Are analytic philosophers ‘hard-working public relations agents for contemporary institutions and practices’? Or are neo-pragmatists hard-working Artful Dodgers…
Author: Ophelia Benson
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Higher Superstition Revisited: an interview with Norman Levitt
Paul R. Gross and Norman Levitt’s book Higher Superstition appeared
in 1994, rattled a good many cages, and prompted the Sokal Hoax. The book describes
a bizarre situation in American universities in which academics in various (mostly
new-minted) fields such as Cultural Studies, Literary Theory, and Science Studies,
plus a few more familiar ones such as Sociology, Comparative Literature and
the like, make a career of writing about science without taking the trouble
to know anything about it. Gross and Levitt have a good deal of fun exposing
the absurd mistakes perpetrated by people who rhapsodise about quantum mechanics
and chaos theory without having the faintest idea what they’re talking about.
But hilarity aside, there are serious issues involved. The Cultural Studies
brigade attack not only the misuses to which science can be put, but scientific
ways of thinking themselves; not only possible inequities in hiring and promotion,
but logic, truth and the ‘Enlightenment project’. Gross and Levitt did an admirable
job of sounding the alarm which Butterflies and Wheels plans to go on sounding.
Norman Levitt very kindly agreed to answer some question for us.
Benson: Do you think the situation has improved since you wrote Higher
Superstition? Do people seem any more embarrassed or self-conscious about
writing ignorant absurdities? Or do they merely congratulate themselves all
the more on how “transgressive” they are?
Levitt: This is a complicated question in that it depends on the parameters
one chooses to measure improvement or deterioration. My main motivation for
writing HS was to alert scientists to the fact that bizarre views of
science were being taught and fervently advocated in various enclaves of the
humanities and social sciences. The main immediate danger, I thought, was that
"science studies" imperialists were, in many schools, proposing that
the "science requirement" for non-science students be replaced by
courses in "science and society" or some such. This was an attractive
proposition for some of the scientists, who view "Physics for Poets"
and the like as joyless and time-wasting tasks. But since word has gotten round
that science studies is a dubious cult and actively hostile to science to boot,
the prospects for this kind of coup have pretty much crashed. Of course, HS
can’t by any means claim all the credit. The real shocker was the Sokal Hoax,
and there were other instructive flaps as well, such as the Science in American
Life exhibit at the Smithsonian.
Another fact worth noting with some satisfaction is that the enthusiasm for
extreme constructivist claims regarding the nature of scientific knowledge has
cooled considerably. Constructivist slogans are no longer reflexively adopted
and mouthed in literature and sociology departments. This doesn’t mean that
science studies has become any more worthwhile or intellectually responsible,
or that its hostility toward science has lessened. But a lot of the rebellious
glee has gone out of it, as has the smug delight in being outrageous.
Most important, the ultimate ambition of many postmodern science-studies enthusiasts–that
is, to become the primary mediators between science and political institutions
(the commissars, as it were, of science and technology)–have largely been squelched.
Embarrassing questions were raised far too early in the game, well before any
successful infiltration of the corridors of power.
On the other hand, alas, few of the more notorious academic anti-science celebrities
have lost out, career-wise, as a result of being flayed by HS, A House
Built on Sand, The Flight from Science and Reason, and so forth.
There are some partial exceptions to this, most notably the failure of the silly
attempts to appoint a science studies professor at the Institute for Advanced
Study. But even the characters gulled by Sokal’s prank remain pretty much immune
to retribution for their intellectual dereliction. Indeed, being attacked by
one of those dreaded scientists in warpaint amounts to a crown of martyrdom
that nicely adorns one’s curriculum vita. Most so attacked have prospered
quite nicely, thank you. One laments the injustice of it all!
But then, we’re not talking about child rape or looting employee pension funds.
It’s just the university culture being its customary silly self, which is hardly
surprising or curable.
Finally, something should be said about the leaching of postmodern antiscience
attitudes into the more general culture. Some real damage has been done. Schools
of education have picked up a bit of this nonsense, especially in connection
with "constructivist" theories of pedagogy. Even worse, so have some
schools of nursing, which invoke shoddy philosophy and pomo slogans to justify
their flirtation with worthless alternative medicine dogmas and practices. Some
of the same stuff works its way into environmental activism or into the kind
of ethnic activism that has set up western science as an ideological enemy.
Postmodern cant has also softened up many intellectuals for the renewed assaults
of creationists, now taking form as "Intelligent Design Theory." (An
example may be found in The Nation, the best-known American leftist journal,
which recently ran a bizarre, effectively pro-ID review of Stephen Gould’s last
book. It was written by an au courant literary critic with scant knowledge of
biology but a thorough grounding in social-constructivist drivel.)
Benson: Are undergraduates aware of the controversies? Do science teachers
have to waste much energy combatting trendy notions about the situatedness of
truth, or is that one area where ignorance is an advantage?
Levitt: Speaking as a mathematics teacher, I waste a lot of energy,
perhaps, but not in order to combat postmodern attitudinizing. In lower-level
courses, I talk and I write stuff on the blackboard, the undergraduates listen
and take notes (or not). Hence, there’s little interchange that isn’t initiated
by "Is this going to be on the exam?" In upper-level courses, things
are a bit more relaxed and clubby, but students who get as far as upper-level
mathematics are hardly the type to pay much attention to the archdruids of deconstruction,
the pythonesses of feminist theory, or the jongleurs of multiculturalism.
Nonetheless, one can get a sense of overall undergraduate attitudes toward
the spectrum of experiences encountered at a university. I’m specifically talking
about a large, multiplex American state university, which encompasses, academically,
all sorts of activity, from hard-nosed engineering to the squishiest, touchy-feely
"oppression studies," and which serves a host of other functions by
way of baby sitting young people between late adolescence and the grim, inevitable
day they have to go out and earn a living. Most students invest most of their
ardor in having a helluva good time-sex, rock ‘n’ roll, and partying down, with
the occasional foray to the football stadium or the basketball arena for those
rituals of mass mindlessness. To extent that they take education seriously,
it’s as a gateway to the possibility of making a decent income-upper middle-class
or better. So they fight like hell to get into the business and management programs,
and sometimes do some serious grinding to qualify for law or medical school.
But the issues that raise tempers in purely academic circles-the culture wars,
the fights over "diversity," and all that rot-are not undergraduate
issues, by and large.
The PC/Pomo faction, to describe it as tersely as possible, certainly has a
death-grip on a lot of instructional turf. Basic courses like expository writing
are in their hands, and many students have to go through the mill of a pious
course on "diversity" or some such. There they get a fairly strong
whiff of academic-left doxology. But the upshot is not, on the whole, a cohort
of enthusiastic recruits, but rather a mass of skeptical-to-cynical young people
who have caught on to the fact that their instructors, or at least, those who
give pedagogical marching orders to their instructors, can often be prigs, bores,
and bigots-and none too bright, at that. PC/Pomo preaching far more readily
generates disdain for itself than hostility toward its declared foes. This is
even true for black and Hispanic students. It is an obvious corollary that the
quirky attitudes toward science common amongst the pomo faithful do not diffuse
very far or very fast into mainstream undergraduate culture.
This is not to say that undergrads are generally knowledgeable about science
or that they have a sophisticated grasp of the canons of reliable knowledge.
Even science majors have a shallow knowledge of science beyond what they’ve
specifically acquired in courses. The non-science majors know little and care
little about science and tend to be clueless and inarticulate when scientific
matters arise at any level. But PC/Pomo demonology, per se, doesn’t seem to
have been responsible for this.
Benson: Is the issue still alive among the faculty? Are there arguments,
debates, quarrels? Do you personally have to deal with bristling, indignant
colleagues from “Cultural Studies” and such who are outraged by your work?
Levitt: The basic story is this: A certain camp within the PC/Pomo enterprise
made a fetish of "science criticism" and, at its high water mark 10
or 12 years ago, even dreamt of becoming a powerful oracular presence on the
societal scale, a major player in determining science and technology policy.
However, it couldn’t fly below the radar forever; its vanguard was spotted and
chased back to the starting line fairly easily. The "science wars"
have dissolved such susceptibility to its wiles as might have existed among
scientists and science administrators. But its own turf is pretty secure, thanks
to the inertia of the academic world. Its members have their little club and
retain their power to praise and promote each other for as long as the money
holds out (which it will for some time to come).
Hurt feelings persist, and folks like Paul Gross and me, not to mention Sokal,
are still excoriated for our villainy and obtuseness, evoking imprecations from
many courses and published papers (and a good thing, too, since it keeps our
books in print!). Yet people in the science-studies racket have also grown more
prudent; they are chary of making outrageous epistemological claims with flags
flying and trumpets blaring the way they used to on a daily basis. Their dreams
of exercising actual political power over science and scientists are on the
back shelf. But the academic cult as such keeps grinding away on its own narrow
terms.
Debates do continue, in some sense, but they have moved to such arenas as schools
of education and-quite frightening-into medicine, where bits and pieces of the
radical science-studies litany are now and then recruited to defend quackery.
But, as I see it, the main thing to keep in mind is that the academic assault
on science began, when you get down to it, because antiscientific attitudes
widespread in the general culture penetrated the academy, becoming over time
increasingly stark and explicit in the thinking of intellectuals who think of
themselves as radically opposed to middle-class politics, culture, and values.
In the universities, this antagonism acquired a particular rationale-philosophies
propounding the situated and socially-constructed character of knowledge claims
and the malign effects of a Eurocentric episteme. It also acquired a vocabulary
and a certain characteristic rhetorical style. At that point, it leached back
into the wider culture, slightly altering the rhetoric, but not necessarily
the essential substance, of demotic antiscience. But it is well to remember
that the basic problem is not that of an assault on rationality by a cabal of
reckless university intellectuals; the assault was going on long before these
guys came on the scene, and will continue even if each and every poststructuralist
and feminist-epistemologist were to convert overnight to logical positivism.
As for my personal experiences; obviously there are people who don’t like me
at all because of HS et seq. Once in a while I get roundly attacked
at a conference where I’m speaking. But this is hardly terrifying; superannuated
as I am, I love being denounced as a dangerous character. In defense of my own
institution, Rutgers University, I must say that it has treated me rather well
as a result of my involvement in the science wars (while treating some of my
local enemies quite well, too!) Post 9/11, we-scientists, intellectuals along
with all the rest–seem to be headed into "interesting times," which
takes a lot of the ginger out of academic quarrels. All this science-wars stuff
may be fading irrelevancy within a few years.
Benson: If some faculty members are indignant, are others as it were
recruited? Do you find new allies in departments such as History, Sociology,
Anthropology, where evidence and the validity of evidence are highly relevant?
If so, could this be a hopeful sign? Could one by-product be a heightened awareness
in many disciplines of the need to ground truth-claims and knowledge-claims
with evidence and logic?
Levitt: Though one could hardly call it a mass movement, there has been
a recurrent "Rally round the flag, boys!" mood amongst some scholars
in areas besieged by relativism and anti-rationality, with the serio-comic episode
of the science wars providing some ground for renewed hope that terminal silliness
will not prevail. I’ve been in touch with quite a few of these people in areas
like psychology, anthropology, and even philosophy. It’s no longer quite so
easy to sneer at words like evidence"" and "objectivity,"
and, to a certain extent, it’s become possible to sneer at the sneerers. Things
are changing slowly, but largely they are changing for the good. The project
of serious inquiry in all kinds of fields is in better shape than it was a few
years ago, and the intellectual fops are no longer quite so sure of their ground.
Norman Levitt is Professor of Mathematics at Rutgers University. He is author,
with Paul R. Gross, of Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels
with Science (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). Edward O. Wilson
said about this book that it was "original" and "brilliant". -
Oh, rapture
Tim LaHaye was on the US public radio show Fresh Air last night. He is a minister, a fundamentalist, a pillar of far-right politics, a former honcho in the Moral Majority, and…a best-selling novelist. To put it mildly. He is the co-author of a series which has sold (I cringe to relate) 50 million copies. The ‘left behind’ series. For those who have the good fortune not to know what on earth that is, the subject matter is ‘the Rapture’. You know. When Jesus shouts in the sky and all the believers are instantly taken up into heaven, to leave the rest of us down here to be tortured for all eternity (after a great deal of to-ing and fro-ing with End Times and tribulations and killing all the Jews and the Anti-christ and never being able to find a parking space).
I have been aware of this delightful cultural artifact for a long time, but have also been doing my best to ignore it. But I listened last night, and as of course I knew it would be, it’s even worse than I thought. I was repelled but not at all surprised by the obvious relish plus loathing in LaHaye’s voice when he talked about all the people who refused to ‘call on God’ (and thus were doomed doomed doomed), about the way they ree-bell, and their attitude. And the air of faintly surprised generosity with which he said he hoped that as many as a billion people might be saved. And the naive fatuity with which he said that because Jesus said ‘Whosoever believes…’ that means he meant everyone, without stopping to reflect that Jesus didn’t actually speak English or that the translation might possibly not bear out his interpretation. But I was (I shouldn’t have been, but I was) a little surprised to learn that the rapture crowd believe that the Bible predicts that ‘one world government’ and world peace are part of the plan of the Anti-christ. Not figuratively but literally. Now there’s a reassuring thought. And there are 50 million of them sold.
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Scientists were unpopular then too
Even in that supposed heyday of reason, attacks on freethinkers were a favourite sport.
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Shocking news: teenagers are easily bored
More teenagers report being bored at school in the UK than in other industrialised nations. Let us hope the response is not to replace teachers with videos.
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Fiction and consciousness studies
David Lodge, while evading ‘the false intimacies of celebrity,’ discusses his new book of essays on that intersection.
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Anger is energizing
Now that’s what I call good news. A piece in yesterday’s New York Times says that, popular wisdom to the contrary notwithstanding, pessimism and anger are not necessarily always unhealthy and their opposites not necessarily always therapeutic. Just exactly what I’ve always thought! I’m a basically cheerful sort, I think, but it’s an irritated sort of cheerfulness–the two go together. I get a lot of energy and motivation from my generalised anger. It means there are things to do, mistakes that need pointing out, stupidities that need correcting. One likes to feel useful. Julie K. Norem, a psychologist and author of the book The Power of Negative Thinking, says that anger is an energizing emotion. I feel vindicated, and joyously indignant.
‘Barbara S. Held, a psychologist and professor at Bowdoin College, argues that it’s time to end what she calls the “tyranny of the positive attitude in America.”‘ I couldn’t possibly agree more.
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Sexist or witty?
Is a poster of a shirtless woman at a Motor Show a stupid throwback to the ’50s or an amusingly knowing and harmless bit of fun? What does it mean that a woman designed the poster? And that a government minister (also a woman) is not amused?
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Misanthropes can stay that way
Good news: people who urge grouches to ‘cheer up, you’ll live longer’ are wrong.
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The oracular mode
Judith Shulevitz wrote of Harold Bloom’s new book Genius, in the New York Times Book Review:
“He repeats himself so often that his favorite words acquire the ring of revolutionary slogans (Originality! Vitality!) or ritual denunciations (Resenters! Historicizers!). He makes grandiose and indefensible claims without explaining or arguing for them. He cloaks himself Wizard-of-Oz-like in the polysyllabic hermeticism of cabala and Gnosticism, with little seeming regard for the violence his borrowings may do to those systems or to the comprehensibility of his prose.”
Just so. I had the same problem with The Western Canon; Shakespeare; How to Read and Why. Bloom used to be (and still is when he wants to, it’s just that he mostly seems not to want to any more) an excellent close reader–something of a genius at it in fact. But he’s given that up now for the oracular mode, and he does indeed endlessly repeat himself and make tiresomely magniloquent claims, without troubling to argue for them. I love his passion for literature, and his passionate resistance to what he calls (often, often) the school of resentment, but for that very reason (as well as others) I wish he would bother to make a case for them rather than simply announcing them. It can be contagious, that kind of thing, and at a time when there is so much bad thought being flung around, it is incumbent on everyone to think and argue as well and clearly as possible. Bloom certainly knows how, and it would be nice if he could get over his taste for the jeremiad.
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First rule: get the evidence right
If you want to make an argument, it’s no good saying the flood ate your homework.
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Galileo and the gang
Is the conflict between science and religion inevitable, or a result of tactical decisions?
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Trinidadian guppies and Arabian babblers
Shouting at predators, risk-taking, the Big Mistake Hypothesis, altruism; the questions about cooperation and evolution go on being asked.
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The power of facing unpleasant facts
One independent thinker with an aversion to tribalism and cant pays his respects to another.
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Hot and cold running Psychoanalysis
Is extensive therapy necessary both to survive family life and to raise children who can survive family life?
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Report undermines its own message
Nuffield Council on Bioethics releases report on behavioural genetics, but guides the press to focus on peripheral issue of designer babies.
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Tversky and Kahneman on irrationality
Nobel prize-winner and his late colleague explored the illogical ways humans make decisions.
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Not new and not science
There is a difference between science and computational play; metaphors can illuminate but not predict.
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Difference Feminism
Second wave feminism has always had a radical strand. It has always been about
more than equal pay. It was also, for instance, about exposing and then discarding
banal conventional unreflective ideas that led to banal conventional unreflective
behaviour. Ideas about cooking and cleaning being somehow naturally women’s
work, for example, which led to men cheerfully lounging about while women put
in what Arlie Hochschild calls a second shift. And even more than that, unexamined
ideas about what women are like, what they want, what they should be and do.
David Lodge once remarked that women became much more interesting after feminism,
and his own novels bear this out, as do those of Michael Frayn and other male
novelists who started writing in the ’50s or ’60s. The pre-1970 female characters
are non-entities, the post-1970 ones–Robyn Penrose in Nice Work, Kate
in Headlong–take up a lot of space. The very way women are perceived
and noticed and thought about changed with feminism, and that would not have
happened if mere institutional reform had been the only goal.
But there are radical ideas and then there are radical ideas. One of the less
helpful ones was difference feminism. The foundations of this shaky edifice
were laid in the ’70s, when a popular rhetorical move was to label many usually
well-thought-of attributes and tools–reason, logic, science, “linear” thinking,
abstract ideas, analysis, objectivity, argument–as male, and dub their opposite
female. So by a contortion that defies “male” logic, it somehow became feminist
to confine women all over again to intuition, guesswork, instinct, feelings,
subjectivity, and arm-waving.
This school of thought became mainstream in 1982 with the publication of Carol
Gilligan’s highly influential In a Different Voice. Gilligan claims that
women have their own special version of morality rooted in relationships and
caring rather than abstract notions of justice and equity. This of course sounds
startlingly like the patronizing pat on the head with which women were barred
from public life in the 19th century, because the dear creatures were simply
too good for that mucky arena. It is quite a feat of legerdemain to take what
had been thought a classic bit of sexist mystification and turn it into new
feminist wisdom.
But however perverse or odd it may seem, and though her research has been sharply
criticised,[1] Gilligan’s views were and are indeed popular.
The criticisms were in small academic publications, while Gilligan got an admiring
profile in the New York Times Magazine in 1990, complete with cover picture.
In the wake of In a Different Voice came epigones such as Nell Noddings’
Caring, Sara Ruddick’s Maternal Thinking, and Belenky, Clinchy,
Goldberger and Tarule’s Women’s Ways of Knowing. The last-named book,
based on interviews with 135 women, claims that women are uncomfortable with
argument and disagreement, and that they have a different approach to knowledge
that emphasizes collaboration, consensus, mutual understanding. Women’s Ways
of Knowing declares in the final paragraph, “We have argued in this book
that educators can help women develop their own authentic voices if they emphasize
connection over separation, understanding and acceptance over assessment, and
collaboration over debate…if instead of imposing their own expectations and
arbitrary requirements, they encourage students to evolve their own patterns
of work based on the problems they are pursuing.” What a flawless recipe for
infantilization and mental abdication. If it were in a book dated 1886 we would
all point and laugh, but tragically it is dated a century later.
Women’s Ways of Knowing raises questions about the evidence its findings
are based on, and about what to do with those findings. Critics have duly pointed
out that the interview subjects were told in advance that the topic was women’s
different approaches to knowledge, which is not quite the way to elicit uncontaminated
testimony. But even apart from that, even if their findings were really findings
rather than self-confirmed prophecies, there would still be a problem with the
conclusions the authors draw. If the evidence truly supported their idea that
women prefer to maintain “connectedness”, make everyone feel good, and promote
understanding and acceptance over judgment or assessment, then clearly the response
ought to be loud and urgent demands for remedial education for women starting
yesterday. In morality, ethics, social life, friendship, there is something
(though far from everything) to be said for preferring understanding and acceptance
to judgment and assessment, but in epistemology or “ways of knowing” there is
just about nothing. Critical thinking is widely recognised to be a basic tool
for cognitive work, and surely the whole point of critical thinking is to know
what not to accept, to know how to judge and assess. It is all about
rejection, separation, negation, being “judgmental”; tolerance and love and
sympathy and sensitivity are the wrong tools for the job. A favourite move for
the different ways of knowing crowd is to quote an aphorism of Audre Lord’s,
“the Master’s tools will never dismantle the Master’s house”, which fact perhaps
demonstrates the result of eschewing logic. Why on earth would the Master’s
tools not dismantle his house? If he goes to town or gets drunk and falls asleep
in the corn crib, his tools will work very nicely. But in any case feminists
need to resist any rhetorical move to hand those tools over to the Master, that
is, to claim that logic and reason and evidence and “linear thinking” and judgment
belong to men, and women should claim what’s left over. Carl Sagan used to like
to say, echoing Hume, that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence,
and we should demand very very good evidence indeed (better than 135 women summoned
to describe their different way with knowledge) before accepting the notion
that logic is male.
And the evidence is not particularly good, to put it mildly. The notorious
1990 American Association of University Women study of the putative fall in
self-esteem of adolescent girls was assailed from all sides for its flawed methodology,
but it got a flood of media attention all the same. It inspired more studies
and books such as Peggy Ornstein’s Schoolgirls and Mary Pipher’s best-selling
Reviving Ophelia, and wasted the time of countless girls in “self-esteem”
classes when they might have been learning history or math. Bizarre claims resting
on flawed evidence generated even more bizarre claims resting on yet more flawed
evidence, in a spiral of epistemological breakdown. If only everyone had done
less accepting and more judging. Susan Haack sums the matter up:
“But even if there were such a thing, the case for feminist epistemology would
require further argument to show that women’s ‘ways of knowing’ (scare quotes
because the term is tendentious, since ‘knows’ is a success-word) represent
better procedures of inquiry or subtler standards of justification than the
male…[W]hat my experience rather suggests is that the questions of the epistemological
tradition are hard, very hard, for anyone, of whatever sex (or gender),
to answer or even significantly to clarify.”[2]
We have certainly gone to a great deal of trouble in order to come back to
where we started. Women are sweet, women are soft-headed, women are nicer than
men and don’t like all that pesky judgmental science and logic and reason and
argument and disagreement. If this were true it ought to be changed, but there
is little reason to think it is true. We thought we had escaped the tyranny
of low expectations for women, we thought we had crashed that prison and freed
ourselves to be as tough and hard-headed and autonomous and wide-ranging as
men–and now here come the beaming Ed School professors to tell us No, no, that’s
all wrong, that’s the male way of doing things. We are women and we have to
park our brains at the door and be nice and warm and caring and empathic and
fuzzy. That’s the sort of thing that makes a self-respecting feminist want to
be as opinionated and cold and uncompromising and downright ruthless as she
can find it in her to be. Janet Radcliffe Richards puts it this way:
“It is hard to imagine anything better calculated to delight the soul of patriarchal
man than the sight of women’s most vociferous leaders taking an approach to
feminism that continues so much of his own work: luring women off into a special
area of their own where they will remain screened from the detailed study of
philosophy and science to which he always said they were unsuited, teaching
them indignation instead of argument, fantasy and metaphor instead of science,
and doing all this by continuing his very own technique of persuading women
that their true interests lie elsewhere than in the areas colonized by men.”[3]
Feminists need to keep their eyes on the prize, as the saying goes, and resist
with every fibre of their being attempts to persuade them that the most fascinating,
inspiring, exhilarating, productive, truth-generating fields of intellectual
endeavour are the private property of men and that authentic women are too maternal
and caring and touchy-feely to be good at them. A more perverse, backward-looking,
destructive idea is hard to imagine, and the fact that it comes from friends
rather than enemies is one of the surrealistic jokes of modern life.
Footnotes
1 Colby, Anne & William Damon. “Listening to a Different
Voice: A Review of Gilligan’s In a Different Voice.” Merrill-Palmer Quarterly
29, 4 (October 1983). Walker, Lawrence J. “Sex Differences in the Development
of Moral Reasoning: A Critical Review.” Child Development 55 (1984).
2 Haack, Susan. Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate The
University of Chicago Press (1998).
3 Radcliffe Richards, Janet. “Why Feminist Epistemology Isn’t”.
The Flight From Science and Reason ed. Paul Gross, Norman Levitt, Martin
Lewis, New York Academy of Sciences (1997).OB
External Resources
- Biology is Destiny, Yet Again
Women must have children. Get on with it! - Children Are Optional
Yes, even for women. - Gender and Ethical Theory
Page of links that connect gender theory with ethics. - More, The Goddess is Bunk
A review of Philip Davis’ Goddess Unmasked originally published in The Skeptical Inquirer. - Political Agendas versus Science
The Skeptical Inquirer reports on a conference titled ‘Rational Feminism Explores the Gender Politics of Science’. - St. Hilda’s
An all-women’s college prompts strange, prurient questions. - The Birth of Pleasure: a review
A skeptical, slightly ironically or teasingly baffled review of Carol Gilligan’s The Birth of Pleasure in The Independent. - The Goddess is Bunk
An article in the January 2001 issue of The Atlantic examines the pseudo-mythology and pseudo-history behind ‘Wicca’ and The Goddess. - The Guardian
An article by Susan Greenfield on women in science, with additional relevant links at the bottom of the page. - The Virtual Library: Gender Equity
A page of useful links to studies and controversies related to education and women.
- Biology is Destiny, Yet Again
