terrasson’s novel
    had a wide influence on the development of European rituals. It is the ultimate
    source of the notion of an Egyptian Mystery System, with its ritual and university
    components, which is preserved both in Masonic ritual and in the many initiation
    ceremonies that derive from it. It survives in occult accounts of Egypt, which
    retain pre-decipherment notions about the mysterious character of hieroglyphics
    and the secret messages hidden in the arrangement and measurement of the pyramids.
    It encourages writers to try to establish direct connections between Egyptian
    ideas from the second millennium B.C. and Greek texts written many centuries
    later, as if no alteration would have occurred through cultural exchange and
    over the centuries (Fauvelle 1996, 157).Here, perhaps, is the origin
    of the Senegalese theorist Cheikh Anta Diop’s account of how Greek initiates
    into the Mysteries at Heliopolis wrote term papers on Egyptian cosmogonies and
    mysteries (Diop 1991, 338).


    Some influential blacks learned about the "Egyptian" initiation ceremonies
    and the Mystery System from Masonry. Secret societies were important for oppressed
    immigrant groups in the United States, and particularly popular among people
    of African descent, many of whom had participated in such societies also in
    their homelands (Herskovits 1941, 161-67; Howe 1998, 59-72). Whites in the U.S.A.
    did not allow blacks to become members of their lodges, but a separate Masonry
    with similar rites was founded in 1775 for black men by Prince Hall (Grimshaw
    1969, 238; Williams 1980, 89; Lefkowitz1997, 129-30). Through Masonry
    Egypt appears to have become not merely the source of European culture but a
    kind of utopia. In 1837 the Rev. Hosea Easton observed that "the Egyptians
    communicated their arts to the Greeks," whence they were disseminated to
    the rest of Europe, but he remarked that they had not passed on to the Europeans
    the generosity and fair-mindedness with which they had governed their neighbors
    (Easton 1837, 9, 19). In 1853 Martin Delany pointed out the irony
    that whites excluded black men from Masonic rites that were first established
    in Egypt and Ethiopia (Delany 1853, 10-11, 13; Walker 2001, 8-9). One of the
    most important figures in the Afrocentric movement, Marcus Garvey, was initiated
    as a mason. So was George G.M. James, the author of the widely influential book
    Stolen Legacy, of which there are perhaps 500,000 copies now in print
    in the U.S.A. (Lefkowitz1997, 130, 254). In Stolen Legacy James
    describes a university "Mystery System" that serves both to educate
    and initiate candidates for priesthood (James 1954, 27-53). James also speaks
    of the several centers of this system as Lodges. The term "lodge"
    derives from Masonry and other societies that model themselves on it, such as
    the Brotherhood of Elks (Lefkowitz 1997, 105). Socrates, James believes,
    was initiated as a Master Mason (James1954,2, 89). James’ pupil
    Yosef A.A. ben-Jochannan, offers a complete account of these Masonic Mysteries
    in ancient Egypt (ben-Jochannan 1991, 204-30).


    Unfortunately, this Masonic notion of ancient Egyptian education is not only
    anachronistic, but almost completely Eurocentric, in that it derives from Greek
    and Roman sources as interpreted by a Roman Catholic priest in eighteenth-century
    France. It takes virtually no account of all that scholars have been able to
    learn about Egypt since the decipherment of hieroglyphics. It is silent about
    the connections of Egypt to adjacent African civilizations such as Nubia, and
    does not offer any sense of what distinguishes Egyptian religion and thought
    from their European counterparts. Yet most ironically, radical Afrocentrists
    want African-American students to learn about this basically Eurocentric Egypt,
    because it makes Egypt, rather than Greece, the cradle of Western thought.


    There is another reason why Afrocentrists prefer this anachronistic notion
    of ancient Egypt. First, it portrays ancient Egypt as the original sourceof all other African civilizations. According to Cheikh Anta Diop, the ancient
    Egyptians spread their culture and indeed their language to the rest of Africa.
    His theory mirrors earlier Eurocentric theories of Egyptian origins (Fauvelle
    1996, 121-69). The Australian anthropologist Sir Grafton Elliot Smith proposed
    that all early civilizations in the world derived their cultures from Egypt.
    But Elliot Smith did not believe that this remarkable people could have originated
    in Africa; he wrote that "the smallest infusion of Negro blood immediately
    manifests itself in a dulling of initiative and the ‘drag’ on the further development
    of the arts of civilization"(Howe1998, 115) His colleague at the
    University of London, W. J. Perry, called these non-African Egyptians the "children
    of the sun." The term was later (and more appropriately) applied by Afrocentric
    writers to Africans (Howe1998,57 n.17). The theory of Egyptian
    origin in turn supports theories of African diffusion into Europe. Were the
    original settlers of the Eastern Mediterranean Egyptians? Could ancient African
    blood-lines have survived after Indo-European peoples moved into the Greek peninsula?


    Against this background, it seems less implausible to suppose that important
    Greek figures might have had African ancestors, although no ancient sources
    mention them. Socrates has been made a candidate for African ancestry because
    Plato describes him as having a snub nose and thick lips; but these features
    are not exclusive to Africans. There is no evidence that his family were not
    Athenians; if they had been, the Athenian comic poets would have been sure to
    point it out. Other famous persons have been selected because they lived in
    North Africa, such as Hannibal (who as an aristocratic Carthaginian was almost
    certainly of Semitic origin, as the reference to the god Ba’al in his name suggests),
    or Cleopatra VII. Cleopatra’s ancestors were all Macedonian Greeks, with one
    exception: no one knows the identity of her paternal grandmother. She could
    have been African, or indeed Jewish, but it is far more likely that she was
    a Macedonian Greek, since if she had been a foreigner some ancient writer would
    surely have called attention to it (Lefkowitz 1997, 26-43, Walker 2001, 54-56).


    If virtually all scholars of the ancient world, whether of Egypt, Greece, or
    the Near East, regard the Masonic notion of Egypt as unhistorical, and are skeptical
    about Diop’s notion of African diffusionism, the revisionists see these reservations
    not as an expression of serious academic concern, but as a confirmation of the
    Eurocentric unwillingness to question received ideas, and, of course, as evidence
    of Eurocentric racism (Moses 1998, 8). Because any attempt to debate or discuss
    the historicity of the Afrocentric narrative can be understood as evidence of
    a conspiracy against Afrocentrism and peoples of African descent, it is unrealistic
    to assume that arguments based on evidence will be effective against it, at
    least among those who most desperately want to believe in it, and who derive
    affirmation and comfort, and even financial support from its continued existence
    (Pipes 1997, 162).


    Conclusion


    The basic structure of the Afrocentric narrative derives from a description
    of ancient Egyptian culture that is anachronistic and (ironically) Eurocentric
    in nature.[8]As a result, many of the theories this narrative has
    inspired can be shown to be unhistorical and even fanciful, such as the notion
    that Greek philosophy was stolen from Egypt. Another problem is its preoccupation
    with questions of racial (as opposed to cultural) identity. Instead of concentrating
    on the many ways in which Mediterranean civilizations influenced each other
    over a long period of time, it gives priority to the achievements of one particular
    ancient civilization, mainly because it is African, to the virtual exclusion
    of other early civilizations, such as those of the ancient Near East.


    Nonetheless, because Afrocentrism is being taught in schools and universities
    and is taken seriously by many people, it presents a challenge that requires
    an informed response. It is a challenge first of all to the academic integrity
    of every student of the Eastern Mediterranean, which requires us first to answer
    charges that we have deliberately misled our students and the general public
    about the extent of Egyptian influence on Western thought. The challenge is
    particularly daunting because attempts to discuss and debate the issues are
    usually met with further accusations and acrimony. It is tempting to try not
    to be involved in the contest, or somehow to remain above it, even to the extent
    of suggesting that belief in the Afrocentric narrative might be particularly
    constructive for young students, and enable them to regard Africa, ancient and
    modern, in a more positive light. I would argue that this temptation ought to
    be resisted, however much we may wish to bring about improvements in the lives
    of many people of African descent. Americans have already had many opportunities
    to see that teaching history based on illusion can cause lasting damage, particularly
    if that illusion encourages belief in the evil nature or inferiority of others.
    Many older history books taught that the European invasion of this continent
    was an unqualified good for all involved. Afrocentrism merely inverts such Eurocentric
    racism. But counter-racism is still a form of racism, and as such, must be actively
    resisted.


    Because of the nature of the Afrocentric challenge, and the importance of the
    historical issues involved, much of the discussion of the Afrocentric narrative
    has taken the form of a spirited defense of the traditional narrative and the
    use of warranted evidence. But now that the historical questions have been answered,
    at least to the satisfaction of those who still believe in the use of evidence,
    it is important to acknowledge that the Afrocentric challenge, like all challenges,
    has a positive side as well. It encourages us to review what we know, and to
    ask some very interesting questions about assumptions that many of us have not
    troubled to question. It has reminded us that ancient Egypt was an African as
    well as a Mediterranean civilization, and that most people of European descent
    have been interested primarily in those aspects of its culture that Europeans
    have regarded as important in their own cultures: medicine, science, architecture,
    and art.


    It is clearly time to investigate the African side of Egypt as well, and not
    to be surprised to find that this side has something to teach us. Classicists
    in particular have tended to compare Egyptian religious thought unfavorably
    with Hebrew or Greek theology, in part because Egyptian theology is more complex,
    and notions of metamorphosis more sophisticated than their Greek counterparts.
    Like the ancient Greeks and Romans, scholars have been puzzled or even repelled
    by the way in which the Egyptians worshiped animals, and sacrificed many of
    them in respect of their divinity (Smelik and Hemelrijk 1984, 1858-64). We must
    try to understand this complex system of belief with greater sympathy, and to
    ask whether or not the Egyptians have something to teach us, both about respect
    for non-human life, and a positive attitude towards death.


    In assessing Egyptian accomplishments in mathematics, scholars have tended
    to adopt a somewhat condescending attitude towards Egyptian methods. They have
    suggested that the Egyptians were practical men, who could measure accurately,
    while the Greeks developed abstract theories that made the principles behind
    the calculations accessible to all. While such assertions are true, they do
    not tell the whole story. It is clear that while the Egyptian scribes had not
    developed a special language to describe what they were doing, they did understand
    that certain types of calculation had universal application, and developed methods
    and formulas, such as the ratio for determining the circumference of a circle,
    which closely approximates the value of pi (Gillings 1972, 233).


    Perhaps the Afrocentric challenge will succeed in encouraging scholars of the
    ancient Mediterranean to look at all ancient cultures in a more sensitive and
    sympathetic manner. If it accomplishes that, despite all the anger and exaggerated
    claims that have been generated by the controversy, it will in the end have
    had a positive educational function.


     


    Endnotes


    1. Revisionist Afrocentric curricula have been adopted in schools in Atlanta,
    Pittsburgh, Washington, D.C., Detroit, Cleveland, Indianapolis, Kansas City,
    and also at some universities, among them Temple University, Kent State, California
    State at Long Beach, Cornell University, and Wellesley College. For details
    and bibliography, see Lefkowitz 1997, 240-41.


    2. On defensive strategies employed by Afrocentrists, see McWhorter 2000, 54-5.
    In my own case, every motive has been attributed to me other than the real one,
    which is respect for historical evidence: for example, refusal to question received
    ideas, Poe 1997, xiv; racism, Asante 1999, 61; racism and ignorance of Greek
    (!), Obenga 2001, 49-51, 117; desire to defend "the Glory that was Greece"
    against "inter-continental hybridity," Bernal 2001, 10. Absurdly,
    Obenga accuses me of mistranslating a word that does not occur in the passage
    in which I am supposed to have mistranslated it. And I said just the opposite
    of what Bernal supposes that I believe in Lefkowitz 1997a, 17.


    3. See esp. Ortiz De Montellano 1991, 49 on the influential theories of Adams
    1987, S 52-53, Finch 1983, 140-41, and Finch 1990, 124-25.


    4. There is no linguistic evidence for Herodotus’ claims that the names of
    all the gods came to Greece from Egypt; Assmann 2000, 32 suggests that the Egyptian
    priests must have described their gods to him using the names of their Greek
    analogues (e.g., Zeus/Ammon, Athena/Neith).


    5. Obenga 2001, 117 tries to argue that Plato’s pupil Hermodorus wrote
    about his trip to Egypt; but in fact Diogenes Laertius (3.6) cites Hermodorus
    only as the source of a story that Plato went to Megara (near Athens) to study
    with Euclid. Obenga does not point out that in the same passage Diogenes says
    Plato traveled to Egypt in the company of Euripides, although Euripides had
    been dead for several years at the time the journey was supposed to have taken
    place.


    6. Asante 2000, 79-80 argues for the existence of an Egyptian mystery system
    by relying on a tendentious mistranslation of the passage where Strabo (first
    cent. B.C.) describes how the priests taught Plato and Eudoxus in the fourth
    century (17.1.29), and by claiming that in order to conceal truths the priests
    used "systems" that are in fact mentioned only in the Kabala and other
    medieval sources (!).


    7. Bernal in particular insists that all modern scholarship is in error; most
    recently, in Bernal 2001a he restates Herodotus’ ideas about the Egyptian origin
    of Greek religion, as if they had not repeatedly been shown by Egyptologists
    to be mistaken ; see, e.g., Assmann 2000, 25-26.


    8. See esp. Walker 2001, 4: "Afrocentrism is Eurocentrism in blackface."


     


    Note: this is an updated version of an article that was published as – "Le
    monde antique vu par les afrocentristes," in Afrocentrismes: L’histoire
    des Africains entre Égypte et Amérique , edd. F-X. Fauvelle-Aymar,
    Jean-Pierre Chrétien et Claude-Hélène Perrot (Paris: Karthala,
    2000): 229-48.


     


    References


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    . Portland, Oregon: Portland Public Schools.


    Asante, Molefi Kete. 1999. The Painful Demise of Eurocentrism. Trenton,
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    Asante, Molefi Kete. 2000. The Egyptian Philosophers: Ancient African Voices
    from Imhotep to Akenaten.
    Chicago: Ancient African Images.


    Assmann, Jan. 2000. Weisheit und Mysterium: Das Bild der Griechen
    von Ägypten.
    Munich: C.H.Beck Verlag.


    ben-Jochannan, Yosef A. A. 1991. The Black Man of the Nile and his Family.
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    Bernal, Martin. 1991. Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization.
    Vol. II: The Archaeological and Documentary Evidence. Rutgers, N. J.:
    Rutgers Univ. Press.


    Bernal, Martin. 2001. Black Athena is the Ancient Model. TLS, May 11:
    10.


    Bernal, Martin. 2001a. Letter to the Editor. TLS. May 25: 17.


    Bietak, Manfred. 1996. Avaris: The Capital of the Hyksos: Recent Excavations
    at Tell el-Dab’a
    . London: British Museum Press.


    Brisson, Luc. 1987. L’Égypte de Platon. Les Études Philosophiques
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    Burkert, Walter. 1985. Greek Religion: Archaic and Classical. Oxford:
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    Burkert, Walter. 1992. The Orientalizing Revolution. Cambridge, Mass.:
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    Coleman, John. 1996. Did Egypt Shape the Glory That Was Greece? In Black
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    , edited by Mary R. Lefkowitz and Guy MacLean Rogers, 280-302.
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    Copenhaver, Brian P. Hermetica. 1992. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.


    Dalley, Stephanie, and A.T. Reyes. 1998. Mesopotamian Contact and Influence
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    Delany, Martin R. 1853.The Origins and Objects of Ancient Freemasonry: its
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    . Boston:
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    Fauvelle, François-Xavier. 1996. L’Afrique de Cheikh Anta Diop.
    Paris: Karthala.


    Finch, Charles S. 1983. "The African Background of Medical Science. In
    Blacks in Science (Ancient and Modern), edited by Ivan Van Sertima, 140-56.
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    Finch, Charles S. 1983. The African Background to Medical Science: Essays
    on African History, Science and Civilizations
    . 1990. London: Karnak House.


    Fowden, Garth. The Egyptian Hermes. 1984. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.
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    Gillings, Richard J. 1972. Mathematics in the Time of Pharaohs. New
    York: Dover Publications, Inc.


    Grimshaw, William H. Official History of Freemasonry Among the Colored Peoples
    of North America.
    1969.New York: Greenwood Press.


    Harris, J.R. 1971. Medicine. In Legacy of Egypt, edited by J.R. Harris,
    112-37. Oxford: Clarendon Press.


    Herskovits, Melville J. 1941. The Myth of the Negro Past. Boston: Beacon
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    Howe, Stephen. 1998. Afrocentrism: Mythical Pasts and Imagined Homes.
    London/New York: Verso.


    Hornung, Erik. 1999. Das esoterische Aegypten: Das geheime Wissen der Ägypter
    und sein Einfluss auf das Abendland.
    Munich: C.H. Beck Verlag.


    James, George G. M. Stolen Legacy. 1954. New York: Philosophical Library.


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    the Achievements of Ancient Greece Borrowed from Africa?
    edited by Andrea
    Ross and Anna Lea, 57-68. Washington, D.C.: Society for the Preservation of
    the Greek Heritage.


    Jasanoff, Jay, and Alan Nussbaum. 1996. ‘Word Games.’ In Black Athena Revisited,
    edited by Mary R. Lefkowitz and Guy MacLean Rogers, 177-205. Chapel Hill: University
    of North Carolina Press.


    Jasnow, Richard, and Karl-Theodor Zauzich. 1998. A Book of Thoth? In Proceedings
    of the Seventh International Congress of Egyptologists
    , edited by C.J. Eyre,
    607-18. Lueven: Peeters.


    Lefkowitz, Mary. 1996. Ancient History, Modern Myths. In Black Athena Revisited,
    edited by Mary R. Lefkowitz and Guy MacLean Rogers, 3-23. Chapel Hill: University
    of North Carolina Press.


    Lefkowitz, Mary. 1996. 1997. Not Out of Africa; How Afrocentrism Became
    an Excuse to Teach Myth as History
    . New York: Basic Books.


    Lefkowitz, Mary. 1997a. Not out of Africa, revisited, Times Literary Supplement,
    June 20: 15-16.


    Lord, Louis E. 1938. The ‘Pyramids’ of Argos, Hesperia 7: 481-527.


    McWhorter, John H. 2000. Losing the Race: Self-Sabotage in Black America.
    New York: Free Press.


    Moses, Wilson Jeremiah. 1998. Afrotopia: The Roots of African American Popular
    History
    . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


    Obenga, Théophile. 2001. Le sens de la lutte contre l’africanisme
    eurocentriste
    . Gif-sur-Yvette: Khepera.


    Ortiz De Montellano, Bernard. 1991. Multicultural Pseudoscience (Spreading
    Scientific Illiteracy Among Minorities–Part 1). Skeptical Inquirer,
    Fall : 16-17, 48-50.


    Palter, Robert A. 1996. Black Athena, Afrocentrism, and the History of Science.
    In Black Athena Revisited, edited by Mary R. Lefkowitz and Guy MacLean
    Rogers. Chapel Hill; London: University of North Carolina Press.


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    von Klassischen Autoren Unschrieben oder Übersetzt Worden sind
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    Williams, Loretta J. 1980. Black Freemasonry and Middle-Class Realities.
    University of Missouri Studies 20. Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press.

  • Misunderstanding Richard Dawkins

    Introduction

    Richard Dawkins’s The Selfish Gene is the kind of book
    that changes the way that people look at the world. Its importance
    is that it articulates a gene’s-eye view of evolution. According
    to this view, all organisms, including human beings, are ‘survival
    machines’ which have been ‘blindly programmed’ to preserve their
    genes (see The Selfish Gene, p. v). Of course, extant
    survival machines take a myriad of different forms – for example,
    it is estimated that there are some three million different species
    of insect alone – but they all have in common that they have been
    built according to the instructions of successful genes; that
    is, genes whose replicas in previous generations managed to get
    themselves copied.

    At the level of genes, things are competitive. Genes that contribute
    to making good bodies – bodies that stay alive and reproduce –
    come to dominate a gene pool (the whole set of genes in a breeding
    population). So, for example, if a gene emerges which has the
    effect of improving the camouflage of stick-insects, it will in
    time likely achieve a preponderance over alternative genes (alleles)
    which produce less effective camouflage. There are no such things
    as long-lived, altruistic genes. If a gene has the effect of increasing
    the welfare of its alleles to its own detriment, it will in the
    end perish. In this sense, then, all long-lived genes are ‘selfish’,
    concerned only with their own survival – and the world is necessarily
    full of genes which have successfully looked after their own interests.

    There are good reasons for seeing evolution as operating at the
    level of genes. Alternative theories are either unworkable (group
    selectionism) or not as successful (individual selectionism).
    However, despite the fact that the central message of The Selfish
    Gene
    has become scientific orthodoxy, the book, and the ideas
    associated with it, have gained something of a reputation for
    extremism. In part, this is because they been subject to sustained
    criticism by a number of high profile, often media friendly, people
    working in the sciences and humanities. On the science side of
    things, critics have included Steven Rose, Richard Lewontin and
    Stephen Jay Gould. On the humanities side, there have been, amongst
    others, David Stove, Hilary Rose and, perhaps most notoriously,
    Mary Midgley.

    Midgley’s ‘Gene-Juggling’

    Mary Midgley first turned her attention to Richard Dawkins’s
    ideas in her 1979 article ‘Gene Juggling’, published in the journal
    Philosophy. On the first page of the article, she had this
    to say about Dawkins and The Selfish Gene:


    His central point is that the emotional nature of man is
    exclusively self-interested, and he argues this by claiming
    that all emotional nature is so. Since the emotional nature
    of animals clearly is not exclusively self-interested, nor
    based on any long-term calculation at all, he resorts to arguing
    from speculations about the emotional nature of genes, which
    he treats as the source and archetype of all emotional nature.
    (‘Gene Juggling’, pp. 439-440).


    Unfortunately, as Andrew Brown – who, incidentally, is usually
    sympathetic to Midgley – points out in his book, The Darwin
    Wars
    , this is just about as wrong as it is possible to get
    about selfish gene theory.[1] It is wrong on
    a number of counts.

    First: Dawkins makes it absolutely clear in The Selfish Gene
    that he is not using the word ‘selfishness’ – or its opposite
    ‘altruism’ – to refer to the psychological states, emotional or
    otherwise, of any entity. Rather, as he pointed out in his reply
    to Midgley (‘In Defence of Selfish Genes’), he gives the word
    an explicitly behaviouristic definition:


    An entity…is said to be altruistic if it behaves in such
    a way as to increase another such entity’s welfare at the
    expense of its own. Selfish behaviour has exactly the opposite
    effect. ‘Welfare’ is defined as ‘chances of survival’….It
    is important to realise that the…definitions of altruism and
    selfishness are behavioural, not subjective. I am not
    concerned here with the psychology of motives. (The Selfish
    Gene
    , p. 4)


    There are no grounds, then, for supposing, as Midgley did, that
    the central message of The Selfish Gene has anything to
    do with the emotional natures of man, animals or genes.

    Second: the very idea that Dawkins might think that genes have
    an emotional nature is so bizarre that it is hard to know what
    to make of it. One would be tempted to conclude that Midgley didn’t
    really mean it, except that she started her article in a similar
    fashion:


    Genes cannot be selfish or unselfish, any more than atoms
    can be jealous, elephants abstract or biscuits teleological.
    This should not need mentioning, but…The Selfish Gene
    has succeeded in confusing a number of people about it… (‘Gene
    Juggling’, p. 439)


    Whatever she meant, two things are clear: (a) no reputable biologist
    thinks that genes have an emotional nature; and (b) genes can
    be selfish in the sense that Dawkins – and other sociobiologists[2]
    – use the term.

    Third: Midgley was confused about levels of analysis. It isn’t
    possible to make straightforward claims about the behaviour of
    organisms from the fact that their genes are selfish. There is
    no requirement for individual organisms to be selfish in the service
    of their genes. Indeed, one of the central messages of The
    Selfish Gene
    is precisely that it is possible to explain the
    altruistic behaviour of individual animals in terms of
    selfish gene theory.

    These kinds of mistakes are typical of Midgley’s article as a
    whole. Dawkins, in his response, claimed that the article had
    ‘no good point to make’ and argued that the details of her criticisms
    were incorrect because they were based on a misunderstanding and
    misapplication of a technical language. This conclusion is echoed
    by Andrew Brown, who states: ‘It has to be said that by the end
    of Dawkins’s piece…any impartial reader will see that she misunderstood
    him.’ (Darwin Wars, p. 92) Indeed, Midgley herself has
    conceded that she should have expressed her objections to The
    Selfish Gene
    ‘more clearly and temperately’. (‘Selfish Genes
    and Social Darwinism’, p. 365).

    What’s going on?

    It is possible to tell a very complicated story in order to explain
    how it is that Dawkins’s ideas, and those of other sociobiologists,
    provoke the kinds of extreme reaction and misunderstanding characterised
    by Midgley’s ‘Gene Juggling’. At its most convoluted, this tale
    would include episodes dealing with: scientism; biological determinism;
    reductionism; metaphor; motives; moral theory; modes of explanation;
    levels of selection; and more. Happily, though, there is an alternative
    story to tell, less comprehensive, but with the advantage of clarity.
    It also gets to the heart of an important aspect of the worries
    that people have about sociobiological ideas. It is a story about
    moral and political commitments.

    The proper starting point of this story is the constellation
    of ideas associated with what has become known as social Darwinism.[3]
    The most general claim of the social Darwinists was that it is
    possible to make use of Darwinian concepts in order to understand
    society and the relationships that people have with each other.
    Specifically, they argued that societies progress because people
    aggressively pursue their own self-interest in competition with
    other people doing the same thing. They are competing primarily
    for economic success, and the ‘fittest’ – those people most adapted
    to the demands of competition – deservedly rise to the top. If
    a person is not successful, it indicates a lack of ‘fitness’,
    and, by extension, that they are not deserving of the rewards
    that fitness brings.

    The nineteenth century social theorist Herbert Spencer is probably
    the best known exponent of social Darwinist ideas. In his view,
    social Darwinism translated naturally into a celebration of the
    individualistic, competitive ethos of laissez-faire capitalism.
    Spencer thought it quite natural that there were economic winners
    and losers under capitalism. He opposed social reform and government
    intervention to help those disadvantaged by the system, on the
    grounds that there should be no interference in what was a natural
    mechanism for sorting out the fit from the unfit. Not surprisingly,
    Spencer’s ideas were enthusiastically adopted by many capitalists
    at the end of the nineteenth century, particularly in the United
    States, as a means to justify their wealth and resist the call
    for social reform.

    This kind of crude social Darwinism was relatively short-lived.
    Indeed, even by the first decade of the twentieth century, Spencer’s
    ideas were beginning to fall into disrepute. Nevertheless, social
    Darwinism remains a factor in the way in which people think about
    sociobiological ideas. Perhaps the major reason for this lasting
    impact is that the history of social Darwinism is tarnished by
    its association with some of the more shameful episodes of the
    twentieth century. Not only, as we have seen, was it used to legitimate
    the painful consequences of untrammelled capitalism, it was also,
    for example: (a) implicated in the emergence of eugenics movements
    at the beginning of the century, something which led directly
    to compulsory sterilisation programmes in the United States and
    indirectly to Nazi concentration camps; (b) integral to ‘scientific
    racism’, which sought to ground racial discrimination in notions
    of biological superiority and inferiority; and (c) a contributor
    to an atmosphere of ‘war apologetics’ that was prevalent in Europe
    in the period leading up to the 1914-1918 war.

    However, it is important to note that people tend now not to
    talk specifically about social Darwinism in relation to sociobiology.
    Rather, its impact is felt through people’s concern with a constellation
    of ideas which are linked by the fact that they are presupposed
    by social Darwinism. Of these, perhaps the most significant are:
    (a) the notion that the behaviour of human beings is solely determined
    by their biology (what is now called biological or genetic determinism);
    and (b) the idea that it is possible to invoke biology in order
    to justify particular social or political arrangements
    (as, for example, extreme right-wing political parties will, in
    order to justify their racist agendas).

    Dawkins and social Darwinism

    Is it the case, then, that Richard Dawkins’s ideas in The
    Selfish Gene
    amount to a kind of social Darwinism? The answer
    to this question is a simple no. There is nothing in Richard Dawkins’s
    work which remotely adds up to social Darwinism. There are three
    main reasons why this conclusion is easy to draw.

    First: Dawkins says clearly that he is not, unlike the social
    Darwinists, advocating any particular way of living. He puts it
    this way in The Selfish Gene:


    I am not advocating a morality based on evolution. I am saying
    how things have evolved. I am not saying how we humans morally
    ought to behave.… My own feeling is that a human society based
    simply on the gene’s law of universal ruthless selfishness
    would be a very nasty society in which to live. (The Selfish
    Gene
    , p. 2-3).


    What Dawkins is doing here is flagging up the ‘is/ought gap’;
    that is, the fact that it is not possible to derive moral statements
    about how things ought to be from statements about how things
    stand in the world. For example, if it turns out that we are genetically
    disposed towards murder, it does not follow that we should, therefore,
    go around murdering people. Biological facts do not entail moral
    facts – a point, incidentally, which is ruinous for social Darwinism.

    Second: Dawkins explicitly disavows irrevocable ‘genetic determinism’;
    indeed, he has called it ‘pernicious rubbish on an almost astrological
    scale’ (The Extended Phenotype, p. 13). Genes affect behaviour.
    If you want to do Darwinian theorising, then you’ve got to look
    at the effects of genes. But there are no grounds for thinking
    that these effects are any more inexorable than the effects of
    the environment. Inevitability is not part of the equation. This
    is how Dawkins puts it in The Extended Phenotype:


    Genetic causes and environmental causes are in principle
    no different from each other. Some influences of both types
    may be hard to reverse; others may be easy to reverse. Some
    may be usually hard to reverse but easy if the right agent
    is applied. The important point is that there is no general
    reason for expecting genetic influences to be any more irrevocable
    than environmental ones. (The Extended Phenotype, p.
    13).


    Third: Dawkins’s work is rarely specifically about human beings.
    Rather, he is dealing with general questions to do with evolutionary
    theory, many of which are only marginally relevant for understanding
    human behaviour. Moreover, he is on record as saying that he has
    little interest in human ethics and does not know a great deal
    about human psychology. (‘In Defence of Selfish Genes’, p. 558)
    Of course, the argument here is not that Dawkins’s work
    never has implications for understanding human behaviour. Rather,
    it is that where it does, it is not usually because human beings
    are specifically his subject, but because humans are evolved animals,
    and evolution is his subject.

    Politics, morals and biology

    If the ideas of Richard Dawkins cannot be construed as a kind
    of social Darwinism, what has social Darwinism got to do with
    the extreme reactions and misunderstanding that his work provokes?
    The answer is that it is the measure against which many
    people assess the merits of those biological theories they judge
    to have implications for the understanding of human behaviour.[4]
    To appreciate the significance of this point, it is important
    to recall that social Darwinism remains a factor in people’s thinking
    because of its association with the horrors of things like racism,
    war and eugenics. Consequently, for many of those people whose
    political and moral inclinations are structured by notions of
    equality and common humanity, social Darwinism is a wickedness
    to be sought out and then vigorously contested wherever it might
    be found.

    The consequence of this injunction to combat social Darwinism
    has been the emergence of a mindset amongst certain sectors of
    the educated public which undermines the proper examination of
    sociobiological arguments. It is a mindset which subjugates science
    to political and moral commitments. It results in sociobiological
    texts being read from a default position of suspicion. Any perception
    that the arguments they contain might conceivably be co-opted
    for the purposes of articulating a social Darwinist agenda – however
    this is construed – is taken as confirmation that this is where
    the sympathies of the author lie. And the scientific merit
    of sociobiological arguments is assessed in terms of the extent
    to which they fit with a political and moral agenda governed by
    notions of equality and common humanity.

    It is easy to point to instances where this mindset prevails.
    For example, it is involved:

    1. In Mary Midgley’s confusion about selfish genes and selfish
      individuals; in her accusation that Dawkins’s ‘crude, cheap,
      blurred genetics….is the kingpin of his crude, cheap, blurred
      psychology’ (‘Gene-Juggling’, p. 449); and her statement that
      her main aim is ‘to show people that they can use Darwin’s methods
      on human behaviour without being committed to a shoddy psychology
      and a bogus political morality’ (‘Selfish Genes and Social Darwinism’,
      p. 369).
    2. In Steven Rose, Leon Kamin and Richard Lewontin’s claim that
      ‘Science is the ultimate legitimator of bourgeois ideology’
      (Not In Our Genes); and their argument that ‘…universities
      serve as creators, propagators and legitimators of the ideology
      of biological determinism. If biological determinism is a weapon
      in the struggle between classes, then the universities are weapons
      factories, and their teaching and research faculties are the
      engineers, designers, and the production workers.’ (Not In
      Our Genes
      ).
    3. In Hilary Rose’s claims, in Red Pepper, that fundamental
      Darwinists, ‘with their talk of biological universals on matters
      of social difference are a political and cultural menace to
      feminists and others who care for justice and freedom’; that
      they are ‘obsessed by the desire to reduce organisms (including
      humans) to one determining entity – the gene’; and that sociobiology
      ‘has a history which varies from the dodgy to the disgusting
      on sexual difference’. (Red Pepper, Sept 1997, p. 23).
    4. In the furious reaction that greeted the publication of Edward
      O. Wilson’s 1975 book, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis,
      which saw: the American Anthropological Association debating
      a motion to censure sociobiology; a group of Boston scientists
      – including Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin – forming
      ‘The Sociobiology Study Group’, and noting in The New York
      Review of Books
      that theories that attempted to establish
      a biological foundation to social behaviour provided an ‘important
      basis…for the eugenic policies which led to the establishment
      of Gas chambers in Nazi Germany’; and Wilson himself being drenched
      with water by protestors at a meeting of the American Association
      for the Advancement of Science in early 1978.

    Conclusion

    Richard Dawkins’s ideas, and those of other sociobiologists,
    then, provoke extreme reactions and misunderstanding because their
    critics believe them to be in conflict with the moral and political
    commitments that they hold. This fact stands independently of
    any considerations about the merit of the kind of science that
    Dawkins, and his colleagues, are doing. Of course, it is not unusual
    for ideology to affect the judgements that people make about scientific
    theories, and where these theories have implications for understanding
    human beings it is especially commonplace.[5]
    But what it has meant in the case of sociobiology is that the
    public space for the debate about evolutionary ideas has
    become polluted by the hyperbole that almost inevitably occurs
    when the politically engaged feel their baseline commitments to
    be under threat.

    However, for those people who prefer their science to be driven
    by a desire to uncover the fundamental nature of things, and not
    by a desire to find spurious support for political and moral values,
    there is still some hope. For, according to Edward O. Wilson,
    the controversy surrounding sociobiology is essentially over.
    ‘The contrarians are ageing,’ he told Ed Douglas, in a recent
    Guardian interview. ‘No young scientists are joining. They
    are not handing on the torch but passing it around a smaller and
    smaller circle.’ If Wilson is right, perhaps there is hope for
    a future where articles like Mary Midgley’s ‘Gene Juggling’ don’t
    get published in reputable journals.

     ********************************

    Endnotes

    1 This is echoed by J. L. Mackie, whose original
    article in Philosophy, ‘The Law of the Jungle’, had motivated
    Midgley to write ‘Gene Juggling’. In a follow-up article he wrote:
    ‘Mary Midgley’s article is not merely intemperate but misconceived.
    Its errors must be corrected if readers of Philosophy are
    not to be left with false impressions, for it rests on a complete
    misunderstanding both of Dr Dawkins’s position and of mine.’ (‘Genes
    and Egoism’, p. 553).

    2 It should be noted that Dawkins is on record
    as saying that he doesn’t much like the term ‘Sociobiologist’
    (but he has also said that he is willing to stand up and be counted
    as one).

    3 Social Darwinsim is something of a contested
    concept. Consequently, there will be those who disagree with the
    way in which I use the term in this article. There is also disagreement
    about the history of social Darwinism. For an alternative treatment
    of this phenomenon, see Robert Bannister’s Social Darwinism:
    Science and Myth in Anglo-American Social Thought
    .

    4 Mary Midgley makes the same point in her article
    ‘Selfish Genes and Social Darwinism’ (pp. 366-367).

    5 In this regard, the whole Lysenkoism affair
    in the Soviet Union is instructive.

     

    References

    Bannister, R., Social Darwinism: Science and Myth in Anglo-American
    Social Thought
    , (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1979).
    Brown, A., The Darwin Wars, (London: Touchstone, 2000).
    Carnegie, A., The Autobiography of Andrew Carnegie, (Boston:
    Northeastern University Press, 1976).
    Dawkins, R., The Selfish Gene, 2nd Edition,
    (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989 [1976]).
    Dawkins, R., ‘In Defence of Selfish Genes’, Philosophy,
    vol. 56, no. 218 (1981), pp. 556-573.
    Dawkins, R., The Extended Phenotype, (Oxford: Oxford University
    Press, 1982).
    Mackie, J. L., ‘The Law of the Jungle’, Philosophy, vol.
    53, no. 206 (1978), pp. 455-464.
    Mackie, J. L., ‘Genes and Egoism’, Philosophy, vol. 56,
    no. 218 (1981), pp. 553-555.
    Midgley, M., ‘Gene Juggling’, Philosophy, vol. 54, no.
    210 (1979), pp. 439-458.
    Midgley, M., ‘Social Genes and Social Darwinism’, Philosophy,
    vol. 58, no. 225, pp. 365-377.
    Rose, S., Kamin, L. & Lewontin, R., Not In Our Genes,
    (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984).
    Wilson, E., Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, (Cambridge,
    Mass: Harvard University Press, 1978).

  • Science Wars: an interview with Alan Sokal

    Dennis Healey once compared a verbal attack by one of his parliamentary
    colleagues to "being savaged by a dead sheep." I was reminded
    of this remark when I met the physicist Alan Sokal, the man who,
    along with mathematician Jean Bricmont, has caused outrage and indignation
    among the French intelligentsia first with his spoof post-modern
    article published in the journal Social Text, and then for
    his and Bricmont’s book Intellectual Impostures, which
    combines a catalogue of misuses of scientific terms by predominantly
    French thinkers with a stinging attack on what they call "sloppy
    relativism"

    Given this history, you’d expect Sokal to be more lupine than lamb-like,
    but in fact, he is a friendly, chatty, effusive figure more interested
    in offering his guests his favourite blackcurrant tea from New York
    than character assassinations. You would have thought he and Healey’s
    sheep would be just about level in terms of terrifyingness, so how
    did this gentle man come to be the scourge of the rive gauche?

    "My original motivation had to do with epistemic relativism," explains
    Sokal, "and what I saw as a rise in sloppily thought-out relativism,
    being the kind of unexamined zeitgeist of large areas of
    the American humanities and some parts of the social sciences. In
    particular I had political motivations because I was worried about
    the extent to which that relativism was identified with certain
    parts of the academic left and I also consider myself on the left
    and consider that to be a suicidal attitude for the American left."

    Sokal’s intention was to write a parody of this kind of relativism and to
    see if an academic journal would publish it. The end result was
    "Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics
    of Quantum Gravity", which was published in the journal Social
    Text
    in 1996. With extensive quotations from the thinkers Sokal
    was targeting, such as Lacan, Irigaray and Baudrillard, the article
    pulls off the powerful trick of constructing the parody almost entirely
    out of the parodied (something which, ironically, some of the post-modernists
    Sokal attacks would surely appreciate).

    "It’s important not to exaggerate what the parody shows," stresses
    Sokal. "As an experiment it doesn’t prove very much. It
    just proves that one journal was very sloppy in its standards. I
    don’t know what other journals would have done. I suspect that
    a lot of other journals would have rejected it. As for the content
    of the parody, in some ways it’s a lot worse than a lot of
    stuff which is published, in some ways it’s a lot less bad.
    Steve Weinberg in his article in the New York Review of Books
    made, I think, a perceptive observation, that ‘contrary to
    what some people have said, I don’t think that Sokal’s
    article is incomprehensible. I find some of the views in it daffy.
    But I think that most of the time he expresses himself clearly and
    indeed I have the distinct impression that Sokal finds it difficult
    to write unclearly,’ which is absolutely true. I had to go
    through many revisions before the article reached the desired level
    of unclarity.

    "It was a parody, intended to be extreme. It comes out in the first
    two paragraphs, and says, without any evidence or argument –
    of course it says it in high-faluting language, but translated into
    English it basically says – ‘Most western intellectuals
    used to believe that there exists a real world, but now we know
    better.’"

    By the time the parody had been published and Sokal had revealed the
    hoax, provoking a storm that became big news in the quality press
    in France, Britain and America, the original target had been extended.

    "As I did the research for the parody, I came up against the other issue,
    namely, the gross abuse of terminology from the natural sciences
    in the writings of French, American and British authors, but
    the French ones are the more prominent, they’re the big stars."

    The parody was thus to spawn a book, Intellectual Impostures,
    covering both relativism and the abuses of science. "It was
    the second aspect that became the most sensational aspect of the
    book, but it was the question of relativism that motivated me."

    However, the coverage of the two themes in one book has perhaps back-fired,
    in that readers have confused the two issues.

    "One thing that I have to emphasise over and over and over again, and
    which we emphasise in the preface to the English edition, but somehow
    it doesn’t seem to sink in, is that there are really essentially
    two books under one cover, which are only weakly related. There
    is the critique of the gross abuses of scientific concepts by certain
    French philosophical literary intellectuals – they’re
    not all philosophers in the strict sense. Then, on the other hand,
    there’s various versions of epistemic relativism which we criticise
    and in that case the targets are mainly British and American, not
    French, and the two debates are on very different planes. They have
    to be evaluated completely separately, the targets are different.
    We do not accuse the authors of the imposture of relativism. In
    some cases it’s not clear what their philosophy is and we don’t
    make any attempt to judge their philosophy. On the other hand the
    authors of relativism, we don’t accuse them of imposture, we
    accuse them of ambiguous writing or sloppy thinking, but certainly
    not of trying to misrepresent things. So they’re completely
    separate and the link between them is primarily sociological. There’s
    only a very weak logical link between them."

    Sokal’s frustration that people don’t notice this separation, when
    it is so clearly stated in the preface, tells you all you need to
    know about what motivates him: he just can’t stand it when
    people fail to notice clear, logical distinctions, and having to
    repeat them until people do get it just irritates him more. Critics
    have claimed that this scientific insistence on clear, neat distinctions
    just isn’t relevant to the texts he lampoons. Sokal is not
    impressed by the objection, voiced most explicitly by John Sturrocks
    in the London Review of Books. "Sokal and Bricmont,"
    wrote Sturrocks, "apply criteria of rigour and univocity fundamental
    to their own practice which are beside the point once transferred
    to this alien context."

    "What criteria of rigour are we talking about?" asks a frankly baffled
    Sokal. "Are we talking about criteria that a sentence should
    mean something relatively determinate; that the words in it should
    mean something and have some relevance to the subject in hand; that
    there ought to be a logical argument from one sentence to another;
    that when you’re talking about some external phenomena, the
    facts about those phenomena are relevant – I mean, we’re
    upholding the minimal standards of evidence and logic that I would
    have thought would be taken for granted by anybody in any field."

    What of the idea that there’s a certain value to be had simply in
    a kind of liberal attitude to ideas? Sturrocks goes on to say, "Far
    better wild and contentious theses of this sort [Irigaray’s]
    than the stultifying rigour so inappropriately demanded by Sokal
    and Bricmont."

    "But," retorts Sokal, "he doesn’t say what is stultifying about
    the idea that the sentences should mean something and that there
    should be some logical connection. If he thinks it is important
    for crazy ideas to be out there and not suppressed, then fair enough.
    But these crazy ideas are out there, so the question is, ‘should
    they be out there and criticised, or out there and uncriticised?’
    He seems to be saying that they should be out there and uncriticised,
    that it’s unfair to point out that these wild and contentious
    theses are in fact crazy."

    What if we take an extreme defence and say that vagueness and ambiguity
    are actually great virtues in writing because they open up possibilities,
    which, again, Sturrocks suggests. Sokal will have none of it.

    "Well in poetry it’s a great virtue, in novels it might be a great
    virtue. But I do think that in analytical writing, whether it’s
    about physics or biology or history or sociology, the goal should
    be to remove ambiguity when possible. Of course, natural language
    is unavoidably ambiguous, but we should do our best. If we’re
    trying to talk about some external objects then we should try to
    make as clear as possible what external objects we are talking about
    and what we’re saying about them.

    "When the book came out in France, Jean-François Lyotard agreed to be
    on a television programme with Bricmont and me and we had a kind
    of debate. Unfortunately it wasn’t a very serious programme.
    Also, unfortunately the fifteen minute debate consisted of a ten-minute
    monologue by Lyotard in very flowery French, in which, if I understood
    him correctly, he was saying that physicists don’t understand
    that words are used in a different way in poetry and novels than
    they are in physics books. When we finally got to the floor, we
    said, ‘Well, we know that, but to our knowledge the books of
    Lacan and Deleuze are not sold in the poetry section of bookstores,
    they are sold in psychology and philosophy, so they should be judge
    by the standards of psychology and philosophy – those are cognitive
    discourses, they are purporting to say something about something,
    let’s judge them that way. If you want to re-classify them
    as poetry, then we can judge them on whether they’re good poetry
    or not.’ My personal feeling would be most of these people
    don’t write good poetry either. Lacan, I don’t think writes
    good poetry."

    However, there were times reading the book when I felt a bit uncomfortable
    in the sense that it felt like, in the first part of the book, we
    were just having a laugh at these foolish people. Where was the
    sincere attempt at trying to see what the interpretations are? I
    read passage upon passage where I thought, "Well, someone,
    presumably, would be able to come in and interpret this in a way
    which might make sense."

    "Let’s not leave this as an abstract question in the air," insists
    Sokal. "This is an open challenge to defenders of all these
    people. We would love for people to pick one or more passages in
    the book where we criticise particular texts and explain first of
    all what they mean, justify the references to mathematics and physics
    and explain why it’s valid. So far, no-one has taken up our
    challenge. There was one article in La Recherche where two
    Lacanians tried – rather vainly I thought – to defend
    Lacan’s square-root of minus-one and the erectile organ. But
    aside from that, the whole debate has just been abstract defences
    of the right to metaphor – which we grant, explicitly –
    but without trying defend any specific one of the texts."

    So in this whole affair no one has shed light on any of those passages?

    "Not only shed light. Aside from that one article [in La Recherche],
    I don’t know if anyone has even selected a passage from the
    text that we’ve criticised and tried to explain what it means.
    Not a single one. It’s all in some ethereal plane, the discussion.
    Our goal is limited. We did not try to understand or to discuss
    in the book the role of topology within Lacan’s psychoanalysis
    – that would be far beyond our competence. We’d almost
    certainly get it wrong, we’d certainly be accused of getting
    it wrong. We’re already stepping far enough out of our field
    to write the book. You can imagine if we’d tried to explain
    how mathematics functions within Lacan’s psychoanalysis, within
    Kristeva’s theory of poetic language and so on – we’d
    have our heads cut off. That’s not the purpose of the book.
    I think we’ve given good evidence that whatever Lacan may be
    trying to do in psychoanalysis, the mathematical theory of compact
    sets or imaginary numbers is irrelevant to it, or at the very least
    that he hasn’t explained the relevance."

    Although Sokal is not interested in attacking the Philosophy of Science in
    general, in Intellectual Impostures, Sokal says, "Science
    is a rational enterprise, but difficult to codify." This remark,
    coupled with his repeated defence of the rationality of science
    without reference to any overarching theory of science, made me
    wonder if there were any philosophers of science with whom he could
    find some agreement.

    "I have respect for a lot of philosophers of science," says Sokal,
    but admits "I don’t think I agree with the systems of
    any of them. For example, we criticise Popper on various grounds,
    although we respect him in other ways. We criticise some of the
    more extreme formulations of Kuhn and so on, but agree with him in
    other ways. The same with Feyerabend. Maybe our view is somewhat
    closer to Lakatos, I don’t know.

    "I don’t have anything against philosophers who try to specify
    it [the scientific method], and I think John Worrall was critical
    because he thought we had underestimated the extent to which it
    can be codified, and to which some philosophers – he mentioned
    Lakatos – had succeeded in codifying it. That’s a more
    subtle question that I’d love to discus with him. But our dispute
    is not primarily with philosophers of science. We’re more worried
    about the gross abuses and gross exaggerations of these ideas which
    originated in philosophy of science but which have trickled down
    in vulgarised form to anthropology and cultural studies. People
    just talk about the incommensurability of paradigms as if it were
    an established fact."

    Sokal tries to maintain a tricky equilibrium between his strongly-held
    views about relativism and his avowed disinterest in getting drawn
    into subtler philosophical debates. Whether this is tenable is unclear.
    Very few people are crude relativists, as Sokal acknowledges. So
    then doesn’t he have to get involved in the subtler philosophical
    issues if he wants his case to stick?

    This perhaps came out in a lengthy exchange I had with Sokal about the
    differences between idealism, relativism and instrumentalism. Idealists
    believe that there is no such thing as a mind-independent reality,
    but it doesn’t follow from this that science is not objective.
    Relativists believe that there is no one truth about reality. Instrumentalist
    believe that science is not about discovering the nature of reality,
    but a means of predicting and manipulating the world. These positions
    can all be classified as non-realist, in that they deny either the
    existence of a world independent of minds, or at least deny that
    such a world can be known. Sokal, who sees himself as a moderate
    realist, is strongly opposed to relativism and less stridently opposed
    to instrumentalism. But if a broad idealism is behind a lot of the
    thinkers he criticises, and that is distinct from instrumentalism
    and relativism, then he’s not only missed his target, he’s
    also not really in the right ball-park.

    I say this, not to criticise the limits of Sokal’s philosophical
    knowledge (it’s abundantly clear that Sokal is much clearer
    in his understanding of philosophy than some of his targets are
    about the science they appropriate), nor because I am sure that
    idealism is behind a lot of what Sokal criticises, but rather
    to illustrate the perils of Sokal’s enterprise. He wants to
    avoid the subtle distinctions and stick to the gross errors. But
    is it not possible that some of these only appear as gross errors
    because of a lack of understanding of the subtler ideas underlying
    them?

    Sokal insists that, "The debate I was trying to raise was much cruder.
    We give the example of the anthropologist and two theories of the
    origin of native American populations, One that they came from Asia,
    which is the archaeological consensus, the other the traditional
    native American creation myths, so that their ancestors always lived
    in the Americas, and the anthropologists said, ‘Science is just
    one of many ways of knowing the world. The Zuni world-view is just
    as valid as the archaeological viewpoint of what prehistory is all
    about.’ So we go through and try and disentangle what he means
    by ‘just as valid’. There are certain interpretations
    of that which are unobjectionable but don’t say much, there
    are other versions that do say something significant which we think
    are grossly false. Jean and I were in Brazil in April and there
    was two-day seminar at the University of Sao Paolo about our book
    and things related to it, and we had long discussions with anthropologists
    who really refused to admit that a culture’s cosmology could
    be objectively true or false. Their beliefs about the origin of
    the universe, or the movements of the planets or whatever, could
    only be judged true or false relative to a culture. Not just questions
    of cosmology, questions of history. And we asked, ‘Does that
    mean that the fact that millions of native Americans died in the
    wake of the European invasion, is that not an objective fact, that
    it’s merely a belief that’s held to be true in some cultures?’
    We never got a straightforward answer from them."

    Whether or not Sokal is right in his accusations, his methods, particularly
    the parody, have been criticised on some fronts for undermining
    certain important things, such as trust. Does perhaps the ridiculing
    of an area of academia bring the whole intellectual community into
    disrepute?

    "There’s certainly a danger. I have to emphasise that I didn’t expect
    that this would ever reach the man on the street. It certainly wasn’t
    intended to reach the front page of the New York Times or
    the front page of the Observer or the front page of Le
    Monde
    . It happened that way. A month before it came out in Social
    Text,
    I was discussing with my friends, ‘How big is this
    likely to be?’ My prediction was that it would be a significant
    scandal within a small academic community. It would be page ten
    of the Chronicle of Higher Education [The American equivalent
    of The Times Higher] and maybe a 50-50 chance of a brief
    mention on the New York Times education page. So I certainly
    didn’t expect that it would make the popular press and, indeed,
    when it did, some of the articles in the popular press, even in
    the so-called serious press like the New York Times gave
    off a whiff of anti-intellectualism, which I’ve tried to criticise
    in my writings since then. We criticise the political twist that
    the New York Times gave it, for example.

    "So yes, it was briefly used. It dropped out of the popular press pretty
    fast, which is fine by me. I intended it to cause a debate in academia
    and that’s what I think it has done. But, yes, in the popular
    press it had briefly two negative effects. It was used to bash intellectuals
    in general and it was used to bash the political left in general.
    At every opportunity I’ve had I’ve argued against both
    of those two misuses. It’s not an attack on intellectuals in
    general. It’s a critique by some intellectuals of other intellectuals.
    And it’s not an attack on the left in general, it’s a
    critique by someone on the left against others on the left."

    As a physicist criticising people in the humanities, I wonder if Sokal
    has ever felt like an impostor.

    "No. I’ve felt lots of times that perhaps I’m getting in over
    my head, which is a totally different thing. We emphasise in the
    introduction that everybody has the right to express their ideas
    about anything, regardless of whatever their professional credentials
    are, and the value of the intervention has to be determined by its
    contents, not by the presence or absence of professional credentials.
    So physicists can say perfectly stupid things about physics or the
    philosophy of physics and non-physicists can say perfectly smart
    things about physics, it depends upon what’s being said. So,
    of course, sometimes I’m a little scared because I know I’m
    venturing outside of the area of my primary competence. A lot of
    the book is on our area of primary competence, namely mathematics
    and physics, but one chapter is on philosophy of science, which
    is a little bit out of our area, so, of course I’m a little
    worried that perhaps I’ve made some stupid mistake and the
    philosophers are going to take us to task for it. If we made some
    stupid mistakes I want to be taken to task for it. If we’ve
    made gross errors or even subtle errors in the philosophy of science
    I want to be criticised, but not because I’m a physicist or
    because I lack a degree in philosophy. That’s irrelevant."

    As Sokal prepares to return to his "first love", physics,
    how have his perceptions of the humanities and social sciences been
    changed by the experience of writing the parody and book?

    "The best thing about this whole affair for me, which has now taken about
    three years of my life, has been that I’ve been able to meet
    and sometimes become good friends with really interesting people
    in history, philosophy and sociology that I wouldn’t have otherwise
    met. From them I’ve found out both that things were worse than
    I thought, in the sense that some of the sloppy thinking was spread
    more widely than I thought, and also that things were better than
    I thought in that there were a lot of people within the humanities and
    social sciences who had been arguing against sloppy thinking for
    years and often were not being heard. After the parody and again
    after the book I got an incredible amount of email from people in
    the humanities and social sciences and people on the political left
    as well, who were saying, ‘Thank you. We’ve been trying
    to say this for years without getting through, and maybe it was
    necessary for an outsider to come in and shake up our field and
    say that our local emperor is running naked.’"

    This article was originally published in Issue 4 of The Philosophers’ Magazine.

    Julian Baggini has a web site here.

    Intellectual Impostures is published by Profile Books and is available in
    paperback at £9.99

  • Lay Sceptic’s Travels on Planet Energy

    Recently I have been feeling like a visitor on an alien planet: ordinary people
    around me have started to communicate in a new, esoteric language. Let’s call
    it Energyspeak. It uses the same vocabulary as Oldspeak (my native language),
    but many of its words have been stripped of their usual meanings. Its speakers
    also seem to inhabit a radically different metaphysical universe. They inform
    me that there is a bioenergetic field flowing through and around us; and that
    disturbances in it have dire consequences for our health. Those fluent in Energyspeak
    pay regular visits to energy therapists (acupuncturists; homeopaths; reflexologists;
    reiki healers) who are able to treat all kinds of physical and emotional problems
    by correcting energy imbalances. I myself have never been to see an energy therapist;
    until recently I didn’t even realise that there were such things as energy blockages.
    I must by now be a walking, talking energy knot; in fact, it is a miracle I’m
    still alive.


    I’ve realised that I can no longer function in modern society unless I teach
    myself Energyspeak, which is why I’ve spent a lot of time wading through alternative
    health magazines and books, and surfed up and down the Internet in search of
    enlightenment. Getting to grips with the basics is easy: it didn’t take me long
    to learn to perform simple translations between Energyspeak and Oldspeak:




















    Energyspeak


    Oldspeak


    I felt chi flowing through my body when I was practising T’ai
    Chi.


    I felt great after my T’ai Chi class because the exercise improved my
    circulation and relaxed my muscles.


    Negative emotions produce blockages in the energy flow, which results
    in illness.


    Chronic depression can suppress the immune function, which can be a co-factor
    in illness.


    The healer relieved my emotional distress by clearing my energy channels.


    I felt less depressed after spending an hour with a kind and caring person
    who made a fuss of me.

    It could be then that Energyspeak simply provides a language for spouting
    New Age poetry. Maybe phrases like ‘experiencing chi’ and ‘clearing energy
    channels’ are not meant to refer to concrete, material things, but are used
    metaphorically to describe such abstract notions as vitality and well-being.
    (After all, I myself often talk about something being good for my ‘soul’, although
    I do not believe in the existence of an immaterial, immortal Soul.) Or maybe
    words like ‘life force’ and ‘energy fields’ should be understood as referring
    to a supernatural or mystical phenomenon – some kind of immaterial bio-spiritual
    force, which can be felt by believers, but is not detected by our gross material
    instruments, let alone by gross materialists like myself, and will always remain
    beyond the ken of science.

    It is, however, clear that most practitioners and consumers of energy medicine
    believe that this mysterious energy is just as real as viruses and hormones;
    that there really exists such a thing as a Bioenergetic Field. In other words,
    the claims made by energy scientists are meant to be taken entirely literally;
    they are testable, scientific claims about the natural world. Some of them concede
    that the force itself may be too subtle to be measured, but are nevertheless
    adamant that its effects are eminently measurable. In fact, most serious energy
    enthusiasts are keen to distance themselves from those wacky New Age types who
    drone on about our energy fields being affected by karmic laws.

    I have been trying to teach myself energy science and energy medicine, but
    it hasn’t been easy as the experts themselves appear to be almost as confused
    as I am about the nature of bioenergy – or chi, universal life force,
    human energy, vibrating energy, as it is variously called. I think they
    are all talking about some special type of field (bioenergetic field, vibrating
    energy field, human energy field; electro-dynamic energy field), which may be
    related to electromagnetic fields and has something to do with quantum physics.
    It courses through the body, travelling between energy centres (aka chakras
    or vortexes ) via a system a channels (aka meridians). This bioenergy creates
    an aura (aka Energy Body) that surrounds our physical bodies. It is part of
    the harmonious life force permeating the cosmos, but at the same time each individual’s
    energy emanations are as unique as their fingerprints.

    Bioenergy is said to play a crucial role in illness, although energy theorists
    are not altogether sure as to how the Energy Body interacts with the physical
    body. One group assert that bioenergy anomalies (blockages, imbalances, weaknesses
    and disharmonies) indicate sickness in the physical body. Others (the majority
    it seems) argue that it is the imbalances and perturbations that cause
    physical or mental illness, and that these anomalies themselves result from
    stress, accidents, trauma, or negative thinking. What they all agree about is
    that energy therapy, which involves removing energy blockages, or balancing
    and strengthening the ’disharmonic’ or depleted energy fields, is beneficial
    for all kinds of medical conditions. Apparently, we need to keep the Energy
    Body nice and strong and clear of blocks because its function is to stimulate
    the physical body’s own healing ability.

    Now I suffer from the same handicap as most other people: I am woefully ignorant
    of science, especially of physics, so I find it hard to assess the validity
    of many of the claims made by energy scientists. One can score cheap points
    by mocking the kind of person who manages to keep a straight face when saying
    things like ‘negative emotions are stored as negative energy in the etheric
    body’. But it is more difficult to disregard those energy experts who radiate
    a scientific aura and whose articles are peppered with complex diagrams and
    impressive-sounding jargon. ‘Alpha and theta frequencies’? ‘vector potentials’?
    ‘colloidal stability’? – I must admit I have no idea what they are talking about.
    Fortunately for me, they often give the game away by insisting that Kirlian
    photography shows the bioenergetic field surrounding the human body or by praising
    William Reich’s Orgone Therapy. But then these people take pride in being ‘alternative’
    physicists who are working at the cutting edge of energy science, leaving behind
    all those narrow-minded traditionalists who refuse to experience the joys of
    vibrating energy fields.

    There are two facts I’ve learnt about energy, as the term is understood in
    conventional physics. First, it doesn’t refer to a substance or a thing, but
    to an abstract idea and is defined prosaically as ‘the capacity to do work’.
    The problem is that we humans have a tendency to reduce abstract concepts to
    concrete things; hence, it’s natural for us to think of energy as something
    substantial that can get blocked, or be manipulated and stored in a specific
    location – and even be described as ‘negative’ or ‘positive’. Second, we are
    made of the same atoms as the rocks, water and air around us; in modern physics,
    there is no energy field that is unique to living organisms, let alone to humans.
    All objects, including human bodies, emit electromagnetic radiation: chairs
    and tables, too, have ‘auras’ whose characteristics depend not on their bio-spiritual
    health, but on such mundane physical properties as moisture and temperature.

    Alternative energy scientists denounce such a reductionist view of human life.
    They subscribe to the doctrine of vitalism – the belief that there is a separate,
    non-physical life force animating all living things and defying mechanistic
    explanations. Indeed, most cultures have believed in the existence of a vital
    force: the Chinese call it chi; the Hindus know it as prana; the
    ancient Greeks used to call it pneuma or psyche, while the Romans
    talked about three kinds of spirits .It is similarly an ancient intuition
    that disease results from the imbalance of natural and supernatural forces and
    that healing consists in restoring balance within the body. Two centuries ago
    scientists rejected the notion of a vital life force, and it is now assumed
    that life emerges from the complexity and organisation of an organism. Having
    gained a better understanding of human anatomy and physiology, medical scientists
    began to concern themselves with such earthly matters as hormonal and metabolic
    balance; and, consequently, spirits, souls, and other ethereal entities gradually
    disappeared from the scene – only to reappear as ‘bioenergetic fields’ and ‘electromagnetic
    bodies’. Energy medics concede that conventional scientists know a thing or
    two about the physical body and its functions, but claim that there is little
    point in trying to treat it if the Energy Body remains out of kilter. Thus,
    far from being radical thinkers, they actually cling to an ancient belief system.
    They may have translated the archaic terms into scientific-sounding language,
    but it’s the same old vitalism, dressed up as quantum physics.

    If energy enthusiasts wish to embrace vitalism, who are we sceptics to snatch
    it away from them? We are merely asking them not to confuse science and metaphysics.
    People have the right to ignore the scientific method; however, if they claim
    they are being scientific, but fail to obey the rules of the game, then they
    can’t expect to be taken seriously. The reason scientists reject vitalism is
    that there is no evidence for it: no special ‘vital’ ingredient has ever been
    isolated; so far our most sophisticated instruments have failed to detect this
    mysterious life force. Contrary to popular belief, spiritual insights and personal
    experiences (‘I can feel the force’) do not constitute valid scientific evidence.
    Of course, there is a lot we don’t know about Life, the Universe and Energy,
    but it seems unfair to criticise scientists for not introducing into their model
    an entity or a principle which has no empirical basis and is not required by
    their theories.

    It is equally unfair to label critics of vitalistic science as evil materialists
    and crude mechanists who wilfully trample on other people’s need for Wonder
    and Mystery. Sceptics don’t deny mystery, nor do they expect scientists to explain
    anything in a ‘deep’ sense. Who knows: maybe there is a Purpose in Nature. However,
    energy theorists and other vitalists are no closer to uncovering the truth behind
    our existence than the rest of us. Energybabble is both bad poetry and bad science;
    instead of deepening the mystery, it serves to extinguish it.

    What is curious is that no one seems to be a full-time resident on Planet Energy.
    When we are injured in a car crash, or our child develops meningitis, we don’t
    worry about the state of our energy bodies, or ask if there is an energy therapist
    in the house; we insist on being rushed to the nearest conventional hospital.
    When the stakes are high, practically everyone reverts to Oldspeak. Life is
    indeed mysterious.  

    References
    Guy Brown: The Energy of Life, (HarperCollins, 1999).
    Victor J Stenger: ‘Bioenergetic Fields’ http://www.phys.hawaii.edu/vjs/www/alt/Biofield.html.