Author: Ophelia Benson

  • Elephants Never Lie

    Department of Amplification, as The New Yorker used to say. Allen Esterson takes issue with Jeffrey Masson in his new article on this site, so I thought I would recount a little dispute I once had with Masson at a book signing. The occasion was about three years ago, Masson was on tour with his new book that said dogs don’t lie about love, and a somewhat, shall we say, New Ageily-inclined friend of mine dragooned me into accompanying her. During the lecture phase of the signing, Masson was quite insistently dismissive of science and scientists. They were unimpressed with his ideas about animal emotions, they hung up the phone when he called, they were narrow-minded and prejudiced. So when he opened the reading up for questions, I asked one along these lines: ‘I have some doubts about all these sweeping attacks on science. Could it be that the scientists who don’t take your claims seriously actually have good reasons, having to do with evidence and so on, as opposed to just being narrow and prejudiced as you seem to be implying?’ He answered, ‘No. They were just being stupid and prejudiced.’ Later I asked another question: exactly how did he know that his dogs had the elaborate (human-like) emotions he was describing. He answered, ‘I look into their eyes.’ I have to admit I laughed a bit scornfully at that.

    The depth of his insight into animal nature is perhaps revealed by an anecdote he told, admittedly by way of confessing his own naivete. He was once taken to an area where there was a herd of wild elephants (in Thailand or India I believe). He was so thrilled by their majesty that he walked up to one, talking to her in a respectful and admiring way. I used to be an elephant keeper in a zoo, and I could hardly believe what I was hearing. ‘So she turned and charged and tried to kill you,’ was my thought, ‘and you’re bloody lucky to be here telling us about it.’ Sure enough–she charged and tried to kill him, he ran like hell and found some tall grass to hide in, and the elephant got bored and wandered off. He did say it was foolish of him. But that insight did not appear to have taught him to take his other insights with becoming modesty. An interesting evening at the bookstore, one way and another.

  • Her Left Foot

    Oh honestly. Sometimes I want to exclaim with Lear’s Fool, ‘I had rather be any kind o’thing than a fool’. Only I would change ‘fool’ to ‘woman’. There are moments when it all just becomes too embarrassing. Such as when reading silly self-parodying nonsense in the Guardian. Who needs sexism or misogyny when women elbow each other aside to say fatuous things like that, eh?

    One of the unnoticed casualties of late 20th-century feminism was that old enfeebled virtue: women’s intuition.

    Oh really? Where is that exactly? Speaking of unnoticed. Has Bathurst not noticed that whole large branch of feminism which does indeed pride itself precisely on embracing dear old female ‘virtues’ like intuition and gut feelings and hunches and instinct and messages from the ‘heart’? If not, she hasn’t been paying attention. The sneering at science and statistics and logic is bang up to date, too, not the bold and paradoxical move Bathurst seems to take it to be. Perhaps her toe has misled her.

  • Don Boffin’s Cod Twin Study

    Statistics, nature v. nurture, ethical considerations, Luce Irigaray: it’s all there.

  • Psychoanalytic Mythology

    During the last decades of the twentieth century researchers showed that much
    of the received history of psychoanalysis consisted of stories that were largely
    mythological. Perhaps the most enduring of all these myths is that Freud postulated
    his seduction theory as a result of hearing frequent reports from his female
    patients that they had been sexually abused in childhood. In this article I
    want to focus on this story, one that for most of the twentieth century was
    taken as historical fact, and is still widely believed to be so.
    According to the traditional account, in the 1890s most of Freud’s female patients
    told him that they had been sexually abused in early childhood, usually by their
    father. How the story continues depends on whether it is based on received history
    or on the revised version embraced by many feminists and popularised by Jeffrey
    Masson. In the orthodox version we are told that within a short time Freud came
    to realise that many of the reports he was hearing were not authentic, that
    the women were fantasizing, and that this led to his epoch-making discovery
    of infantile incestuous fantasies. But according to the feminist account, it
    was the staunch opposition of colleagues outraged by his claims of widespread
    childhood sexual abuse that led Freud to abandon the theory. Previously a sympathetic
    listener, Freud now betrayed the women who had had the courage to reveal their
    terrible experiences of abuse.
    Whichever version you choose to believe, both make dramatic stories, and each
    has its strong adherents. The basic elements are the same, but the interpretation
    of them is very different. I suspect that most people rely on their gut feeling
    and opt for Masson and the suppression of the truth about the widespread sexual
    abuse of girls at that time. But it’s time for a reality check.
    The articles that Freud published in the 1890s, and his correspondence with
    his confidant Wilhelm Fliess, tell a very different story. Putting it briefly,
    Freud’s patients in the mid-1890s did not tell him that they had been
    sexually abused in early childhood. In contrast to what he was to assert in
    his later accounts, at the time he wrote that they assured him “emphatically
    of their unbelief” in the preconceived infantile sexual traumas that he
    insisted they had experienced.
    The essential features of the episode can be outlined as follows. During the
    early 1890s Freud had become convinced that repressed memories of sexual ideas
    or experiences, not necessarily from childhood, lay at the root of the symptoms
    of patients he had diagnosed as hysterics. Then in October 1895, on the basis
    of a speculative notion, he alighted on a theory that he was convinced had solved
    once and for all the problem of the causes of the psychoneuroses. Hysterical
    symptoms were invariably caused by unconscious memories of sexual molestations
    in infancy.
    Using his newly developed analytic technique for uncovering unconscious ideas
    in the minds of his patients, he immediately set about showing that he was right.
    Although he had not previously reported any instances of his having uncovered
    sexual abuse in infancy, within four months of announcing the new theory to
    Fliess he completed two papers in which he claimed that with every one of thirteen
    “hysterical” patients, plus some obsessionals, he had been able “trace
    back” to infantile experiences of sexual abuse. A few months later he delivered
    a lecture, “The Aetiology of Hysteria”, in which he gave a more detailed
    exposition of his theory, claiming confirmation for eighteen patients diagnosed
    as hysterics.

    How did he manage to access deeply repressed experiences of this nature with
    all his patients in such a short time? Although he claimed that he had induced
    patients to “reproduce” the infantile experiences (what he meant by
    “reproductions” is open to a wide range of interpretations), it is
    evident that he typically arrived at his clinical findings by the decoding of
    symptoms, and the analytic interpretation of patients’ ideas produced under
    the influence of the “pressure” procedure he was using at that time.
    He explained that patients’ symptoms correspond to the “sensory content
    of the infantile scenes” of sexual abuse that he had inferred to lie at
    their root. His analytic procedure, he wrote, was analogous to that of forensic
    physician who can arrive at the cause of an injury “even if he has to do
    without any information from the injured person”.

    This is exemplified by the case of a patient who had a facial tic and eczema
    around the mouth. On the basis of these symptoms Freud analytically inferred
    that she had in infancy been forced to engage in fellatio. “I thrust the
    explanation at her”, he told Fliess. And when she expressed her disbelief
    he “threatened to send her away” if she persisted in her scepticism.
    Of course for Freud a rejection of his inference was evidence of the patient’s
    “resistance”, providing further confirmation that his analytic reconstruction
    was valid.
    For reasons impossible to deal with in a short space, within two years of announcing
    publicly his solution to the aetiology of the neuroses Freud lost faith in it.
    But instead of this leading him to question the reliability of his newly developed
    technique for reconstructing unconscious memories, he sought to explain his
    claimed findings as patients’ unconscious fantasies. This necessitated some
    retrospective emendation of the original claims to make the new theory minimally
    plausible. In fact the story went through a number of stages before finally
    arriving at the familiar version in New Introductory Lectures in Psychoanalysis
    (1933): “In the period in which the main interest was directed to discovering
    infantile sexual traumas, almost all my women patients told me that they had
    been seduced by their father.” (Incidentally, no one seemed to think it
    odd that it was only in this short period that “almost all” his female
    patients should have reported early childhood sexual abuse.)
    It is important to appreciate that the traditional accounts give no idea that
    the putative “fantasies” were unconscious ideas or memories
    in the patients’ minds that Freud believed he had uncovered (i.e., reconstructed)
    by his analytic technique of interpretation. (Freud’s use of the word Phantasie
    is translated as ‘phantasy’ by James Strachey in the Hogarth Standard Edition,
    but usually as ‘fantasy’ elsewhere in the literature, giving readers the misleading
    impression that Freud was generally referring to conscious ideas that
    patients reported to him.)
    There are a considerable number of anomalies in Freud’s retrospective accounts
    of the episode, too many to be dealt with here. One of these is that originally
    he had claimed that the “infantile traumas” he had uncovered could
    be described “without exception” as “grave sexual injuries”.
    How putative ‘memories’ of experiences that he had described as “brutal”
    and “absolutely appalling” could plausibly turn out to be unconscious
    fantasies of “seduction” that had the purpose (according to his first
    explanation) of “fending off” patients’ disturbing memories of infantile
    masturbation, Freud made no attempt to explain. The same objection applies to
    his later story that the putative “seduction fantasies” were projections
    of patients’ Oedipal desires. In any case, he was in no position to know whether
    his analytic reconstructions represented repressed memories of actual events,
    or patients’ unconscious fantasies — or indeed, as was actually the case, imaginative
    scenarios originating in his own mind.
    A little known fact is that, in accord with his theoretical requirements, Freud
    claimed in 1896 that for each of his six obsessional patients he had uncovered
    repressed memories not only of passive infantile sexual abuse scenes, but also
    of active sexual experiences at a slightly older age. Nothing was heard again
    of these remarkable clinical ‘findings’, and Freud made no attempt to explain
    how his later unconscious fantasy theory could possibly account for them.
    The above arguments, of course, refute Jeffrey Masson’s version of events as
    well as the received psychoanalytic story, though his case lacks cogency for
    other reasons. He suggested in The Assault on Truth that Freud’s motive
    for abandoning the seduction theory was in part an attempt to ingratiate himself
    with his colleagues, who supposedly were outraged by his clinical claims. This
    thesis is undermined by the fact that Masson’s account of the ostracizing of
    Freud by his colleagues is entirely erroneous. But it is also invalidated by
    the fact that Freud did not reveal his abandonment of the seduction theory to
    his colleagues for some seven years after he had privately renounced it. (Masson
    erroneously stated that “the critical period for Freud’s change of heart
    about the seduction hypothesis” was “during the years 1900-1903”.
    This vague dating effectively closes most of the gap between the abandonment
    of the theory and Freud’s public announcement of his change of view, and tallies
    with Masson’s thesis, but Freud’s letters to Fliess show clearly that he had
    completely given up the theory by the end of 1898.)
    That the traditional story of the seduction theory episode is false in all
    its essentials is especially important in recent times, when it has been drawn
    into the debate about the repression of memories of childhood abuse that are
    supposedly ‘recovered’ some decades later. People need to get the historical
    facts straight before Freud’s supposed early clinical experiences are erroneously
    cited to support the arguments of one side or the other. More generally, as
    Cioffi has emphasized, an accurate account of the transition from the seduction
    theory to its successor fantasy theory calls into question the reasoning which
    Freud was to employ for the rest of his career to reconstruct infantile fantasy
    life and the contents of the unconscious.
    References
    Cioffi, F. (1998 [1974]). “Was Freud a liar?” In Freud and
    the Question of Pseudoscience
    . Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, pp. 199-204.
    Esterson, A. (1993). Seductive Mirage: An Exploration of the Work of Sigmund
    Freud
    , Chicago: Open Court.
    Esterson, A. (1998). “Jeffrey Masson and Freud’s Seduction Theory: a New
    Fable Based on Old Myths.” History of the Human Sciences, 11
    (1)
    , pp. 1-21.
    Esterson, A. (2001). “The Mythologizing of Psychoanalytic History: Deception
    and Self-deception in Freud’s Accounts of the Seduction Theory Episode.”
    History of Psychiatry, xii, pp. 329-352.
    Esterson, A. (2002). “The Myth of Freud’s Ostracism by the Medical Community
    in 1896-1905.” History of Psychology, 5 (2), pp. 115-134.
    Freud, S. (1953-1974). The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological
    Works of Sigmund Freud
    , ed. and trans. by J. Strachey et al. London: Hogarth
    Press.
    Israëls, H. and Schatzman, M. (1993). “The Seduction Theory.”
    History of Psychiatry, iv, pp. 23-59.
    Masson, J. M. (1984). The Assault on Truth: Freud’s Suppression of the Seduction
    Theory
    . New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
    Masson, J. M. (ed. and trans.) (1985). The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud
    to Wilhelm Fliess 1887-1904
    . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
    Scharnberg, M. (1993). The Non-Authentic Nature of Freud’s Observations:
    Vol. 1. The Seduction Theory. Uppsala Studies in Education, No
    47 and 48. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International.
    Schimek, J.G. (1987). “Fact and fantasy in the seduction theory: a historical
    review.” Journal of the American Pyschoanalytic Association, 35,
    pp. 937-965.

  • Having a Bad Argument Day

    Here is an article by Oliver James in which he tries to argue for environmental explanations of sexual proclivities, in particular the male preference for very young women not to say girls, rather than or in addition to genetic ones. This is surely an idea for which a case can be made, but James makes a hash of the job here. Take this passage for example:

    Evolutionary psychologists regard these facts as grist to their mill – youthful looks are a signal of fertility: get a young wife to get more children out of her, blah, blah, blah, ad nauseam. But they could just as well be explained by the fact that, whereas men can reproduce at any age, women’s clocks are ticking, so potential mothers are always in much shorter supply than potential fathers.

    Er…am I missing something? Isn’t his alternative explanation at least arguably every bit as much of a ‘genetic’ or evolutionary one as the first? Aren’t they in fact the same explanation, worded slightly differently?

    And then this one:

    Men may be sex maniacs, but they are not completely thick. They can work out that if they want to have a baby, a pensioner is not likely to be much help; their attraction to youth could be a rational decision rather than a genetic script.

    Same again only more so. One, attraction to youth can still be both a rational decision and hard-wired, and two–the research that shows men preferring young women across cultures applies to all men, not only the ones who want to have children. Has Oliver James never met or heard of a man who in fact doesn’t want children but is still more attracted to young women than to old ones? Surely he can do better than that…

  • Pseudo-investigation

    A show of journalistic digging without the reality lets the powerful off the hook.

  • Abductees Go to Harvard

    Do we construct memories of sexual abuse the same way we construct memories of alien abductions? Harvard researcher finds the question is highly political.

  • Scientists Against Boycott

    The universality of science is too important to give up lightly, four Oxford professors say.

  • Listen Up, Sir

    SciTechDaily gives us an item from the archive today: Richard Dawkins explaining to the future king why scientific reason is a better way of thinking about issues than intuition. As he points out (and it seems so obvious one shouldn’t have to point it out), Hitler and Saddam Hussein and the Yorkshire Ripper had their intuitions too. John Stuart Mill made, mutatis mutandis, the same point in On Liberty a century and a half ago.

    Dawkins also points out that nature is not necessarily admirable or something humans ought to imitate in all respects.

    No wonder T.H. Huxley, Darwin’s bulldog, founded his ethics on a repudiation of Darwinism. Not a repudiation of Darwinism as science, of course, for you cannot repudiate truth. But the very fact that Darwinism is true makes it even more important for us to fight against the naturally selfish and exploitative tendencies of nature.

    A simple but very important point, and one often overlooked. The fact that biologists and evolutionary psychologists think there is good and ever-increasing evidence that there is such a thing as evolved, naturally selected human nature does not have to mean that they don’t think we should fight against our natural selfishness. Mind the gap.

  • Unprized

    Historian de-prized after panel concludes he did “unprofessional and misleading work.”

  • What Do You Mean, You Don’t Want Your Bones Back?

    It’s not the indigenous peoples themselves who want their ancestors’ remains back, it’s caring academics who insist on returning them.

  • Manipulation

    The therapeutic and market world-views converge, when “personal well-being” is our only goal.

  • Argument by Fashion

    There is a review of Steven Pinker’s The Blank Slate in the current American Scientist. It raises some reasonable objections to Pinker’s book, including a contradiction I have wondered about too: on the one hand Pinker rejects the “naturalistic fallacy” (also known as the fact-value distinction, or confusing “is” with “ought”), and on the other hand the whole book is an argument that a proper understanding of human nature undermines ideas about social engineering and utopian dreams. Fair enough. But then there comes a very odd paragraph.

    At this point in the book I was increasingly struck by resonances with the intellectual conservatism of science warriors such as Paul Gross and Norman Levitt. Pinker’s standard lists of blank-slaters (exponents of social constructionism, science studies, cultural studies, poststructuralism and the like) are eerily reminiscent of the singling out of enemies of science by Gross and Levitt and others. It would be a task beyond the present review to explore the connections, but the appeal to right-of-center middlebrow scientism is certainly similar and surely suggestive of a broader cultural tendency.

    The intellectual conservatism? Right-of-center? Middlebrow? What is this, a fashion show? A game of Who is Hippest? Is epistemology identical with politics? Is intellectual conservatism even a meaningful concept? Is defending the role of evidence and logic in science and other forms of inquiry “middlebrow”? It may be conservative, in the sense that that is how science has been done for centuries, but does it follow that, oh dear, that’s getting a bit stale and tiresome and vieux jeu now and we really ought to do it the opposite way, via hunches or the I Ching or political preference? Surely not.

    ********************

    There is an article here from our sister publication The Philosophers’ Magazine about a debate between John Dupré, who wrote the review in question, and Dylan Evans, author of Introducing Evolutionary Psychology, chaired by the novelist Ian McEwan.

  • Secularism is Good

    Hermione Lee admires Salman Rushdie’s chutzpah: extolling unbelief in a Sunday address in King’s College Chapel.

  • The Persistence of Superstition

    Magical thinking thrives when the other kind can’t perform miracles.

  • Identity What

    There is an essay by Martin Jay in the current London Review of Books about “situatedness”, about speaking azza. Azza woman, azza Muslim, azza graduate, azza whatever. The subject is similar to that of Todd Gitlin’s Twilight of Common Dreams: the difficulties and limitations of what we like to call “identity”. As Jay points out, in reviewing David Simpson’s Situatedness: or Why We Keep Saying Where We’re Coming From, it is difficult to decide which bit of our identity is relevant to any given discussion.

    How can we know, for example, whether it is more important that a person is a woman, a baby boomer, a heterosexual, Asian-American, a Catholic, a breast cancer survivor, upper-middle class, a college drop-out, twice divorced, a fashion victim or second in birth order in her family in understanding why she campaigned for Ralph Nader in the last American Presidential election?

    How indeed. In fact surely the possibilities are almost infinite. An introvert, a cat lover, a Buffy fan, a runner, a sloth, a Shakespeare fan–on and on it goes. Why do we think we have more in common with fellow women/whites/Muslims/gays than we do with fellow readers/knitters/cooks? Or do we think that. Probably not. We do tend to find our friends among people with similar interests and tastes, after all. And yet identity politics is about race/gender/sexualorientation rather than about interests and pursuits and even vocations. Balkanize this way but not that, seems to be the line of thought. One wonders why. One also worries about how parochial and narrowing and claustrophobic it all is, if some people don’t spend all too much time and energy thinking about their gender or sexual preference and all too little thinking about a larger world.

  • Rawls and Nozick

    It is instructive to consider the two opposing principles of equality and liberty taken to the extreme conclusions Nozick and Rawls did.

  • Truth in Advertising

    Euphemism is a subject that keeps coming up on Butterflies and Wheels. That’s not very surprising, because much of what we’re talking about is education, writing, public debate. It’s all about language, and euphemism is a well-known and time-honoured way of trying to make one’s case by prettying up crucial facts. George Orwell was particularly good at pointing this out, but he was certainly neither the first nor the last. The tactic was the issue in three stories we linked to recently: the one about incitement to murder as free speech, the one about death threats as a personality quirk, and today, again, a commentary about about death threats as free speech or freedom of religion or piety.

    Do we begin to see a pattern here? It appears that some people want to argue that free speech, or second chances for schoolboys, or piety, are of more value than forbidding or preventing incitement to murder. But if people really do want to argue that, then why are they reluctant to say so? Why do they in fact not say so, but say something else instead? Presumably because they know the non-euphemistic version will sound repellent. ‘We must respect the right of schoolboys to make death threats against their teachers.’ ‘We must respect the right of pious Muslims to make death threats against novelists or journalists who have said something they consider blasphemous.’ ‘We must respect the right of poets to say that a certain group of people should be shot dead.’ But is it only their audience that euphemisers are trying to mislead? Or is it also themselves. Perhaps if they put their own positions into unmistakable language, they would be able to think more clearly about what they are saying. Euphemism tends to confuse in all directions.

  • Threat Envy

    When piety equals incitement to murder, not to mention murder itself, there is nothing to negotiate.

  • How to Attract Corporate Interest

    Issues of patenting and profit versus free exchange of knowledge surface in new stem cell research.