Author: Ophelia Benson

  • Closeted Atheists

    Christians are encouraged to trumpet their beliefs, atheists are encouraged to do the other thing.

  • No Bible Distribution In Public School

    Federal Court ruled unanimously: district may not allow distribution of Bibles to children in elementary school.

  • People Praying at Tree Stump Are Like Dawkins

    They’re nuts and he’s nuts. No. They’re fanatics and he’s a fanatic. No. He’s a fanatic and they’re not. Yes!

  • Jesus and Mo Question the Barmaid

    But it’s like talking to a brick wall.

  • Paul Vallely on Eagleton and Armstrong

    Hard to find words for how stupid this is.

  • Science, Science Literacy and Religion

    Michael Rosch is not persuaded by Unscientific America.

  • Walter Cronkite

    So long and thanks for all the news.

  • 1 in 4 Britons Think Moon Landing Was a Hoax

    11 of 1009 think Buzz Lightyear was the first person on the moon.

  • Is it something in the water?

    This is the stupidest thing I’ve read since…well since the last eruption from the twins. There’s so much stupid in it that it’s hard to single it all out.

    Saying that science has made religion redundant is rather like saying that thanks to the electric toaster we can forget about Chekhov, says Terry Eagleton in this gloriously rumbustious counter-blast to Dawkinsite atheism…paradoxes sparkle throughout this coruscatingly brilliant polemic…

    Brilliant my ass. It’s tricksy, it’s decorated, but it’s not brilliant.

    Eagleton is not anti-science or reason. He merely points out that science has produced Hiroshima as well as penicillin.

    Because nobody would know that if he hadn’t merely pointed it out, and besides it’s stupid to say that ‘science’ produced Hiroshima.

    Eagleton is stronger on reason than Ditchkins, for he thinks carefully about what his opponents say whereas Dawkins & Co prefer knockabout rhetoric to serious engagement with mainstream religious thought.

    How would somebody who mindlessly follows Eagleton’s mindless lead in using ‘Ditchkins’ know what being strong on reason even looks like? And how can he claim without irony that Eagleton ‘thinks carefully about what his opponents say’ two words after he’s echoed that very Eagleton in calling two of those very opponents by a stupid schoolyardy nonce-name? Don’t ask me; I can’t begin to figure it out.

    This is, then, a demolition job which is both logically devastating and a magnificently whirling philippic. Ditchkins, he says, makes the error of conflating reason and rationality. Yet much of what seems reasonable in real life turns out not to be true. And much that is true, like quantum physics, seems rationally impossible.

    My foot my tutor, as Prospero said. Contrary to what Paul Vallely clearly thinks, neither Dawkins nor Hitchens is actually stupider than Terry Eagleton. Neither of them needs Eagleton to explain quantum physics. Neither of them needs him to explain that much of what seems reasonable in real life turns out not to be true. Eagleton is a conceited teacher of English who got way too much undergraduate adulation early in life and let it go to his head. He is not a polymath or a universal genius or a towering intellect. Dawkins and Hitchens aren’t necessarily right about everything (I hope it’s needless to say) but that doesn’t mean Eagleton is the guy to set them straight. Paul Vallely isn’t even the guy to comment on anybody setting them straight.

    There’s more, but it’s too sick-making. I’m outta here.

  • Fragility

    Daniel Dennett gives the believers just the tiniest of prods.

    Today one of the most insistent forces arrayed in opposition to us vocal atheists is the “I’m an atheist but” crowd, who publicly deplore our “hostility”, our “rudeness” (which is actually just candour), while privately admitting that we’re right. They don’t themselves believe in God, but they certainly do believe in belief in God.

    Yes, but that is because belief in God is a very peculiar and special kind of belief that goes all spiky and painful if outsiders explain why they don’t share it. It doesn’t work the other way, of course – non-believers don’t double up in pain if believers explain why they don’t share the non-belief. They get bored, they roll their eyes, they wish they were somewhere else with a bowl of ice cream, but they don’t break or fall apart or need hospitalization. That’s why vocal atheists are called hard names even by other atheists, while believers are wrapped in three layers of cotton wool and kept at an even temperature.

  • Natalia Estemirova

    Her killing was probably connected to her investigative work – including the case of seven murdered women.

  • India: Women Forced to Take Virginity Test

    All the women who took part in a state-run mass wedding last month were forced to take the test.

  • Nepal: Widows for Sale

    ‘Anybody walking on the road could say, look, there’s a widow! I could get 50,000 rupees if I married her.’

  • Haredi Riots in Jerusalem

    Protesting the arrest of a woman for allegedly starving her three-year-old son over the course of two years.

  • Baggini on Belief in Belief

    Belief in belief is powerful precisely because it is not usually explicit.

  • Dennett on the Folly of Pretence

    Today one of the most insistent forces arrayed in opposition to us vocal atheists is the “I’m an atheist but” crowd.

  • What Questions Can Science Answer?

    Science does not proceed phenomenon by phenomenon.

  • Wahhabi Cultural Center Opens in Boston

    This sad milestone is praised as a great victory for diversity and a boon to local Muslims.

  • Colgate is not enough

    Last week a journalist had a very disgusting encounter with a group of Haredi men in Jerusalem. They were protesting the local council’s decision to open a municipal carpark on Saturdays, and she was there to report on their protest. She dressed conservatively, but then she accidentally walked up the wrong street.

    I suddenly found myself in the thick of the protest – in the midst of hundreds of ultra-Orthodox Jews in their long coats and sable-fur hats. They might be supremely religious, but their behaviour – to me – was far from charitable or benevolent. As the protest became noisier and the crowd began yelling, I took my recorder and microphone out of my bag to record the sound. Suddenly the crowd turned on me, screaming in my face. Dozens of angry men began spitting on me. I found myself herded against a brick wall as they kept on spitting – on my face, my hair, my clothes, my arms. It was like rain, coming at me from all directions – hitting my recorder, my bag, my shoes, even my glasses. Big gobs of spit landed on me like heavy raindrops. I could even smell it as it fell on my face. Somewhere behind me – I didn’t see him – a man on a stairway either kicked me in the head or knocked something heavy against me.

    Why? Because ‘using a tape-recorder is itself a desecration of the Shabbat even though I’m not Jewish and don’t observe the Sabbath.’ That’s why.

    In other words, a minor, formal, mechanical, petty rule is so important that it justifies dozens of men spitting all over a woman because she breaks it. In other words, something of no inherent importance whatsoever justifies revolting intimidation and bullying and humiliation of a human being.

    Right. Just so, the action of a Florida college student in removing a cracker from a church justified death threats and a campaign to get him expelled from his university.

    But the Toothpaste Twins don’t see it that way. They see it the other way. They think it’s the trivial infraction that is enormously important while the intimidation and attempted life-spoiling is trivial. They must, because if they didn’t, they wouldn’t keep publicly raving about PZ Myers and his destruction of a cracker without mentioning the bullying and death threats directed at the student.

    [W]e will end by elaborating upon why, in the wake of the communion wafer desecration, we decided we had to speak out about Myers in a way that would really be heard…[W]e were appalled. We could not see what this act could possibly have to do with promoting science and reason. It contributed nothing to the public understanding or appreciation of science, and everything to a nasty, ugly culture war that hurts and divides us all.

    There’s a lot more in that vein, and very emetic it is. It’s also very misleading, because it never mentions the college student, just as the Newsweek article doesn’t.

    I tell you what. I would dearly love to see a crowd of some five hundred women or so – a crowd big enough to win – surround that mob of Haredi men and turn on a whole truckload of recording equipment. You bet I would. No violence, no spitting, no pushing up against a wall, no kicking – just a spot of payback combined with demonstration. Demonstration of what? The unimportance of rules of this kind, that’s what. If people want to make them important to themselves, fine, but when it comes to punishing other people for failing to observe them – that’s bad and wrong and intolerable.

    Would the Toothpaste Twins be appalled if a bunch of women did that? Apparently, they would. Their thinking is fucked badly up.

  • Free Speech in a Plural Society

    The Conference Room, British Library, London
    February 20, 2009

    Ian McEwan’s novel, Saturday, begins with the image of a sharp, bright light in the sky
    that the neurosurgeon Henry Perowne sees from the corner of his eye on a restless
    night when he is unable to sleep. It is a troubling time for Britain; it is February 15, 2003, the
    day of the big march, where hundreds of thousands of people from around Britain are
    going to come to central London, with the vain hope of stopping the impending war in
    Iraq.

    Perowne is a liberal; he does not like torture – in fact, he has learned much about Iraq by
    treating an Iraqi refugee fleeing the terror of Saddam Hussein. And yet, surrounded by
    the prevailing orthodoxy of opinions among his friends and colleagues, in his
    cosmopolitan home in Fitzrovia he cannot match the intensity of arguments, which his
    daughter, for example, would articulate later that afternoon, after the march.

    Now let us take a step further back, and think of another explosion in the sky – the flight
    AI 420, Bostan, blown up by extremists. Two men emerge from that explosion,
    descending gently towards earth, still dressed impeccably, one’s hat not out of place, the
    other able to sing an old Raj Kapoor song, as they are headed for “proper London, yaar,
    Ellowen Deeowen.”

    They fall on windswept, chilly English coast. The Miltonian allusion is clear, and we are
    to return to Milton momentarily.

    The two men are Saladin Chamcha – the man without a face but 1,001 voices, and
    Gibreel Farishta, who acts in theological films in India, and who will soon hallucinate,
    and imagine an alternate interpretation of the origin of a great faith, questioning the
    source of our inspiration.

    Farishta and Chamcha are of course imagined; they are characters in Salman Rushdie’s
    novel, The Satanic Verses, about which I will say more a bit later.

    What I’d like us to imagine is us descending from the sky, and arriving on an English
    landscape today. And what will we see? We will see a thriving print media, questioning if
    the prime minister was paying attention to the City, while he was opting for light
    regulation of the financial sector, during his watch at Treasury. We will learn inane and
    anodyne gossip about footballers and celebrities. We will see the Big Ben and we will
    turn up at the Speakers Corner at Hyde Park, where all kinds of people will give vent to
    all sorts of theories.

    From The Independent and The Guardian on one hand, and The Daily Telegraph and
    The Mail on the other, we will see most opinions given space. Britain will look like the
    post-card image of the mother of parliaments, the land of ancient liberties, of Magna
    Carta
    , and of Milton’s Areopagitica.

    Now, let us pause for a moment and consider what else we might see, if we had the kind
    of pinpoint accuracy that Google Earth provides these days. And if we look across the
    park, there is the Science Museum, which, in 2007, decided to cancel a talk by James
    Watson, the Nobel Prize-winning scientist, because in an interview in The Sunday
    Times
    he said he was “inherently gloomy about the prospects for Africa” because “all
    our social policies are based on the fact that their intelligence is the same as ours—
    whereas all the testing says not really.”

    Inevitably, there was a furore, and the great and the good condemned Watson. The
    board of the state-of-the-art Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory in the US, where Watson
    has spent decades pursuing advanced research, removed him from his administrative
    responsibilities, pending further deliberation.

    Watson is a known maverick in the scientific community, and he has in the past made
    provocative remarks. He is not a development or social policy expert. He later clarifiedhis position, saying we do not know enough about how genes determine our capacities in different environments.

    That should have been the end of it, and his initial remarks resembled the ramblings of
    just the kind of people he says are not worth spending time with. His new book is
    ironically called Avoid Boring People: Lessons from a Life in Science. Cheering the
    museum for showing Watson the door, London’s ebullient mayor, Ken Livingstone, said
    Watson’s views were “not welcome in a city like London, a diverse city whose very
    success demonstrates the racist and nonsensical nature of (his) comments.” This, from
    a mayor who did not have much of a problem inviting at tax-payer expense a cleric to
    London, who supported suicide bombings in Israel, and who supported the death penalty
    for gays.

    This is not at all to suggest that Watson’s views have scientific basis. The science of
    intelligence is disputed; the Herrnstein-Murray hypothesis of intelligence being
    distributed on a bell curve along racial lines has been challenged; and in the hands of a
    mass murderer like Hitler, such “theories” can have catastrophic consequences. To be
    fair, Watson has supported none of this, and in his mea culpa, he has shown how little
    we know.

    Contrast British response to Watson’s remarks with the American reaction to the
    fulminations of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Iranian President, who has denied not only
    the Holocaust, but the existence of homosexuals in his country. In September, Columbia
    University faced considerable political pressure in the US, with many calling on the
    university to withdraw an invitation made to the Iranian leader. Instead, Columbia went
    ahead with its invitation, and then, asserting its own values, Columbia’s president, the
    feisty Lee Bollinger, launched a blistering attack on Ahmadinejad’s record and the values
    he espouses. In doing this, Bollinger gave a new meaning to the dictum attributed to
    Voltaire: I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it. In
    Britain, universities want to boycott academics merely for having an Israeli passport.
    Watson’s faux pas was not surprising, and, sadly, nor was the ease with which the
    British establishment had forgotten its old commitment to free speech, because of the
    assumed codes of behaviour of operating in a multicultural, plural society.

    This is hardly the first such instance. Just last week we have seen Britain convulsed in
    another debate, over whether to allow the Dutch parliamentarian Geert Wilders into
    London, to show his film, Fitna, at the House of Lords. Unlike Keith Vaz, the MP who
    defended Wilders’s expulsion from Britain on Newsnight the other day, I have seen the
    film; and it is, indeed, 15 minutes of unremitting boredom. But rather than let Maajid
    Nawaz of the Quilliam Foundation debate with him in London, Vaz wanted Nawaz to fly
    to Amsterdam to have his debate. But then Vaz has been through this before; he was
    among the Labour Party MPs who marched with those who were protesting against The
    Satanic Verses
    . A Man of All Seasons, he saw nothing wrong in phoning Rushdie a
    week later, expressing his sympathies over protests. Biology has a word for it –
    chameleon.

    We did the right thing in Britain in protecting Rushdie’s freedom to imagine and speak;
    this country made good use of its tax-payers’ money by providing him with the protection
    he so justly deserved. Freedom of speech is meaningless if we are not to bear its
    consequences. But in the years that followed, we have seen the emergence of a climate
    where almost anyone who wishes to take offence over what he or she does not like, is
    able to get speech circumscribed. Let me turn to some such instances.
    Last year, three men were detained after they allegedly tossed a petrol bomb at the
    home-office of Martin Rynja, who runs the Gibson Square publishing firm. Gibson
    Square has shown the courage – or audacity, or foolhardiness – to publish The Jewel of
    Medina, a novel based on the life of Aisha, the Prophet Muhammad’s wife. This is
    dangerous territory: Earlier this year, its American author Sherry Jones discovered that
    Random House, which had decided to publish the novel and paid an advance for it,
    changed its mind and dropped the book. The publishing house did so after receiving
    unfavourable notices from a critic who was shown the manuscript, and following Internet
    chatter that suggested that the book would be highly controversial. Ironically, Random
    House publishes Salman Rushdie, who knows a thing or two about those who seek to
    silence others. When Random House pulled out of publishing the book, Rushdie
    expressed his disappointment, calling it “censorship by fear.”

    A couple of years ago the British government praised the British media for its restraint in
    not republishing the Danish cartoons that have offended many Muslims. The state
    department has also called those cartoons offensive. The problem though is that it
    makes free expression a matter of accounting, of balancing costs and benefits. We are
    all judges now, preferring the good of public safety to the harm of public disorder and
    death threats. How did we get here?

    I do want to emphasize one aspect here: we have to decouple free speech from cultural
    relativism. It is a British right, rooted in ancient liberties for which Lilleburn and John
    Wilkes fought and went to jail, and which Milton campaigned with passion for. I was born
    in India; and I derive my position not only from Voltaire’s defence of ideas he disagreed
    with, or Milton in Areopagitica, or John Stuart Mill’s thoughts, but also from my own
    traditions and thinkers, too. The Nobel Laureate Rabindranath Tagore wanted India to
    awaken in that heaven of freedom “where the mind is without fear and the head is held
    high”. Mahatma Gandhi had said “freedom is not worth having if it does not connote
    freedom to err.”

    Freedom of expression, then, was not only the product of Western Enlightenment; it
    belonged to all of us. And it included the right to say something outrageous, something
    offensive and even something stupid. Speaking to Der Spiegel after the Danish cartoons
    were published by Jyllands Posten, Pnina Werbner of Keele University said: “There’s a
    difference between a novel of great merit […] and […] cartoons that are in many ways
    trivial, have little artistic merit and are deliberately provocative and gratuitous.”
    But who decides artistic merit? What constitutes provocation? In the neat world of
    academic distinctions, Werbner may be able to separate the two and say, Rushdie yes,
    cartoons no. But the assassin will target both. If the priority is to avoid provoking him, we
    have lost the battle already, for he wants total silence. To take a sartorial analogy, it is
    like telling women not to wear miniskirts because they’ll inflame passions. There are no
    half-measures, like checking the appropriate length of the skirt. In such a circumscribed
    universe, it is hijab or bust.

    Rynja, who published Sherry Jones’s novel, says he opposes censorship and
    champions free speech. Gibson Square has also published Robert Pape’s study of
    suicide terrorism, “Dying to Win”, and its forthcoming titles include the memoir of
    Levrenti Beria, Stalin’s KGB chief, by his son Sergio, and a book about the killing of
    Father Popieluszko, which led to the unravelling of Polish Communism. If anything,
    Gibson Square is an equal opportunity offender.

    It is in that spirit that I wish to emphasise that mine is not a tantrum about one particular
    religion. In December 2004, the Birmingham Repertory staged a play called Behzti
    (Dishonour) which dealt with a rape and murder in a Sikh community centre. Before
    staging the play, the company had held discussions with leaders of the local Sikh
    community to gauge their feelings and likely response. Those discussions did not really
    help; once the play was performed, a group of angry Sikhs protested, and one day, they
    stormed the theatre. Fearing escalating tension and further public unrest, the authorities
    suggested to the theatre company that it should reconsider the programme. The theatre
    group closed the production.

    Instead of standing up for Britain’s ‘ancient liberties’, then minister in charge of racial
    equality, Fiona Mactaggart, said: ‘When people are moved by theatre to protest … it is a
    great thing… that is a sign of the free speech which is so much a part of the British
    tradition.’ Some of us will be visiting the exhibition later this afternoon; I doubt if there are
    many documents which show those aspects of the British tradition in good light.
    In a post-modernist twist, the minister had transformed the notion of protest theatre –
    one which forces audiences to think again and demand social change – into one where
    those resisting change protest against the play, to prevent it from being staged in the
    first place. And somehow, in Mactaggart’s Orwellian universe, that protest, which
    stifles free speech, becomes a sign of freedom of expression, and, weirdly enough, a
    part of the British tradition. Suddenly, it is no longer traditional to tolerate views you
    disagree with; tradition has come to mean that you impose your views violently on
    others, or to prevent others from hearing views with which you disagree.

    And yet, if tradition is to mean a set of customs or practices that have evolved over time,
    then Mactaggart may have been on to something. For acquiescing with bullies seems to
    be the emerging tradition in Britain. This is where we have come, twenty years after the
    fatwa. Some blinked at that time, so others taking offence believe they, too, will get the
    rest of us to blink, if they shout loudly enough. Lack of resolve at the first time,
    rewarding those who called for a ban on the book, and honouring with a Knightood Iqbal
    Sacranie, former head of a Muslim organisation in Britain, even though he had not
    objected to calls for Rushdie’s death has emboldened others : they think they, too,
    should get away with it. This is mutually-assured madness.

    This leads to narrowing our public dialogue and discourse. It has now become
    acceptable for anyone upset over anything to demand an apology at best, or a ban, at
    worst. That they don’t succeed each time is a good thing, but for how long?
    It is time to say: enough.

    The same month Sikhs were expressing their disapproval in Birmingham,
    James Anstice, a lecturer, was upset because Madam Tussaud’s museum in
    London had displayed a nativity scene in which the football star David
    Beckham and his wife Victoria, or ‘Posh Spice’, were dressed up as
    Joseph and Mary. Actors Hugh Grant and Samuel Jackson were shepherds,
    Kylie Minogue was an angel, and George W Bush, Tony Blair and the Duke of
    Edinburgh stood in as the three wise men. Anstice was angry about this, and he
    destroyed the Beckham statue. The next year at his trial, he was given a light fine and
    discharged conditionally. In early 2005, some 47,000 Christians complained to the
    British Broadcasting Corporation over its screening of Jerry Springer: The Opera, and a
    Christian group even launched a private blasphemy suit against the corporation. If the
    show is not blasphemous, a spokesman of the group, Christian Voice, said, ‘Nothing in
    Britain is sacred.’

    In 2006, a group of self-proclaimed Hindu activists attacked Asia House, an art gallery in
    central London, which was showing the works of Maqbul Fida Husain, who is 92 years old,
    and is easily India’s most widely-known painter. The reason for their anger: Husain
    has depicted Hindu deities in the nude. Husain has been the target of a vicious
    campaign in India where over a thousand spurious cases against him have been filed.
    And again in 2006, on a Sunday afternoon, London’s most famous street in the city’s
    East End, Brick Lane, saw a bunch of 60 men and women marching up and down,
    seeking to stop the filming of Monica Ali’s acclaimed eponymous novel. They claimed
    Brick Lane dishonoured the Sylheti Bangladeshi community. They succeeded partly; the
    production company had to move elsewhere, but the film got made. However, when it
    was premiered, the royal family avoided attending the event, for fear of offending the
    Bangladeshi community.

    The protesters at Brick Lane were careful to emphasise that their problem with the novel
    was not so much about faith, as about the way Bangladeshis were presented in the
    novel, which takes the notion of such protests to a different level, moving it beyond faith,
    and into the realm of any specific interest group. Indeed, intolerance has moved beyond
    religion: In 2002, Paul Kelleher (since jailed for causing criminal damage) beheaded a
    statue of former prime minister Margaret Thatcher using his cricket bat at London’s
    Guildhall. The Conservative Party at one point forced its then MP (and now London
    mayor) Boris Johnson to apologise to Liverpudlians because a Spectator editorial (he
    edited the magazine at that time) said Liverpool’s residents wallowed in victimhood – a
    remark that upset Liverpudlians.

    Let us spend a few minutes over Bradford, to understand why. There, a group
    of Muslims decided to burn copies of The Satanic Verses, whose main thrust was that it
    was a post-modern fable about migration and the hybridisation that follows, where
    identities no longer remain pristine and pure, but intermingle, transforming themselves
    and the society around them.

    Rushdie dared to imagine an alternate universe, with a central character hallucinating
    and going mad, who thinks he is at the focal point of the birth of a great religion, and
    pictures himself at its centre, visualising himself as the messenger. In so doing, he goes
    deep into the abiding mystery of Islam: did Satan, at any stage, deceive Mohammed into
    believing that there was nothing wrong in worshipping Lat, Uzza and Manat, the pagan
    goddesses of the pre-Islamic world? Did Mohammed realise the mistake when
    Archangel Gabriel told him so, and then he disowned the verses, bringing Islam
    back to its monotheistic path?

    Far from being an insult, here was an imaginative way to explore the nature and
    meaning of inspiration. Rushdie explained once: “The main character (an Indian movie
    star) is going insane. He decides to step out of his life and step away from it. He is losing
    his mind and is becoming convinced that he is, in some way, the Archangel….
    (The novel) is about angels and devils and about how it’s very difficult to establish ideas
    of morality in a world, which has become so uncertain that it is difficult to even agree on
    what is happening. When one can’t agree on a description of reality, it is very hard to
    agree on whether that reality is good or evil, right or wrong. Angels and devils are
    becoming confused ideas…. What is supposed to be angelic often has disastrous
    results, and what is supposed to be demonic is quite often something with which one
    must have sympathy. It (the novel) is an attempt to come to grips with a sense of the
    crumbling moral fabric or at least for the reconstruction of old simplicities. It is also about
    the attempt of somebody like myself who is basically a person without a formal religion,
    to make some kind of accommodation with the renewed force of religion in the world;
    what it means, what the religious experience is.’

    It was an attempt to come to grips with the disunities and discontinuities around us, to
    discover an inner moral core, binding our fabric – was misinterpreted as an attack on a
    faith, and that interpretation has clouded any meaningful discourse on the novel.
    But this, as readers of Rushdie would probably infer from another of his novels,
    Haroun and the Sea of Stories, was P2C2E, or a Process Too Complicated To Explain.
    Far easier for the imam, then, to proclaim: ‘Death to Rushdie’, for raising doubt, for his
    certainties must prevail.

    To be sure, once the fatwa was declared, many authors, politicians, editors, and
    academics came to Rushdie’s defence. The advocacy group ARTICLE 19 – derived from
    the Universal Declaration, also on display here – which was founded in 1987, almost as
    if it was prescient of the Rushdie affair that was to unfold within two years, proved not
    only its relevance, but also its integrity by standing up for the novelist during those
    difficult years. Rushdie has described those years of exile as his “plague” years, when
    few wanted to associate with him. This was the time when bookshops were being
    threatened with bombs, and a few retailers decided not to stock the novel. (Some staff
    at retailers like B Dalton’s protested; they insisted that their management should not
    cave in). Police on Indian streets had shot at demonstrators, killing over a dozen people,
    some of whom wanted to march to the British Council library in Bombay and raze it,
    because they mistakenly thought the library carried copies of the book. I remember it
    vividly; as a young reporter I walked alongside that procession; I also spoke to police
    officers who had given the orders to shoot.

    Elsewhere in the world too there were demonstrations in front of British embassies.
    Tragically, Hitoshi Igarashi, the Japanese translator of The Satanic Verses, was
    murdered. Ettore Capriolo, its Italian translator, was wounded in an attack, as was
    William Nygaard, its Norwegian publisher. That attack shook the senses of Oslo
    residents: driving me to his home one day, a classmate of mine called Tore, now an
    international investor who wishes he had more time to read good books, slowed his car
    near the spot where Nygaard was attacked, and shook his head as he told me: ‘That
    was wrong, very wrong. How can anyone attack a publisher?’

    What a Norwegian investor understood so instinctively was lost on some men and
    women of letters in London, paving the way for the collective acquiescence that
    followed. The fatwa was the time to stand up, unequivocally, supporting free speech, free
    expression, creativity, and imagination. A roll-call of those who blinked, then: In India,
    Khushwant Singh, himself never one to shun controversy, told Penguin India, as its
    editorial advisor, not to publish the book, because doing so would invite violent
    repercussions. In Britain, Germaine Greer refused to sign the petition supporting The
    Satanic Verses, because it was ‘about his own troubles,’ adding that Rushdie was ‘a
    megalomaniac, an Englishman with a dark skin.’ While not condoning Rushdie’s
    persecution, John Le Carre called the novel an affront to Muslim sensibilities. He then
    added there was ‘no law in life or nature that says great religions may be insulted with
    impunity.’ Edward de Bono, the lateral thinking guru, suggested that if Rushdie had the
    right to speak – and in the process offend some – then the reader had the right to feel
    offended. Roald Dahl, John Berger, Paul Johnson, and Hugh Trevor-Roper too thought
    writing the book was somehow Rushdie’s mistake and he had invited trouble.
    Would they also blame the young girl wearing a miniskirt for attracting wolf whistles, if
    not a sexual assault, for inviting trouble?

    The comparison with the miniskirt is not coincidental, nor facetious. As Rushdie noted in
    an essay subsequently, those who opposed his work were also those against rock
    music, miniskirts, and kissing in public. They were against individuals who stand out,
    who take charge of their own lives. (As Christopher Hitchens astutely noted after the
    failed bombs at London’s nightclubs that greeted Gordon Brown’s assumption of office
    as Britain’s prime minister, the terrorists had targeted locations where young people
    gather, precisely because they objected to hedonistic liberalism).

    Writers noted that danger: If Brick Lane has a message, it is of the gradual assertion of
    an immigrant woman’s identity, even in a claustrophobic surrounding. Ali’s protagonist is
    a 19-year-old woman called Nazneen, who has come to London in an arranged
    marriage. Her husband wants her to stay at home and bear children. Ultimately, he
    leaves Britain, but she chooses to stay on. If anything, the predominantly male
    protesters against the filming were troubled by this portrait of an emancipated woman,
    because she threatened their hierarchy and control over their lives. ‘This is England,’ a
    friend, Razia, tells Nazneen. ‘You can do whatever you like.’ Ten years earlier, in The
    Black Album,
    Hanif Kureishi had warned us of what lay ahead if the fundamentalists
    were ignored. In The Satanic Verses, Rushdie had presciently called that ghetto ‘the city
    visible but unseen’.

    No one was questioning a reader’s right to feel offended. The issue was what the
    offended person would do in response. You don’t kill a chef who produces a bad meal.
    You don’t tear up the movie screen when a film disappoints you. You don’t demand your
    money back if a novel you buy turns out to be not to your liking. You switch the channel
    you don’t like, you turn off the radio, or you close the book. You don’t go to that
    restaurant again. You move on.

    And yet, such reasonable responses are not considered enough by the fundamentalists,
    and their liberal supporters felt it was wrong even to imagine an alternate universe. And
    why? Because doing so would offend some people, and they might act irrationally.
    If I were a Muslim, I’d find that offensive: that’s so hugely patronising about millions of
    Muslims whose main concerns in life are completely different from what self-nominated
    leaders of their faith claim to be.

    The very idea of curbing one’s freedom over perceived offence was preposterous; it runs
    counter to the very notion of dialogue, argument, and debate, on which liberal,
    democratic, civilised societies were built. And yet, when the crunch came, a few Labour
    Party MPs like Vaz marched in solidarity with some Muslims protesting Rushdie. Worse,
    Iqbal Sacranie, who later headed the Muslim Council of Britain, was to say: ‘Death,
    perhaps, is a bit too easy for him… his mind must be tormented for the rest of his life
    unless he asks for forgiveness to Almighty Allah.’ To its shame, the Labour Government
    knighted Sacranie before knighting Rushdie, indicating a peculiar sense of priorities.
    The fatwa has made the taking of offence the norm. The beheading of a statue in
    London, the attack on a theatre in Birmingham, the killing of a film-maker in Amsterdam,
    the assassination of a translator in Tokyo, the ransacking of a research institute in India
    – have occurred with relative impunity, because such attacks don’t appear surprising
    anymore. Taking offence is becoming the norm. We have come to expect that if
    someone writes, or paints, or imagines something that others find offensive, the
    offended party will take the law in its hands and impose silence.

    This should outrage us. Instead, some of us have been telling the writers to think more
    pleasant thoughts, the artists to curb their imagination, the playwrights to tackle safer
    topics, and not provoke the beast within all communities and religions. The next step will
    be to tell the student not to walk to the Chinese tank commander, ask the
    Burmese monks to accept their fate and not confront the authorities.

    When prison guards refused to give him a pencil or a notebook, Alexander Solzhenitsyn
    began memorising the novel he wanted to write, while in the Soviet gulag. On the island
    of Buru, Pramoedya Ananta Toer did the same, and when he was finally released, the
    world was richer, with his Buru Quartet. They lived in extreme, closed societies, where
    words were precious, where words had to be smuggled in – and out. (I took several
    copies of Pramoedya’s books to Indonesia during many visits there during the Suharto
    era, for friends in Jakarta who could not buy the banned books). In Ray Bradbury’s
    Fahrenheit 451, after books are obliterated people walk around an island, reciting great
    works of literature – when words are suppressed in one form, they emerge in another
    form – to keep books alive.

    In Haroun and the Sea of Stories, the Prince of Silence and the Foe of Speech is called
    Khattam-Shud, ruling a land called Chup (silence), which has a cult that promotes
    muteness. It is a land at peace, in harmony. But that outward stability conceals inner
    fragility. Such societies force people to live a lie: that their contrived cheer and forced
    harmony are superior. Open societies appear brittle and frail because they are
    cacophonous, where everyone can contradict everyone else, and where nothing is
    sacred. But, Rushdie wrote: ‘All those arguments and debates, all that openness, had
    created powerful bonds of fellowship between them… The Chupwalas (those from the
    silent land) turned out to be a disunited rabble, suspicious and distrustful of one another.
    The land of Gup (talk) is bathed in endless sunshine, while over in Chup, it is always the
    middle of the night.’

    It is time to move firmly on the side of noise and light, if we are not to continue to
    circumscribe our thoughts, watch our words, and swallow our meanings. The alternative
    is the middle of that dark night. And the bright light visible in the sky may not be a
    shining star, but an exploding plane.

    Everyone has the right to speak; the right not to listen; and the right to be a schmuck
    (like David Irving, who deserves his freedom as much as does Orhan Pamuk). Maybe
    those Danish cartoonists are schmucks, and the European editors are only trying to
    provoke. We should still support those rights. Otherwise, we have to swallow our words
    and thoughts. And if we do that, we shall have little to talk about and less to debate. And
    our conversation with those whom we must not provoke will only be about agreeable
    topics, like the weather – whose unpredictable performance has brought us here today.