Author: Ophelia Benson

  • Dawkins on the Church

    The damage religion does to the mind is worse than sexual abuse by the parish priest.

  • Textbook Publishers Bow to Pressure from Right

    Because the Bible doesn’t say fossil fuels were formed millions of years ago, so neither should books in Texas classrooms.

  • National Geographic Strangely Uncritical

    An article about the conflict between preservation of a historic site and use by an ‘alternative’ religion gives oddly short shrift to the scholarly half of the equation.

  • Not Good for the Mind

    Richard Dawkins says that the real damage done to children by the Catholic Church is not “a little fondling,” but what it does to their minds. This is not a conventional or (in the general estimation, especially in the US) polite thing to say, but I think it is profoundly true. There is the fear of hell, for one thing, as Dawkins says, and as we’re all familiar with from A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man as well as our own pasts or those of friends. One does have to wonder why people are so immovably convinced of the general benevolence of religion, when that kind of terror-mongering is part of it.

    But even more than that, there is the early training in bad thinking. “I think it’s a very demeaning thing to the human mind to believe in a falsehood, especially as the truth about the universe is so immensely exciting,” Dawkins says. Indeed. And it’s not only demeaning, it’s disabling. If one has been trained to believe one falsehood, what is to prevent one from believing in more? From believing any falsehood that happens to appeal? And if that is one’s mental habit, how can one think clearly about anything at all?

  • Sinister people or hoaxers?

    A Sokal Hoax turned back to front? And why does the Chronicle of Higher Education call it just deserts?

  • Two for the price of one

    The intersection of two vexed subjects, evolutionary psychology and the differences between men and women, is examined in A Mind of Her Own.

  • Proving the point

    Steven Pinker points out that New York Times book reviewer resorts to the very fallacy the book is about.

  • Dignity and

    Mystery, humility, human finitude; science has nothing to say about who we are; the self cannot be an illusion; free will must be true…Such are the platitudes that greet a book on bioethics by a presidential pundit.

  • Cleaning the closets

    There is a difference between amassing a great many facts, and acquiring or conveying knowledge or understanding. There is also a difference between exploring every possible detail and speculative possibility of Poet X’s sex life, and writing a good intellectual biography. The review of yet another new biography of Byron indicates that we have yet another example of the first part of the equation instead of the second. There has been a rash of such biographies in the last decade or so, profoundly anti-intellectual works that undertake to clean out the closets of various writers and thinkers without stopping to ask why we care about those closets if we don’t care about the work. We know more than we knew before about the neuroses of Virginia Woolf, the repressions of Henry James, the bad marriage of T.S. Eliot, Charles Dickens’ secret mistress, and (over and over again) the undeniably colourful life of Byron. But so what? If that’s what we want, why bother to look to writers for it? Why not just watch a soap opera, or better yet, just go out and work up a colourful life of our own? As Duncan Wu says at the conclusion of his review,

    But it is a sad comment on our culture that a fully researched biography such as this has little to say about what made Byron a great poet, while devoting several hundred pages to proving that he was a closet homosexual whose cover was the exaggerated number of female conquests which were his chief boast.

  • Elitism or Meritocracy?

    Frank Dobson, a Labour M.P. and former Secretary of State for Health, has an article in today’s Observer that assails the ‘elitist’ policies of Tony Blair’s government, particularly in education and health care. The health issue seems reasonably straightforward: he says that less money is being spent in poorer areas, and that does sound like a policy that favours the already favoured. But in education, surely things are not quite so simple. There is a worry, among those who agree with Dobson, about a proposal for super A-levels to challenge super-clever children. Dobson parses the idea this way:

    “This idea that gifted children need super A-levels comes from people who want a privileged minority to be able to look down on young people who have passed ‘just’ A-levels.”

    Well. That is one possibility, certainly, but surely there are others? Surely there is more than one way to look at the subject, and more than one possible motivation for wanting to see students challenged to stretch as far as they can? Is the most spiteful or invidious motive automatically the correct one? Is education solely a mechanism for getting ahead? Is it solely a pretext for humiliating other people? Is it solely a slotting-device for the hierarchy? Could a desire for more demanding education possibly have anything to do with thoughts about education being an intrinsic good as well as an instrumental one? Could the subject, in short, be a little more complex than that comment makes it sound?

  • Science Studies

    In 1994, Paul R. Gross and Norman Levitt published Higher Superstition,
    and the pigeons have still not recovered from the shock of that particular cat.
    Higher Superstition is a funny-painful ‘deconstruction’ or rather demolition
    of an array of trendy anti-science ‘studies’, stances, branches of putative
    scholarship: Postmodern, cultural constructivist, feminist, sociological, environmental.
    Most of these orientations are on the left, although it has been frequently
    pointed out (e.g. by Richard J. Evans in his article on Postmodern history on
    this site) that PoMo is at least as useful to the right as it is to the left
    and that there are indeed right-wing Postmodernists. But the majority of the
    attacks on science come from the left (and could be seen as a kind of displacement
    activity, at a time when the non-theory-driven variety of leftist work seemed
    moribund), which to old-fashioned leftists can be a very puzzling turn. Yes,
    naturally, science can be turned to exploitative or sinister uses, but so can
    many good and useful things; the solution would seem to be to expose and resist
    the misuses, not smash the thing being misused. And frivolously confusing issues
    like the is-ought gap or how evidence is to be evaluated, is a weapon that can
    be very quickly and decisively turned against its user.


    Higher Superstition is not only an eye-opening and hair-raising expose
    of various fatuous anti-science critiques or broadsides, it’s also a very good
    read. There’s a certain pomo-ironic hilarity in the fact that this book by a
    mathematician and a biologist, in addition to flattening the pretensions of
    the anti-science crowd, is witty and eloquent and lucid beyond the wildest dreams
    of their literary opponents. So unlike the old ‘Two Cultures’ debate between
    Snow and Leavis, in which Leavis was able to make much play with Snow’s lack
    of talent in the rhetoric department. No fear of that with Levitt and Gross!
    They escort us, Virgils to our Dante, through the antiscience “arguments” of
    cultural constructivism, postmodernism, feminism (or one branch of feminism–one
    could argue that they paint with too broad a brush there), and ‘radical environmentalism’
    or deep ecology. The first two are the funniest, the most replete with non-sequiturs
    and grandiose claims based on non-understanding of Gödel’s incompleteness
    theorem, quantum mechanics, chaos theory, and the like. In the chapter on Cultural
    Constructivism we see Stanley Aronowitz misunderstand the uncertainty principle,
    translating it into “a kind of epistemological and spiritual malaise”. We see
    Bruno Latour leap from observations of laboratory politics to the notion that
    science reaches its conclusions via wheedling and agreement. We learn that Steven
    Shapin and Simon Schaffer’s Leviathan and the Air Pump converts Hobbes’
    mathematical ineptitude into an episode of the class war, and that Wallis’ math
    and Boyle’s physics were not superior knowledge but the unfair privilege of
    an excluding elite. We see Jacques Derrida pontificate about topology under
    the mistaken impression, apparently, that’s it’s just a slightly grander word
    for topography. We see N. Katherine Hayles claim that the Zeitgeist did
    Einstein’s work for him:


    “If we think of these projects as attempts to ground representation in a non-contingent
    metadiscourse, surely it is significant that the most important work on them
    appeared before World War I. Einstein published his papers on the special theory
    of relativity in 1905 and the general theory in 1916; the Principia Mathematica
    volumes appeared from 1910 to 1913; and logical positivism had its heyday
    in the closing decades of the nineteenth century. After World War I, when the
    rhetoric of glorious patriotism sounded very empty, it would have been much
    more difficult to think language could have an absolute ground of meaning.”
    [N. Katherine Hayles, Chaos Bound]


    And Andrew Ross portray scientists as an arbitrary cabal of all-powerful snobbish
    pedants:


    “How can metaphysical life theories and explanations taken seriously by millions
    be ignored or excluded by a small group of powerful people called ‘scientists’?”
    [Andrew Ross, Strange Weather]


    In 1995, a year after the publication of Higher Superstition, the New
    York Academy of Sciences held a conference titled ‘The Flight From Science and
    Reason’, and the papers that were read at the conference were collected in a
    book of the same name. It is a rich source of fascinating examinations of the
    subject from participants such as Susan Haack, Janet Radcliffe Richards, Gerald
    Holton, Mary Lefkowitz, James Trefil, Frederick Crews, who discuss history and
    evidence, feminist epistemology, Freud, social construction, education, and
    many more subjects. The book makes it all the clearer that attacks on science
    and reason in one discipline amount to an attack on them in all.


    And at the same time, shocked after reading Higher Superstition, Alan
    Sokal came up with his famous hoax. He read another great pile of books and
    articles (which was a noble sacrifice of time and effort), wrote his article
    ‘Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum
    Gravity’
    , and got it published in the 1996 Spring-Summer issue of Social
    Text
    –even though the editors, at least so they later claimed, found it
    a tad ‘hokey’. Then he published a follow-up article in Lingua Franca declaring
    the hoax…and the fur flew. Sokal’s article is full of blatant mistakes and
    transparent parody; but not quite blatant or transparent enough to get it rejected.
    The Science Studies crowd has never quite recovered. The editors of Lingua
    Franca
    put together an excellent collection of journalism and essays called
    The Sokal Hoax, and Sokal and Jean Bricmont co-wrote the book Fashionable
    Nonsense
    [US]/Intellectual Impostures[UK]. Finally the work is continued
    in the 1998 book edited by Noretta Koertge, A House Built on Sand, another
    excellent collection of essays.


    Norman Levitt tells Butterflies and Wheels in his interview with us
    that the situation is a little better in some ways. In particular, “the ultimate
    ambition of many postmodern science-studies enthusiasts–that is, to become
    the primary mediators between science and political institutions (the commissars,
    as it were, of science and technology)–have largely been squelched. Embarrassing
    questions were raised far too early in the game, well before any successful
    infiltration of the corridors of power.” This is good to know. But ill-founded
    nonsense has not by any means been laughed out of town yet, so there is still
    work to be done.

    OB

    External Resources

  • David Lodge thinks

    Which tells us more about consciousness, fiction or cognitive science?

  • Credentials

    Philosophers uncover conceptual connections and thus help to make ethical debate better informed.

  • Bizarre claims

    Philosophers will insist on getting Dawkins wrong.

  • Truth and lies

    Bernard Williams defends the truth, while also exploring when we need to tell lies.

  • Anyone’s neighbour

    ‘It could be you’. Perhaps a more useful suggestion about the Nobel prize than about the lottery.

  • Tragic view

    Are John Gray and Steven Pinker saying the same dismal thing about human hopes, and are they right to be saying it?

  • Cargo cult science

    ‘Statistics show’ is a mere rhetorical device in education research, used to support whatever policy one favors. Research in cognitive psychology shows promise.

  • Mormon correctness

    Even practicing Mormons can have a hard time conforming to the rules at Brigham Young University.

  • One way to introduce the two cultures

    A computer scientist teaches liberal arts students an intelligent skepticism about computer technology…and what binary numbers are.