Category: Articles

Welcome to our articles section. The articles below either have been written specifically for ButterfliesandWheels or are appearing here having been published elsewhere previously.

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  • Two “Witch children” Rescued from Traffickers

    On February 11, 2011 I led a team of child rights activists and a police officer who rescued two children – Freedom Peter Okoro-Oko (8) and Anietie Mfon Ime Etuk (10) – following a tip off from our local contacts in Uyo, Akwa Ibom State.

    [media id=24275 title=”the_boys_taking_their_lunch” width=”150″ height=”150″ ]

    The kids were living in a shanty buiding with an old man, Asuquo Akpan Ukpong, whose family members – according to local sources – trafficked children.

    [media id=24272 title=”DSCN2288″ width=”150″ height=”150″ ]

    Freedom and Anietie were accused of witchcraft and then abandoned by their families. They were living in the local market  square before they were ‘picked up’ by Mr Asuquo who used them as child labourers. (Asuquo, we were told, used to send children to work for him on his farm. They were peeling cassave at the time our team arrived.) Sources in the community said the children could disappear any moment because Asuquo’s family members were into human trafficking and had targeted child witch victims in the community.

    [media id=24273 title=”Police_collecting_statement_from_the_custodian” width=”150″ height=”120″ ]

    At the local police station, officers confirmed that two members of Asuquo’s family had, in the past, been arrested for human trafficking. I made a report at the station and later handed over the two children to Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Welfare in Uyo for proper care and other necessary investigations.

    [media id=24274 title=”The_custodian_explaining_issues” width=”150″ height=”150″ ]

  • On Sans and islamophobia

    Helle Klein has instinctively labeled Sans magazine as islamophobic, solely on the grounds that its cover portrays a woman in a burqa. If that is the case, most articles and news stories from Afghanistan should be labeled islamophobic in the delusional world of Helle Klein, write Sara Larsson and Christer Sturmark, editor and editor in chief of Sans magazine.

    The new cultural magazine Sans has recently been launched. Its theme is the religious oppression of women and in the issue’s main article, American feminist and author Ophelia Benson is interviewed. In her book “Does God Hate Women?”, Benson examines how women’s human rights are violated in the name of conservative religious traditions all over the world.

    On Sans’ cover, which bears the headline “A God for Women?”, we have published a picture of a woman dressed in a burqa.

    The magazine had barely left the printers before Christian think tank Seglora smedja, run by Helle Klein among others, had dismissed it as islamophobic. Ignoring the fact that the think tank has not prioritized its research (Sans is published not by the Humanist Association but by Fri Tanke publishers) Klein makes the following remarkable comment on Seglora’s website:

    The first issue will be about religion and gender oppression and the cover is decorated with a woman in a burqa under the headline “A religion for women?”. As usual religious criticism has an islamophobic undertone. Seglore smedja will, however, wait with a full review of Sans until we have read the issue in its entirety.

    It is kind to put off reviewing the magazine until it has been read, but instinct seems to allow the judgment islamophobic to be passed without scruple. Also note that the headline is misquoted as “A religion for women?”. Perhaps a Freudian slip? Seglora smedja would probably have preferred it had we pointed at Islam as the only reason behind global gender oppression. Such journalistic one-sidedness would have made it easier to throw suspicion on the magazine.

    If Seglora smedja actually does take the time to read Sans, they will see that we highlight religious gender oppression within all the Abrahamic world religions, that is to say Judaism, Christianity and Islam. One example is the extreme abortion legislation that characterizes many Catholic countries and that dooms almost a hundred thousand women to death every year. We also write about the more subtle conservative gender patterns in the Swedish church and point at the treacherous “difference feminism” that can take both religious and secular shape.

    There are without doubt many degrees on the scale of oppression, and there are many different expressions for religious exclusion in terms of gender as well as the religiously motivated violence and disrespect against women in today’s world. Not all these expressions can be linked to Islam; something we expressly state in our themed first issue.

    But we cannot see any reason to deny that the most obvious forms of gender apartheid and the worst crimes against women’s rights are currently happening in the name of Islam, which Benson also points out in her book.

    It is hard to find a more eloquent symbol for this reality than the burqa. The garment is – unfortunately – not a figment of imagination produced by neurotic atheists, but an actual expression of Islam in the modern world. To call the burqa oppressive to women is an understatement. It would be more correct to say that the garment represents the woman’s total eradication as citizen, individual and autonomous subject. Far from all Muslims embrace the extreme view of gender and sexuality that lies behind these clothing restrictions, but the garment is still an Islamic reality.

    It is surprising, to say the least, that it is not possible to publish an authentic depiction of this reality without being called islamophobic, as if the burqa picture were a caricature or a montage.

    Using Helle Klein’s definition “islamophobic undertones” should be applicable to not only Sans’ cover but many documentaries from the Muslim world. Swedish National Television’s reports from Afghanistan should, in keeping with this argument, be labeled islamophobic, as women in burqas are more than often shown on footage.

    Sans’ first issue contains a multitude of facts about religious oppression. We now anxiously await Seglora smedja’s comments on this realistic depiction. Will our information be called into question? Will the seriousness of the situation be denied, relativized or toned down?

    To present different facts or different evaluations of facts is totally legitimate in a debate about religion’s role in society, but the impulsive allegations about islamophobia are disappointing in their prejudice. They risk paralyzing the discussion on human rights in general and brutal violations of women in particular.

    Perhaps this is in fact the purpose. Let us not forget that religious criticism and its truths hurt, especially for well-meaning liberal theologists.

    Let us also remember that those in the debate who would discard humanist critical theory as islamophobic cast their verdict from a very safe and comfortable corner of the western media landscape. Rather than open their eyes to the insufferable subordination and suffering of women in other parts of the world, they choose to once again try to silence critics with lame labels of disease.

    The denial may be psychologically understandable, but it is intellectually and morally unsustainable.

    About the Author

    Translation from the Swedish by Emma Ulvaeus
  • Darwin and Others, and Apophatic Atheism

     

    To mark Darwin Day, which is galloping toward us at a rate of knots, I have decided to write about apophatic atheism.  

    “Apophatic” (from Greek ἀπόφασις from ἀποφάναι – apophanai, “to show no”) – is a term used in apophatic theology, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apophatic_theology ] according to which the essence of God and His mysteries is unknowable by way of pure reasoning, and therefore to know God you have to use a method of negation, paradox, antinomy, etc.

    It states what God is not; for example, God is not mortal, God is not limited.

    The first apophatic text which made a serious impression on me was written in 1956 by Leszek Kołakowski and was entitled “Socialism is not Truncheons”. The young (then) philosopher explained on two pages what socialism is not and concluded with praise rooted in the apophatic tradition of that which is not what we were just talking about.

    I have decided that there is a need to illuminate the mystery of apophatic atheism, which says what atheism is not.   

    Let us start with the fact that for many people atheism is an unfathomable secret. Though atheists themselves state that it is merely a refusal to believe in supernatural beings—the peculiar mystery of shrugging one’s shoulders—many stop at the word “mystery” and feel the shortage of God’s grace to understand it.

    Atheism is less complicated than quantum theory, the theory of relativity, the theory of the origin of species by means of natural selection, and many others with which it is worthwhile to get acquainted because they are interesting.

    Atheism is not complicated. This is the first and most important thesis of apophatic atheism (it is also probably the main reason it is so incomprehensible for many).

    Atheism is not science. Because among Nobel Prize winners in sciences the quotient of non-believers to believers is in inverse proportion to that among the participants of a village fair, a supposition arises that atheism has something to do with science. Yes, atheism is a conclusion (in the past – but also today – it has been an astonishing one) that explaining the mysteries of the world does not require the idea of God, and furthermore, the idea of God makes the explaining more difficult. An atheist who reaches the conclusion that God is redundant does not have to be a scientist, but he/she should know that one cannot present any scientific proof for the non-existence of God, nor proof of the truth of atheism, for atheism is not a scientific theory. It is a point of view that holds that doing theology is as infertile as a gelding, and that religion itself can be as damaging… as I don’t know what.

    Atheism, which is a conclusion drawn from science more than from philosophy, is not a complete worldview, either. This proposition may seem very controversial to some, but I am prepared to defend it. Nothing (in science) points to the idea that some higher being was necessary for the universe to appear, for matter to appear, or for life to appear. So far, all natural phenomena can be explained without this hypothesis, and where our knowledge is too meager to give a good explanation today, the God hypothesis is merely a cardboard explanation which in no possible way wants to cooperate with solid scientific explanations of other phenomena. For those who reject religion as something which allows us to know and understand the world, religion may remain as a source of morality, i.e. a local god as a source of good and moral judgments.

    Atheism is not a system of ethics. Rejecting the proposition that “good” comes from a god, the atheist has a free hand and the right to ponder where this damned “good” came from and why there is so little of it. In effect, the quest for an independent ethic is not based on atheism as such, though the lack of an invocation to God in ethics carries with it a dramatic duty to think independently.

    Atheism does not exempt you from thinking. Atheism does not suggest any ready-made solutions, either in relation to discovering the world or in relation to moral codes. Atheism, in contrast to religion, is not a crib. It is a proposition to think independently, it is a proposition to look at tradition critically, but it does not offer any ready-made solutions, and it doesn’t even give a hundred percent surety that those supernatural beings really do not exist, stating merely that neither immaculate conception nor walking on water is a likely phenomenon. It gives, however, the right to gain knowledge and to draw conclusions.

    Why should Darwin Day also be the Day of Apophatic Atheism? From childhood Charles Darwin was much more fascinated by birds, beetles and even worms than by theology. These interests led him, though he was offered the altar and the pulpit, to a journey around the world and to observations of the animal world. It finally led him to unraveling the mystery of how the diversity of life had arisen. A side conclusion of Charles Darwin’s scientific work was finding that there is no place for a god in his theory.

    Charles Darwin lived at a time when his self-restraint in announcing this conclusion was caused by his unwillingness to upset his wife and his dislike of the shrieking of hacks who might scare away the readers of his book. However, he didn’t have to be afraid, as some others were, of imprisonment or of being burned at the stake.   

    Hundreds of others—the greatest minds in the history of mankind—were not in such a comfortable situation, and while developing the sciences they remained silent about many of their conclusions, because words which could have been interpreted as contradictory to religion could also have meant a sentence of a not always painless death. In schools they don’t mention the humble letter from Nicolaus Copernicus to the Pope. Information is also not given about atheism, so it is not surprising that we so often encounter slightly nonsensical questions.

  • Helle Klein brands humanist criticism of ideas as islamophobia

    Published: 2011-01-23, Updated: 2011-01-24

    The past days saw the launch of the new culture magazine Sans. The theme [of the premier issue] is religious oppression of women, and the main article of the magazine is an interview of the American feminist and author Ophelia Benson, who in the book “Does God hate women?” charts how women’s human rights are violated within conservative religious traditions around the world.

    On the front page of Sans, which bears the headline “A God for women?”, we publish a picture of a woman dressed in a burqa.

    The magazine has barely left the presses before the Christian think tank Seglora Smedja, run by Helle Klein among others, brands Sans as islamophobic. Apart from a failure of research (Sans is published not by Humanisterna but by the Fri Tanke publishing house), Klein makes the following remarkable comment on the Seglora home page:

    The premier issue will be about religion and oppression of women, and the front page is graced by a woman in a burqa with the headline ‘A religion for women?’ embedded in the picture. As usual the criticism of religion receives an islamophobic subtext. Seglora Smedja will however put off a review of Sans until we have read the entire premier issue.

    Putting off the review until one has read the magazine is a friendly gesture, but it seems that one can render the judgement “islamophobic” by spinal reflex. Also note that one wrongly quotes the front page headline as “A religion for women?” (our italics). Maybe it’s case of a Freudian vision problem. Likely Seglora Smedja would prefer to see that we pointed to Islam as the only cause of the global oppression of women. Such a journalistic one-sidedness would make it easier to sow suspicions against Sans.

    If Seglora Smedja does in fact bother to read the magazine, one will see that we give our attention to religiously sanctioned opression of women within all the Abrahamic world religions, that is Judaism, Christianity and Islam. One example is the extreme abortion laws which characterize many Catholic countries and which take the lives of close to a hundred thousand women every year. Additionally we write about more subtle gender conservative patterns within the Swedish church and point out insidious difference feminism both in religious and secular forms.

    Undoubtedly the degrees of oppression run a wide gamut, and there is a multitude of different expressions of religious difference thinking surrounding gender, as well as religiously motivated violence and contempt directed at women in today’s world. Not all these expressions are grounded in islamism, as is made clear in our theme issue.

    At the same time we see no reason to deny that the most obvious forms of gender apartheid and the most egregious violations of womens’ humarn rights today take place in the name of Islam, as Benson too points out in her well researched book.

    It is indeed hard to find a more eloquent symbol for this reality than the burqa. The garment is – unfortunately – not a product of neurotic atheists’ brains, but one of the true faces of Islam in this world. Calling the burqa oppressive to women would be an understatement. Rather, the garment is symbolic of the total eradication of woman as a citizen, an individual and independent subject. Far from all Muslims embrace the extreme view of gender and sexuality that lies behind the insistence on the complete covering of women, but the garment is still an Islamic reality.

    It is, mildly put, disappointing that an authentic picture of this reality cannot be published without eliciting shouts about islamophobia from certain quarters, as if the burqa image were a caricature or montage.

    With Helle Klein’s definition one should be able to discern “islamophobic subtexts” not only in Sans’ cover image but in many documentary reports from the moslem world. As an example, SVT:s [Swedish government TV] news reports from Afghanistan must for consistency’s sake be branded as islamophobic, since it is the rule rather than an exception to see burqa clad women there.

    Sans’ theme issue contains a wealth of facts about religious oppression. We are now waiting with bated breath for Seglora smedja’s comment to this description of reality. Will the information be questioned? Will one deny, relativize, or perhaps try to tone down the seriousness of the situation?

    Presenting different facts or different evaluations of the facts is completely legitimate in a debate about the role of religions in society, but the reflexive charges of islamophobia are depressingly off target. They risk paralyzing the discussion of human rights in general and serious violations of women in particular.

    Maybe this is intentional. Let us not forget that the truths in the criticism of religion hurts. Perhaps particularly so for well-intentioned liberal theologists.

    Let us also not forget that those participants of the debate who would rather brand humanist criticism of ideas as islamophobic hand out their diagnoses from a particularly safe and protected corner of the western media landscape. Rather than opening their eyes to the unfathomable subordination and suffering of women in other parts of the world many choose again and again to try to silence the critics with imagined pronouncements of disease.

    The denial may be psychologically understandable, but it is intellectually and morally untenable.

    About the Author

    Translator’s note:  First, please note that I am not a professional translator. I have done my best, but may inadvertently have changed the authors’ intended meaning of the text in some places. I find myself constantly pulled between the goals of staying close to the original text on one hand, and writing reasonably idiomatic English on the other. But that must be the dilemma that faces all translators. The reader should always keep in mind that what they read may not be what the original author intended.
  • Harris and Pigliucci: On moral philosophy

    Say what you will, Sam Harris knows how to stir a hive and send its inhabitants into a positive buzz. Some of them will turn this into an opportunity to get some intellectual exercise. Others may fly into a frenzy and sting at anything and everything, eventually disembowelling themselves intellectually in the process. Of the first, Brother Blackford (to co-opt a recently Coyned soubriquet) is a prime example: his ruminations are clearly valuable to the discussion. But where clarity is its own reward, the contributions of others need to be carefully disentangled from their ill-conceived targets, in order that everybody may see clearly where they went off course. Massimo Pigliucci has thankfully supplied us with such an opportunity—one is tempted to say: again.

    This opportunity then is not one to defend Harris’s book, The Moral Landscape (TML); he is a big guy and can take care of himself (and his ideas). On the contrary, it is one to positively assert the values and proper methods of rational criticism—which, to get slightly ahead of myself, are fundamentally the same in philosophy as in science. Also, I might be able to slip one or two somewhat novel ideas into the discussion to try and help propel it forward.

    If philosophy’s goal is to teach us how to think well, then its first order of business is, in Wittgenstein’s words, “to make [thoughts] clear and to give them sharp boundaries”. At the heart of TML is the repudiation of the idea that facts and values live in different realms. That idea has often been equated with the is–ought problem, usually traced back to David Hume. In his review, Pigliucci takes the same road, asserting that Harris “spectacularly” fails to undermine the separation of facts from values.

    At this point, we would have to consider two things: is the supposed separation absolute, i.e. is there no conceivable way to get from one to the other; and if the separation is not absolute, what are the conditions that get us from one to the other. The first is easily settled, as even Hume takes pains to point out that, for the traversal to be successful, “’tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason should be given”. While a logical deduction may not be possible, other rational inferences are explicitly not ruled out—and it would be apposite to point out that any science of course relies on such forms of induction for its conclusions.

    That out of the way, the question becomes: how do we get from an ultimate goal to concrete instructions for action? Pigliucci thinks he has found an insurmountable stumbling block in that science cannot compel us to accept any criterion that we might use to judge an action moral: “science cannot make us agree on whether that particular criterion (pain) is moral or not.” But Harris is perfectly aware of this complaint:

    It is essential to see that the demand for radical justifiaction leveled by the moral skeptic could not be met by any branch of science. … It would be impossible to prove that our definition of science is correct, because our standards of proof will be built into any proof we would offer. What evidence could prove that we should value evidence? What logic could demonstrate the importance of logic? (TML, 37)

    This very closely follows John Stuart Mill’s views on the matter, expressed a mere 140 years earlier:

    Questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof. Whatever can be proved to be good, must be so by being shown to be a means to something admitted to be good without proof. The medical art is proved to be good, by its conducing to health; but how is it possible to prove that health is good? (Utilitarianism, Ch I)

    Science cannot show us what truth is, but it can show us what is true. Similarly, science cannot show why we should value well-being, but it can show us, and in that sense determine, what we should do in order to achieve it. This is not an over-reaching of science into fields where it does not belong. Also, Pigliucci’s accusation of “scientism” (a hopelessly ill-defined term, or as Dan Dennett says: nonsense) is miles wide of the mark:

    if we can define “science” as any type of rational-empirical inquiry into “facts” (the scare quotes are his) then we are talking about something that is not at all what most readers are likely to understand when they pick up a book with a subtitle that says “How Science Can Determine Human Values” (my italics).

    Three things. One, that definition of science is hardly controversial. Two, the assertion about readers’ presuppositions would need supporting evidence. And three, Harris explicitly deals with this objection—in the same note that Pigliucci quotes to support his charge of “scientism”:

    Granted, one doesn’t generally think of events like assassinations as “scientific” facts, but the murder of President Kennedy is as fully corroborated a fact as can be found anywhere, and it would betray a profoundly unscientific frame of mind to deny that it occurred. I think “science,” therefore, should be considered a specialized branch of a larger effort to form true beliefs about events in our world. (TML, 195n2)

    Contrary to Pigliucci’s assertion about what readers expect when picking up a science book, and contrary to the assertion that Harris’s conception of science is well out of the mainstream, we think of all sorts of disciplines as “sciences” (including, of course, all historical sciences, from history to palaentology). Moreover, we would also characterise the systematic inquiry into a murder as “scientific”—to quote Bertrand Russell, “Whatever knowledge is attainable, must be attained by scientific methods” (Religion and Science). To make matters worse, even Pigliucci’s attempted separation of philosophy from science is not successful—Russell, again, on the continuousness of the two:

    those questions which are already capable of definite answers are placed in the sciences, while those only to which, at present, no definite answer can be given, remain to form the residue which is called philosophy. (The Problems of Philosophy, Ch. XV)

    In a sense, then, philosophy is the rational exploration of hypothetical space, where science is that of real space. In its pursuit of truth, moreover, science necessarily generates its own values. Harris dutifully points this out in the Introduction of TML:

    the very idea of “objective” knowledge (i.e., knowledge acquired through honest observation and reasoning) has values built into it, as every effort we make to discuss facts depends upon principles that we must first value (e.g., logical consistency, reliance on evidence, parsimony, etc.). (TML, 11)

    This idea of “an ethic for science which derives directly from its own activity” is one that was possibly first elaborated on by Jacob Bronowski in 1956:

    The values of science derive neither from the virtues of its members, nor from the finger-wagging codes of conduct by which every profession reminds itself to be good. They have grown out of the practice of science, because they are the inescapable conditions for its practice. (Science and Human Values, 69)

    Which, incidentally, leads him to reject the idea of an is–ought problem outright: “‘Ought’ is dictated by ‘is’ in the actual inquiry for knowledge.” (Origins of Knowledge and Imagination, 129) This, of course, nicely ties in with what Jerry Coyne, among others, has maintained about the status of methodological naturalism as a principle in science, which has been falsely equated with religious dogmas—all of which is of some consequence in the accommodationism debate.

    What all this amounts to is another idea of Bronowski’s, a “social injunction”, as he calls it, and another stab at Hume: “We ought to act in such a way that what is true can be verified to be so.” (Science and Human Values, 66) Pigliucci’s review repeatedly runs afoul of this principle. The two most instructive cases will have to suffice to make this point.

    First, the use of painfully inadequate arguments, especially the appeal to authority. In reference to Harris’s well-argued consideration of lie-detecting neuroscience, Pigliucci has this to say: “If these sentences do not conjure the specter of a really, really scary Big Brother in your mind, I suggest you get your own brain scanned for signs of sociopathology.” That anyone, let alone a professor of philosophy, should literally argue, ‘If you don’t agree with me, you should get your head examined’, is deplorable.

    Second, inaccurate and misleading representation of what the other person says. Harris excuses his omission of philosophical jargon by (only half-jokingly, I suspect) asserting that it every piece of it “directly increases the amount of boredom in the universe” (TML, 197n1). Pigliucci says this amounts to a dismissal of all of metaethics, that Harris finds it boring, that TML as a whole “shies away from philosophy”. (And so on and all-too-predictably on.) Not only is this implausible even given the quote that Pigliucci used; Harris explicitly gives his reasons for “not engaging more directly with the academic literature on moral philosophy”: he arrived at his position not because of that literature, but for independent logical reasons; and he wants to make the discussion as accessible to lay readers as possible. Again, in such a way to distort a position beyond recognition is deplorable.

    Paraphrasing Wittgenstein, we can thus arrive at a simple philosophical injunction: ‘whereof one cannot speak fairly, thereof one should be silent.’ Which, it unfortunately needs to be added, is not to say that anybody should shut up. It is a friendly reminder, in the interest of all concerned, to raise your game.

  • Sex, secrecy and religion in Africa

    “Secrecy,” says American fiction writer, Robert Heinlein, “is the beginning of tyranny”. But I think, secrecy is actually the abode of darkness, ignorance, prejudice and confusion. Because whatever is held in secret is like something held in the dark- it can be anything, it can become anything. It can become nothing.

    In Africa, so much secrecy prevails in the area of human sexuality. Sexual expressions are preferably done in secret or discussed in hushed tones. There is hardly any open honest debate or dialogue on sexual issues going on anywhere on the continent. All questions about sexual matters appear to have been answered and such answers are taken to be correct- absolutely correct. Sexual rules are taken to be beaten paths cast in stones without any room for revision, change or improvement. And any attempt to question, challenge or alter the sexual norms and traditions is perceived as a taboo or an open invitation to social chaos and moral anarchy. Africa’s secretive morality has caused so much confusion, misinformation and misrepresentation of sexual dynamics in the region. It has estranged Africans from the table of ongoing debate on global ethics and morality. It has thrown up self appointed moral demagogues and custodians of African cultural norms.

    Unfortunately, religious faiths have capitalized on this confused situation in Africa to tyrannize over the lives of the people using their largely primitive and mistaken doctrines, dogmas, notions and norms. Alas, most people in Africa have taken moral solace in religious dogmas and superstitions. It was Arthur C. Clarke who once said that the greatest tragedy in human history might be that religion hijacked morality. I think Clarke made this assertion not because he did not know that religious doctrines shaped people’s moral choices. But because religious faiths weighed undue influence- total and absolute influence- on moral decisions.

    Religious faiths corrupt people’s moral sense and hamper their ability to question, examine and revise their moral positions when the need arises. Religions made moral rules divine commandments-perfect, eternal and immutable laws handed down to mere mortals from above. But in actual fact, moral rules are imperfect, temporary, questionable and changeable laws articulated by humans for their own happiness and well being. Religious morality is the moral outlook that prevailed in the past; the moral viewpoints of those who lived in the past- at the time the religion was codified or instituted.

    So due to religious influence, Africans hold moral perspectives-exotic moral perspectives- as if we are strange beings thrusted down from a dark age. Many Africans openly express moral views that fly in the face of facts, reason, history and common sense. They espouse moral positions that are patently hypocritical, retrogressive and backward-looking.

    One moral issue that has revealed the darkening, corrupting and confusing influence of secrecy, hypocrisy and religious tyranny in Africa is homosexuality.

    Homosexual orientation is found is all cultures of the world including Africa. But many Africans have tried in vain to deny this cultural reality. Persons who are attracted to people of the same sex  have always existed in societies and communities across the globe. But in Africa, there is this tendency in many people to pretend about this social fact and to regard homosexuality as an unnatural perverse moral import from the West. In actual fact many Africans want a situation where homosexuals do their things in secret or go about their business as if they do not exist.

     I have met Africans who told me that they did not bother if homosexuals expressed themselves hiding. That they were opposed to their going open with their sexual identity and their demand for equal rights with hetereosexuals. And they had quotations and references in the Bible and the Koran to justify their outrageous moral positions. Yes, their moral position is outrageous by today’s moral standards.

    But I have always wondered why Africans cannot pause for a moment and think. Don’t we, Africans, know that there are practices that were morally justifiable and tenable in the past and in the scriptures like slavery, discrimination against women, child marriage, persecution of unbelievers etc that are criminal and atrocious by today’s moral standards?. Why can’t we Africans chart an independent moral course without the trappings of religious dogmas and pretensions?

     When will Africans realize that those who introduced the Bible and Koran to the continent no longer allow these ancient texts to tyrannize over their lives? Why can’t we say NO to religious tyranny and extremism, ‘secretive’ and self deceitful morality and hypocritical attitudes towards human sexuality? Because these are the primitive sentiments that led to the murder of the Ugandan gay rights activist, David Kato and to other atrocious acts-genocide, religious violence, witch hunts etc-which Africans perpetrate against Africans.

    I mean, when shall we, Africans, wake up from our intellectual and moral slumber?  We, Africans, missed out on the old enlightenment. Shall we also miss out on the new enlightenment?

    About the Author

    Leo Igwe is the International Humanist and Ethical Union’s representative for West Africa and Executive Director of the Nigerian Humanist Movement.
  • An Encomium for Richard Holloway

    I admire Richard Holloway for his courage. Here is a religious man who, from 1986-2000, was Bishop of Edinburgh; a man of virtue concerned with his neighbor, with social justice, and with the common good; and, not the least, a contemplative man who somewhere along the way lost his faith but not his desire for transcendence. I don’t know when his doubts became so substantial that they compelled him to leave the Anglican Church, but I imagine that the decision came only after the crisis had become too acute to ignore and too great to bear.

    What brought on this crisis, one that emerged, no doubt, over the course of many years only to reach critical mass in the past decade, was the feeling that traditional religion had lost its grip on the modern world together with the sense that the general account offered by evolution could no longer be denied.

    The loss of traditional religion is still movingly recorded in Philip Larkin’s poem “Church Going,” a poem with which Holloway is all too familiar. Here, the speaker describes his experience of walking into a church and of finding that this hallowed space, a space that had once been suffused with life, meaning, and community, has since been abandoned. And what does he do? He goes through the motions, taking off his hat, signing the guest book, and intoning “Here endeth” too loudly. Is this a museum, a tomb, a ruin? And what does he wonder? Only how we’ll get on after the rituals that in previous epochs had bound us together have ceased to be practiced. He sees that this life-world has lost its sense; that the people have gone elsewhere (but where have they gone?); that the church, for millennia a symbol of communion and love, is now but a relic of another world, one dimly remembered yet still vaguely felt.

    And that is the thing, really: the poem speaks to us because it inhabits a certain post-religious sensibility, marking off the death of traditional religion but also the absence of some serviceable replacement. There is honesty in this (if one can describe a poem as being “honest”) since the poem voices the question rising up from a life need. Accordingly, “Church Going” is inoculated against “bland nihilism,” a matter-of-fact ethos of a later generation where the question—whither has fled?—no longer arises, at least not with the urgency it once did. 

    I admire Holloway first, therefore, because he is attuned to the melancholy of our time but also to the hope for something more, something else. Throughout his writings, he acknowledges that something deep has gone missing but that we can’t go home again. For even if we abandon traditional religion, “we have not necessarily abandoned the religious quest,” he says in Looking in the Distance, “not if we think of it as the name we give to humanity’s preoccupation with its own meaning or lack of meaning.”

    Here we are in exile for once we grant the general truths of evolution, we realize that there is no going back. Darwin’s revolution, we know, amounted to replacing a providential order with an interminable process of adaptation to contingencies, pressures, and circumstances. Under this new dispensation, human beings do not fit into a hierarchy of being. Rather, they are natural organisms in many respects like any others, participating in a world filled with remarkable complexity as well as ineradicable transience. In consequence, we have no pre-given purpose, no all-encompassing framework with which to make sense of our lives, no shared structure that gives weight to our life projects.

    On the one hand, the feeling of secularism resembles that of spring: both lighten our metaphysical load. We modern secularists needn’t worry that our lives do not conform to an alien ideal. As Hegel beautifully put it, unhappy consciousness was always a temptation resulting from positing an ideal that went beyond our human capacities. However much we strive to approach the essential, however steadfast we remain in our endeavors, still the distance between the real and the ideal shall remain. But, thankfully, no more of that.

    On the other hand, it seems that it’s difficult to get comfortable in our post-metaphysical seats no matter how hard we try. During the morning well before dawn, we might fall into nihilistic despair, a mood Holloway describes as flowing from a “sense of bafflement at the massive indifference of the universe.” How puzzling, Holloway remarks, that we’re conscious beings surrounded on all sides by an unconscious universe. To be sure, we have no trouble understanding how we came about—Antonio Damasio, among others, has given us a naturalistic account of the emergence of phenomenal and introspective consciousness out of embodied life—but we are still no closer to explaining why we’re here. Unless, that is, we assign the “why” question to another epoch and seek to assure ourselves that such an inquiry betokens an error in judgment or, to be more precise, an illusion harking back to premodernity.

    And if it doesn’t? And if we still take nihilism seriously, working to quiet our despair not by diagnosing our condition as megalomania but by engaging in rational inquiry? Then what ensues is a perilous antinomy between traditional faith (God imbues the world with meaning) and existentialism (crudely put, meaning is constructed). But while the idea of a providential order has collapsed, the existential slogan that “we make life meaningful” seems more like a catch-all marketing slogan than like rigorous speculative philosophy.

    “Traditional religion has collapsed? Hardly!,” replies the theist pointing to sociological studies indicating an uptick in self-identified religious observers in the developing and developed world. What’s more, eclectic, “postmodern” religions are springing up every day in American suburbs near you and in exurbs around the corner. A latter-day Dr. Johnson, the theist kicks the stone in front of him and, foot now throbbing, blurts out, “I refute it thus!”

    Not exactly. Traditional religion lives on because it promises to fulfill what Hegel calls “objective spirit”: the identification of a subject with an institution. In Hegel’s account, I am positively free insofar as I can see myself as embodied in institutional life, embodied, for instance, within the walls of the church, in its practices, and through its forms of charity. Indeed, in his First Encyclical God is Love (Deus Caritas Est), Pope Benedict echoes this line of thought, arguing that the spirit of the Catholic Church is caritas. (To be sure, this line of thought of necessity throws up the doubt that the Church is not, or has not always been, an instrument of caritas in practice.) God’s love thereby finds expression in the giving of alms to the needy, and who among us has never been needy? Especially in Latin American countries where tradition is still an integral part of everyday life, we should expect to see Catholicism remain a living force for some time to come.

    However, this does not belie the fact that the spirit of traditional religion is slowly dying. Alienation from institutional life seems to be an undeniable fact about the modern world. Perhaps this is the natural result of the spirit of Protestantism. For once Reformers rejected the authority of the Church and once our relation to God became a matter of the heart, it was only a matter of time—the slow drift of time—before the divine itself was put into question. In this story, sociality gave way to interiority which, after the Darwinian revolution, gave rise to nihilism. The God hypothesis, finally, becomes unnecessary. Unable thus to regard our potentialities as being actualized in and through traditional institutions—the bourgeois family which has yet to accommodate the plurality of sexual practices, educational establishments which feed on individual achievement and which seek to foster “self-esteem,” and, above all, the church whose messages seem somehow written for those that came before us—we muddle on. Some experiment with new forms of mystical and religious practices such as Cafh, New Ageism, and ecological pantheism while others like Holloway admit with stirring honesty to being lost in the wilderness.

    On other side of the antinomy lies existentialism, which, I’m about to argue, is just as spiritually unsatisfying. In “Navigating Past Nihilism,” Sean Kelly claims that we need no more than pluralism in order to flourish. He writes approvingly (Hegel would have said “tragically”) that the modern world is filled with “many distinct and incommensurate good ways of life.” There is thus no single summum bonum toward which we strive. Rather, there are many to choose from and plenty, he implies, that are choiceworthy. It is this latter implication that sounds suspect.

    Robert Nozick’s distinction between value and meaning sheds some light on the problem with Kelly’s pluralistic solution. In The Examined Life: Philosophical Meditations, Nozick claims that “[v]alue involves something’s being integrated within its own boundaries, while meaning involves its having some connection beyond these boundaries.” If I value a painting, then I must be attending to whatever salient features bring a certain unity to the work. And if I find meaning in my participation in a neighborhood cause, then I must be making a connection with some larger whole that is beyond me but of which I am a part. Crucially, Nozick goes one step further, arguing that value and meaning are “coordinate notions”: “[m]eaning can be gained by linking with something of value.” (To up the ante, I would add the word “only” after gained.)

    Here, Nozick has put his finger on something, and that something is the “wastrel problem.” I may take my relationship to some larger entity to be a meaningful one, but what if that object to which I am attached is not something of intrinsic value? I may, after all, be deluded or self-deceived. Suppose I were expending time, effort, and care on behalf of a particular cause yet suppose that cause turned out to be not at all worthwhile. Then wouldn’t I be wasting my life? Indeed, how do we know that we’re not also wasting ours?

    I don’t see how the pluralism Kelly defends can immunize us from living in a society whose shelves are well-stocked with real and make-believe wastrels. “But perhaps that’s simply the price we pay for living in a pluralistic society. Give people freedom. Tell them that there’s only one constraint on their doing what they want: that they don’t go out and harm their neighbors. If they don’t live meaningful lives, what of it? That’s their business, not mine.”

    This libertarian reply, whether caricatured or accurate I can’t say for sure, is shocking inasmuch as it assumes that there is no such thing as society. The essence of our being is to be an individual. Yet if in an atomistic, pluralistic society we can all be wastrels, unsure exactly what end we should aim at, then how are we not slipping even deeper into nihilism? Or have we simply managed to forget the problem of nihilism entirely as we go about pursuing our enlightened or not so enlightened self-interest?

    My provisional conclusion is that we need a telos that directs and organizes our ideas, actions, and life plans, yet, in a secular age, we seem to have no idea where to look for it. What then?

    We need to be careful lest we confuse being virtuous with finding meaning. New Atheists are right to say that we needn’t resort to religious absolutism in order to be good. Of course, one can lead a life of virtue, a life of kindness, thoughtfulness, and tolerance, without grounding one’s virtues in religious principles or practices. I would even go further and say that all morality is of its very nature “godless”: it is without god, not of or about god, that is to say, not pertaining to the category of god. But the person who fulfills all her duties may still be paralyzed by early morning despair. Unlike positivists who insist that the question of meaning is unintelligible and that we’d do well to swear off the problem of meaning altogether, Holloway seeks to preserve some spiritual orientation in human life. But this dimension is scarcely more than a mode of vague, indistinct intuiting. Sensing that there is an absence of the divine when he “looks in the distance,” he feels not “neutral agnosticism” but “committed unknowing.”

    This, I think, is the stuff of tragedy with cognition claiming not to know conflicting with passion’s demand that there be something. And this tragic conflict would help explain why Holloway resorts to poetry and why he speaks in terms of moods. His early morning mood, nihilistic despair, is followed by a predawn wistfulness, which will lead to others in turn. The first mood accompanies the claim of absolute absence, the second alludes to an absence that could have once been but now is not. Both moods describe poetic experiences where giving expression to a feeling is not all that matters, yet—for all that and at least for the time being—it is all that can be hoped for.

    All this makes life into something of a gamble. Living well thus requires honesty and humility in order to persevere as well as courage and constancy in order to be strong enough to look on in wonder and in horror. This is also something I admire about Holloway.

    About the Author

    Andrew Taggart is a writer and philosophical counselor based in New York. His essays are archived at his website.
  • Hundreds of rocks are thrown at her head

    As the Afghan Government continues its wooing overtures to the Taliban, and Karzai whines about “foreign interference” in his latest meddling in Afghan parliamentary democracy, the Taliban execute a couple by stoning them to death in Kunduz province in front of a crowd of hundreds.

    The crime? The couple fell in love and attempted to elope, beyond a community where relationships based on mutual love and attraction, and not on money and perversion, might have a chance of fulfillment.

    The BBC has short clips of the horrific murders, noting that “most of the video is too graphic to be shown.” The event is described as follows:

    The video begins with Siddqa, a 25-year-old woman, standing waist-deep in a hole in the ground.

    She is entirely hidden in a blue burka. Hundreds of men from the village are gathered as two mullahs pass sentence. As Taliban fighters look on, the sentence is passed and she is found guilty of adultery.

    The stoning lasts two minutes. Hundreds of rocks – some larger than a man’s fist – are thrown at her head and body. She tries to crawl out of the hole, but is beaten back by the stones. A boulder is then thrown at her head, her burka is soaked in blood, and she collapses inside the hole.

    Incredibly Siddqa was still alive. The mullahs are heard saying she should be left alone. But a Taliban fighter steps forward with a rifle and she is shot three times.

    Then her lover, Khayyam, is brought to the crowd. His hands are tied behind his back. Before he is blindfolded he looks into the mobile phone camera. He appears defiant.

    The attack on him is even more ferocious. His body, lying face down, jerks as the rocks meet their target. He is heard to be crying, but is soon silent.

    In between the murders, a man is showing clacking two large stones together, deliriously excited at the prospect of participating in what amounts to a viciously drawn out execution. It’s a sunny day and hundreds are gathered to witness this crime, all of them undeniably complicit in it. It’s an almost unbelievable communal deficit of conscience, were it not preserved on film proving this scene devoid of humanity really did take place, in all of its grisly actuality.

    A Taliban spokesperson defends the stoning, quipping about the dangers of “foreign thinking” in Afghanistan (in reference to people who call stoning to death inhuman). A spectator had used a mobile phone, one product of demonic “foreign thinking” to record this atrocity, standing idly by, gleefully filming the scene as if it were an amusing event he happened to pass by.

    It’s an indefensible abomination, and nothing should signal more clearly that the Taliban have not reformed, that they will never reform. ‘Taliban’ and ‘reform’ are opposing forces in the 21st century, and the longer the Afghan Government takes to realize this, the more destructive their pandering to these degenerates will be for the citizens of Afghanistan. To even suggest power sharing or deal-making with the death-cult psychopaths that are the Taliban is a searing insult to the people of Afghanistan, and a signed death warrant to all of the country’s free thinkers, democrats, intellectuals, feminists and idealists.

    Today is the International Day of Commemoration in Memory of the Victims of the Holocaust, an occasion that should perhaps inspire a solemn reminder to confront atrocities and crimes against humanity. Nearly 70 years have passed since the Holocaust and the declaration of “never again”, which set the stage for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. How is it that we continue to condone the barbaric treatment of human beings in other lands? How have we reached a point, in 2011, where we would contemplate allowing any place in the world for the ideology of the Taliban, and its ugly manifestations in the form of a bludgeoned young woman and her lover?

    How very far we have yet to go.

    About the Author

    Lauryn Oates is a Canadian human rights activist, gender and education specialist who has been advocating for the rights of Afghan women since 1996. She is currently Projects Director for Canadian Women for Women in Afghanistan, as well as a founding member of the Canada Afghanistan Solidarity Committee.
  • A ‘Witch-Girl’ Rescued in Akwa Ibom State

     

    [media id=23811 title=”Esther” width=”225″ height=”300″ ]

    On January 11, 2011, I led a team of police officers who rescued an 8 year old girl, Esther Obot Moses, in a remote village, Nsit Ubium, in Akwa Ibom State in Southern Nigeria.

    Esther, according to locals, was accused of witchcraft and abandoned by her family. She was sleeping in the local market till a 40 year old man, Okokon, ‘kidnapped’ her.

    Police arrested Okokon who is believed to have some mental problems. He has been living with Esther in his shanty building since last year, and he raped her several times.

    Both Okokon and Esther made statements at the police station at Nsit Ubium. Esther was later taken to Uyo and handed over to the Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Welfare for proper care after receiving some treatment for malaria at a local children’s hospital.

    [media id=23805 title=”Leo” width=”300″ height=”225″ ]

    Every year, thousands of children are accused of witchcraft, abused, abandoned or exiled from their homes by family and community members in Akwa Ibom state. These children are forced to roam or live on the streets or in markets or public or abandoned buildings. Others are trafficked by unscrupulous persons.

    In 2008, the government of Akwa Ibom enacted the child rights law which prohibits the abuse or abandonment of children in the name of witchcraft. Unfortunately the state has not recorded any successful prosecution to date.

    About the Author

    If you want to donate to Leo’s campaign you can do so via the Institute for Science and Human Values or Stepping Stones Nigeria. Donations to support the work of Leo Igwe and IHEU can be made here: http://www.iheu.org/donate. To ensure your donation is devoted entirely to Leo’s work, just send an email to office-iheu@iheu.org instructing us to do so.
  • My Arrest in Uyo

    On Tuesday January 11th around 5pm, I was arrested along with my driver and a photographer in front of a bank in Uyo Akwa State in Southern Nigeria . I arrived in Akwa Ibom on Sunday, January 9 to rescue two alleged witch children abused and abandoned by their families. One of the kids, 8 year old Esther Obot Moses, was living with a mad man who raped her several times. On that ‘fateful’ Tuesday, around 5.40 am, I stormed a dilapidated building in Nsit Ubium where the lunatic lived with two police officers and successfully rescued the poor girl. We went to the police station, made an entry and got a police extract.

    Esther started vomiting on our way back. I took her to a children’s hospital in Uyo where she was treated for malaria. I later handed the children over to the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and Social Welfare. I ran short of money in the course of doing this and rushed to a nearby bank to collect some cash. On leaving the bank, I couldn’t find my driver and the photographer who were waiting for me outside. I was accosted by a police officer who led me to where they were being held and questioned. I identified them as those who accompanied me to the bank, and the police forced me to sit on the ground. The police officers were asking us questions indiscriminately in their effort to implicate us or to confess to crimes we never committed.

    They accused us of planning to kidnap someone. All my explanations as to our mission at the bank fell on deaf ears. Later a bus with some gun-throttling and fierce-looking police officers arrived. They removed our shirts and used them to tie our hands at the back. They pushed and kicked us into the bus and took us to the Anti-Kidnapping Unit at the state police command in Uyo.

    Meanwhile we were in pain due to the way our hands were tied. On getting to the police station we urged the officers to untie our hands. But they refused. After a while one of the officers came and untied the hands of my photographer and replaced it with chains. I asked him to replace my own too. And he retorted “Don’t you know they are for sale?” Of course I didnt know and didn’t bother to ask him how much the handcuffs were sold for.

    Another police officer said my hands were not properly tied,so he brought another shirt and tied my hands the second time. The pains increased. I literally lost all the sensations in my hands down to my fingers. I felt as if I had no hands or fingers at all. My hands were just dangling at my back as if they were lifeless.

    At this point the Officer in Charge (O/C) of the anti-kidnapping unit, a middle-aged man who is fair in complexion, came in and started interrogating me. “Who are you? And where do you work?” he asked.

    I told him that I worked with the International Humanist and Ethical Union (IHEU), an that I was in Uyo for an ongoing campaign against witchcraft accusations and to rescue victims.

    “Where is your organization based?” he inquired. I said, London . As soon as I mentioned “London” he hit me several times with a baton on my head and my legs. He said I was among those who used fake NGOs to make money in the name of campaigning against witchcraft accusations in the state. He asked other officers to move me to another room for further interrogation. On getting to the other room, the officer started beating and kicking me. The O/C later arrived and asked him to stop. He ordered them to untie my hands.

    I made a statement narrating how we were arrested. The O/C ordered us to be detained.

    The next morning the O/C invited me to make another statement on IHEU. He asked me to state where it was based, whether it had an office in Nigeria, how it raised its funds etc., which I did. They kept us in a squalid building where we were held incommunicado – without food, water or access to our telephones. But we managed to smuggle out the telephone numbers of our family members and friends through some visitors who helped us contact them.

    We were detained along with 50 other persons suspected of kidnapping in a room with one door and four windows all on one side.

    The apartment had no fan or electricity. It used to be hot in the night so most inmates slept naked, packed like sardines. Most of them slept on the floor, a few slept on plastic bags. I couldn’t sleep and spent the night massaging my swollen head by pressing it against the floor.

    All the detainees urinated, defecated, bathed and ate in the same room. Most of them had rashes, wounds and sores all over their bodies. They had no access to any medical care, and the police did not allow their families to bring them drugs.

    The police did not care a hoot about the welfare of the detainees. They only opened the gate by 6 am and closed it by 6 pm, and of course extorted money from visitors who came to see their loved ones. Even animals are treated than the way detainees at the anti-kidnapping unit of the Uyo Police Command are treated. The police only arrest suspects and throw them into detention to languish and die slowly. Most of the detainees have been there for months awaiting trial. I had no doubt that some of the detainees were innocent citizens like us who were going about their business but were arrested and framed as kidnappers.

    In the morning of Thursday, January 13, news reached us that the O/C had agreed to release only my driver and the photographer. I was a bit relieved.

    Shortly after the news came, a humanist friend, Barrister James Ibor, arrived and we were all released without charge, after a short meeting with the assistant commissioner of police. It appeared that there had been some pressure on the police authorities to release us. I still experience pains on my head, hands and legs. My left hand is still not functioning properly.

    But I am undeterred by the arrest, torture and detention – whether it was politically motivated or not. I will continue to work and campaign against witchcraft accusations and related abuses in Akwa Ibom state and beyond.

    About the Author

    If you want to donate to Leo’s campaign you can do so via the Institute for Science and Human Values or Stepping Stones Nigeria. Donations to support the work of Leo Igwe and IHEU can be made here: http://www.iheu.org/donate. To ensure your donation is devoted entirely to Leo’s work, just send an email to office-iheu@iheu.org instructing us to do so.
  • Critical Thinking and the African Identity

    I start this piece by stating emphatically that if lack of critical thinking or inability to apply one’s common sense to issues is what makes one an African, then I am not an African. I say this – and I really mean it. That I hereby renounce my African identity if it means that I should not exercise my critical intelligence or apply reason and science in all areas of human endeavor. If being an African means I should suspend and shut down my thinking faculty and blindly accept whatever any person or prophet says or preaches, then, I say, count me out. Don’t count me as an African. I am making this assertion because very often blind faith, dogma and fetishism are identified with African mentality.

    Whenever I try to apply logic, critical reasoning and scientific temper to issues during public debates, I am often accused of not thinking like an African. I am always told that I think like a white man or that I have a western mentality. As if critical thinking or the scientific outlook is for westerners alone or that critical thinking can only be exercised by people from a particular race or region. No, this is not the case.

    Surprisingly, nobody has ever stepped forward to tell me how an ‘African’ thinks. For me it is either this ‘African mode of thought’ is one which nobody knows about or is one that does not exist or qualify to be called a thinking pattern. Nobody has tried to let me know if Africans think at all. Because this misguided view that one is unAfrican or western in outlook is often employed to block or suppress critical reasoning or inquiry particularly when it is used to challenge traditions, positions and opinions informed by blind faith or dogma.

    While holding on to beliefs and outlooks informed by superstition and primordial thinking is often glorified as African. Even in this 21st century, reason and science are still perceived as western, and not African values. I have yet to understand how we came about this mistaken idea. Hence, it is often portrayed as if the African does not reason and dare not reason or that the African does not think or cannot think critically. It seems thinking like an African means suspension of thought, logic or common sense. Thinking like an African means not thinking at all- thoughtlessness or thinking in spiritual, occult or magical ways.

    For instance, whenever I try to challenge or question the irrational and absurd claims of witchcraft, juju and charms, and other ritualistic and religious nonsense that dominate the mental space of Africans, I am often reminded that my mentality is western. And you know what, whenever in the course of a public debate, somebody allges that a position is western, it means that it is unacceptable though it may be reasonable or may have a superior argument. Is that not unfortunate?

    Whenever I try to fault or expose the absurdity of witchcraft accusations or the persecution of alleged witches or wizards, many people often urge me to set aside this my oyibo(white man’s) mentality. As if critical thinking is the exclusive cultural preserve of white people while mystical thinking is for blacks and for Africans. Personally, I am aware that the white race and the western world have recorded significant achievements in the areas of science and technology, in rational and critical disourses. They also have their own share of dark age nonsense, dogmas and superstitions.

    But that does not make the values of science, reason and critical thinking western or white. The values of science and reason constitute part of human heritage, which all human beings can lay claim to, exercise, access, express, celebrate, cultivate and nurture. The progress which the western world has recorded as a result of their institutionalization of reason and science is one which any society can realize and supercede if it wants. Africans should stop hiding behind this misrepresentation thatreason and science are unAfrican western values. Africans should embrace the enlightening matrices of critical mindedness and work to dispel the dark age and barbaric mentality that loom large on the continent.

    Those who are propagating this erroneous idea that critical thinking is alien to African identity and mentality are doing the African race and civilization a great disservice. They are frustrating the take off of African enlightenment, emancipation and emergence. There is no sound mind who would fault this logic. The syllogism that says –

    All human beings can think critically. All Africans are human beings. Therefore all Africans can think critically.

    So Africans should rise up to the challenge of critical evaluation of issues. Because lack of critical thinking is at the root of most problems that plague the continent. Africans should strive and make critical inquiry part of African culture, identity and civilization. I am also appealing to all all lovers of science, reason and critical thought around the globe to help Africans realize this intellectual breakthrough.

  • How “Hindu” is yoga after all?

    Yoga is to North America what McDonalds is to India: both are foreign implants gone native. The urban and suburban landscape of the United States is dotted with neighbourhood health clubs, spas and even churches and synagogues offering yoga classes. Some 16 million Americans do some form of yoga, primarily as a part of their exercise and fitness routine. Thus, when everyday Americans talk about yoga, they mostly mean physical, or hatha yoga, involving stretches, breathing and bodily postures, or asanas. Many styles of postural yoga pioneered by India-origin teachers are thriving, including the Iyengar and Sivananada schools, the Ashtanga Vinyasa or ‘power yoga’ of Pattabhi Jois, and ‘hot yoga’ recently copyrighted by Bikram Chaudhary. The more meditational forms of yoga popularised by the disciples of Vivekananda, Sivananda and others are less popular. Americans’ preference for postural over meditational yoga is not all that unique: In India, too, hundreds of millions follow Baba Ramdev, a popular TV-yogi, who teaches a purely medicalised, asana-oriented yoga.

    By and large, the US yoga industry does not hide the origins of what it teaches. On the contrary, in a country that is so young and so constantly in flux, yoga’s presumed antiquity (‘5000-year-old exercise system’, etc.) and its connections with Eastern spirituality have become part of the sales pitch. Thus, doing namastes, intoning ‘om’ and chanting Sanskrit mantras have become a part of the experience of doing yoga in America. Many yoga studios use Indian classical or kirtan music, incense, signs of om and other paraphernalia of the Subcontinent to create a suitably ‘spiritual’ ambience. Iyengar yoga schools begin their sessions with a hymn to Patanjali, the second-century composer of the Yoga Sutras, and some have even installed his murthis. This Hinduisation is not entirely decorative, either, as yoga instructors are required to study Hindu philosophy and scripture in order to get a license to teach yoga.

    One would think that yoga’s immense popularity and Hinduisation would gladden the hearts of Hindu immigrants to the US. But in fact, the leading Hindu advocacy organisation in the US, the Hindu American Foundation (HAF), is not swelling with pride. On the contrary, it has recently accused the American yoga industry of ‘stealing’ yoga from Hinduism. Millions of Americans will be shocked to learn that they are committing ‘intellectual property theft’ whenever they do an asana, because they do not acknowledge their debt to ‘yoga’s mother tradition’. HAF’s co-founder and chief spokesperson, Aseem Shukla, is now exhorting his fellow Hindus to ‘take back yoga and reclaim the intellectual property of their spiritual heritage.’

    The take-back-yoga campaigners are not impressed with the growing visibility of Hindu symbols and rituals in yoga and other cultural institutions in the US. They still find Hindu-phobia lurking everywhere they look. They want Americans to think of yoga, the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali and the great Vedas when they think of Hinduism, instead of the old stereotypes of caste, cows and curry. They would rather that, to paraphrase Shukla, Hinduism is linked less with ‘holy cows than Gomukhasana,’ a reference to a particularly arduous asana; less with the ‘colourful and harrowing wandering sadhus’ than with ‘the spiritual inspiration of Patanjali’. It seems that this yoga-reclamation campaign is less about yoga and more about the Indian diaspora’s strange mix of defensiveness, combined with an exaggerated sense of the excellence of the elite, Sanskritic, aspects of Hindu religion and culture.

    The ‘who owns yoga’ debate gained worldwide attention in late November, when the New York Times carried a front-page feature on the issue. But the dispute started earlier this year, with a battle of blogs hosted online by the Washington Post between HAF’s Shukla and the New Age guru, Deepak Chopra. Shukla complained of the yoga establishment shunning the ‘H-word’ while making its fortunes out of Hindu ideas and practices. Chopra, who shuns the Hindu label, instead describing himself as an ‘Advaita Vedantist’, declared that Hinduism had no patent on yoga. He argued that yoga existed in ‘consciousness and consciousness alone’ much before Hinduism, just like wine and bread existed before the Jesus Christ’s Last Supper, implying that Hindus had as much claim over yoga as Christians had over bread and wine. Shukla called Chopra a ‘philosophical profiteer’ who did not honour his Hindu heritage, while Chopra accused Shukla and his foundation of Hindu-fundamentalist bias.

    Neither eternal nor Vedic

    This ‘debate’ is really about two equally fundamentalist views of Hindu history. The underlying objective is to draw an unbroken line connecting the 21st-century yogic postures with the nearly 2000-year-old Yoga Sutras, and tie both to the supposedly 5000-year-old Vedas. The only difference is that, for Chopra, yoga existed before Hinduism, while Shukla and HAF want to claim the entire five millennia for the glory of Hinduism. For Chopra, yoga is a part of a ‘timeless Eastern wisdom’, while for HAF, ‘Yoga and Vedas are synonymous, and are as eternal as they are contemporaneous.’

    The reality is that yoga as we know it is neither ‘eternal’ nor synonymous with the Vedas or the Yoga Sutras. On the contrary, modern yoga was born in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It is a child of the Hindu Renaissance and Indian nationalism in which Western ideas about science, evolution, eugenics, health and physical fitness played as crucial a role as the ‘mother tradition’. In the massive, multi-level hybridisation that took place during this period, the spiritual aspects of yoga and tantra were rationalised, largely along the Theosophical ideas of ‘spiritual science’ introduced into India by the US-origin, India-based Theosophical Society, and internalised by Swami Vivekananda, who led the yoga renaissance.

    In turn, the physical aspects of yoga were hybridised with drills, gymnastics and body-building techniques introduced from Sweden, Denmark, England and other Western countries. These innovations were creatively grafted on the Yoga Sutras – which has been correctly described by Agehananda Bharati, the Austria-born Hindu monk-mystic, as ‘the yoga canon for people who have accepted Brahmin theology’ – to create an impression of 5000 years worth of continuity where none really exists. HAF’s current insistence is thus part of a false-advertising campaign that has been going on for much of the 20th century.

    Contrary to widespread impressions, the vast majority of asanas taught by modern yoga gurus are nowhere described in the ancient texts. The highly ritualistic, yagna-oriented Vedas have nothing to say about Patanjali’s quest for experiencing pure consciousness. Indeed, out of the 195 sutras that make up the Yoga Sutras, Patanjali devotes barely three short sutras to asanas. The Mahabharata mentions asanas only twice out of 900 references to yoga, and the Bhagvat Gita does not mention them at all.

    There are, of course asana-centred, hatha-yoga texts. But they were authored by precisely those matted-haired, ash-smeared ‘harrowing’ sadhus that the HAF wants to banish from the Western imagination. Indeed, if any Hindu tradition can at all claim a patent on postural yoga, it is these caste-defying, ganja-smoking, sexually permissive, Shiva- and shakti-worshipping sorcerers, alchemists and Tantriks who were cowherds, potters and such. They undertook arduous physical austerities not because they sought to transcend the material world, but because they wanted magical powers (siddhis) to control their bodies and the rest of the material world.

    The Mysore Palace mystery

    New research has brought to light intriguing historical documents and oral histories that raise serious doubts about the “ancient” lineage of Ashatanga Vinyasa of Pattabhi Jois and Iyengar yoga.  Both Jois (1915-2009) and Iyengar (b. 1918) learned yoga from T. Krishnamacharya during the years (1933 until late 1940s) when he directed a yogasala  in one wing of the Jaganmohan palace of the Maharaja of Mysore, Krishnaraja Wodiyar IV (1884-1940).  

    The maharaja, who ruled the state and the city of Mysore from 1902 until his death, was well-known as a great promoter of Indian culture and religion, but was also a great cultural innovator who welcomed positive innovations from the West and incorporated them into his social programs.  Promoting physical education was one of his passions and under his rein Mysore became the hub of physical culture revival in the country.  He hired Krishnamacharya primarily to  teach yoga to the young princes of the royal family, but also  funded Krishnamacharya and his yoga protégés to travel all over India giving yoga demonstrations, thereby encouraging an enormous popular revival of yoga

    Indeed, Mysore’s royal family had a long-standing interest in hatha yoga: Wodeyar IV’s ancestor,  Mummadi Krishnaraja Wodeyar III (1799-1868), is credited with composing an exquisitely illustrated manual, titled Sritattvanidhi,  which was first discovered by Norman Sjoman, a Swedish yoga student, in the mid-1980s in the library of the Mysore Palace.  What is remarkable about this book is its innovative combination of hatha yoga asanas with rope exercises used by Indian wrestlers and the danda push-ups developed at the vyayamasalas, the indigenous Indian gymnasium.

    Both  Sjoman and Mark Singleton, a US-based scholar who has interviewed many of those associated with the Mysore Palace during its heyday in the 1930s, believe that the seeds of modern yoga lie in the innovatory style of  Sritattvanidhi.  Krishnamacharya – who was familiar with this text and cited it in his own books —  carried on the innovation by adding a variety of western gymnastics and drills to the routines he learned from Sritattvanidhi,  which had already cross-bred hatha yoga with traditional Indian wrestling and acrobatic routines.

     In addition, it is well established that Krishnamacharya had full access to a Western-style gymnastics hall in the Mysore Palace which had all the usual wall ropes and other props which he began to include in his yoga routines. Sjoman has excerpted the Western gymnastics manual which was available to Krishnamacharya. Sjoman claims that many of the gymnastics techniques from that manual  — for example, the corss-legged jumpback and walking the hands down a wall into a back arch — found their way into Krishnamacharya’s teachings  which he passed on to Iyengar and Jois. In addition, in early years of the 20th century, an apparatus-free Swedish drill and a gymnastic routine developed by a Dane by the name of Niels Bukh (1880-1950) was introduced into India by the British and was popularized by YMCA.  Singleton argues that “at least 28 of the exercises in the first edition of Bukh’s manual are strikingly similar (often identical) to yoga postures occurring in Pattabhi Jois’s Ashtanga sequence or in Iyengar’s Light on Yoga.” The link again is Krishnamacharya who Singleton calls a “major player in the modern merging of gymnastic-style asana practice and the Patanjala tradition.”

    So, who owns yoga?

    The shrill claims of HAF about Westerners stealing yoga ends up covering up the tremendous amount of cross-breeding and hybridization that has given birth to yoga as we know it. Indeed, cotemporary yoga is a unique example of a truly global innovation in which eastern and western practices merged to produce something that is valued and cherished all around the world.

    Hinduism whether ancient, medieval or modern, has no special claims on yoga. To pretend otherwise is not only churlish, but also simply untrue.

    About the Author

    Meera Nanda is currently a visiting professor in history of science in the Indian Institute of Science Education and Research (Mohali), India. Her book God and globalization in India will be published in the US by Monthly Review Press in 2011.
  • Akpabio and the Child Witch Commission

    In what appears to be another move to combat the allegations of witchcraft and child abuse, the governor of Akwa Ibom state, Chief Godswill Akpabio, has inaugurated a six member Commission to inquire into witchcraft accusations and child rights abuses in the state. He charged them to recommend appropriate actions to be taken to protect children from being branded witches and wizards in order to guard against future occurence. The governor asked the Commission to determine the veracity of all the allegations of witchcraft against children and infliction of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment upon such children and to examine the role and culpability of all the allegations and abuses or practices and make recommendations.

    He then urged the people of Akwa Ibom to cooperate with the Commission in order to ‘obliterate this blot from the pages of our history’. The Commission is chaired by Justice Godwin Abraham and has Barrister Theresa Obot, Dr Okon Edet Akaiso, Dr Essien Edward Essien, Rt Rev John Koko-Bassey, Barrister Uduak Victor Ekwere as members. The Commission was given six weeks to submit it report. Anyone who has been following the ‘child witch saga’ in Akwa Ibom state would regard this as a welcome development. Surely it is, particularly when looked at on the surface. But taking a critical look at this development, one wonders why the state government decided to set up this Commission after passing into law the child rights act which prohibits witchcraft acusations and child abuse. If the government had yet to determine the veracity of the allegations of witchcraft against children and infliction of degrading treatment on them why did it sign into law the child rights bill with sections that prohibit child witch stigmatization. That there is already an existing law enacted by the state implies that the government is not in doubt as to the veracity of the claims of witchcraft accusations and child abuse. So what is the rationale behind setting up this body? Does it mean that the allegations of witchcraft and child abuse were not verified before the government enacted the child rights law? If there is one thing any intelligent observer of the situation in Akwa Ibom is expecting from the government, it is not to setting up a body to inquire into the allegations of witchcraft, but to facilitate the enforcement and implementation of the child rights law which was enacted in 2008. Since this law came into force two years ago, Akwa Ibom has not recorded any successful prosecution. Not even one offender has been convicted or punished under the child rights law in the state. And this has nothing to do with the veracity of the allegations of witchcraft but everything to do with the gaps in the political will, in the policing and justice system in Akwa Ibom state. And if this Commission could at the end of the day succeed in closing these gaps and ensure the full implementation of the child rights act, then the whole idea of setting it up would have been worthwhile.

    But that seems unlikely. Going by the pronouncement of the government of Akwa Ibom particularly its reactions to the international media coverage of the problem of witchraft accusations and child abuse, some people think the government might at the end of the day have some hidden agenda for setting up the Commission. In August, CNN broadcast a report on child witch stigmatization in Akwa Ibom state. It highlighted the role of churches in fueling the problem, and what governemental including the UN- agencies were doing to address this menace. That report  on CNN angered the government of Akwa Ibom state for reasons I have yet to understand. Because the government was given the opportunity by CNN to state its case and present its own side of the story but it wasted it. The CNN reporter interviewed the Commissioner of Information to know what the government was doing to tackle the problem of witchcraft accusations and child abuse but the Commissioner used the space to attack individuals and NGOs whom he accused of exaggerating the problem and using it to raise money for themselves. The governor, in his own reaction, was visibly upset.  He also blamed the NGOs for using the same images to generate international sympathy and funds. However he outlined the efforts his government had made to tackle the problem including enacting the child rights law, providing free education to all children from primary to secondary level and making some donations to stigmatized children in Eket. The governor admitted that, after two years of enacting the law, not a single offender had been successfully prosecuted. It was not long after this broadcast on CNN, which rattled the Akwa Ibom state government, that the governor inaugurated this Commission.

    The world is watching. And many are wondering what could be the real motive behind setting up this august body. It is only time that will tell what the actual mission of this Commission is.  I hope at the end of the day, this Commission would not be used to witch hunt individuals and groups particularly those whom the government accuses of using the witchcraft problem to dent the image of the state internationally.

    I hope the Commission will not be used to undermine the work of NGOs who are complimenting the efforts of the government in the fight against child witch stigmatization. The Commission should be used to recognize the selfless efforts and the humanitarian gestures of individuals and groups who have worked over the years under very dangerous circumstances to tackle this social scourge with little or no assistance from the government. The Commission should work to fill in the gaps in the response by the state to this embarrassing phenomena and facilitate the total eradication of child witch stigmatization in Akwa Ibom.

    About the Author

    Leo Igwe, IHEU Representative in West Africa, lives in Ibadan.
  • Review of Science and Religion: A Very Short Introduction

    [References to Dixon’s book are to location numbers in the Kindle edition. There are 2548 locations in the book, so those using the print edition should be able to access the general page vicinity of the quote based on the percentage of the book traversed at the location number indicated. This, by the way, raises a question for publishers of ebooks. They should include page numbers for the sake of scholarly reference.]

    This is a worryingly confusing and confused book, as I shall try to show in detail. It purports to be a very short introduction to a field of academic study, and yet it does not really address the question of whether or not there is such a field. The existence of journals or even university departments of ‘Science and Religion’ is not sufficient to establish the existence of academic specialities. No doubt, from the religious point of view, the problem of relating science and religion is pressing, since religion is multiply challenged by science and scientific methodology. However, from the scientific point of view this is not only not a pressing issue, it is not an issue at all. What may be an issue is the continuing attempt by religionists to claim a relationship between science and religion, an attempt to harmonise religion with science, and to accommodate science to religion. But this cultural struggle is not a scientific concern, except insofar as it interferes with the proper function of the sciences; the pretence that it is, and that there are meaningful parallels between science and religion, is the entire burden of this book. In my view the case is simply not made.

    Let’s get the first misunderstanding out of the way. Despite its comprehensive overthrow by the Enlightenment – what Jonathan Israel calls “theology’s loss of hegemony in the eighteenth century” (Israel, Jonathan. Enlightenment Contested (Oxford: University Press, 2006), 68) – religion still has a disproportionate footprint in the public sphere, even in places where the Enlightenment originated and flourished. Counter-Enlightenment forces were very effective in preserving the structures of ecclesial power that existed in Europe and in societies whose majority populations derive from European immigration. Religious belief itself made successive accommodations to scientific discoveries and the liberal, democratic political arrangements that originated in foundational philosophical works of the Enlightenment. These continued accommodations were in the nature of a steady retreat of religion and theology in the face of the growing success of science in producing reliable descriptions of the natural and human world. The liberal face of religion, thus revealed, acknowledged these successes, yet the heart of religion remained obdurate and unmoved. The forces which kept religions united and effective, as religions, were the beliefs which had been subverted by science. Surrounded by the protective glacis of liberalism, these beliefs were the citadel, without whose existence religion as religion would have simply perished.

    This is why, when churches consult together, they still, even in the midst of the bitterest disagreements, claim to be seeking God’s will, and carrying out God’s plan for them. Though there is no conceivable basis for speaking of God’s will in regard, say, to specific questions such as the acceptance or rejection of homosexuality, or the ordination of women, continuing as a religion means that such speech must be privileged. In non-religious contexts such disagreements would be about matters of fact, or about disagreements regarding ethical principles which are, at least in principle, resolvable. In religious contexts the assumption is that there is one correct answer to the questions in dispute, and that God knows that answer. The task of the religious is, in humility, to seek to know God’s will, and when found, to submit, in humility, obediently to it. Yet there is no conceivable way of resolving the issues in dispute, if that is what they are. We will come to the question of revelation in due course, but it is clear that where claims are made to revelation, they are always to sources which are unquestionably human and fallible, and, moreover, open to interpretation. There is simply no way that this problem of sources and authority can be solved, except, of course, by main force. So, the simple truth is that religion’s continued prominence cannot underwrite religion’s claim to epistemic respectability. And yet it is almost entirely upon this that its claim to relationship with science is based. There is no sound epistemological basis for relating religion and science. If religionists wish to form a bastardised academic speciality it should be called ‘Religion and Science’, not ‘Science and Religion’. But it cannot be a field of knowledge for the simple reason that theology is not one.

    That may seem an unpromising point from which to consider Dixon’s book, but it is, after all, not so unreasonable as it seems, for Dixon raises the issue of authoritative sources of knowledge without addressing any of the problems associated with the idea of authoritative knowledge. Religion, throughout the book, is merely assumed to produce knowledge. The bona fides of this purported knowledge and its sources are nowhere examined. However, clearly, to show that there is a substantive or meaningful relationship between religion and science, some epistemological work must be done. Dixon, however, never raises the question at all – not once. Yet he makes it clear that the “field” of Science and Religion is about harmonising science and religion. He says, for example:

    Academic work by scientists and theologians seeking to develop a harmonious interdisciplinary dialogue has been supported by a range of institutions, including the Roman Catholic Church, through the work of the Vatican Observatory, and also the John Templeton Foundation in America – a philanthropic organization particularly committed to supporting research that harmonizes science with religion. (411–14 [italics added])

    Earlier he had remarked that  “The goal of a constructive and collaborative dialogue between science and religion has been endorsed by many Jews, Christians, and Muslims in the modern world.” (248) The reader will have noticed a trend. The relationship between religion and science is being sought by religions, not by scientists. The decision has already been made. The Templeton Foundation supports research harmonising religion with science. (Notice how different it sounds when you turn it around like this, and put the word ‘religion’ first.) The idea of constructive and collaborative dialogue is an odd one in this context. How would scientists and religions collaborate, and what constructive contributions can religion make to the work of scientists? Those questions are never asked and therefore never answered in the course of this book.

    This leaves a difficult question. If the supposed constructive and collaborative dialogue is not what the field of Religion and Science is all about, what is it about? The answer to that question is unclear. So far as I can tell it is not really about anything in particular. It raises a lot of questions that are raised for religion by the growth of science, but there is no obvious or consistent relationship between the questions that are thus raised. Certainly, if Dixon’s book is a fair introduction to the “subject”, as he claims it is, then at least this reader came away wondering what “subject” the book was really about. At no point, for instance, are any epistemological issues raised which show some relationship between scientific knowledge and religious belief. Dixon does tell us at one point that “[s]cience is unable to tell us why there is something rather than nothing.” ( 888–89) Clearly, Stephen Hawking would disagree (see Hawking and  Mlodinow, The Grand Design (New York: Bantam Books, 2010). But even if it should turn out that Hawking is wrong about this, it is still not obvious that religion can do this either. Religions can certainly tell us what they believe to be true, but they cannot produce good reasons for thinking that they are right.

    The truth seems to be that the principal subject matter of the supposed “field” of Religion and Science is to call into question the claim that some religious believers think has been made, namely, that, to use Dixon’s words, there is “an inevitable conflict between science and religion.” ( 236) It is worth saying at the outset that there is really very little question about conflict between science and religion, and the claim that there is such conflict is quickly shown by, to take but one example, the religious insistence that creationism should be taught along with evolutionary biology in the science classroom. However, the idea that there is an inevitable conflict is a different claim altogether, and one that has seldom been made. In general, science and religion do not conflict, because science deals with knowledge of the world, and religion does not deal with knowledge. Conflict arises only at those points where there is disagreement between the findings of science and the deliverances of supposed religious revelations. Where religion has not spoken – for example, with respect to theoretical entities like quarks and leptons – there is no occasion for conflict, because religion is simply silent about such things. So, in general, the task of Dixon’s “academic field” of Science and Religion is to show that there is some kind of harmony between religious claims, based upon revelation, or the authority of churches and other religious bodies to define what will constitute reality for them, and those scientific issues which seem to be in conflict with those claims.

    Accordingly, the emphasis is placed just where one would expect to find it, on historical instances where it seems that there has been conflict between the growing epistemological confidence of science and the authoritative pronouncements of religious authorities. Two notable examples of this conflict are the condemnation of Galileo in 1633, and the religious response, often though not invariably negative, to Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution. Clearly, there was deep conflict in both cases, especially in the case of Galileo, who was not only threatened by the Inquisition with torture, but was also actually forced to recant, assigned penitential discipline, and placed under house arrest for the rest of his life. Yet the new “discipline” of Science and Religion holds that this was all a misunderstanding of the complex issues involved at the time. It follows that, in reality – if scholars in the “field” of science and religion are right – when the Vatican, in 1992, apologised for the condemnation of Galileo, they need have done no such thing, since the condemnation had nothing to do with a conflict between religion and science, which is simply based on a misunderstanding of the complex relationships between science and religion.

    The question, for Dixon, seems to be about the kind of conflict involved. There obviously was conflict, because someone ended up being punished. But was it a conflict between religion and science? According to Dixon, who suggests that he is giving us the tools to take an even-handed, dispassionate approach to the question, it was not a conflict between science and religion at all. As he says:

    The only thing to avoid is too narrow an idea of the kinds of conflicts one might expect to find between science and religion. The story is not always one of a heroic and open-minded scientist clashing with a reactionary and bigoted church. ( 252–4)

    So, how would Dixon describe the conflict between Galileo and the church, if not as a conflict between science and religion? Now, this is where Dixon’s discussion becomes very murky. Instead of coming right out and saying what kind of conflict he thinks is involved he becomes all “philosophical” and wiggly. His aim, as he says, is

    … to look historically at how we came to think as we do about science and religion, to explore philosophically what preconceptions about knowledge are involved, and to reflect on the political and ethical questions that often set the unspoken agenda for these intellectual debates.  ( 271–73)

    But there is a basic misunderstanding here. Dixon wants to dissolve the science-religion conflict into its political and ethical dimensions, as well as to show some kind of weak parallel between supposedly religious “ways of knowing” and scientific ways of knowing, between religious authority and the authority of science. And this is where Dixon’s discussion becomes hopelessly confused.

    For example, he suggests that there is a parallel between religious ways of responding to the night sky and scientific ways of doing the same thing. The point that he is trying to make is that both science and religion do violence to what we perceive by our senses. For example, science tells us that the solid objects around us are constituted mainly of empty space and the forces between “particles” (and we put the word ‘particles’ in scare quotes, because Dixon wants to allow for both realism about the entities of physics and anti-realism or instrumentalism). But we must ask: In what way is this to do violence to our senses? Part of what physics does, whether we are realists or anti-realists about the theoretical particles of physics, is to explain why things appear to our senses in the way that they do. The very complex theories that help to explain this show that, in order to come up with reliable explanations, we cannot simply take what appears to us as the end product of explanation. We have to do complex research and experimentation in order to distinguish reliable theories from unreliable ones – or in epistemological terms to distinguish what is true from what is false.

    For instance, Galileo did some very simple experiments with mass and motion, and concluded that what we think will happen – that heavy objects will fall faster than lighter ones – is mistaken. But this doesn’t do violence to our senses. It gives us a more precise description of what we can verify by means of our senses. Same with his telescope. By seeing the moons of Jupiter, he completely overturned what appears to be the common-sense account of the universe, that the earth is at the centre of things and everything revolves around the earth. But everything doesn’t. Some things revolve around Jupiter.

    Now see how this fits in with Dixon’s idea of the relationship between science and religion. Science, he says, is mediated by a tradition of inquiry, a tradition of authority. But religion is just the same. It is mediated by tradition too. So, when the scientist looks at the night sky, and gives an account of it, he or she is doing the same thing that is done by the religious person, only the conclusions that they arrive at are mediated by different traditions. Take what Dixon says about the religious person’s response to the night sky.

    In the religious case, what intevenes between the light hitting your retina and your thoughts about the glory of God is the lengthy history of a particular sacred text, and its reading and interpretation within a succession of human communities. … Religious teachers, as much as scientific ones, try to show their pupils that there is an unseen world behind the observed one. ( 327–30)

    He prefaces this astonishing remark with the claim that “[i]ndividual religious experiences, like modern scientific observations, are made possible by long processes of human collaboration in a shared quest for understanding.” ( 326–7) But this is simply a false equivalence. We are not talking about unseen worlds. We are talking, when we are talking about science, about something which explains why we see what we do. The long process of human collaboration, in the case of religion, contributes nothing to this. It is only dubiously called a “quest for understanding” at all. Understanding what? is the question that springs immediately to mind, and Dixon has no answer. Certainly, it has nothing to do with unseen worlds.

    The world that science seeks to explain is not unseen at all. It’s the one that we live in. The unseen worlds of religion have no comprehensible relationship to the world of the senses. Religious “explanation” has no relationship to scientific explanation. We know this, because religion doesn’t explain the world. In fact, religion exists within a multitude of conflicting traditions of interpretation, all with their own incompatible stories of how the world came to be, and how we came to be in the world.

    Dixon says that the strategy of the “field” of Science and Religion is, first, “to replace the overarching image of conflict with that of complexity, and to put emphasis on the very different ways that science-religion interactions have developed” (Dixon, 2008, 333-34) in different times and places, local circumstances, and even national differences. And then he goes on to suggest that, though there are real conflicts, the conflicts are really political, not between science and religion at all. For example, in the United States, the conflict between science and religion is really a conflict over who should control “the educational agenda” (350), and not a conflict between religion and science in any ordinary sense. But of course, while it is true that science-religion conflicts almost always have a political dimension, this doesn’t diminish the sense in which it is really science and religion which are in conflict.

    There is almost a sense of passing through the looking glass in the Dixon’s discussion of science-religion conflicts. For example, he speaks, in defence of the fact that the science-religion conflict is really political, of “… the recent development of ‘science and religion’ as an academic field in its own right,” (402) as though the existence of this “field” raises no questions. And then he immediately speaks of “the relationship between natural knowledge and revelation,” (403) as if this is simply unproblematic. But is there any reasonable epistemological basis for speaking of revelation? Even if there are different interpretations of what science does, whether scientific conclusions are understood realistically or instrumentally, say, there is good epistemological warrant for them. But where is the epistemological warrant for the idea of revelation? Just because religions speak about revelation is not sufficient to give authority to revelation as a source of knowledge. After all, there are so many incompatible “revelations” that the chance of any one of them being a genuine revelation of a god is vanishingly small.

    Dixon even gets so carried away by the complexity of the “field”, that he thinks of Richard Dawkins as a contributor to it! The strange thing is that when he speaks of Dawkins’ contribution, he changes the word ‘field’ to ‘topic’ (cf. 422) And when he speaks about the “field” it is very clear that it is a religious undertaking, and has no relationship with science at all, as the following (already quoted passage) makes clear:

    Academic work by scientists and theologians seeking to develop a harmonious interdisciplinary dialogue has been supported by a range of institutions, including the Roman Catholic Church, through the work of the Vatican Observatory, and also the John Templeton Foundation in America – a philanthropic organization particularly committed to supporting research that harmonizes science with religion. (411-414)

    But in what sense does this describe an “interdisciplinary dialogue” and not just an attempt by religiously inclined scientists and scientifically inclined religionists to assimilate science to religion? Until religion can provide epistemic warrant for its claims, there isn’t even a discipline of theology. Dixon acknowledges that the concern to harmonise religion and science is, as he says, “partly driven by apologetic motives” (425), but it is not clear that he ever fulfils his promise to show that there are “purely academic considerations” (427) involved.

    Take the case of Galileo. Usually, this is taken – correctly, in my view – as the opening round in the conflict between science and religion. But Dixon suggests a retelling of the story in such a way that it becomes “a disagreement among 17th-century Catholics about how to read the Bible.” (469) Dixon puts this retelling in the context of an account of how we know anything, and suggests that if we think of what was happening in this disagreement in philosophy of science terms we will see that what was happening in the disagreement between Galileo and the Inquisition was a more complex disagreement about the nature of human knowledge, and less a simple conflict between science and religion. He does this by considering two metaphors, Bacon’s metaphor of natural knowledge as something of God’s own planting, and the metaphor of the book of nature. So we have two books, the book of nature, and the book of God’s revelation, both of them coming from God, and both of them requiring interpretation. And then he says:

    … the project of discerning an author’s intentions in a text is a difficult and controversial one. The histories of science and religion reveal that these difficulties have been experienced in full measure in relation to both of God’s books. (499-500)

    And this he follows up with the claim that “[n]either nature nor scripture offers a transparent account of its author’s intentions.” (501) And, while acknowledging that we don’t need to think of nature as a book in need of interpretation, or of scripture (which scripture did he have in mind?) as revelation, he nowhere provides any basis at all for speaking of revelation. He seems to take it for granted that there is a revelation, so that we can speak without complication of “[r]evealed knowledge [as] produced by a supernatural uncovering of truth,” (511) but there is simply no convincing evidence that we have such knowledge, and Dixon provides us with none.

    In the absence of such evidence the conflict between Galileo and the Inquisition is not one about the authority of different sources of knowledge, (cf. 516-17) it is simply a conflict between science, with its empirical evidence, and religion, with its unfounded claim to ‘a supernatural uncovering of truth.’ And even if the religious try to “reconcile their readings of God’s two books without doing violence to either” (527), there is simply no reason to suppose that God has written anything at all.

    So, when we come to the conflict between Galileo and the church, and Dixon brings all these ideas into play, he concludes that Galileo’s argument, that the distinction between knowledge of the world by means of observation, and experiment, and knowledge of salvation by means of scripture and revelation, applied to his case, (532-33) did not convince the authorities, and that this failure did not amount to a conflict between science and religion. After all, says Dixon, “there were limits to show how far the authority of the Bible and the of the church could be challenged by an individual layman like Galileo. He went beyond those limits.” (533-34) Well, yes, he did, didn’t he? And that’s just where the conflict between religion and science comes into play.

    Even if Galileo was in a minority amongst the scientific community of his day, as Dixon claims (537), and even if the astronomy of Ptolemy was better at making some calculations than the Copernican system which Galileo accepted, Galileo’s observations showed that Ptolemy couldn’t have been right, since there is more to astronomy than just making calculations about the positions of the planets. The pope may have taken an instrumental or anti-realist view of science, as Dixon suggests (642-43), but there are other things that Galileo’s observations explained that Ptolemy’s astronomy did not explain, such as the reason why Venus and Mercury can only be seen at dusk and twilight, and why some satellites, like Jupiter’s moons, did not orbit the earth. Dixon thinks that an objective observer “would have pronounced the scientific question an open one ….” (630) But, even if that were true – which in my opinion it is not, since, after all, this is the path that science followed shortly thereafter – the question of the authority of the Bible is still simply irrelevant to these issues. Dixon says that Galileo was punished “for disobeying the Church, rather than for seeking to understand the natural world through observation and reasoning ….” (624-25)

    But this is just silly, since Galileo produced the evidence for his observations and reasoning, and he was forced to recant the conclusions to which he was led by them. Dixon has an answer to this. Since the history of science is the graveyard of dead theories, Dixon says, and “there is no reason to suppose that today’s successful theories are true,” (674-5) there is, presumably, no reason for faulting the pope for dismissing Galileo’s arguments. But there is every reason in the world for supposing that today’s theories are true, because these are the theories that are supported by the evidence, and others are not. The theories may have to be held provisionally, since they may come to grief, but there is every reason for believing them to be true, and until contrary evidence is found, no reason to believe them false. When the church disciplined Galileo, and forced him to recant, it dismissed his evidence and reasoning, not based on contrary evidence, but on the belief that the church’s sacred text had authority over any claims that were made about the nature of the world. And what is this but a conflict between science and religion. The only acceptable way of resolving this conflict was by doing more scientific observation, not by condemning Galileo for going beyond the limits of acceptable challenge to the authority of the Bible and the church.

    Not only that, but Dixon even accuses Galileo of forcing the church to declare these conclusions heretical! So, not only did Galileo exceed his authority, he’s really to blame for the church’s conservative reaction. It seems that, in order to assimilate science to religion, no response is too absurd:

    By drawing new attention to Copernicanism and to the Church’s attitude to scripture, Galileo had succeeded in having the former declared heretical and in seeing the latter hardened and entrenched in a more conservative position. (599-600)

    What can one say to that except – “Wow!”? Or maybe “Whoa, baby!” We are told that the conflict between Galileo and the church was not a conflict between science and religion, but then we are told that Galileo’s actions hardened the church’s conservative position and forced the church to declare Copernicanism heretical!

    There’s got to be something deeply wrong with this conclusion. Indeed, it shows, clearly, I think, that the whole “field” of Science and Religion is misconceived from the start. It is built on the assumption that there are two different sources of knowledge, each with its own legitimate authority, and the task of the “field” of Science and Religion is to come up with some way of harmonising these authorities. But surely the simple truth is that religion has not been able to provide an authoritative source of knowledge, or a method for distinguishing between what is true or false in the religious account of the world. The multiplicity of religions is alone enough to confirm this.

    But there is something else that is particularly notable about Dixon’s treatment of the trial and condemnation of Galileo, and the lengths he appears to be willing to go in order to exonerate the church. For, there is not one mention of the Index of Prohibited Books (Index Librorum Prohibitorum) in Dixon’s book – not one. Now, surely this is a remarkable oversight in a book that claims to be providing the tools for thinking reasonably about the relationship of religion and science. The Index was established in 1559, a good 74 years before the trial and condemnation of Galileo. And while Dixon says that the Galileo forced the church to declare Copernicanism heretical, Johannes Kepler’s Epitome astronomiae Copernicianae, was on the Index from 1621 to 1835, and Copernicus’ work was already there, placed on the Index in 1611, and it also remained there until 1835. The last edition of the Index was issued in 1948, and the Index was not abolished until 1966. Surely, not to mention a religious institution that lasted for so long, and which prohibited, in its time, most of the greatest works of science and scholarship of the modern period, is a serious lacuna in a study aimed at exploring the relationship between science and religion. The failure betrays a degree of scholarly bias which leads one to wonder how the book got past the Oxford University Press editors, and alone calls into question the basic premise of the book about the existence of an academic “field” of Science and Religion.

    When I began this review I had intended to look in some detail at the conflict between religion and science as it pertains to Darwin and the theory of evolution. Of course, it is evident that there is an incredible amount of conflict between forms of fundamentalist religion and evolutionary biology. Dixon may, as we have seen, want to see this conflict as mainly political, but this is irrelevant. It is political because it is a conflict between religion and science, which is bound to have political ramifications. And while it is true that many learned religious people, especially in the mainstream of Christianity, accepted evolution, as the evidence clearly requires, it is still true to say that there is a fundamental incompatibility between religion and evolutionary biology. It was an incompatibility that was recognised by Darwin. And while it is true that some religious people are prepared to accept evolution as a purely algorithmic process, most religious people, even very liberal religious believers, cannot dispense with the notion that, whatever we may say about the rest of life on earth, the existence of human beings is somehow purposed and therefore privileged.

    But Darwin had noticed something that most religious believers simply have not even considered. It is said that after his beloved daughter Annie died of tuberculosis at the age of 10, Darwin stopped attending church. He would accompany his family to the church door, and then carry on with his morning walk. Why? Scarcely anyone asks this question. Why did his daughter’s death topple whatever semblance of faith he had managed to preserve, mainly for his wife’s sake, over whose letter expressing her sense that life would not be worthwhile if she could not believe that they would be reunited after death, he had so often cried? I think I know the answer. It was not just that someone deeply loved had died. The reason was that Darwin had seen, in the death of his ten-year-old daughter, the process of natural selection at work, and the horror of that process, the pain and suffering and the snuffing out of a bright life and all its hopefulness, made it brutally clear that this was an impersonal process, indifferent and blind to the suffering it caused. This was not the product of a caring or benevolent being. It was a mechanical process in which life was indifferently selected for or selected out, much like a stock breeder will choose between the animals that are chosen as studs for breeding and those that are turned into steers for slaughter. And Annie had been selected out. Belief in God could not survive that.

    Dixon says that the world scarcely needed Darwin to point out that suffering, violence and death “were features of the natural world in general and of human life in particular.” (1192) Well, no, of course it didn’t. But Dixon misses the new dimension that Darwin’s theory adds to the problem of evil. Evolution plans suffering and death into the very process of “creation” itself. Indeed, evolution is the problem of evil magnified. It is one thing to recognise that there is suffering, violence and death in the world, and that, in itself, has been a virtually unsolvable problem for religion. Epicurus’ argument, quoted by Hume, seems to be decisive. “Is he willing to prevent evil but not able? then he is incompetent. Is he able but not willing? then he is malevolent. Is he both willing and able? whence then is evil?” (Dialogues of Natural Religion, Part X) But if God has planned additional suffering into the very process by which he creates life, then the problem of evil is simply magnified. Not being able to create life without suffering, violence and death is problem enough. But creating life by means of suffering, violence and death: that’s another problem altogether. This Dixon does not see.

    Aside from its magnification of the problem of evil, the real problem with evolution from the religious standpoint is, as Dixon himself observes, that it obliterates the boundary between human beings and the rest of life on earth. (1198-99) But then he goes on to quote the pope (Benedict-Ratzinger):

    We are not [says the pope] some casual and meaningless product of evolution. Each of us is the result of a thought of God. Each of us is willed, each of us is loved, each of us is necessary. (1234-35)

    And then Dixon, misleadingly, I think, goes on to say this:

    The Pope’s warnings are not against evolution as a science, but against adopting the idea of evolution as an overarching view that deprives the world of meaning and purpose. (1236-37)

    This is simply a misunderstanding of what the pope said. The pope’s statement is the statement of a religious conviction that is in immediate and direct conflict with evolutionary science. It assumes that thinking of ourselves as the unpurposed products of evolution is to deprive the world of meaning and purpose. In response to this the pope contrives to spin evolution in such a way as to maintain the barrier between ourselves and the rest of life on earth. But this is imply a rejection of the theory of evolution. It is not a harmonising of religion and science, but a desperate subversion of the conclusions of science themselves.

    And this is a misunderstanding that runs through the whole book. There are all sorts of other matters raised in Dixon’s book, questions about miracles, for instance, or about determinism and quantum indeterminacy, and how science and religion relate in each case. “Pity the poor theologians!” he cries, “They are faced with a seemingly impossible dilemma when it comes to making sense of divine action in the world.” (745) Either God’s acts are few, and inexplicable. Why in this case if not in that? Or God does not act at all, and simply creates the processes that govern the world, and lets things unfold as the laws of nature decree. In the first lemma, as he points out later, “divine inaction is as hard to explain as divine action.” (967-68) But in the second, God is simply a deist first cause, and not the god of religion at all. In the light of this, would it not be better simply to acknowledge that there is no reason for believing that there is any evidence for the divine anywhere in the world? And if there is no such evidence, what reason is there for believing? The attempt to harmonise religion and science (rather than science and religion) is in fact an attempt to reinterpret scientific findings in such a way that they can be reconciled with people’s religious beliefs, so that people can hold incompatible ideas in their minds without noticing the incompatibility. This will also make it look as if science and religion never conflict, but this is just for religious consumption. It has absolutely nothing to do with history, and even less to do with science.

    Thomas Dixon, Science and Religion: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: University Press, 2008)

  • Court rules against Helen Ukpabio and the Liberty Gospel Church

    Today a Federal High Court in Calabar in Cross River State, presided over by Justice P.J. Nneke, dismissed the application by Helen Ukpabio and some members of the Liberty Gospel Church seeking to enforce their fundamental rights against Akwa Ibom state government, the Commissioner of Police of Cross River state, Assistant Inspector General of Police, Leo Igwe, Sam Ituama, Gary Foxcroft and others as respondents for daring to organize a workshop which they perceived to be critical of their activities. They asked the respondents to pay them 200 billion naira ($.1.3 million dollars) in damages.

    The court wondered why Helen and her church members attacked some of the respondents and still came to court to enforce their fundamental rights for the mere reason that the victims of the attack dared report the matter to the police. The court dismissed the application and awarded costs of 20,000 naira(184 dollars) against Helen and her church members. Helen Ukpabio, her church members and her lawyers were not in court today for the ruling.

    It should be recalled that last year over 150 thugs from Helen Ukpabio’s Liberty Gospel Church invaded the venue of a workshop on Witchcraft and Child Rights in Calabar. They attacked and beat up the organizers of the program. The police intervened and arrested some of them; in their statement they said they were sent by Helen Ukpabio to disrupt the event. Shortly after the arrest, Helen and her church members went to court to enforce their fundamental rights. Early this year, Helen’s lawyers did not appear in court on two occasions and the court had to strike out the case. But a month later, the leader of her legal team Victor Ukutt went to court and re-listed the case.

    “This is a landmark judgment and a victory of the rule of law over the law of the jungle. I am greatly delighted that the court has sent a strong message to Helen and her church members who have continued to use their connections to evade justice and to undermine the cause of reason, enlightenment and human rights.”

  • Polygamy in Canada Should Remain Illegal

    Polygamy is illegal in Canada but to date no one has been arrested or faced the consequences for being in a polygamist relationship.  This inaction has led to no enforcement of the law.  Such policies allow polygamist families to legally enter Canada by declaring the first wife as the legal wife and the second, third and fourth “wives” as dependents along with their children. Young girls are pushed into polygamy relationships by the leaders of their parents’ religion.  A wave of women involved in polygamy fled from Bountiful (BC) and presented their case publicly.  Books and articles were written by these brave women.  They discussed the effects of polygamy on their lives and their children, they talked about women’s oppression, sexual abuse and of men’s aggression towards young girls.  They described child sexual abuse masquerading as a marriage and child trafficking for the purpose of marriage.  Some courageous women went even further and discussed the effects of polygamy in society at large.  Sadly no law enforcement was involved in any of these cases, even though Act 293 was present on the law books.

    Now after all the reports by these women bringing attention to the plight of being caught in a polygamy relationship, and after all the evidence of injustice, discrimination and abuse, something is actually happening.  But not for women and children who have suffered in polygamy relationships, not for the ones who put their lives in danger by presenting their cases to media.  Instead the situation allows for further victimization of women and compromising women’s right for the sake of religious rights. This is a disgrace to humanity.

    Today there was a challenge over Section 293 of the Criminal Code in the British Columbia Supreme Court.  The attempt was to de-criminalize polygamy.  The distressing part is that the attempt was said to be beneficial for women!  The following are some statements that have been put forward under the name of women’s rights ! 

    •  Polygamy laws actually helped enable abuse in closed, religious communities such as the one in Bountiful. – Beverley Baines   
    • Women in legal polygamous marriage will not be able to immigrate to Canada.  – Beverley Baines   
    • The door is legally closed for women in Canada who want to terminate their polygamous relationship.  – Beverley Baines     
    • Because Canada has adopted a policy of multiculturalism, it follows that Canada needs to adapt laws to accommodate the diversity of the population. – Beverley Baines     

    The reality is the law in Canada needs to be more progressive which means a move more towards gender equality that is not based on an assumption of gender equality as we are far behind it.  Some residents involved in polygamy in Canada still follow the 7th century tradition of Sharia law, and some remain hundred years behind the civilized world.  The authorities need to enforce progressive laws and regulations or else women will never be able to gain full and unconditional equality.  Only by putting in place laws and progressive measures women will be able to gain complete equality in Canada.  I am for repealing of any law and regulation that restricts the rights of women and puts them in position as second class citizens.   

    It should be known to everyone by now that women in Islamic communities are pressured by their family, members of the community and religion to become involved in a degrading relationship such as polygamy.  In these communities, men are considered as “head of the family”.  He is in charge of the family’s finance, choice of residence, up–bringing of the children, and control of the social interaction of his wife and children.  Can anyone see gender equality in this picture?  That is not all, men have right to marry more than one wife and many seegheh (temporary wives).  Women in these sects, cults or Islamic communities would never, ever have the right to have two or three husbands at the same time.  The consequences of getting emotionally involved with another man is harsh, sometimes as harsh as losing their life or being disowned by all members of their community.  Women are forbidden to see their own children.  All these injustices are happening in all provinces of Canada. 

    I am perplexed how someone can call oneself a concerned global citizen but close her or his eyes to the inhuman treatment of women and children.   

    After 100 years of having a law that makes polygamy illegal in Canada, polygamy still goes on.  It is not the fault of Act 293.  It is because although the Act is on the law books, it has never been enforced by the police and the court system.  I believe for the past seventy years only one case went through the court system in this regard.

    Polygamy needs to remain illegal but Act 293 needs to be amended.  Right now the assumption of this Act is that women and men have gained gender equality and women willingly enter into these relationships.  The truth is because of the adopted policy of multiculturalism, some sects and cults who have been living in this country for past century never had chance to live according to today’s progressive ways of living.  The policy of multiculturalism has put thick invisible walls between communities.  Each community lives according to their home country culture, traditions and religion.  They are encouraged to do so.  In some cases these communities receive financial support and validation from the Canadian government in order to keep their way of living instead of integrating in Canadian society.

    In all these equations, there is no consideration for women’s rights.  It should not come to our surprise if we hear or witness women are set on fire and are burnt for losing their virginity, young girls and women face honour killings for not being obedient or for having a boyfriend in Canada.  Child trafficking for the sake of marriage is another down side of multiculturalism.

    Therefore as long as the policy of multiculturalism maintains in Canada, gender equality is out of picture, so to prosecute women who are involved in polygamy relationships is a joke.  I believe Act 293 prosecutes women and men equally for being in polygamist relationship.  As I said it before, the assumption is that men and women have an equal say in their marriage.  Most women involved in polygamy relationship have no control over their body and mind.  The right of choice has been taken from them right from birth by their parents, culture, and religion. 

     It is justified to say the Act 293 must get amended in such a way that all men or anyone who performs or assists in polygamy marriages must be arrested and prosecuted for the crime against women and children.

    We need to get a lot tougher with polygamists and start prosecuting men and religious leaders who perform such a marriages.  Polygamy is a disgrace to gender equality. 

     It has been said that to criminalize polygamy is against the Charter of Rights of Freedom of religion.  Women’s rights and children’s rights must not be compromised under any circumstances and that includes religion.  As everyone is aware, in Islam and some other restricted religions, child brides is an on going practice even in Canada, behind the closed doors by laws such as Sharia laws.  But because it is an ongoing practice, we did not drop the Act for Universal Rights of the Child to suite Sharia law or of any other religion, for the sake of freedom of religion.  Instead child brides are considered a crime and men caught in this matter would face charges for sexual assault.  The same should go towards polygamy.  Religions should be declared as private affair of the individuals and not allowed to interfere with any law in Canada.  The civilization in 21st century should not tolerate interference of religion in laws and regulation.

    I have been aware that a woman with two male common–law partners is challenging the polygamy law in Canada.

    In response to this case I must say in this particular situation gender equality exists, all three parties have control over their own bodies and minds.  They are all adults and there is no form of coercion to push them into this relationship.  They all have equal rights in their family setting.  They all equally make decisions concerning the family’s property and finances and all matters concerning cohabitation.  They all participate in caring for children in their family.  In this case free and consensual sexual relationship is undeniable right.  They are completely free in deciding over their sexual relationship.  Voluntary relationships of adults with each other are their private affair and no person or authority has the right to scrutinize it, interfere with it or make it public.  I consider this relationship modern and progressive. This revolutionary relationship does not need any permission (marriage license) from the government or any religious leaders.   This case is not comparable with adult women living in sects or cults or in Islamic communities in Canada.  They can not be put in the same category.  One belongs to today’s modern world while the other belongs to an ancient time.  How else can one describe it, when adult women practically have no choice to choose their own partners?  They are never able to live with two male partners, not even in their dreams.  

     In these closed communities women have no control over their sexuality and have to accept the husband her parents or the elder of her community chooses for her.  And if she disagrees, she will face harsh consequences.  No free women ever will agree to be in a relationship with someone she has no feeling for.  

    Polygamy in Canada should remain illegal and enforced by police in order to empower women and eliminate discrimination against women; in order to abolition of man’s privileges as the so-called “head of the household”; in order to prevent degradation and violent treatment of women and girls in the family. In order to eliminate any form of degrading, male-chauvinistic, patriarchal and unequal treatment of women in family, community and public institutions.

    homawpi@nosharia.com

    www.nosharia.com          

    416-737-9500

  • Scientists Anonymous

    I recently chanced upon Scientists Anonymous: Great Stories of Women in Science (2005), by Patricia Fara, Senior Tutor and Director of Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Clare College, Cambridge. Aside from her several popular books on science, Dr Fara is relatively well-known in the UK for her contributions to Melvyn Bragg’s BBC Radio 4 series “In Our Time”, on which she has featured on seven occasions in the years 2008-2010. Scientists Anonymous is published in the series Wizard Books (the children’s imprint of Icon Books), and is designed to be read by teenage schoolchildren. This to some extent dictates the style the author has chosen, and she succeeds in making it a very readable book.

    As the title implies, Fara provides brief sketches of the life and work of a large number of women who have made contributions to science, grouped under a variety of chapter headings. It’s a pretty mixed bunch, with a few well-known names, a number of women who certainly should be better known, and many of no great significance in scientific history. Overall Fara does a good job of showing teenage children that women have played a role in science that has not been widely recognized, but the book is unfortunately marred by the author’s propensity to overdo the current fashion for depicting women as the inevitable victims of male prejudice regardless of specific situations where a more nuanced approach would be more appropriate.

    In what follows I shall be focusing on passages where Fara has, to a greater or lesser degree, misrepresented the situation she is describing in the interests of this agenda. This is not meant to devalue much of the content, or the intention of the author in drawing attention to the work of female scientists and mathematicians, but to emphasize the important principle that authors of non-fiction books, especially those addressed to children, should approach their subject matter as dispassionately as possible. What such books should not do is to carry an implicit message that is conveyed by exaggeration, tendentious selection of material, and even misrepresentation of the historical facts as is occasionally the case here.

    The underlying tone of much of the book is set from the beginning, in the chapter with the title “Present”: “Many people argue that it is a waste of time teaching girls physics, because they are inherently incapable of grappling with mathematical equations and lack a good 3-D imagination” (Fara 2005, p. 14). I have been interested in science, education and politics for longer than I care to remember and I have never heard, or read, anyone asserting such an absurd notion in the crude terms expressed by Fara, let alone “many people”.

    It would take a very lengthy essay to fully demonstrate all the deficiencies in Fara’s accounts, so a number of choice examples will have to suffice. For instance, Fara includes Rosalind Franklin in the introductory section under the heading “Nobel Prizes” as a “famous example” of women “excluded because of her sex” from a Nobel Prize joint award (p. 174). But Franklin was dead when the 1962 Prize in physiology or medicine was awarded to Francis Crick, James Watson and Maurice Wilkins for their contributions to the discovery of the structure of the DNA molecule, and it is a condition of the Prize that it is not awarded posthumously – as Fara herself implicitly acknowledges later in the section on Franklin! (p. 186). (Though she immediately adds, “In 1962, three men were awarded the prize for DNA, and many people feel that she was treated unfairly”, which rather muddies the water.)

    Fara’s account of Franklin’s experiences at King’s College London in the early 1950s mixes valid points about the treatment of women in many science departments in that era with tendentious misrepresentation of the facts. She writes: “[Franklin] had been told that she would be in charge of the X-ray diffraction unit, but in fact a senior researcher called Maurice Wilkins was already using X-rays to analyse DNA. From the very beginning, Franklin felt she was excluded from normal laboratory life, and her relationship with Wilkins deteriorated until they were scarcely on speaking terms” (p. 187).

    Compare this with the account by Brenda Maddox in Rosalind Franklin: The Dark Lady  of DNA (HarperCollins, 2002), an author without an axe to grind. Maddox notes that, thanks to a letter from head of the biophysics section John Randall shortly before she joined his department, Franklin was under the misapprehension that Wilkins would be “moving off DNA”, leaving her in charge of the X-ray work. She made this clear in no uncertain terms to Wilkins, who was “profoundly shaken” by her words, especially as he was assistant director of the lab. (Maddox 2002, pp. 114, 149-150.) This was a major factor in the rift that developed between Franklin and Wilkins. (It does not take much to imagine what Fara would have made of the situation had a male newcomer to the department warned off Franklin from the work she had previously been doing.).

    Fara writes that at King’s, Franklin “soon realised that women were discriminated against. She was even banned from entering the special coffee room where male scientists often discussed their work” (p. 187). She is presumably alluding to the exclusion of women from the King’s senior common room, but in other respects her claim of discrimination is wide of the mark. In the context of the male-dominated world of university physics departments Maddox says of the head of the biophysics section, John Randall: “Randall’s lab offered a strong contrast to this misogyny. Not only did he have many women on his staff, but they tended to find him as an employer sympathetic and helpful” (p. 134). Elsewhere Maddox writes in relation to Anne Sayre’s book Rosalind Franklin and DNA (1975) (which she describes as “marred by a feminist bias”): “As a biographer writing nearly three decades later and given access to Franklin’s personal correspondence, I found… a King’s College more congenial and welcoming to women scientists than Sayre had allowed. I also found that Franklin felt singularly unhappy at King’s, not so much because of her gender, but because of her class and religion: a wealthy Anglo-Jew felt out of place in a Church of England setting dominated by swirling cassocks and students studying for the priesthood.” (“The double helix and the ‘wronged heroine’.” Nature, vol. 421, 23 January 2003.) Perhaps more relevant in this context is that “The biophysics unit included a number of ex-military men [i.e., young men who had served in the armed forces in the Second World War] who had come to King’s for an intensive two-year undergraduate course, and who remained on, working together as a team… In short, an upper-middle-class Anglo-Jewish woman with French tastes in serious discourse suddenly found herself in an environment friendly to everything she was not.” (Maddox 2002, p. 128.)

    In the immediate aftermath of the publicity surrounding Crick and Watson’s discovery of the double helical structure of the DNA molecule, the crucial role that Franklin’s work with X-ray diffraction photographs played was not fully appreciated, not least because the two men working at Cambridge failed to draw sufficient attention to it. However, Fara provides her readers with a misleading account of the episode that enabled Watson to see Franklin’s celebrated DNA X-ray diffraction photo 51. She writes that “Behind her back, he persuaded Wilkins to show him an X-ray photograph that only Franklin, who was exceptionally skilled and systematic, had managed to obtain” (p. 188). In fact Watson had no knowledge of the photograph, taken some eight months earlier, until Wilkins “unguardedly” showed it to him in January 1953, having “no idea it would strike Watson with the force of revelation.” (Maddox 2002, pp. 195-196; see also J. Watson, The Double Helix, 1968, pp. 132-133.)

    Incidentally, Wilkins himself had no knowledge of the photograph until Franklin’s research student Ray Gosling “brought it to him some time that January. Gosling, preparing to complete his thesis without Rosalind’s supervision [in July 1952 her application to join John Bernal’s crystallography department at Birkbeck College London had been formally accepted], had every reason to show what was also his own current work to the assistant head of the department. ‘Maurice had a perfect right to that information,’ Gosling said, looking back. ‘There was so much going on at King’s before Rosalind came.’ Both he and Wilkins knew that the DNA research would continue after she left.” (Maddox 2002, p. 196.) [1]

    On Watson’s much-condemned personal comments about Franklin in The Double Helix (1968), Fara provides her readers with her own paraphrase of his remarks, including the assertion that he “made offensive remarks about women scientists”, adding: “He later apologised, but he had probably only stated in print what many men were saying in private” (pp. 188-189). I have been unable to locate any such generalised remarks about “women scientists” in The Double Helix, and I suspect this is as gratuitous as Fara’s assertion about what “many men” say in private. But no doubt young female readers will get the message that Fara is evidently so keen to get across to them. (Incidentally, Watson did more than apologise for his personal remarks: in the Epilogue to the 1970 Penguin paperback edition of The Double Helix, he paid handsome tribute to her considerable scientific achievements as well as to her “exemplary courage and integrity” (p. 175).)

    In the section headed “Nobel Prizes” Fara writes: “Joyce [actually Jocelyn] Bell Burnell is a British astronomer who worked with the Cambridge team that discovered pulsars in the 1960s… According to Burnell, she should have shared the Nobel Prize that was awarded to her [PhD] supervisor” (p. 174). But this assertion is contradicted by Bell Burnell herself in a talk (later published in Annals of the New York Academy of Science, vol. 302, pp. 685-689, December 1977) in which she explained why she disagreed with those who thought she should have been awarded a share in the Nobel, her final point being: “I believe it would demean Nobel Prizes if they were awarded to research students, except in very exceptional cases, and I do not believe this is one of them.” (My own view, for what it’s worth, is that she should have been included in the award because of the exceptional way she persevered with confirming her results after her first discovery of the idiosyncratic radio signals.)

    In this same section Fara highlights the work of the superb Austrian physicist Lise Meitner, who coined the term “nuclear fission”. After making entirely valid points about the obstacles Meitner faced as a woman trying to pursue a career in physical science at the University of Berlin in the early years of the twentieth century, the author recounts events during the crucial period in the late 1930s. As head of the physics department, Meitner collaborated on nuclear physics with her friend and colleague, Otto Hahn, head of the chemistry department. (Hahn was in charge of  the experimental work, while Meitner supplied the theoretical expertise.) When Austria was annexed by Germany in 1938, Meitner (who was of Jewish descent) lost the protection her Austrian citizenship had given from Nazi racial laws, and had to escape clandestinely to Sweden. Fara reports: “When Hahn obtained some unexpected results, he turned to her [by letter] for help. With her nephew Otto Frisch, Meitner solved Hahn’s problem by working out how a uranium nucleus could split into two and release a gigantic amount of energy… Their long, close collaboration came abruptly to an end after Hahn published a paper separately from her, even though he had been helped by her insights. Working together, Meitner and Hahn had played a crucial role in modern physics, but although Meitner was nominated for a Nobel Prize, only Hahn received one.” (pp. 185-186)

    While Fara’s comments about the failure of the Nobel committee to award Meitner a share in the 1944 Prize for chemistry awarded to Hahn alone (“for his discovery of the fission of heavy nuclei”) are entirely justified, her account of events is misleading. Soon after Meitner had escaped to Sweden, Hahn and the brilliant young experimental chemist Fritz Strassman performed an experiment the results of which they found themselves unable to explain theoretically. In December 1938 Hahn and Strassman sent a manuscript to the journal Naturwissenschaften (published in January 1939) reporting they had detected the element barium after bombarding uranium with neutrons, and Hahn simultaneously communicated their results to Meitner. She, together with her nephew Otto Frisch (a physicist who worked under Niels Bohr in Copenhagen), quickly worked out the theoretical explanation. In early 1939 two letters were sent to Nature, one signed by both with their theoretical explanation of Hahn and Strassman’s experimental results, the other signed by Frisch alone reporting his confirmation of those results after he returned to Copenhagen. (See Max Perutz, “A Passion for Science”, New York Review of Books, 20 February 1997.)

    So the problem was not that, as Fara has it, “Hahn published a paper separately from [Meitner]”, since the paper in question reported experimental results that he and Strassman had obtained when she was in Sweden. Meitner’s theoretical explanation (published with Frisch) was quite separate, and together these papers should have ensured Meitner a share in the Nobel Prize. Notably absent from Fara’s account is any mention of Strassman, who also deserved a share in the Prize, as was belatedly recognised when the prestigious Enrico Fermi Prize was awarded jointly to Hahn, Meitner and Strassman in 1966. (It is ironic that in popular accounts of the discovery of nuclear fission, the male scientist Strassman is frequently airbrushed out of the story, as in Fara’s narrative, despite his vital experimental role, and almost never is he mentioned as also unfairly missing out on a share in the 1944 Nobel Prize for chemistry.)

    The final entry in the section “Nobel Prizes” is Mileva Marić Einstein, under the subheading “Wife of a Genius”. Fara begins by stating that “Some historians claim that Mileva Einstein (1875-1948) was the true source of inspiration for Albert Einstein’s revolutionary theories of physics” (p. 189). In point of fact not a single one of the main proponents of this contention, Desanka Trbuhović-Gjurić, Dord Krstić, Senta Troemel-Ploetz, Evan Harris Walker and Margarete Maurer, is an historian (not that this would matter if the case they made was well founded). Historians of physics who have investigated the claims have all concluded that the contention is without foundation (notably John Stachel, but also Abraham Pais and Alberto A. Martínez). Fara goes on to observe that “if he did present her ideas as his own, it does seem strange that she never published anything separately”, but then depicts the situation in a characteristically tendentious way.

    She writes that Einstein and Marić “did discuss the new physics of relativity at home with each other, but this was probably because – like many scientists – he wanted an intelligent listener to sound out his ideas.” Strangely, Fara seems to be unaware of the well-known fact that Einstein had such a “listener” par excellence in his friend Michele Besso, with whom he discussed what would become his special relativity theory in intensive exchanges both at the Bern Patent Office where they worked, and on their common journey to their respective homes.

    Fara again: “Einstein may have started out with marvellous intentions, but it seems far more likely that after their marriage they slotted into a traditional relationship: he threw himself into his work, while she looked after their home and their family. Her case is sad, but also fascinating because it suggests what happened to many other female graduates – and still does.” Nowhere in her two page account does Fara mention the crucial fact that Marić twice failed the Zurich Polytechnic final diploma examination for teaching physics and mathematics in secondary school, nor that some two years after her second failure she lost their out-of-wedlock infant girl Lieserl, which undoubtedly left her temporarily in a state of depression. (It is not known whether Lieserl died, or was given up for adoption.) It was as a consequence of these events that Marić, understandably, gave up any ambition for a career in physics.

    Fara errs not only by omission, she falsely states that “both [Einstein and Marić] graduated” (p. 190). In the introductory section under the heading “Nobel Prizes” she had earlier written that “Mileva Einstein [was] also a physicist” (p. 175), though someone who twice failed the diploma exam for teaching physics and mathematics in secondary school, and never produced any known work in physics, can scarcely be so described. She continues: “If his wife were his hidden collaborator, then a woman would have been responsible for the most fundamental theories of modern physics. Unsurprisingly, not everyone agrees that she played such a crucial role.” Given the content of the preceding sentence, and the constant theme of the book, it is difficult to interpret Fara’s otherwise redundant use of the word “unsurprisingly” other than as suggesting that the fact that she was a woman was a significant factor in the rejection of the claim. This is an implicit, and totally unjustified, slur on the historians of physics cited above.

    Returning to her theme that Marić was unwillingly cast into the role of wife and mother, Fara reports Einstein’s saying “how happy he was to have a wife who ‘takes care of everything exceptionally well, cooks well, and is always cheerful” (p. 190). This is tendentiously expressed. Einstein (in a letter to Besso two weeks after his marriage) did not say how happy he was to have a wife who did all those things, he merely reported on the situation (Albert Einstein Collected Papers, Vol. 5, Doc.5). (Without doubt he was happy with the situation, but the insinuation that that was how he essentially saw Marić’s appropriate place in his life is contradicted by his repeated encouragement for Marić in her studies when they were students, and his expressing to her his hopes for them to have a future life together working on physics, subsequently dashed by her double failure to pass the diploma exam.)

    Fara’s implicit contention that Marić’s ambition for a career was thwarted by Einstein’s selfish disregard of her wishes (pp. 190-191) is inconsistent with the evident contentment she felt in the first years of her marriage, as she indicated in letters to her close friend Helene Kaufler Savić  (M. Popović (ed.), In Albert’s Shadow, 2003, pp. 83, 86). (Incidentally, contrary to many accounts, in the early years of the marriage, Einstein was an attentive and loving father: “My husband often spends his leisure time at home playing with the little boy…” (2003, p. 88).)

    Following her writing “To get as far as university, Mileva Einstein must have been a very clever woman”, Fara asks: “So why did she never produced any original work?” (p. 190) The implication that one has to seek an explanation why a student who succeeds in getting to university doesn’t later produce any original work is rather odd, seeing that this has been the case with many hundreds of thousands of university students, and indeed applies to the great majority of science graduates. But the straightforward explanation, that Marić, like many students who attain high grades at high school, found university level physics and mathematics rather more challenging is taboo among almost all those who write on this subject. Rather than entertain this forbidden possibility, Fara seeks the explanation in Marić’s lacking “the extra spark of determination” essential for a woman to succeed against “so many obstacles” placed in front of her, or alternatively, to blame Einstein: “Another answer it is that she married the wrong man. Albert Einstein was so absorbed in his own career that he did little to encourage either her independence or her cooperation.” (See “Appendix” below for rebuttals of these alternatives provided by Fara.)

    Turning now to some other prominent women scientists and mathematicians featured in Scientists Anonymous, the talented mathematician Ada Lovelace (1815-1852) is rightly commended for her work in connection with the theoretical ideas of Charles Babbage for machines capable of performing complex calculations. Within this context Fara writes: “The ideas that Lovelace introduced would later revolutionise computing. Her outstanding innovation was the concept of computer programming” (p.110).

    Is this emphatic assertion an accurate summing-up of the historical record? Judging by her own contribution (and, especially, that of an expert on the history of computing) to the BBC radio programme on Lovelace in March 2008, it is not:  

    Melvyn Bragg: “Some people say that the Notes [published by Lovelace] contain what can be thought of as the first computer programme…”

    Patricia Fara: “There is some dispute about whether she actually wrote that bit of it, or whether Babbitt did, what she did, or they did together…”

    […]

    Doron Swade (Visiting Professor in the History of Computing at Portsmouth University): “The point I wanted to pick up on, to be exact about Ada being credited with being the first programmer, she published the first thing we would now recognise as the first programme, though programming was not a word they used at that time, and it’s absolutely understandable that she should be so perceived, because the first series of steps of instructions, we would now call it an algorithm, was published under her name, or at least, under her initials. The thing is that the work was Babbage’s… The concept of a programme, what we would now  call a programme… is based on Babbage’s work before Lovelace had any major involvement in the analytic engines… The actual principle of a programme was Babbage’s.”

    At this point Fara came in, but (significantly) did not attempt to dispute what Swade had just said. Evidently what Fara writes for what one might call a captive audience, one unlikely to have any knowledge of the subject, and what she says in a serious science programme in the company of her peers, are two rather different things.

    Emilie du Châtelet (1706-1749), who lived with her lover Voltaire for some fifteen years, was an extraordinary woman who played a crucial scientific role in enabling the work of Newton to gain acceptance in France. Fara justifiably draws attention to her virtual exclusion from the history of science and records her achievements. But she is unable to resist a gesture towards the background agenda of her book:

    “Together du Châtelet and Voltaire wrote France’s first main book on Newton’s physics [Elements of Newton’s Philosophy]… Their joint publication was a big success, and is often seen as a turning point in French physics, when people switched from Descartes to Newton. But, surprise, surprise – only Voltaire’s name was on the title page! However, the book did contain a long poem by Voltaire paying tribute to Emilie du Châtelet as a great genius who studied at his side.” (p. 71)

    Leaving aside the way she expresses this for her teenage readers, with her gratuitous sarcastic comment, is it so evidently the case that du Châtelet’s name should have appeared on the title page with Voltaire’s? Not so, one would gather, from the authoritative Emilie Du Châtelet: Selected Philosophical and Scientific Writings, edited by Judith P. Zinsser (University of Chicago Press, 2009), a book having the declared aim of renewing interest in an unfairly neglected scientific writer (pp. 16-22). While du Châtelet undoubtedly collaborated with Voltaire, Zinsser refers to Elements of Newton’s Philosophy as his (Voltaire’s) book on several occasions (pp. 8, 16, 53, 111, 119, 161), as does du Châtelet herself in a letter and book (pp. 60, 119). She even published critical reviews of the book (pp. 16, 111) and a critical comment in her Foundations of Physics (p. 119).

    According to Zinsser, as well as the poem to which Fara alludes Voltaire also “wrote a preface to his Elements that extolled du Châtelet’s role in its writing” (p. 59, n.13), something Fara omits to mention. Unfortunately, readers of Fara’s section might well, from its general tone, fail to appreciate just how widely acclaimed du Châtelet was in her lifetime: “In her own day, her published works brought her the learned reputation she sought” (p. 16).

    A brief comment on another woman featured in Fara’s book: she writes of the geologist Charles Lyell’s wife: “For his success, he depended on his wife, Mary Lyell, yet only his name appears on the title pages of the books which she helped him to write” (p. 104).

    Is it in fact the case that Charles Lyell’s success depended on the valuable assistance given by his wife (who became an accomplished conchologist) after their marriage? Hardly, since he married her in 1832, whereas the crucial research that underpinned his later work was undertaken without her presence well before that year, and the first volume of his celebrated Principles of Geology was published in 1830. Peter Whitfield writes:

    “… Principles of Geology (published in three volumes 1830-33) laid the foundations of the modern science of geology… […] Lyell’s views were the product of his all-important field-trips in the late 1820s in France and Italy, especially in the volcanic regions of the Auvergne and Sicily.”

    There are some sixty women featured in Fara’s book, and without a considerable amount of time-consuming research it is impossible to ascertain how accurately she has portrayed their various contributions to science and mathematics. It is a consequence of the author’s tendentious and not infrequent inaccuracies or misrepresentations in the case of scientists with whose work I am familiar that I have my doubts about how reliable these vignettes are, quite possibly unjustifiably in many instances. However, I would certainly advise that they be treated with caution. And considering Fara’s academic status, it is remarkable how many factual errors there are, including the howler that “Only one person, man or woman, has won two Nobel Prizes – Marie Curie” (p. 175). In fact, if we consider Nobel Prizes for science alone, there are two other double award recipients: John Bardeen (1956 and 1972) and Frederick Sanger (1958 and 1980).

    It is unfortunate enough that simplistic and often misleading accounts in relation to some of the more significant scientists above are promulgated without similarly tendentious accounts being published with the authority of a Senior Tutor in the History and Philosophy of Science at Cambridge University. That what Dr Fara writes may well be uncritically recycled is demonstrated by a short review commending the book in the Canadian Women in Science and Technology Newsletter (January to April 2007) that contains erroneous statements about the only two scientists whose work is briefly discussed. Likewise, Scientists Anonymous was the Critics Choice in the Guardian’s education section in October 2005 (i.e., a recommendation for its use in schools). And I suppose it was inevitable that Scientists Anonymous would be included in the reading list for the “In Our Time” BBC Radio 4 programme on “Women and Enlightenment Science” broadcast on 4 November 2010, in which Fara participated.

    I have had reason to comment before about academic feminists being cavalier with facts when writing on scientific topics. Scientists Anonymous unfortunately serves to confirm there is valid cause for concern.

    Note

    1. For a full account of the events leading to the discovery of the structure of DNA, see Watson Fuller, “Who said ‘helix’?”, Nature, vol. 424, 21 August 2003, pp. 876-878. Fuller writes: “The history of the discovery of DNA is too often presented in popular accounts in terms of results ‘stolen’ by Watson and Crick, with Franklin as the victim. Yet in the complex interactions in and between the two laboratories, it is not sustainable to view Franklin merely as a victim of other people’s actions. […] It was to the sad detriment not only of herself but also of the King’s laboratory as a whole that Franklin chose to work in isolation on a problem, the solution of which depended on confluent results from several workers using different techniques. This is particularly a matter for regret because the experimental work that Franklin performed at King’s was of the highest quality; her use of Patterson techniques to obtain structural information from fibre-diffraction data was highly innovative, if disappointing in its outcome. Franklin’s approach contrasted markedly with that of Wilkins, who made his results freely known.” (p. 876)

    Appendix: Mileva Marić

    With reference to Fara’s suggestion that Marić’s failure to achieve a scientific career was in part a consequence of “so many obstacles” that she had to face, it is certainly true that Marić had to overcome institutional barriers in Serbia for girls wishing to acquire a high school education in physics. However, once she had achieved her immediate goal of enrolling for a university level course in physics and mathematics in 1896 at the prestigious Zurich Polytechnic, this was no longer the case. Indeed, unlike Einstein (who was on bad terms with the professor of physics Heinrich Weber), in 1900 she was offered an Assistantship (Popović 2003, p. 61), but her failure in the final diploma examinations at least temporarily postponed the possibility of her career progressing in that direction, and her second failure the following year precluded it entirely.

    The other, glib, explanation that ultimately it was Einstein’s fault that she didn’t have a career in physics is again unsupported by the evidence. Passages encouraging her in her studies in letters in their student years and his expression of his wish for their eventually sharing a life of scientific endeavour together are testimony to his hopes for their future (Renn & Schulmann 1992, pp. 13-14, 15, 32, 33, 39, 54, 59), as was his encouraging her to jointly study books on advanced physics (pp. 9, 16, 35, 52, 72-73) and his regularly regaling her with his ideas on extra-curricular physics (pp. 14, 17, 18, 22, 37, 40, 41, 43, 45, 47, 53, 54, 68, 69, 71). Once she had failed the diploma examination for the second time in 1901 (while disadvantaged by being some three months pregnant), followed by the trauma of the loss of their out-of wedlock infant daughter, she evidently gave up her ambition to work on physics (Hans Albert Einstein, in G. J. Whitrow (ed.), Einstein: The Man and his Achievement, 1967, p. 19).

    Authors who emphasise Marić’s academic prowess base their contentions on her high school record in Serbia, where she excelled in physics and mathematics. However, her academic achievements thereafter are either not recorded in the literature or are patchy. Neither of her biographers, Trbuhović-Gjurić and Krstić, provide her grades at the end of the academic year 1895-1896 at the Zurich Higher Girls’ School, though they do give full details of her courses and teachers from the school records. Nor do they provide her grades in the Matura examinations (university entrance level) that she passed in 1896. (In contrast, Einstein’s grades for his final high school year 1895-1896 at the Cantonal School in Aarau, Switzerland, are reported in the literature, as are his Matura grades. In the former he gained good or adequate grades in all subjects other than French, and in the latter he was top of nine examinees with a grade average of 5.5 (scale 1-6), despite, at 17, being considerably younger than the other candidates. (Collected Papers, Vol. 1, Doc. 19; Fölsing 1997, pp. 44-45.)

    In the Polytechnic entrance examinations for mathematics which she was required to take in late summer 1896, Marić achieved a moderate grade average of 4.25 (scale 1-6). Her end-of-semester coursework grades for 1896-1900 were moderately good, but she came only fifth out of six candidates in the intermediate diploma examinations, and last out of five in the final diploma exams in 1900. Her failing to gain a diploma on that occasion was almost certainly due to her very poor grade in the mathematics component (theory of functions), only 2.5 on a scale 1-6. (Einstein was top of the group of six candidates in the intermediate diploma examinations, and fourth out of five in the final diploma examination, having neglected his coursework material in the previous two years until the immediate period before the exams, preferring to follow up his extra-curricular physics studies. Contrary to the impression sometimes given, the coursework grades recorded on their respective Zurich Polytechnic Leaving Certificates for the nine subject topics taken in common show that Einstein’s were higher than Marić’s for six of them (Collected Papers, Vol. 1, Doc. 28; Trbuhović-Gjurić 1988, p. 61).)

    I have provided the above information to enable a more accurate picture to be gained than the one usually presented of a brilliant university student who somehow missed out on a successful academic career, for which something or someone (Einstein) must be to blame. Rather, the documentary evidence points to her suffering the fate of large numbers of students who achieve excellent examination results at high school, but find university level work more challenging and fail to live up to their early promise.

     Selected references

    Einstein, A. (1987). The Collected Papers of Albert Einstein, Vol. 1. Princeton University Press.

    Esterson, A. (2006). Mileva Marić: Einstein’s Wife

    Fölsing, A. (1997). Albert Einstein. London and New York: Penguin Books.

    Krstić, D. (2004). Mileva and Albert Einstein: Their Love and Scientific Collaboration. Kranjska, Slovenia: Didakta.

    Popović, M. (2003). In Albert’s Shadow: The Life and Letters of Mileva Marić, Einstein’s First Wife. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

    Renn, J, and Schulmann, R. (1992). Albert Einstein/Mileva Marić: The Love Letters. Princeton University Press.

    Stachel, J. (2002). Einstein From ‘B’ to ‘Z’. Boston: Birkhäuser, pp. 26-38: Stachel’s reply to Troemel-Ploetz and Walker; also 39-55.

    Trbuhović-Gjurić, D. (1988). Im Schatten Albert Einsteins: Das Tragische Leben der Mileva Einstein-Marić. Stuttgart: Paul Haupt. (French translation: Mileva Einstein: Une Vie (1991). Paris: Antoinette Fouque.)

     November 2010

     http://www.esterson.org

  • The Islamic regime of Iran plans to execute Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani immediately‏

    According to news received by the International Committee against Stoning and International Commitee against Execution on 1 November 2010, the authorities in Tehran have given the go ahead to Tabriz prison for the execution of Iran stoning case Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani. It has been reported that she is to be executed this Wednesday 3 November.
     
    We had previously reported that the casefile regarding the murder case of Ms Ashtiani’s husband had been seized from her lawyer’s office, Houtan Kian, and found missing from the prosecutor’s Oskoo branch office so as to stitch Ms Ashtiani up with trumped up murder charges. Ms Ashtiani’s son, Sajjad Ghaderzadeh, and her lawyer, Houtan Kian, have warned of the regime’s plan to do so on many occassions. With the arrest of Ms Ashtiani’s son and lawyer on 10 October and her not having had any visitation rights since 11 August and after fabricating a new case against her, the “Human Rights Commission” of the regime has announced that: ‘according to the existing evidence, her guilt has been confirmed.’ In fact, the regime has created a new scenario in order to expedite her execution.
     
    The International Committees against Stoning and Execution call on international bodies and the people of the world to come out in full force against the state-sponsored murder of Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani. Ms Ashtiani, Sajjad Ghaderzadeh, Houtan Kian and the two German journalists must be immediately and unconditionally released.
     
    International Committee against Execution http://notonemoreexecution.org
    International Committee against Stoning http://stopstonningnow.com
    Email: minaahadi@aol.com
    Tel: 0049 (0) 1775692413
  • The overlap between agnosticism and atheism

    From John R. Shook, The God Debates: a 21st Century Guide for Atheists and Believers (and Everyone in Between). (pp 16-18) Wiley-Blackwell 2010. Published by permission.

    Nonbelievers who reject traditional theistic Christianity have many options for positive worldviews. Besides other nontheistic religions, there are many kinds of pantheisms, spiritualisms, and mysticisms, along with varieties of humanism and naturalism. Forming a positive worldview is hard enough; selecting a label for oneself from a limited menu is even harder. Demographers polling people in America and around the world consistently find that few nonbelievers prefer the label of “atheist” for labeling their own position (Zuckerman 2007). This reluctance probably has more to do with the perceived meaning of atheism rather than the actual views of nonbelievers. Besides its strongly negative connotations, attached to the label by believers’ scorn or fear towards atheism, the term “atheism” became associated with dogmatism. Nonbelievers, quite understandably, do not want to be perceived as evil or dangerous, or stubbornly dogmatic. It is ironic how believers could accuse atheists of dogmatism, when the word “dogmatic” was a preferred label for true religious believers since the early days of the Christian Church. The meaning reversal that happened to “dogmatic” in turn caused “atheism” to shift meaning. In earlier centuries, an atheist was simply a skeptical nonbeliever, characterized by an inability to be dogmatic about religion (Thrower 2000, Hecht 2004). This lack of dogmatism was precisely what distinguished the wayward atheist who strayed into ignorance about religious matters. Unable to be persuaded by sacred scripture, religious creed, or theological reasoning, atheists expressed their unbelief and uncertainty. That’s how you could tell a religious believer from a nonbeliever back then: the religious person pronounced their confident knowledge about religious matters, while the atheist could only admit hesitant ignorance. Nowadays, however, the atheist is often accused of dogmatism.

    The rise of the label “agnostic” is connected with the strange fate of the term “atheism”. In the 1860s Thomas Henry Huxley recommended “agnosticism” – the contrary of “gnostic,” a Greek term for knowledge. An agnostic recommends admitting our lack of knowledge about any ultimate reality, such as a “supreme being” or whatever caused the universe. Huxley offered agnosticism as a reasonable stance towards not just any religion’s overconfident dogmas but also about any philosophy’s overreaching conclusions as well. Skeptical towards both theology and metaphysics, Huxley and many other rationalists adopted “agnosticism” as a convenient general category for their conservative philosophical stance. The agnostic is not a complete philosophical skeptic who claims to know nothing. The agnostic’s standard of knowledge is just our ordinary reliable (not perfect or infallible) knowledge of the natural world around us. While presently unable to know anything about ultimate reality using these empirical tools of intelligence, the agnostic, like everyone else, is able to know plenty of other things about the natural world, where ordinary human investigations yield practical and reliable results.

    Since agnosticism’s conservative approach to belief is also the basis for atheism, confusion between atheism and agnosticism immediately ensued, and has not stopped since. What exactly is the relationship between agnosticism and atheism? An agnostic, like an atheist, does not accept supernaturalism, specifically, because no supernatural belief has yet passed the reasonable standard of empirical knowledge, and so a confession of ignorance is the only conclusion. Despite the obvious overlap between agnosticism and atheism, the impact of agnosticism in the 1800s and early 1900s had the rhetorical effect of clearing a middle ground between religious belief and atheism. This adjustment in turn affected the meaning of “atheism”. If the agnostic cannot know that supernaturalism is right, and if the atheist isn’t an agnostic, then the atheist must therefore be someone claiming to know something about the supernatural. What might an atheist claim to know? The common meaning of “atheism” began to shift towards “disbelief in god” and “the denial that god exists” so that many people began taking atheism to mean “it can be known that nothing supernatural exists”. The agnostic, on the other hand, could still be religious through other means besides the intellect (such as faith), so that there could be agnostic theists as well as agnostic atheists (see Flint 1903).

    It is not easy to track dictionary definitions of “atheism” over the centuries, since this subject, so distasteful to Christians, rarely received its own entry. By the time the term began regularly appearing in dictionaries, around the turn of the twentieth century, the distinction between two kinds of atheism was already noticed. The eleventh edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1911) was the earliest edition of that reference work to include atheism. It distinguishes between dogmatic atheism and skeptical atheism. Dogmatic atheism “denies the existence of god positively” while skeptical atheism “distrusts the capacity of the human mind to discover the existence of god”. The entry goes on to add that skeptical atheism hardly differs from agnosticism. But skeptical atheism kept fading from view, lost in the glare of its new cousins, agnosticism and dogmatic atheism. Dogmatic atheism is now widely taken to be the only kind of atheism, especially in the recent form of a “new atheism”. This new meaning for atheism has achieved common parlance, dictionary affirmation, and philosophical usage. Instead of being an ignorant skeptic about the divine, an atheist is now supposed to be just another overreaching gnostic possessing confident knowledge about ultimate reality. Agnosticism has now re-emerged into popular view as a nonbelief option to atheism’s dogmas and religion’s faith.

    About the Author

    John Shook is is Director of Education and Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Inquiry Transnational in Amherst, N.Y., and Research Associate in Philosophy at the University at Buffalo.
  • Larry King: Now why don’t you interview Mina Ahadi and Sajjad Ghaderzadeh?‏

    Larry King’s overly cordial interview with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad failed to press the head of a repressive Islamic Republic of Iran on many issues raised, including on the Iran stoning case of Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani.
     
    When asked about the stoning case, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad replied: ‘This lady’s case has not been completely examined yet. No verdict has been issued yet. She is accused of being — of murdering her husband. And I don’t think in the world if someone is accused of murdering their husband, people would pour on the streets and rally in support of her.’ Without correcting the facts on the case, King then went on to say: ‘If they were going to stone her, they would.’ Ahmadinejad then said: ‘She has been accused of the murder of her husband. There is no verdict issued. No verdict, no sentence has been passed… And it is not about a stoning case at all. There’s no stoning sentence here at all. A person in Germany made this claim, which was untrue. Our judiciary also said it was a false statement.’
     
    Given the public outcry against stoning, it is understandable why Ahmadinejad prefers to lie on the issue.
     
    In fact, however, a number of government officials have confirmed and defended the stoning sentence. In an interview on 8 September, Foreign Ministry Spokesman, Ramin Mehmanparast, said that Ms Ashtiani’s stoning sentence was under review by the Supreme Court (english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2010/09/201098122526772598.html). In July 2010, Mohammad Javad Larijani, head of the Human Rights Department of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Judiciary, told IRNA state news agency that stoning is in the Islamic Republic’s constitution and therefore the law. He went on to say that Ms Ashtiani’s case has gone through the routine procedures and that there is no ambiguities surrounding it. He added that protests would not affect judges or the execution of sentences since stoning is part of the sacred Sharia of Islam (http://www.radiofarda.com/archive/news/20100709/143/143.html?id=2095819). Also in July, Malek Ajdar Sharifi, the top judicial official in the province where Ashtiani was convicted, said the verdict has been halted due to humanitarian reservations and upon the order of the judiciary chief, and would not be carried out for the moment. (http://www.rferl.org/content/Iran_To_Review_Womans_Stoning_Execution/2096579.html)
     
    Furthermore, the International Committee against Stoning has provided the actual court verdict sentencing Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani to death by stoning. In the Judgement (ref no. 38 – 85/6/19, dated 10 September 2006, Case reference number:  94 – 84/6 Province Criminal [Court], Reference number of the Head Penal Office:  237 – 84/11/18) the plaintiff is listed as the ‘Honourable Prosecutor of the General and Revolutionary Court of Tabriz’, the accused is listed as ‘Mrs Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani, daughter of Asqar, of Tabriz address (Tabriz Prison)’ and the charge is listed as ‘Adultery [Zena-ye Mohseneh’]. Court documents can be found here: http://stopstonningnow.com/wpress/4059.
     
    Additionally, Ms. Ashtiani has been acquitted of murder. Even the man convicted of her husband’s murder has not been executed. In Iran, under Diyeh laws, the family of the victim can ask for the death penalty to be revoked. Ms Ashtiani’s son explains why he and his 17 year old sister spared the man’s life in an interview saying: ‘He is the father of a little girl who is three years old, who cried many tears before us. We, my sister and I, did not want to be the cause of his execution.’ (http://stopstonningnow.com/wpress/3618)
     
    Clearly the regime hopes to brand Ms Ashtiani a murderer in order to push back the immense international campaign in her defence. This, however, is unlikely given the outrage surrounding this case in particular and the barbaric practice of stoning in general. This is largely due to Ms Ashtiani’s children who pleaded for international support when she was to be imminently stoned to death and Mina Ahadi who is referred to by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as a ‘person in Germany.’ Mina Ahadi accepts Ahmadinejad’s ‘accusation’ with pride http://stopstonningnow.com/wpress/4097.
     
    Ms Ashtiani’s son, Sajjad Ghaderzadeh, has called on US media networks to organise a debate between him and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (http://stopstonningnow.com/wpress/4059).
     
    Larry King and Christiane Amanpour: You have interviewed Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Now why don’t you interview Mina Ahadi and Sajjad Ghaderzadeh for the truth on Ms Ashtiani’s case, stoning and the regime in Iran?
    September 24, 2010
     
    Notes:
     
    1. You can see the video of the Larry King interview here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CQmdv1l4Zm0
     
    2. For more information, contact:
     
    Mina Ahadi, International Committee Against Stoning and International Committee Against Executions, minaahadi@aol.com, 0049 1775692413; http://notonemoreexecution.org/; http://stopstonningnow.com.
     
    Maryam Namazie, Iran Solidarity, iransolidaritynow@gmail.com, 0044 7719166731, Iran Solidarity: www.iransolidarity.org.uk; http://iransolidarity.blogspot.com/.