Idiot Savant? Moi?
It can be quite interesting, in an unnerving sort of way, seeing people blogging about Oneself. I’ve been seeing quite a lot of that lately, partly because of the religion and hijab discussions, both of which get people agitated. I’m certainly not going to comment on all of them – I’m not that much of an egomaniac (oh yes you are, oh no I’m not, are, amn’t) – but once in awhile one will suggest an interesting thought or line of inquiry. There is this one for example.
“Some people come into the world as idiot savants, having no choice but to concentrate all their energies on the study of their one small corner of the universe. The results can be interesting, beautiful or even profound, but that’s not a defense of small mindedness, is it?” I cut that paragraph out of last night’s post and moved it up to the front. I think I should have a little more fun with it, since it applies not only to the limitations of Ophelia Benson’s ideology (and the limits of her intellectual curiosity) but also in a more general way to a whole array of recent events and debates…The argument behind liberal economics is that it is predicated on a form of neutrality, predicated itself on an assumption, that of the drive for maximalization. Ophelia Benson assumes that rationalists and religionists want the same thing. Brad Delong assumes, for the purposes of his economic theorizing, that all people want the same thing.
I take it (and I could be wrong) that this guy is criticizing instrumental rationality, and that he takes me to be an instrumental rationalist. I find that interesting not only because it’s about Me (oh come on that’s why, no it’s not, yes it is, no it’s not, is, isn’t) but because it’s probably relevant to why rationality and reason have a bad name at the moment. It’s the Voltaire’s Bastards idea, that conflates rationality of all kinds with instrumental rationality. So questions such as ‘Why should we believe X if there is no evidence for X?’ (a question I have been asking a lot lately) are viewed as peculiarly narrow and limited, and the same kind of thing (or perhaps even exactly the same thing) as instrumental rationality. So if one raises such questions, and then declines to be fobbed off with replies to the effect that science can’t answer all questions and there is more in heaven and earth than etc. therefore we should believe what our inner experience tells us however incommunicable it may be – then one is a small-minded idiot savant with limited intellectual curiosity.
Of course I don’t in the least assume that rationalists and religionists want the same thing. Quite the contrary in fact, and that’s part of what I’ve been saying. Religionists want consolation, or meaning, or reassurance, or a feeling of security, or all those. Rationalists want their ideas about the world to match the reality of the world as closely as may be. I see those two things as being strongly opposed; in short, not the same thing.
Maybe an item a little farther down the page helps to explain the confusion.
“[I]t is never a good idea to allow one’s political, ideological and moral commitments to infect the judgments that one makes about truth-claims which have nothing to do with such considerations.” I have little interest in arguments except those that involve one’s political, ideological and moral commitments, and not only for political, ideological and moral reasons.
That’s a quotation from our About, as you’ll probably recognize. Apparently our blogger has found me irritating enough (on the God thread at Twisty Sticks, I think it is) to explore B&W a little. But he hasn’t understood the passage very well. I should be sympathetic, really, because it took me awhile too. I got confused in much the same way. It’s my colleague’s work, About is, and when he first wrote it, when B&W was under construction, when in fact there was no B&W except a banner at the top of an empty page – when he first wrote it, we discussed it, and I wasted a good deal of time arguing about that very line, for the same sort of reason. I didn’t want to disavow all political, ideological and moral commitments. Nor did I have to, he kept patiently explaining, until after a few hours I finally grasped it. The point is about the truth claims. Judgments about truth claims are different from judgments about politics and morality, and things do go wrong when we get them muddled. We can all, I imagine, think of examples in about a quarter of a second – especially if we’ve been reading B&W, which spends all its time pointing them out. We want it to be true that there are, or are not, WMD in Iraq, so we have to be very very careful, when considering the evidence, not to let that want influence the way we look at that evidence. Substitute anything you like for the phrase ‘WMD in Iraq’ and the thought is the same.
So we’re not in the least saying that moral or political arguments are less interesting than other kinds. We’re saying that it’s not a good idea to let our commitments infect our judgments of truth-claims. If that’s a small-minded, idiot savant, limited, intellectually incurious view – so be it. But guess what – I don’t think it is. I think improving one’s chances of getting at the truth of the matter is actually enlarging rather than narrowing. But then I would, wouldn’t I.
Hmm. I’m not aware that truth claims are particularly facilitated by ad hominem arguments like ‘the limits of her intellectual curiosity’ either.
Hm. I love ambiguity. Spend a lot of time pointing it out, urging it and an acceptance of it on other people, etc. Have absolutely no desire to keep it at bay. Unconscious agendas I no doubt have, but I really don’t think that’s one.
Formal logic? Moi? You flatter me.
I don’t think arguments are necessarily useless. I also don’t accept that ‘one cannot reason with the faithful.’ People are capable of changing their minds. Not all people, not all the time, but some people, sometimes. One never knows. I don’t know why one should decide in advance. And anyway, argument has all sorts of other benefits. (Besides, I didn’t spend all that much time. I write fairly quickly, and I skimmed or skipped the very long semi-incoherent posts.)
I assure you I’m interested in a good many things other than the mechanics of language, as logic or otherwise. I think you’re the one ignoring some ambiguity here. There are people who simply find religion utterly unconvincing, who nevertheless are highly intellectually curious and have more than a soppish interest in the humanities. A great many of them, actually. (Freud, in fact, leaps to mind.)
excuse my ignorance, but could you please explain briefly what “instrumental rationality” is, and how it differs from the usual sort?
thanks.
Judging action by effectiveness alone. Useful to bureaucrats, factories, etc. The kind of rationality that kept the trains to Auschwitz running smoothly.
Now that I’ve finished proofreading (hurrah! champagne all around!) I’ll add one more point, since Mr Ghirlandaio has added it to the post on his site as well as said it here.
“For any religion all truth is subservient to moral truth.”
I know, and that’s just the problem. That’s precisely why people like me disagree with it. Truth simply doesn’t happen to be subservient to moral truth. If it is it ain’t truth.
Most truth is and should be subservient to moral truth. That assumption is one of the strengths of religious belief, and is quite logical. But it leaves open the question of what the moral truth may be. And religious doctrine, as doctrine, rather than methodology, is often of little help.
Oh well, why not. I’m sure someone here is going jump on my use of doctrine as opposed to [??] methodology:
Suppose we lived in a society where all moral dilemmas were resolved, or at least confronted and discussed, through a reading and analysis of Shakespeare. In this society, justice, friendship, loyalty, mercy etc. are all to be described and defined by way of this debate. Use the Bible instead and you have the function of Christianity. This is all freshman comp stuff really. The secret of understanding is not to take people at their word, not even scientists. The point of certain forms of modern rationalism is to pretend otherwise.
People of faith lose that faith when they feel betrayed by it, not when someone ‘proves’ it makes no sense. That’s why it’s called faith. And however many times I demonstrate the inapplicability of logic to faith, Ophelia will continue to argue with the faithful. She should give up, and frankly so should I. But I get more annoyed by those who profess a faith in reason than by those who profess one in words. I admit I still have some hope that those who value reason should be able to turn it towards themselves. I am a fool.
Blimey. What a lot of nonsense in a small space. I’m not sure I have the energy to point out all the non sequiturs, quotations of me saying things I didn’t say, flat-out factual errors (most truth is not subservient to moral truth, in fact no truth is), irrelevance, baseless condescension…
Who knows. Maybe I will, maybe not.
I will say this though. I’ll argue with anyone I want to argue with. Don’t tell me what I should give up. I don’t need your or anyone’s permission to talk. Got that?
Oh well, I’ve answered that stack of emails and I have a minute before I have to rush off, so I will just mention a couple of points.
None of this has anything to do with “freshman comp” which is a remedial class for unfortunate students who didn’t learn to write in high school.
I know why faith is called faith. Because that’s the name for believing something without good evidence.
You haven’t “demonstrated” anything at all. You’ve announced it over and over, but that’s a different thing.
You’re the one who keeps talking about logic, not I. I’ve been talking about evidence, not logic.
I haven’t professed a faith in reason. I don’t talk that way.
As for your annoyance – that is, as the saying goes, your problem.
We went through this a while ago. Truth is a construct in metaphysics. Facts are something else entirely: mere objects and occurances.
And I never said anyone needed my permission to do anything,
“I admit I still have some hope that those who value reason should be able to turn it towards themselves. I am a fool.”
You’re already making progress, Mr. Edenbaum!
(I can never resist one of those…)
Rose, details please.
Ms Benson,
You are making what amounts to a moral defense of amoral logic: of a techné.
The important questions -‘what is justice?’ etc.- can not be answered by this means. Religion tries to answer them, but gives answers that are seen by moderns, including the two of us, as inadequate.
You seem to think intellectualism is a skill.
It isn’t
Seth:
‘Scuse my ignorance in this matter (I guess my narrow engineering background will justify it, sort of) but I have a hard time trying to understand your definition of “Moral Truth”. I have always thought that the truth value of any statement is totally unrelated to morality.
I disagree that the the “important questions” you are positing cannot be answered by amoral logic. The origins of morality and even its reason for existing can be explained (in fact, better and better) by an approach to truth that is not grounded on morals.
You say:
“But I get more annoyed by those who profess a faith in reason than by those who profess one in words.”
I fail to see anybody in this site professing “faith” in reason, at least nothing that can be equated to religious faith. We have tangible proof (just look at your computer screen) that the methodical use of logic (in this case the rational approach present in science) produces results. These results constitute powerful evidence that our trust in reason is not misplaced. This is nothing like the belief without evidence advocated by religions. Blurring the distinction between a justified trust in reason and blind faith is the sort of oscurantism advocated by dogmatic relativists.
You yourself seem to profess a very strong faith in an all encompassing skepticism , as in your assertion “The secret of understanding is not to take people at their word, not even scientists”. Shouldn’t you apply the same standards to this particular belief just to be consistent?
And also, many of us don’t just take scientists at their word as you are saying. Those of us who can follow scientific explanations usually find them utterly convincing. I try in all honesty to look at arguments from each side as much as possible, and evaluate them on their own merit. But religious explanations are many times pitifully dishonest or just plain ridiculous. The same goes for the arguments put forth by many post-modern theorists who usually make statements about topics they know nothing about and loudly demand to be taken seriously by the public. So you see, there is a distinction. All explanations are not equally plausible. For an intelligent person to deny that, plain ignorance is not a likely explanation. I think it takes a good dose of old-fashioned dishonesty.
Seth,
“The important questions -‘what is justice?’ etc.- can not be answered by this means.”
Oh is that what you’re talking about! We have been talking at cross-purposes then.
No, I agree with you that such questions can’t be answered (definitively) by such means, though I do think that as José indicates logic can play a role, as can various kinds of factual (true) knowledge, about human nature and desires for instance. (Maybe José would disagree with me about the definitively bit.)
But this is the old fact-values gap, the is-ought gap. I realize some people deny the existence of that gap, and perhaps you’re one. But it does look to me as if you’ve been conflating what I say about truth-claims about the world with something or things I didn’t say about moral questions.
To expand a bit. I have moral opinions – masses of them. If you’re thinking I dismiss or belittle all moral or political opinions because they can’t be grounded the way factual claims can – then that’s just a mistake, that’s all. I don’t. Very far from it.
But that’s not the same thing as saying that moral views should decide factual questions. It’s our view (and of course the view of a great many other people) that moral views should not decide or influence or contaminate judgments about factual questions.
I am not trying to advocate the naturalistic fallacy in my post. All I wanted to point out is that statements like “What is justice” and “You should not kill” can be explained in an evolutionary frame. Perhaps not definitively, but again what can be explained definitively? Definitive explanations are not easy to reach, as science itself changes its paradigms once in a while.
I agree that we should not be assuming what ought to be from what is (we have already gone through the evils of Social Darwinism and related social policies), but I think that nothing else but a rational approach would definitely shed light on why we are the way we are, what morality is and so on. I sort of liked the idea behind Peter Singer’s “A Darwinian Left” (which I understand as getting to the point where we can trick our nature (what is) into accepting our ideas of what ought to be. Just the reverse way of bridging the is-ought gap.
The way I see it, for us nonbelievers in supernatural explanations, there is not much else to hold on to, just a naturalistic approach exclusively based on facts and logic. But that arises from my skepticism of revealed knowledge and everything we can’t justify rationally (including the “yuck factor”).
Ophelia wrote:
“But that’s not the same thing as saying that moral views should decide factual questions. It’s our view (and of course the view of a great many other people) that moral views should not decide or influence or contaminate judgments about factual questions.”
Exactly!!
Yup. That’s my view too. [Update: this was a cross-post – I was agreeing with what José said, not with what I said!]
Although we then run into the question of how do we ground moral views. I’ve had long arguments about this with my colleague. He’s sort of convinced me that there’s no escape from emotivism when it comes to morality – that we can’t ground morals the way we can facts about the world. I pointed out to him when he came up with ‘Taboo’ and asked me to write ‘The Yuk Factor’ – that the Yuk Factor is a kind of argument against emotivism. He said yes but. Emotivism can’t be wrong, but The Yuk Factor is a warning to emotivists.
Which seems like a bit of a checkmate or aporia. We’re stuck with emotivism, but then we’re in danger of sheer yuk-ism.
The temporary or provisional accomodation I’ve reached with this is that I’m stuck with emotivism at ground level, but that at the next level there is all sorts of room for arguments over facts and what follows from the facts. So emotivism doesn’t have to be as irrationalist as it at first seemed to me. At least I think so.
At least we will eventually be able to factually explain where all those moral views come from. But yeah, we have to rely on emotionalism primarily to justify why we have these strong prohibitions against killing or maiming or even taking somebody’s lunch money when we feel like it.
I see what you mean by definitive explanations. As in how to ground moral views. I agree with your colleague in that we can’t do that either. All we can do is tell facts about them, but we cannot ground them like we can do with factual statements. It’s a part of our nature from which we cannot disassociate ourselves.
Yes, it’s very disconcerting. At least it disconcerted me, realizing and being forced to admit that moral judgments can’t be grounded.
But there it is. Seth mentioned Shakespeare. My colleague has also enjoyed himself reminding me that aesthetic judgments can’t be grounded (that at least I already knew). It’s true enough, and yet it doesn’t make much difference to me. I still know that Shakespeare is better than, say, Sharon Olds, and I can give reasons, however ungroundable they are. There’s irrationalism for you.
“He’s sort of convinced me that there’s no escape from emotivism when it comes to morality – that we can’t ground morals the way we can facts about the world.”
Correct, though that doesn’t necessarily prevent us from understanding the reasons for those emotional reactions and changing them. Have you come across Antonio Damasio’s work on this subject?
Yes, I have. Very interesting indeed.
Simon Blackburn also has interesting things to say about emotion. Ruling Passions.
“Yes, it’s very disconcerting. At least it disconcerted me, realizing and being forced to admit that moral judgments can’t be grounded.”
I believe that it’s statements like this which make the religious believe they are morally superior to atheists. Have you decided that MacIntyre’s attempt to get around emotivism through the establishment of virtues grounded in “practices”
was unsuccessful?
Hmm. Some religious people I’ve known don’t require any statements to make them believe they’re superior to atheists, they simply take it for granted.
What’s your point?
No, I haven’t decided anything about MacIntyre, I’ve only read a little of him and don’t remember that little.
Well, as I understand it, (and it isn’t easy to understand, because they are often inconsistent with themselves) religious conservatives think they are the only moral people, because they think the non-religious have an attitude of “Anything goes,” or, “If it feels good, do it”. They never consider the reasons, for example, that the choice to have an abortion is critical to women’s self-determination. They just think that liberals favor abortion because it facilitates irresponsibility and our “loose”, feelings-based morality. I’m always looking for a more secure way to ground ethics atheistically than through emotivism. MacIntyre’s is possibly the best scheme philosophy has offered up so far, or as far as I know (which is about 4 feet), it is.
I haven’t actually read MacIntyre directly (i intend to soon though), but I have read a bit about Virtue ethics, and it sounds quite intriguing.
Though from the little I’ve read, I would probably agree with James Rachels when he suggests that it is somewhat incomplete on its own.
That’s actually one of the big advantages of Alonzo Fyfe’s theory “Desire Utilitarianism”, I think… I think it manages to incorporate the advantages of Virtue ethics (e.g. focussing on character, rather than actions) within a broader Utilitarian framework.
I mentioned this briefly in another recent comment, i believe, but in case you missed it, a Rich-Text File which summarises the theory is available onlinehere:
http://www.slappingmackerel.com/forums/download.php?id=290
(If anyone – eg Marijo – is interested in this stuff, I’d love to hear what you think of the theory. At the end of the summary is a link to the IIDB forum thread on this topic)
RC– I’ll read it and get back to you.
“Yes, it’s very disconcerting. At least it disconcerted me, realizing and being forced to admit that moral judgments can’t be grounded.”
I’ve taken that for granted my entire life. It’s no biggie. Now what do we construct out of that awareness? But that’s not your interest, though I would say it should be.
The temptations of Platonism. You’re still searching for faith and truth I guess.
And of course esthetics can be grounded. To say otherwise is just silly. Mastery is mastery of convention. Baseball is not ‘grounded’ either, but some players are better than others and some are ‘great.’
Any formal system involves the possibility of mastery. How do you compare baseball to football? Painting to sculpture. Music to poetry, or Ming vases to cycladic figures. Interesting discussion. But not for Butterflies and Wheels I think.
And on the head scarf: Maybe the French should ban high heels as well. So demeaning. So sexy.
“And of course esthetics can be grounded. To say otherwise is just silly.”
Really? I’ve been trying to figure that one out for years. Peraps I could finally ground my opinions on what makes Norman Rockwell so awful.
“Baseball is not ‘grounded’ either, but some players are better than others and some are ‘great.'”
Baseball is, how should I put it? Quantifiable. As in pages and pages dedicated to nothing more than statistics. I read somebody was trying to quantify the fractal dimension of Pollock’s paintings. Don’t know what he found out but I just know that Pollock does not do it for me. And I don’t think I would change my mind about it.It’s something almost visceral.
“Mastery is mastery of convention.”
Many of today’s well known artists seem to have no mastery at all. Except in the art of marketing. Nonetheless, there will always be somebody that will say that there is more to Damien Hirsch than just shock value. Oh well, I disagree.
But seriously. How can you ground esthetics? I’m curious…
Hmm. I have a feeling he won’t tell you. He’ll just say he’s known all his life and it’s no biggie.
We can hope I’m wrong though!
I just came home and I’m covered in dust.
You’re right of course. Baseball is quantifiable to a point. but there are still plenty of arguments. Rule based activities are not grounded in any absolute sense, sports any more than literature, theater, or law.
Off the top of my unwashed head:
If someone creates an enclosed -self referential- system that is complex and formally subtle, that has within it a wide range of categories – gradations of meaning, and of sense- and which exhibits these categories in such a way so as to invite the same sort of mental activity in the ‘audience’ as in the ‘maker’; the system is a work of art. Someone may be called a ‘good’ conversationalist, or a ‘good’ dancing partner. Both talking and dancing are formal activities, based on a technical facility; but as social activities both are also based on an ability to involve others, to cater to them without condescending, and engage without flattery.
Art “is that which convinces.” It’s a kind of complex seduction. The best way to describe the limitations of M.C. Escher is to say that his art dances with itself and allows us to watch. The best criticism of Norman Rockwell is to say that his work is neither ‘formally’ complex in the modern sense, and not formally complex in terms of distinction of meaning and character. What does Rockwell make out of the aporias of modern American life? How does his work stack up to the complexities- the complexities of meaning (of any sort of meaning) – in Faulkner or John Ford? Not ‘What’ does it mean? but ‘How much’ does it mean? How much can a viewer bring to the work without drowning it in the viewer’s own response. If Escher’s work is dancing with itself, how long until the appreciative viewer is dancing with him/herself in a dream that has little to do with the object/book/film under his/her gaze?
What causes complexity? Is art the creation of individuals? The Bible is not. The Odyssey is not. These stories both became complex through all the hands that touched them over time. With we are unable to tell the art from the history of its telling. It does not matter how complexity is formed. The point is that on occasion it is focused on a specific point, object or story. But there are within this men and women of ‘genius’ just as there are people of genius in any other field.
As with justice, which is taught in law schools as ‘Imperfect Justice,’ all judgment in the arts is ‘imperfect’ judgment. That does not mean there is no objective ideal of justice, nor any objective ideal of art. What it means is that any given act of judgment may in itself be wrong, but that by our series of approximations we keep these ideals within sight, if not within reach,
At this point I think it’s safe to say, however, that Bach is objectively pretty good. If you think the mathematical patterning proves it, than I’ll say Titian is good too.
Obviously this I have not tried to ground esthetics in any absolute sense, any more than I’ve tried to ground law. What I’ve tried to do is explain how we can ground it to the point of acknowleging mastery, even if at any given point we can not point to one example with absolute certainty.
—
About Pollack. Interesting problem. He was a very intelligent man at a party full of very interesting people, at a very complex time in our history.
Is it a case of “You had to be there” ? Possibly. In 200 years people may read about the times and the party without needing to look at the pictures; in 200 years, but not yet.
Let’s start with the first explanatory paragraph that came off the top of your “unwashed head” :
“If someone creates an enclosed -self referential- system that is complex and formally subtle, that has within it a wide range of categories – gradations of meaning, and of sense- and which exhibits these categories in such a way so as to invite the same sort of mental activity in the ‘audience’ as in the ‘maker’; the system is a work of art.”
Mmmm, looks like you could also be defining Quantum Theory, for instance. Gradations and contrasts of meaning can be found in let’s say, Bohm’s views and also the Copenhagen School’s. It seems to me that QT is both formally subtle and extremely complex and it definitely invites the same sort of mental activity in the, er, graduate student as in the “maker” or theorist. So, according to this definition can QT be considered an art too?
I also have beef with your definition or description of art as “that which convinces”. No doubt you know it is too loose and inclusive. Art should convince (in many levels) but still…
And complexity, in my view, either of form or meaning, has nothing to do with it, apart with the necessary human complexity that is a product of our evolved minds.
“That does not mean there is no objective ideal of justice, nor any objective ideal of art.”
How objective can it be if your ideal of art differs from mine? Is it objective as in something that exists regardless of our perceptions? Or objective as in something totally unaffected by our ideological distortions or turns of mind?
“At this point I think it’s safe to say, however, that Bach is objectively pretty good. If you think the mathematical patterning proves it, than I’ll say Titian is good too.”
I wish I could say that. Maybe he is only subjectively good and that almost unanimous impression of quality just applies to many people in a statistical fashion. And the mathematical patterning doesn’t mean anything to me. My point in that last post was that trying to quantify what makes something “art” is absurd.
“ Obviously this I have not tried to ground esthetics in any absolute sense”
In this one I agree with you. You can’t and nobody can, that was my point. You might tell me that, for instance, what Matthew Barney does is art…and I will probably tell you it’s shit, and go on my merry way…
Art is that which convinces. It is rhetoric. It documents a skill at communication regardless of subject.
—
You misunderstood my point. With the proper information -if I knew enough mathematics- my mind could replicate the process described in any article on quantum mechanics. Any article can ‘illustrate’ information. If I myself felt the rush of discovery as I read, mirroring the process of discovery of the author, that is because the information has been relayed by means of ‘art.’ To say: “That’s was a wonderful essay” is not the same as to say: “What the author wrote about was wonderful”
—
No matter what, subtlety is more ‘complex’ than its lack. We notice the subtlety of art, so we notice the complexity. ‘Subtle distinction’ implies a variety of classes and characteristics: complexity.
—
Your ideal of art or mine does not matter. The best art -the lasting art- is not about ‘taste.’
Read Kant on the difference between Genius and Taste. [why do I have always to say this to fans of philosophy?]
Art is about the ability to communicate with skill and subtlety. It has nothing to de with what is communicated. What is communicated may be barbaric to some and civilized to others.
I don’t like much of Hirst’s work. But I like some of it. You react to what you find annoying in his manner not to the art itself. I assume there’s not one Hollywood movie you’ve ever seen that you are not offended by. Hollywood is thoroughly corrupt and always has been. I’m sure nothing ever made for the Popes meets your approval. The Catholic Church has been a criminal enterprise for what, 1500 years?
I’m sorry, this time you mentioned Matthew Barney. My mistake. My response is similar, except Barney and I have some friends in common, so I’m less likely to say anything nasty. Barney is a stage designer.The props he uses are designed as references to various mythologies and cultures. He’s a fan of the Masons.And yes he’s read what there is to read on the subject. If it weren’t for the differences in temperment I’d say he has more than a bit in common with TS Eliot, who tried to make something out of nothing, using formal trickery to eke a little meaning out of 19th century crap and christianity. What we’re left with in both cases is the tricks themselves, the rhetorical skill. Barney’s work Wagnerian and and overdone, but I don’t hate it. I wince sometimes, but then sometimes I’m moved by it. It is not ‘bad.’ Again the Hollywood comment applies.
My comments about Hollywood and the Church were a little off. Every age is criminal; not every age is decadent. Hirst and Barney share a decadent age. But then so did Eliot and Huysmans!