Author: Ophelia Benson

When Tony Blair first became leader of the Labour Party in 1994, the Sun
newspaper, a British tabloid, took to calling him ‘Bambi’, presumably in the
hope that the nickname would become established in the public consciousness.
It did not, of course, for it lacked any kind of resonance with what people
could believe about Blair. He wasn’t a child, his leadership was anything but
childlike, and he lacked the requisite number of legs to be a baby deer. Not
discouraged, the Sun was at it again in 2001, this time when Iain Duncan
Smith became leader of the Conservative Party. In what was probably a desperate
attempt to establish his man of the people credentials, it started to call him
‘Smithy’. A quite absurd conceit, given his double-barrelled name and former
career as an army officer. Needless to say, this nickname didn’t catch on either,
and now, almost universally in the UK media, Duncan Smith is known as IDS.

None of this is surprising. If your aim is to coin, ex nihilo, a name
or epithet which quickly gains widespread public acceptance, the chances of
success are not great. Even the media, with its ability to talk daily to massive
audiences, fails as often as it succeeds. Thus, for every ‘Slick Willy’, you’ll
find that there is a ‘Bambi’, for every ‘loony left’ a ‘Doris Karloff’.

This is a comforting thought for a secularist at the present time. For a rather
unfortunate meme has lately infected the minds of some leading exponents of
a naturalistic worldview. It is a meme which says that it would be a good idea
if people without belief in things supernatural started to call themselves ‘brights’.

The meme started with two people from Sacramento, California. Though atheists,
Paul Geisert and Mynga Futrell did not want to be referred to as being ‘godless’,
so they came up with the word ‘bright’ to better describe their naturalistic
worldview. Their hope is that other nonbelievers will also use the word, and
that it will become an umbrella term for the whole range of naturalistic philosophies
(i.e., atheist, agnostic, humanist, etc.). They have setup a website, The Brights
Net (www.the-brights.net), to this end, and have attracted a number of high
profile advocates, including Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett, both of whom
have written articles supporting the idea.

It is easy enough to understand the efficacy of this meme. The naturalistic
philosophies of the non-religious do not play the same kind of high profile
role in political and civic life as do the supernaturalist ideas of their religious
counterparts. This is the case particularly in the United States, but also in
the United Kingdom, where, for example, assorted bishops get to sit on various
ethics committees simply because they are bishops. Given this situation,
any intervention which promises to raise the profile of naturalistic thinking
is bound to be attractive at first sight. The trouble is that it doesn’t take
too many more sights of the brights idea to realise that it is badly flawed.

First, ‘bright’ is just the wrong word. How it was chosen in the first place
isn’t quite clear. It seems to have had something to do with the fact that it
is a ‘positive’ and ‘memorable’ word; and also that it is sufficiently puzzling
or enigmatic when used as a noun – ‘I am a bright’ –that it invites the
response, ‘What’s a bright?’, thereby allowing a person to talk about their
naturalistic worldview. But there are major problems with the word.

The first is that its enigmatic quality is indicative of a fundamental arbitrariness
in its relationship to the phenomenon that it names. It’s the let’s call Tony
Blair ‘Bambi’ problem. Dawkins imagines that a bright might have a conversation
which goes like this:

‘"What on earth is a bright"? And then you’re away. "A bright
is a person whose world view is free of supernatural and mystical elements…."

"You mean a bright is an atheist?"

"Well, some brights are happy to call themselves atheists. Some brights
call themselves agnostics. Some call themselves humanists, some freethinkers.
But all brights have a world view that is free of supernaturalism and mysticism."’

(Richard Dawkins, ‘The future looks bright’, The Guardian, June
21^st 2003)

All very nice, except that the conversation is far more likely to go something
like this:

‘What on earth is a bright?’

‘A bright is a person whose world view is free of supernatural and mystical
elements.’

‘Right. So why the word "bright" then?’

‘Err. Well it’s a positive word. And memorable.’

‘So is the word "truffle", but you wouldn’t call yourself a truffle.
So why "bright"?’

‘Well, it’s what this couple from Sacramento came up with… and it is
a very cheerful word!’

The arbitrariness of the choice of the word ‘bright’, though undermining its
potential as a meme, would not matter so much were it not for the fact that
one of the established uses of the word is as an adjective meaning ‘clever’
or ‘intelligent’. The problem here is that in the absence of an obvious reason
to explain how it is that the word ‘bright’ designates a person who espouses
a naturalist worldview, it is easy to jump to the conclusion that what is being
suggested is that it is more intelligent to embrace naturalism than it is to
embrace supernaturalism.

It must be said that the supporters of the brights idea are quite clear that
the word should not be taken to be an adjective in this way. However,
this does not make the problem go away. It should be obvious why it does not.
For starters, there is the trivial point that you cannot strip a word of its
associations simply by denying that you intend them. [1] Nor can you do so by
using the word in a slightly strange way (i.e., as a noun). If someone announces
that they’re a bright, then likely it will occur to their audience that what
they actually mean is that they are bright. The fact that they will also
be unable to explain why the word ‘bright’ is appropriate as a label for someone
with a naturalistic worldview will do nothing to allay this suspicion.

There is also a slightly more complex point to be made here. To be an atheist
in the United States – and also in some ways in the United Kingdom – is to set
oneself against the dominant culture. There is, therefore, a tendency to associate
atheism with a certain kind of intellectual independence. This is reflected
in the names of the groups with which many atheists associate themselves (e.g.,
freethinkers; skeptics; etc). And it also underpins the anti-intellectual sentiment
of much of the religious sermonising characteristic of Christian fundamentalism.
The problem with the word ‘bright’ is that it is too easily seen as confirming
this link between atheism and intellectuality. Or to put this more precisely,
if people with no belief in god begin to self-identify as brights, they run
the risk of apparently confirming what many religious people already suspect
about them, that they consider themselves to be better or more intelligent than
people who believe in a god.

Does this matter? Yes it does, if one is interested in convincing people of
the merits of a naturalistic worldview. To start with, there is the obvious
point that people are more likely to be receptive to new ideas if they feel
that they are being treated with respect. But perhaps more worryingly, a movement
which self-identifies as a movement of brights makes itself a hostage to rhetorical
fortune. It is extremely easy – and, it must be said, very tempting – to parody
the whole idea of a brights movement. And, of course, this is exactly what the
enemies of a naturalistic worldview will do should the idea take off. The brights
movement will find itself transmogrified into a ‘We’re smarter than you’ movement.
And, at that point, protesting that the word was chosen simply because it is
‘warm’ and ‘cheerful’ will just result in more parody and more laughter.

‘Bright’, then, is the wrong choice of word to designate a person with a naturalistic
worldview and as an umbrella term for a movement. But substituting a different
word won’t make the brights idea a good one because it is muddle-headed for
other reasons. Perhaps the most interesting of these has to do with what appears
to be an unspoken assumption about people with a naturalistic worldview.

The assumption seems to be that the rejection of supernaturalism is enough
to qualify someone as a person without religion. This claim is only unproblematic
if one defines religion as involving supernatural beliefs. However, there is
at least an argument that the sphere of the religious can be extended to include
aspects of the secular world. It is an argument inspired by the French sociologist
Emile Durkheim. He claimed that the realm of the sacred is distinguished by
the separateness of its objects from those of the world of the profane, and
by the system of interdictions which prevents them from being denied. [2] If
one accepts this conception, then there are secular phenomena which qualify
as sacred. So Durkheim talks of ‘common beliefs of every sort connected to objects
that are secular in appearance, such as the flag, one’s country, some forms
of political organisation, certain heroes or historical events’, which are ‘indistinguishable
from beliefs that are properly religious’; and he notes that ‘Public opinion
does not willingly allow one to contest the moral superiority of democracy,
the reality of progress, [or] the idea of equality, just as the Christian does
not allow his fundamental dogmas to be questioned.’

It is easy to understand what Durkheim is getting at. It is only necessary
to attend a meeting organised by a group like the Revolutionary Communist
Party of Britain to become very quickly aware that people can hold secular
beliefs to be every bit as inviolable as religious beliefs often are for the
religious. Of course, this point is already well understood. For example, in
a review of Steven Rose et al’s Not in Our Genes, Richard Dawkins, commenting
on their arguments against ‘genetic determinism’, has this to say: ‘The myth
of the “inevitability” of genetic effects has nothing whatever to do with sociobiology,
and has everything to do with Rose et al’s paranoiac and demonological theology
of science. [my italics]’ (Richard Dawkins, New Scientist 24 January
1985).

What this means for the brights idea is that the criterion of a naturalistic
worldview is no guarantee that people will be free of the kind of thinking which
is quite reasonably described as ‘religious’. Or to put this another way, it
is no guarantee that people will not be committed to beliefs, or sets of beliefs,
which are beyond rational scrutiny in the same way as are many of the beliefs
which are associated with theism. Possibly the supporters of the brights movement
will not deny this, but rather claim that it does not matter too much, that
their expectation has never been that they will create a movement of absolutely
rigorous thinkers, each one holding up their beliefs to the light of reason.
Fair enough. Except for two further points.

First, there is just a suggestion in some of the writings of the supporters
of the brights idea that they see themselves as the true inheritors of the Enlightenment
tradition. Well, it just isn’t this clear-cut. First off, the belief in a deity,
in and of itself, does not rule out an attitude towards this world which
is entirely consistent with the Enlightenment emphasis on reason and the progress
of human knowledge. But perhaps more significantly, many people who qualify
as brights would have a decidedly ambivalent attitude towards the products of
the Enlightenment. Just consider, for example, that many Marxists would agree
with Rose et al that ‘science is the ultimate legitimator of bourgeois ideology.’
(Not in Our Genes). And that from amongst the whole caboodle of postmodern
thinkers, at least some will be prepared to commit to agnosticism, and will
no doubt claim something like ‘that progress in social thought is not possible
without a thorough critique of the Enlightenment, whether for its justification
of the domination of nature, or its authoritative support for belief systems
like scientific racism or sexism, or for the monocultural legacy of its assumptions
about rationality.’ (Andrew Ross, The Sokal Hoax).

Which thoughts lead on to the second point about the kind of movement the brights
idea is likely to foster. It is certainly going to contain some odd bedfellows.
Scientific atheists and Marxist atheists will be united in thinking that there
is definitely no god, but they’ll fight like cats and dogs over the fate
of the bourgeoisie. The agnostics will irritate both groups by sitting on the
fence, whilst freethinkers drive themselves crazy trying to find a viewpoint
unique to themselves. The skeptics will watch the whole thing from afar with
slightly cynical smiles, and the postmodernists will talk past themselves, as
per usual. As for the rest of the world? They won’t see past the name. And laughter
and parody will be the result. Therefore, one can only hope that the ‘bright’
meme fails on its evolutionary journey.

Footnotes

[1] The observant reader will notice that there is an echo here of the criticism
that some people have made of the language of Dawkins’s The Selfish Gene.
For the record, I think the criticism is misplaced in the case of The Selfish
Gene.

[2] There’s obviously a lot more to Durkheim’s argument than this mere bald
assertion. See his The Elementary Forms of Religious Life; and also,
for a summary of the argument I’m making here, J. C. Alexander’s The Antinomies
of Classical Thought: Marx and Durkheim (Routledge, 1982), pp. 242 -250.

The rise of the precautionary principle in public policy and international
relations has called into question the role technological innovation should
be allowed to play in society. [1] According to the precautionary principle, no
novel technology, regardless of its benefits, should be deployed if it poses
risks to human health or the environment. [2] Under some interpretations
of the principle, these risks need not even be testable hypotheses, but may
merely be posited. [3] In the latter case, the principle merely
says that technological innovation is too dangerous to be allowed.

Critics of technological advance have also invented a doctrine which is antithetical
to the precautionary principle, and dubbed it the ‘technological imperative.’
In its first formulation, this doctrine only existed as a ‘straw man’ argument,
something put forth so that it may be attacked at convenience by its creators.
The doctrine has no canonical statement, its existence is at best claimed to
be "implicit," it has no discernible champions, yet its critics abound.
[4]

In spite of its dubious origins and lack of formulation, the technological
imperative actually exists in Western philosophy and jurisprudence. In ethics
technological invention is a virtue and in law it is protected and encouraged;
and in both, a duty exists to allow the dissemination and use of novel technology.

The technological imperative in philosophy and ethics.

Perhaps the earliest, but certainly the most durable, contextual explanation
of technology was offered by Aristotle. His explanation relies on making distinctions
between three types of knowledge: episteme, techne [5]
and phronesis. Episteme is pure knowledge, such as of mathematics, geometry
or logic. Techne, from which our word ‘technology’ is derived, is concrete knowledge
of how to rearrange lumps of matter in a purposeful way. Phronesis has no counterpart
in English, but is often rendered as ‘prudence.’ As Aristotle explains it,

We may grasp the nature of prudence [phronesis] if we consider what sort
of people we call prudent. Well, it is thought to be the mark of a prudent
man to be able to deliberate rightly about what is good and advantageous…
[P]rudence cannot be science or art; not science [episteme] because what
can be done is a variable (it may be done in different ways, or not done
at all), and not an art [techne] because action and production are generically
different. … What remains, then is that it is a true state, reasoned,
and capable of action with regard to things that are good or bad for man.
We consider that this quality belongs to those who understand the management
of households or states. [6]

This explanation of three forms of knowledge establishes a framework for understanding
the nature of technology. On Aristotle’s account, techne is value-neutral and
capable of serving any number of ends, good and bad alike. This accords well
with intuitions about the nature of technology, but this value-neutral status
cannot establish the existence of a technological imperative. However, Aristotle
links technology to phronesis, to knowing "things that are good or bad
for man." If there is a technological imperative, it must go two steps
beyond this framework and address the question of whether a change in
knowledge (be it episteme or techne) when put to use serves a good purpose.
Aristotle stops short of addressing that, saying instead that with phronesis,
episteme and techne are "capable of action."

Elsewhere in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle reasons that actions have goals,
that those are human goals, and that human goals in general are directed at
eudaimonia— a term often translated as ‘happiness,’ but defined by Aristotle
as the general direction of human activities intended to make human life complete
and satisfying. [7]

Aristotle did not leave us with much more than this on what is good to do,
because his emphasis in ethics was on what was good to know and to be.
Like many he was a virtue theorist and to him, good meant being virtuous.

Later philosophers re-examined human virtues and claimed they were human duties
instead.

Duties to oneself include preserving one’s life, pursuing happiness, and
developing one’s talents. Duties to others fall into three groups. First,
there are family duties which involve honoring our parents, and caring for
spouses and children. Second, there are social duties which involve not
harming others, keeping promises, and benevolence. Third, there are political
duties that involve obedience to the laws, and public spirit. [8]

Other philosophers preferred to judge between good and bad activities by determining
their outcomes, which is known as consequentialism.

Consequentialist normative principles require that we first tally both
the good and bad consequences of an action. Second, we then determine whether
the total good consequences outweigh the total bad consequences. If the
good consequences are greater, then the action is morally proper. If the
bad consequences are greater, then the action is morally improper. Consequentialist
theories are also called teleological theories, from the Greek word telos,
or end, since the end result of the action is the sole determining factor
of its morality. [9], [10]

This begs the question of how good is actually distinguished from bad, but
the most famous consequentalist would have good and bad be defined socially
or democratically, as "the greatest good for the greatest number."
[11]

The pragmatist John Dewey blended notions of virtue and consequentialism in
his account of the nature and value of innovation.

The logic of the moral idea is like the logic of an invention, say a telephone.
Certain positive elements or qualities are present; but there are also certain
ends which, not being adequately served by the qualities existent, are felt
as needs. Facts as given and needs as demands are viewed in relation to
each other because of their common relationship to some process of experience.
Tentative reactions are tried. The old ‘fact’ or quality is viewed in a
new light— the light of a need— hence is treated in a new way and thereby
transformed. [12]

It is unnecessary to delve much deeper into notions of technology and how philosophers
define ‘good’ to see that there is an underlying consensus that technology should
be deployed for good purposes. If one discovers something new and sees that
it can be used for a good purpose, then it follows that the new should be used
for a good purpose. This is easily justified on all the theories mentioned above,
whether in terms of improving the quality of life, having good consequences
for many people, fulfilling a duty or serving a need. So philosophically and
ethically speaking, there is a technological imperative.

The technological imperative in jurisprudence.

If the technological imperative has its basis in ethics, it should not be surprising
to find this reflected in law, especially in product liability law, which addresses
innovations which offer novel benefits, or in injury, which occasions a legal
dispute.

Product liability law places a punitive burden on producers of defective products
which cause injury. In contrast, the law refuses to impose a duty to retrofit
non-defective products when an innovation would, i.e., improve their safety,
and the reason is found in the technological imperative. "Imposing a post-sale
duty to recall or retrofit a product ‘would discourage manufacturers from developing
new designs if this could form the basis for suits or result in costly repair
and recall campaigns.’" [13] However, nothing prevents
a manufacturer from voluntarily retrofitting its products already in use— which
is another way to introduce an innovation— and this has also been held to absolve
a manufacturer of liability. [14]

So in product liability law, the value of innovation eclipses other interests.
Even though a duty to retrofit would benefit some consumers, the cost of such
a rule would intolerably burden the general social benefits of technological
progress.

The internet is an innovation which may well prove to have the broadest impact
on society since the invention of the printing press. Here, too, the technological
imperative has come into play. Even though legislators know the internet might
be misused, the law is willing to countenance the prospect of misuse to protect
innovation.

This explosive democratization of the capability to publish [on the internet]
has raised fundamental questions about who bears responsibility for content
that is harmful. In February 1996, Congress enacted 47 U.S.C. § 230 to eliminate
some of the uncertainties surrounding that question. Section 230 establishes
that providers of interactive computer services are generally immune from
liability for harms resulting from the dissemination of defamatory or otherwise
harmful information that other persons or entities create and make available
through such services. [15]

Indeed, the law in general may be said to be structured to encourage technological
progress by making it a protected activity. The system of patents established
by the United States Constitution, which gives inventors temporary monopolies
on the use of their inventions, is probably the most obvious example of this.
Thus, we may also conclude that the technological imperative is an important
part of Western jurisprudence.

The status of the technological imperative.

Having established the existence of the technological imperative, it is necessary
to determine its status. In both philosophy and law, some things rise to the
level of a duty, while other things are considered virtues, and praised or rewarded
when they are exhibited. For instance, it is deemed virtuous to be a hero, but
there is no duty to be a hero. Indeed, one cannot become a hero by fulfilling
a duty and this is intuitively recognized by firefighters, who often deny fighting
a fire is heroic. In fighting a fire, they are doing their job.

Acts above and beyond the call of duty, which are by definition voluntary,
produce heroes. These are known as supererogatory acts.

Although agents are not obliged by the dictates of ordinary morality to
perform supererogatory acts— extraordinary feats of heroism or extreme deeds
of self-sacrifice, for example— they may be commended for doing so. Normative
theories that demand the performance of the best possible action in every
circumstance render supererogation impossible by identifying the permissible
with the obligatory. [16],[17]

Both in law and in ethics, there is a duty to avoid causing harm to others.
In ethics, a breach of this duty deserves punishment and in law, the punishment
is delivered. In ethics, complying with this duty is not praiseworthy, and in
law is irrelevant except as a defense. Doing good to others goes beyond this,
and is supererogatory. ^[18] In ethics, this is
virtuous and in law, is protected and encouraged by various rights.

When it comes to employing technology, the analysis is similar, but not the
same. Employing the current state of any art is nothing more than using available
means to achieve expected ends, which is just as ordinary as not harming others
and just as morally neutral. However, failing to employ the state of the art
breaches no duty per se, and can at most be condemned as irrational or
foolish. [19] This indicates, but does not yet demonstrate,
that improving on the current state of the art is virtuous.

As stated above, technology, by itself, is value-neutral. However, that applies
only to the current state of the art. A technological improvement over the status
quo is distinct because it by definition makes a new contribution to the availability
of moral goods. [20] Otherwise, it would be no improvement
and would not be adopted. Once adopted, it becomes the state of the art and
reverts to value neutrality.

This is consistent with the notion of technology as instrumentality, where
technology serves as a means to an end, rather than being an end in itself.
The conclusion is inescapable, however, that the value of a technology is measured
with reference to the moral goods it may be used to produce or deliver. Similarly,
every technological improvement is justly measured according to the moral goods
it can be used to produce or deliver over and above the previous state of the
art. In this way, the value of an invention derives from the ends it more ably
serves. But it cannot accomplish that on its own.

The improvements in technology called for by the technological imperative are
supererogatory and laudable because of their novelty and usefulness [21]
for improving the quality of human life, for conferring increased net benefits
on society, or more readily fulfilling a moral duty. In this way, techne
is again revealed as morally neutral while phronesis, the ability to
"deliberate rightly about what is good and advantageous," becomes
central to the virtue established by the technological imperative.

Since phronesis is at work in discerning and choosing the mean at which
ethical virtue aims, ethical virtue cannot achieve its own end without phronesis.
On the other hand, discernment of the good and perfection of deliberation
is dependent on having a good character; hence, without ethical virtue,
one might have cleverness in figuring out the means to any end, but one
would not have phronesis, the virtue of choosing the appropriate means to
the right end. Excellence of character, then, and practical wisdom together
form a whole which alone counts as genuine virtue. [22]

On this analysis, phronesis justifies techne, and even more strongly justifies
technological invention.

The technological imperative establishes duties.

Just as the moral considerations behind the technological imperative require
[23] praise for those who exemplify the virtue of invention
by making new technology available for use, patent law requires that inventors
be compensated for a time for the use of their inventions, on condition that
the substance of the inventions be disclosed and made freely available thereafter.
In law, the condition is a duty. In ethics, it is a duty as well, and this is
where the technological imperative becomes worthy of being called an ‘imperative.’

The value of an invention derives strictly from its ability to be used to improve
the availability of moral goods but in ethics, as in law, there is no duty act
for the benefit of someone else absent a special relationship such as that between
parent and child. Thus it would violate law and ethics to require that an inventor
make an invention available to others, because that would amount to imposing
a duty to act in the interest of others; [24] and the act
of inventing creates no special relationship which could impose such a duty.
Indeed, an inventor may legally and ethically make use of an invention in secret.

The duty arises instead when the inventor offers the invention to be used.
It is not a duty to use the invention; for as we have seen before, failure to
employ the current state of the art may be unintelligent, but is neither reprehensible
nor illegal. [25] Nor is it a duty adhering to the inventor,
who will already have disclosed the substance of the invention. The duty is,
instead, reciprocal among all who might benefit directly or indirectly from
its use, and that is to allow its use. There are utilitarian aspects which justify
this conclusion.

The sciences, like the arts, may expand in two directions—in superficies
and in height. The superficial expansion of those sciences which are most
immediately useful, is most to be desired. There is no method more calculated
to accelerate their advancement, than their general diffusion: the greater
the number of those by whom they are cultivated, the greater the probability
that they will be enriched by new discoveries. [26]

This helps explain why in ethics, preventing or interfering with the dissemination
of innovative technology is a breach of duty, and that duty is the technological
imperative.

Footnotes

1 The author of this article is Andrew Apel, B.A. (Phil), M.A. (Phil.), J.D., editor
of AgBiotech Reporter, http://www.bioreporter.com

2 An early formulation of the precautionary principle is found
in the "Wingspread Statement." See http://www.sehn.org/wing.html
Versions of the principle appear in over 20 international treaties, laws, protocols
and declarations. See, e.g., Royal Commission on Genetic Modification, "Current
status of genetic modification in New Zealand," http://www.gmcommission.govt.nz/RCGM/pdfs/appendix1/2-2.pdf

3 Such posited risks are often called "unknown risks."
See, e.g., National Center for Policy Analysis, "Amid Famine, Africans
Reject GM Corn," http://www.ncpa.org/iss/env/2002/pd082302b.html
Danish Environmental Protection Agency, "The precautionary principle,"
http://www.mst.dk/udgiv/Publications/1999/87-7909-203-9/html/bil01_eng.htm
Friends of the Earth, "Tomorrow’s World," http://www.foe.co.uk/campaigns/sustainable_development/publications/tworld/land.html

4 See, e.g., Daniel Chandler, "Technological or Media
Determinism," http://www.aber.ac.uk/media/Documents/tecdet/tdet07.html

5 Aristotle limits episteme to self-evident, axiomatic principles
and to what can be logically derived from them. See Muryat Aydede, "Aristotle
On Episteme And Nous: The Posterior Analytics," http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/maydede/Aristotle.html

6 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1140a24-1140b12. See Theodore
Goertzel, "Three Approaches to Knowledge," http://www.crab.rutgers.edu/~goertzel/threeapproaches.htm

7 Eugenio Benitez, "Eudaimonia," http://www.usyd.edu.au/philosophy/benitez/eudaimonia.html

8 The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/e/ethics.htm#Normative
Ethics

9 Ibid.

10 Critics of consequentialist theory say that since all future
outcomes of an act cannot be known in advance, its relative goodness or badness
cannot be determined in the present. Critics of the precautionary principle
say that the principle exploits this weakness in consequentialist theory by
making it a pretext to ban all novelty.

11 J.S. Mill. For an outline of the many approaches to defining
good, see "What Matters in Life?" http://home.att.net/~talk2perry/what_matters.htm
Though the claims made there are not entirely accurate, the outline serves well
to show the variety of theories available, and the general compatibility of
those theories with the conclusions of this paper.

12 John Dewey, "The Evolutionary Method As Applied To
Morality: II Its Significance for Conduct,"http://spartan.ac.brocku.ca/~lward/dewey/Dewey_1902b.html

13 Stephanie Scharf and Thomas Monroe, "Post-Sale Duty
to Warn," http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s20Publications%5CRelatedDocumentsPDFs2254%5C324%5CMichigan.pdf
citing Estate of Raap v. Clark Equip. Co., No. G88-614-CA7, 1989 WL 382091 (W.D.
Mich. June 20, 1989) Note that this only applies to non-defective products.
Another way to view the doctrine is that the improvement of a product does not
render more primitive products automatically defective.

14 Ibid.

15 Patrick Carome, Samir Jain and Elizabeth deGrazia Blumenfeld,
"Federal Immunity For Online Services: How It Works and Why It Is Good
Policy," http://www.ldrc.com/Cyberspace/cyber1.html

16 Free Online Dictionary of Philosophy (FOLDOP), http://www.swif.uniba.it/lei/foldop/foldoc.cgi?supererogatory

17 On sociological evidence, there is justification for accepting
both standard and normative theories as descriptive and explanatory. Those who
rescue children from burning buildings, firefighters and civilian passersby
alike, often reject being described as heroes; members of both groups often
report feeling that their duty was either pre-existing or had been thrust upon
them and in either case merely did what they should have done under the circumstances.

18 There is of course a vast spectrum of supererogatory acts,
ranging from what some call "random acts of kindness" to developing
superior crops which save millions from starvation.

19 But see footnotes 24, 25.

20 In this monograph ‘moral goods’ are defined as things a
human may desire and attain without violating moral principles. These would
include the necessities of life, as well as its enjoyments.

21 In law, these are the two fundamental requirements for
the issuance of a patent.

22 Robert Berman, "Nicomachean Ethics: Commentary on
Book III," http://webusers.xula.edu/rberman/CommentBk3.htm

23 The requirement may be rationally necessary, per Aristotle
or Kant; or practically necessary, per the consequentialists; or dutifully necessary,
per those who rest their arguments on duty (which would again include Kant).

24 There are significant exceptions to this which nonetheless
underscore the technological imperative. When public interest in the value of
a patented invention is sufficiently great, the US government may force the
inventor to license the patent. See James Love and Michael Palmedo, "Examples
of Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property in the United States,"
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/us-misc.html
A similar power is found in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). See "Health
Care and Intellectual Property: Compulsory Licensing,"
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/cl-ilaw.html

25 There are significant exceptions to this, such as in food
safety regulations, which are constantly upgraded to require the use of novel
technologies – but this, too, underscores the technological imperative.

26 Jeremy Bentham, The Rationale of Reward: Reward Applied
to Art and Science, http://www.la.utexas.edu/labyrinth/rr/rr.b03.c03.html