Author: Ophelia Benson

  • Philosophy is not Just Self-Help

    But the promotion for Penguin’s Great Ideas series might make one think otherwise.

  • Dogmatic Commitment to Instrumentalism

    If knowledge is not an intrinsic good, then any ‘knowledge’ will do.

  • 1893–1895–1897–1899: Or How Norman N. Holland Gave Game, Set, and Match to Frederick Crews

    The situation of the present state of psychoanalysis and of the current reputation of Sigmund Freud is well documented and cogently (and patiently!) presented in Professor Crews’s “Reply to Holland.”(1) In my view, and in the opinion of several other Freud scholars, the continuing ability of Freudian rhetoric to deceive is even more dangerous and difficult to resolve than Crews allows.

    And, alas, the kind of staged public jousting whereby Fred Crews will accept the publication for the Spring/Summer issue of The Scientific Review of Alternative Medicine (vol. 9, no. 1) of “a commentary on both submissions [that of Holland and the reply of Crews] by the psychiatrist Peter Barglow” seems to be `loaded’ from the start.

    Barglow is a psychiatrist of the Old School when it was thought a useful career-move in American medical schools, if you were specializing in psychiatry, to go into analysis and to become a certified psychoanalyst oneself. And then to conduct training analyses.(2) That Barglow is a personal friend of Holland and has just returned from the June conference on Art and Psychology at Arles in France where they both were, raises the suspicion (no doubt unworthy) that Crews may not receive an entirely “objective” commentary.

    Some works are missing from Crews’s generally excellent bibliography and I need to refer to them in this article. They are, in alphabetical order: Jacques Bénesteau’s Mensonges freudiens: histoire d’une désinformation séculaire (Sprimont, Belgium: Mardaga, 2002); Max Scharnberg’s The Myth of Paradigm-Shift, or How to Lie with Methodology (Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Uppsala Studies in Education 20, 1984); Robert Wilcocks, Maelzel’s Chess Player: Sigmund Freud and the Rhetoric of Deceit (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994) and Mousetraps and the Moon: The Strange Ride of Sigmund Freud and the Early Years of Psychoanalysis (Lanham MD: Lexington Books, 2000).

    Frederick Crews is careful to reply to the full text of Norman Holland’s paper, rather than to limit himself to the abbreviated version now available on Butterflies and Wheels. Crews begins “Although Norman Holland’s synopsis conveys the gist of `Psychoanalysis as Science,’ the devil is in the details.” In fact, Crews is being scrupulously fair here to Holland and his arguments are indeed closely related to Holland’s full original text. Crews is mistaken, however, if he really believes that “the devil is in the details.”

    With Holland’s wretched piece, the details are insignificant and largely irrelevant. I will come to his “innocent” and misleading use of Fisher and Greenberg in a minute (and I will offer the devastating examination by Scharnberg as evidence). But let me begin with Holland’s last Freudian quotation. For in that quotation — as it is offered by Holland – lies the very essence of what is wrong with psychoanalysis-as-science. And it has nothing to do with sex (or even with Freud’s weird version of it), nor with science, nor with concepts of the mind. It has everything to do with lying. And you cannot build a science – of any kind – on LIES!

    If, as Frank Cioffi pointed out over a quarter of a century ago, Freud was a liar,(3) then the problem of the significance of the power to deceive of psychoanalysis is resolved immediately. Snake-oil! And rub it in carefully. You suffer from hay-fever? Have no fear – psychoanalysis will resolve the hay-fever(4). And so on… Now, how does Norman N. Holland end his piece? With a priceless quotation from one of the most devious paragraphs that Freud ever drafted. The devil is not in the details, Professor Crews is being far too circumspect; the devil is right here in Holland’s deceived (and innocently deceptive) conclusion. I quote:

    In Freud’s first published dream analysis, for example, he began by spelling out his associations (his data). In doing so, he indicated a variety of recurring themes. Finally, he concluded: “They could all be collected into a single group of ideas and labelled, as it were, concern about my own and other people’s health — professional conscientiousness” [26, p.320]. This is purely and simply holistic reasoning.

    And that is precisely the kind of response that Freud was counting on, the intelligent, sympathetic and credulous offering of a heart laid bare by the Master’s magic with words.

    This is where “his associations” or, as the brackets naïvely inform us, “his data,” take their place in the presentation of psychoanalysis as the one and only way to understand the human mind and the related by-products of dreaming. Now go back to that very strange title I have chosen for this paper: “1893–1895–1897–1899” – there is a problem here. Interestingly, it was a problem recognized over half a century ago by the faithful daughter, Anna Freud. When she was preparing the first edition of the collected correspondence of her father to the Berlin Otorhinolaryngologist (E.N.T. doctor as we say in England – Ear, Nose and Throat), Wilhelm Fliess,(5) Anna Freud dutifully removed (and/or censored) certain letters from her father which might cast doubt on his veracity. Could the founder of psychoanalysis and her father be a liar? Perish the thought! Or rather, remove the correspondence which might give rise to such sacrilegious thoughts. (Which implies, incidentally, that the disinformation invented by Sigmund in the cocaine-inspired years at the end of the 19th Century was thoughtfully – and knowingly, quite knowingly – continued by Anna Freud in the 20th Century.)(6)

    This most famous of dreams – “The Dream of Irma’s Injection” – is indeed the first dream we encounter in Chapter 2 (after a preliminary chapter giving a brief history of dream investigation) of Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams. It was called by Freud himself Das Traummuster – “The Specimen Dream.” It is also a piece of contrived rhetorical deception devised by Freud probably during the autumn of the year in which his book was published (1899). My multi-dated title refers to the various dates that are involved in the text offered to the unsuspecting public by Sigmund Freud.(7)

    Briefly, the dream reported as dreamed and analyzed on 23/24 July 1895 could not have contained the associational material reported by
    Freud.(8) At that date his eldest daughter, Mathilde, had not suffered from diphtheria. According to the dream reports, Freud’s anxiety about her health relates to concerns of some two years previous (i.e., 1893). In April 1897, however, we find (now, thanks to Masson’s Harvard University Press publication of the uncensored correspondence with Wilhelm Fliess) that Mathilde did indeed suffer from a bout of diphtheria – and thanks to him we now know when (April 1897)! And it was precisely this letter (with several others) that Anna Freud chose to remove from her 1954 edition of the correspondence. The letter had nothing to say about psychoanalysis; but it did show clearly that her father was a liar in his professional invention. And lies have to be covered up by denial or censorship or disinformation.

    It is extraordinary that in France of all places, a seriously-researched book on Freud should appear that would tear holes in the whole fabric of Freudian invention. The author of this excellent piece of work – Mensonges freudiens – is a clinical child psychologist at the University of Toulouse – Dr. Jacques Bénesteau. His book, and this is a splendid opportunity to congratulate the objectivity of la Société française d’histoire de médecine, was unanimously awarded the year’s prize for the best book on the history of medicine in France for 2003.

    Bénesteau reveals to the public at large the multitude of deceptions and downright lies that were at the heart of the psychoanalytic enterprise – and also at the heart of the Jung version of “Analytic psychology.” It is no wonder – this is par for the course, alas – that Bénesteau had to run through the unappreciative hoops of at least sixteen Parisian publishers before he found intelligence and integrity in the Belgian publisher, Pierre Mardaga.

    The last publisher to be presented to the North American public is that of the Swedish university of Uppsala. Dr. Max Scharnberg, who teaches in the Faculty of Education of the University of Uppsala, published in 1984 The Myth of Paradigm-Shift, or How to Lie with Methodology (Upsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Uppsala studies in Education, 20.). His book is a scorching indictment of the “authority” assumed in North America by Fisher and Greenberg (and their devoted followers). Scharnberg, who understands mathematics and symbolic logic better than I do, complains about the moral dilemma of some types of Freudianism which claim the sanctity (and hence the accuracy?) of “science” for psychoanalysis. Let me quote from Endnote 20 of Chapter 5 of my last Freud book:

    See the penultimate paragraph of the preface to: Seymour Fisher and Roger P. Greenberg (1978), The Scientific Evaluation of Freud’s Theories and Therapy: A Book of Readings (New York: Basic Books). As their preface points out, this collection of papers is intended as a companion volume to their earlier (1977) The Scientific Credibility of Freud’s Theories and Therapies (New York: Basic Books). As a matter of topical interest, I should mention the careful assessment of Edward Erwin, which is unsparing in its critique of the pro-Freudian hopes of Fisher and Greenberg. See E. Erwin (1995) A Final Accounting: Philosophical and Empirical Issues in Freudian Psychology (Cambridge, Mass.:MIT Press). Fisher and Greenberg seem (and have seemed for years) innocent of, or totally vacuous about, the hideous implications of their enterprise.

    A moral, as well as scientific, critique was published in 1984 in Max Scharnberg’s The Myth of the Paradigm-Shift, Or How to Lie with Methodology. Having described the methodological slip from “real problem” (Pr) to “substitute problem” (Ps), Scharnberg writes:

    Every psychoanalytic experiment with a positive outcome that I have come across during 24 years uses Ps’s that are invalid signs. And we must question the honesty of Fisher and Greenberg: The Scientific Credibility of Freud’s Theories and Therapy; they give lots of extremely false accounts of cited experiments. The worst instances of the faults that I shall describe below could easily have been avoided without any new knowledge. Better morals are much more important. (Scharnberg, 1984, p. 151)

    That “honesty” had been questioned – or rather, denied – some fifty pages earlier in the introductory pages of his Chapter 4, “The Doctrine of the Substitute Problem,” where Scharnberg writes: “The only thing that is academic in Fisher and Greenberg’s book is the jargon. Everything else is swindle.” (quoted in Wilcocks, 2000, pp. 173-174)

    And, indeed, as Scharnberg notes, “everything else is swindle.” It is with the “swindle” that we now have to deal (and please note, this has NOTHING to do with science). The mistake of that excellent philosopher of science, Adolf Grünbaum, was to have taken Sigmund Freud at his word. Grünbaum’s investigations of psychoanalysis have, as Frederick Crews has shown, revealed the intellectual disaster awaiting the noviciate. But Grünbaum’s critique is really one for those who might have been impressed by Freud’s rhetoric of persuasion; it is not a critique that has any significance for the more thoughtful.

    Will it never end? This extraordinary waste of human potential? The great English medical scientist, Sir Peter Medawar, chairman for important years of the British Medical Research Council, and Nobel Prize winner for his contribution to medicine (in relation to his work on organ transplants), once wrote in a review-article for the New York Review of Books, “The opinion is gaining ground that doctrinaire psychoanalytic theory is the most stupendous intellectual confidence trick of the twentieth century…”(9) Sir Peter Medawar got it right! It is, or was, the “most stupendous intellectual confidence trick of the twentieth century”… Did it catch you? At an uncomfortable moment of your life? Well … there is help at hand, just read Molière’s splendid satire of the corruption of the “directeur de conscience” Tartuffe. Tartuffe was, in 17th-century Paris, what “The Shrink” became for many Americans after the Second World War. The French, of course, had their very own psychoanalytic Tartuffe in the ghastly presence of Jacques Lacan.

    1. Butterflies and Wheels

    2. This career pattern is less prevalent no in North America. Crews is correct in pointing out that nowadays many serious university departments of psychology no longer rely on Freud or on Freudians. Richard McNally at Harvard’s Department of Psychology told me this Spring that there were no longer any Freudians in his department – the last of them had long since emigrated to departments of literature!

    3. See, for example, Frank Cioffi, “Was Freud a Liar?” The Listener 91 (1974), pp. 72-74. See also the many critical articles reprinted in Cioffi’s Freud and the Question of Pseudoscience. Chicago, IL: Open Court, 1998.

    4. This is not a joke in poor taste. It is what is revealed in a reading of the correspondence between Freud and his infatuated neophyte Karl Abraham. (Hilda C. Abraham & Ernst L. Freud, eds. A Psycho-Analytic Dialogue: The Letters of Sigmund Freud and Karl Abraham, 1907-1926. Tr. Bernard Marsh and Hilda C. Abraham. London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis.)
    See Abraham’s letter of August 9, 1912 (pp. 121-22) in which “looking for the psycho-sexual roots of the hay-fever” is the first step to its complete cure by psychoanalysis. There is a sense in which psychoanalysis was promoted rather like one of those all-purpose products that 19th-century con-men delighted in selling: it cleans your teeth, polishes your shoes, removes unwanted hair, and presses your suit. Norman Holland is still at this level of understanding.

    5. This edition, which appeared in English in 1954 was entitled The Origins of Psycho-Analysis: Letters to Wilhelm Fliess, Drafts and Notes, 1887-1902, by Sigmund Freud. Edited by Marie Bonaparte, Anna Freud, and Ernst Kris; translated by Eric Mosbacher and James Strachey; introduction by Ernst Kris. New York: Basic Books, and London: Imago Publishing Company, 1954.

    6. This is one of the carefully documented points made by Jacques Bénesteau in his Mensonges freudiens: Histoire d’une désinformation séculaire. The various forms of disinformation and misinformation and “re-writing” of its own history have made of the psychoanalytic movement the nearest thing medicine has to Stalinism and the Soviet version of its own (and everybody else’s) history.

    7. For extensive discussion of this deception see Wilcocks (1994), Chapter 7, pp. 227-280. This material was the consequence of a thorough medical check via the University of Alberta’s Infectious Diseases Unit. It has since been confirmed by Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen who informed me that the Anna Freud archives at the Library of Congress (Washington) show clearly that in response to an Ernest Jones request for information about the health of the Freud children, Anna Freud replied that Mathilde and the others had no grave illnesses at the time which would correspond with the associations (“the data”) invented for the “Dream of Irma’s Injection.” I am pleased to note that the Australian clinical psychologist, Malcolm Macmillan, has accepted my discovery and refers to it positively in the revised MIT edition of Freud Evaluated: The Completed Arc (1997).

    8. We have, in fact, a brief letter addressed by Freud to Fliess on the very morning of the day on which he claimed to have had the secrets of the dream revealed to him. Needless to say, there is not a word in this letter about resolving the secrets of dreams, nor indeed about the apparent monumental revelation of the previous night. See, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson (ed.), The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess 1887–1904 Cambridge (Mass.), The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985, p. 134.
    Fliess himself, by the way, must have been one of the first to have realized the fabrication involved in this dream. He wrote to Freud questioning the date reported by Freud. And Freud replied (Masson, 1985, letter of June 18, 1900, p. 419), with the blind confidence of genius, that that was the date in the book itself, Die Traumdeutung! “I have authenticated the date of July 24, 1895, however. The dream is dated the same way in the book, July 23-24, and I know that I analyzed the dream the following day.” (Masson, 1985, p. 419.)

    9. See Sir Peter Medawar’s review of The Victim Is Always the Same by the neuro-surgeon I.S. Cooper. The title of Medawar’s article is “Victims of Psychiatry” and it originally appeared in the New York Review of Books, January 23, 1975, p.17. It was reprinted in the collection of essays and articles mischievously called Pluto’s Republic, Oxford University Press paperback, 1990.

  • David Cesarani’s Biography of Eichmann

    Scrupulously objective; the hatchet-job is reserved for Hannah Arendt.

  • Eichmann, Everyman as Genocidaire

    It seemed the right thing to do at the time.

  • David Lodge’s Henry James Novel

    It’s about writing novels rather than sexual secrets.

  • Googling for Laughs

    I’m a kind and generous person, and I’ve just been enjoying a good laugh, so I’ll let you enjoy it too. It’s funny how I found this essay. It’s on Alan Sokal’s site, but that’s not how I found it (there are a lot of articles there, happily, and I haven’t read them all yet). No, I found it by typing Sandra Harding and – a certain unkind adjective, into google. What a lot came up! I’ll have to try it with different unkind adjectives in the future. What a pity that life is so short – I’m sure to miss some interesting stuff. Quite a lot. But I found a lot, too.

    This essay is about Social Text and the Sokal hoax and related matters. The author has a good time with Andrew Ross, and then he gets to Harding: ‘If Gross and Levitt are “shrill,” what would Ross have to say about Sandra Harding, whose raving essay opens this Ross-authorized collection?’

    “It is ironic,” she begins, “that the major criticism of the new social studies of science and technology from the antidemocratic right in fact provides yet more evidence for the value of these science studies.” For me, “antidemocratic right” did not bode well for the level-headedness or credibility of this essay, especially when goofily reiterated in “the antidemocratic right’s recent clarion calls for the citizenry to join in stamping out feminism,” which reads like a parody from “Doonesbury.”…Harding, incredibly enough, is a professor of philosophy at the University of Delaware, which doesn’t speak well for the current state of precise thinking amongst people who nowadays can pass as philosophers. Her first two footnotes defy credulity: “I use antidemocratic right and democracy-advancing movements or tendencies in a somewhat simplistic way throughout this discussion,” surely the understatement of the year. And the second note offers yet another modification of her intemperate off-the-wall philosophizing: “Local knowledge systems … are by no means always more accurate and effective than modern scientific knowledge, but sometimes they are.” And sometimes professors of philosophy are hard to distinguish from idiots (but not always)! Why say stupid things in the first place if you are going to take them back in footnotes?

    It was that last line that caused me to crack up. It sounds so exactly like the kind of thing I scream, shout, snarl, or whine as I read Harding. ‘Goofily reiterated’ is exactly right, too, and so is the ‘incredibly enough’ about the professorship of philosophy. Yes, it is incredible. Well, I have to go think up some more adjectives now.

  • More Profundity

    More Harding. Why? Because there is more, that’s why. Because you don’t know the half of it. Because that previous comment barely scratched the surface. Because it just keeps getting worse. Because my jaw keeps dropping until I can barely use the damn thing to talk and eat anymore. Because this book was published by Cornell University Press. I repeat – this book was published by Cornell University Press.

    And because I’m a woman, god damn it, and a feminist, and this kind of bilge is enough to discredit both categories. Feminist! She calls herself a feminist! She links what she’s doing with feminism! It’s an outrage! Well you see what I mean about the jaw. Same thing with the exclamation points – they’re hospitalized with severe overuse. It’s a wonder I haven’t yanked all my own hair out – I feel like it while reading.

    The book by the way is Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?, in case you want to read more.

    Many writers have identified the distinctively Western and bourgeois character of the modern scientific world view. Some critics have detected social values in contemporary studies of slime mold and even in the abstractions of relativity theory and formal semantics. Conventionalists respond by digging in their heels…As historian Thomas Kuhn said, back when he was such a conventionalist…

    That was page 80. Here is one from page 84:

    Contemporary physicists, ethologists, and geologists collect evidence for or against hypotheses in ways different from those that medieval priests used to collect evidence for or against theological claims, yet it is difficult to identify or state in any formal way just what it is that is unique about the scientific methods.

    Well it is difficult for Harding, at least, which she proceeds to demonstrate by making an amazing hash of it.

    ‘Observing nature’ is certainly far too general to specify uniquely scientific modes of collecting evidence; gatherers and hunters, premodern farmers, ancient seafarers, and mothers all must ‘observe nature’ carefully and continuously in order to do their work.

    Umm…yes, fair enough, ‘observing nature’ is quite general. But then, is that a usual answer to the question ‘what is unique about [‘the’] scientific methods?’ And then, why is that the question in any case? Why is she looking for uniqueness? Because it makes a useful red herring? Many of the discussions of ‘scientific methods’ I’ve seen in fact talk about their continuity with other kinds of inquiry and research; those of Susan Haack for example.

    But then it gets even better.

    Scientific practices are common to every culture. Moreover, many phenomena of interest to science, though they can be predicted and explained, cannot be controlled – for example, the orbit of the sun and the location of fossils.

    I swear. You’ll think I’m lying, but that’s exactly what it says. I tell you what, that’s some pretty deep thought.

    Update: Here is an interview with Harding, which will give you a larger sample.

  • Work of Art Thrown in Bin and Badly Damaged

    Tragedy at Tate when cleaner throws away bin liner filled with waste paper.

  • Hey, it’s Popular

    ‘Music is very important to black people,’ so if it advocates killing gays – er – shut up?

  • Outrage at Harker on OutRage

    Music is important to black people, and not being beaten to death is important to gay people.

  • Free Speech Shouldn’t Cover Death Threats

    Blunkett was right to ban animal rights ‘activist.’

  • Excluded

    Blunkett bans animal rights campaigner Jerry Vlasak.

  • Common Sense Good, Political Correctness Bad

    And the difference is entirely self-evident. Right.

  • ‘A Good Book Should Make You Cry’?

    The lachrymose world of the problem novel for children.

  • Margaret Talbot on Munchausen’s by Proxy

    Naming a syndrome can create it, and when is a crime a ‘disorder’?

  • From Multiculturalism to Where?

    The city on a hill where everyone celebrates differences isn’t working out.

  • Epistemology for Toddlers

    I mentioned that I’ve been reading Sandra Harding. I have. Therefore I need to vent. I also need to write in short simple clause-free declarative sentences, because that’s the way Harding writes, and it’s catching.

    Reading Harding is a very strange experience. I keep wondering – huh? What happened? Why did this book get published? Why didn’t anyone shove it back at her and say (at the very least), ‘I’m sorry but you’ll have to re-write this for grown-ups. Children don’t read books about epistemology.’ Why does she write the way she does? Why do people let her? And then publish it? And then why do other people buy the books and read them? And why, godgivemestrength, why do people cite them and quote them and praise them? As they do? You can google her and find people calling her ‘distinguished.’ A distinguished philosopher. But – seriously – the things she says are beyond wrong, they’re just inane. I’ll give you some examples.

    At least one person has pointed this out – this ‘yes but her work is not acceptable’ aspect: Gonzalo Munévar in the collection Scrutinizing Feminist Epistemology edited by Cassandra Pinnick, Noretta Koertge and Robert Almeder. An excellent collection, I recommend it highly.

    I argue not that Sandra Harding’s epistemology, so highly regarded by feminists [not all of them! ed], is wrong; rather, I intend to show that serious scholars should consider the quality of her work unacceptable…The reader’s embarrassment grows with each amazing example…

    It does. I feel actual discomfort reading her – I kind of squirm as I read. I feel like letting out little yips of protest like a dog – not to mention the occasional howl.

    So. Want an example or two? Sure you do.

    Might our understanding of nature and social life be different if the people who discovered the laws of nature were the same ones who cleaned up after them?

    No. Next question.

    Furthermore, there are many feminisms, and these can be understood to have started their analyses from the lives of different historical groups of women: liberal feminism from the lives of women in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European and American educated classes…Third World feminism from late twentieth-century Third World women’s lives. Moreover, we all change our minds about all kinds of issues.

    Ah! Do we! I hadn’t realized that. That’s good to know. But that’s how she writes, you see. Repetitively. Ploddingly. Pointing out the obviously. Everything she says is either tautologous or obvious or wrong. Oh Third World feminism has to do with Third World women – I see! Thank you for clearing that up.

    Okay, that’s enough venting for the moment. I feel slightly cruel – as if I’ve been mocking the afflicted. But she writes these damn books, and some people take them seriously. That’s a symptom of something very odd.

  • Undercurrent

    Just to gather them all in one place. Jonathan Derbyshire has a post about the vexed (especially around here – we vex the damn thing to death) matter of the, shall we say, tender-mindedness of some parts of the left toward Islamism.

    There seems to me to be an essential continuity between the stance adopted towards radical Islam by the intellectual left broadly conceived (and not just the SWP), and certain of the attitudes that characterised the so-called ‘New Left’ in the 1960s, and which were brilliantly diagnosed by Irving Howe in a wonderful 1965 essay entitled ‘New Styles in “Leftism”‘…

    Yes, I like Howe, and he looks better all the time. He nailed the anti-intellectual aspect of the New Left as soon as it stuck its head over the parapet. I only wish more people had paid attention. Jonathan lists some ‘characteristic attitudes’ (are they Anglo-Saxon attitudes? now cut that out! ed.) that Howe noted then and that are still with us.

    Then Oliver Kamm picks up the discussion, quoting from correspondence from Jeffrey Ketland of Edinburgh University:

    …it’s hard to say to what extent the anti-Enlightenment features of postmodernism and social constructivism animate the views of current far left groups, including SWP and Respect, and the occasional letter to Guardian. To some extent, there is an undercurrent of relativism and sneering towards allegedly Western notions of truth and objectivity. Alan Sokal described this undercurrent as a “weird zeitgeist” in modern academia and beyond. But I would argue that they are predominantly motivated by simple-minded hatred of the US, rather than direct sympathy for Islamic theocracy. For example, I’ve never seen political leftists directly defending Sharia law, stonings, beheadings, etc., but there’s sometimes a disturbing whiff of apologetics.

    Hmm. Not Sharia law and stonings, no, but the hijab, yes. No, of course the hijab is not as bad as stonings, but it is part of the whole system of unequal laws and rules for women and men, so the passionate support for it seems – peculiar. Not to say worrying. Anyway the point about the undercurrent and the weird zeitgeist seems pretty unmistakable. If I’ve seen one sneer at alleged Western notions of objectivity, I’ve seen several. (Often in the same paragraph, actually – I’ve been reading Sandra Harding. She’s like a factory for the output of such sneers all by herself.)

    In place of obviously crude biological racism, modern fascism (in the form Wolin calls ‘designer fascism’) has adopted a cultural racism that decries the achievements and principles of the Enlightenment. The astonishing spectacle of the far-Left around the Respect coalition defending the progressive character of – among other aspects of Muslim particularism – the hijab is the ‘left’ variant of the same phenomenon. I stress that we are not talking here of Muslims’ right to adopt the practices and observances of their faith, for religious liberty is an essential principle of the Enlightenment tradition. I mean instead the insistence that the character of those observances is itself a principle to be defended.

    Yup. I have huge reservations about the stipulation about ‘Muslims’ right to adopt the practices and observances of their faith’ – because of course that instantly gets right back into ‘defending Sharia law, stonings and beheadings’ territory. Religious liberty covers a multitude of sins, unfortunately, so I just don’t think it’s helpful to give blanket exemptions like that. But that aside, I agree with the rest of it. The insistence that the hijab (and the attitude to women that prompts it) is actually a good thing, is…unfortunate.

    And then there’s one at Crooked Timber. Chris takes issue with Ketland’s reading of Foucault:

    Foucault was a difficult, obscure, contradictory and often infuriating figure. At his worst he wrote nonsense. At his best he can be profoundly unsettling to the lazier assumptions of the “Enlightenment” (with a capital E) view of the world, in a similar way to the manner in which Rousseau and Nietzsche also can disturb them. What he won’t do is provide an easy example for blogospheric divisions of the world into sheep and goats.

    Me, I don’t know. As I’ve said before, I’ve read only a very little Foucault (I think the bit I read was part of the nonsense), so I don’t know if people are getting him wrong. But I don’t take the point about Foucault to have been central, and I do think Ketland is right about that undercurrent. Well obviously; what else are we about, after all.

  • Outrage! Plan Mobo Protest

    Gay rights group to pressure the BBC not to broadcast the music of black artists who promote homophobia.