Author: Ophelia Benson

  • S. Fleischacker on the Israel-Palestine Conflict

    The Biblical claim to the land should be retired permanently from debates over this issue.

  • Left’s ‘Creeping Racialist Antipathy’ to Muslims

    ‘Muslims are denied the right to take offence when their most holy emblems are deliberately pilloried.’

  • Religious Killings Bad for India’s Reputation

    Attempts to restore peace to Kandhamal district, the epicentre of the religious riots, have had little effect.

  • The fallacy of the too convenient

    Susan Haack in Defending Science – Within Reason (p. 286) quotes (in order to dispute) Richard Swinburne:

    If God’s existence, justice and intentions became common knowledge, then man’s freedom to choose [to believe or disbelieve] would in effect be vastly curtailed. (Swinburne, The Existence of God p. 244)

    What I immediately wondered (not for the first time) on reading that is: why is that important? Why is it even meaningful? Why is belief an issue? And why, being an issue, does it become an issue of freedom? Why is it treated as a test?

    We have all kinds of common knowledge – and that’s not seen as a problem. We don’t worry about our freedom to choose to believe or disbelieve various items of common knowledge; why is it different with God? That is, independent of the fact that God is hidden and is not common knowledge?

    Given the fact that God is hidden – and that billions of people claim to believe in it anyway – it becomes very difficult to see how to separate the claim about freedom (and other similar claims) from the need to explain the brute inconvenient fact that God is hidden. In my case anyway, it is impossible.

    In other words – God is hidden – and this obvious fact is slightly inconvenient (though not as inconvenient as it ought to be) for people who believe in it and want others to believe in it, and espcially for people who want to rebuff and reprove and correct non-believers. That means there is a need for some kind of explanation. What would such an explanation look like? Well, like what Swinburne says. Therefore…it seems likely that that is why Swinburne says it.

    1) God is hidden. 2) Non-theists consider this a reason not to believe God exists. 3) Theists need a counter-reason. 4) Therefore theistic explanations of God’s hiddenness are rendered suspect by this motivation.

    An explanation can be suspect and still be correct, of course – but to a non-theist all these excuses for God’s non-appearance do tend to sound awfully…carefully crafted to fit the disconcerting and undeniable facts. (We keep inviting God to dinner and it keeps not showing up.)

    An argument like this would show its fragility quite readily in real life. ‘You skipped work today, you’re fired.’ ‘No, I was there.’ ‘No you weren’t!’ ‘Yes I was, it’s just that we kept missing each other.’ ‘Uh huh – that’s a little too convenient – you’re fired.’

    An explanation that is too convenient in that way is suspect.

  • Beware of Catholic doctors then

    The European Federation of Catholic Medical Associations issued a statement

    at the conclusion of its 11th annual congress expressing its firm commitment to the defense of life in response to the threats of abortion, euthanasia, genetic manipulation, the creation of human embryos, and others…[T]hey stressed that ethical norms and principles precede civil laws, which should be influenced by natural law and the teaching of the Church. They went on to state that decisions about “the medical treatment for patients who put their trust in us should be guided above all by our conscience. Moral evaluation of medical practice should not be based on superficial opinions or the latest tendencies, but rather on the sensibleness of a conscience formed according to the objective ethical norms common to all people and constantly defended by the Church.”

    What is the difference? What is the difference between ‘superficial opinions’ and ‘the latest tendencies’ on the one hand and objective ethical norms on the other? And how do the Catholic doctors know what the difference is? And how do they tell? How, exactly, do they distinguish between the two? What exactly is that silly line-up of bollocks supposed to mean?

    What it appears to mean, to an outsider at least, is simply ‘norms that we don’t like’ on the one hand and ‘norms that we do like’ on the other hand, dressed up as something detectable with fine Catholic instruments.

    After emphasizing the spotless moral character that a doctor should have, they noted that “the source and foundation of ethical norms is the inalienable dignity of the human person throughout his or her life, from conception to natural death.”

    Natural death? So they’re putting their imprimatur on natural death now? So we are to take it that Catholic doctors from now on will refuse to treat any illness that could, if left untreated, cause natural death? That’s a little off-putting.

  • Rushdie ‘Unrepentant’ About Satanic Verses

    His remarks are pertinent at a time when Islamists have again driven a literary figure into hiding.

  • Cult Stud Charlie Gere Does a Stanley Fish

    No free speech, good thing too. Muslim sensitivities; culture riddled with own taboos; no wonder angry.

  • From Obscure Texas Academic to London Firebomb

    The campaign against The Jewel of Medina was started not by an imam but by an American academic.

  • Salil Tripathi on Firebombing Free Speech

    Acquiescence to threats has emboldened other faiths to demand bans on plays or art they do not like.

  • Catholics Must Mobilize to Block Women’s Freedom

    Archbishop of Cardiff warns that teenage girls might be able to salvage their own lives.

  • Liberals Disagree

    Offending people is sometimes wrong; but no one has a right against being offended.

  • All in the Name of Cultural Sensitivity

    Today free speech is seen as an inherent problem, because it can offend as well as harm.

  • Why bother

    Kenan Malik reminds us of the wise and reasonable words of Khomeini when he put out the hit on Rushdie and his accomplices.

    [O]n February 14, 1989, the Ayatollah Khomeini issued his fatwa. “I inform all zealous Muslims of the world,” he proclaimed, “that the author of the book entitled The Satanic Verses and all those involved in its publication who were aware of its contents are sentenced to death.”

    Note that – not just Rushdie, but also all those involved in its publication who were aware of its contents should be murdered by religious zealots. What a nice guy. It’s a shame he never had a chance to meet Torquemada; they would have gotten along so well.

    And of course it’s so sensible and fair – that all human beings in the world should be required to say nothing about Islam that fails to meet with Khomeini’s approval, on pain of death. Islam is not incidentally but centrally a set of laws and restrictions and limitations that control the lives of people who are subject to them (people who ‘submit’ to them), but people are not allowed to discuss those laws in a way Khomeini (and his successors) might not approve (and to be safe of course we should understand that as in any way at all, since we don’t know for sure what they do or don’t approve). So an intrusive controlling demanding religion full of sexist laws and arbitrary restrictions must be immune from criticism and discussion, because if we discuss it the wrong way we might be murdered.

    [T]he argument at the heart of the anti-Rushdie case – that it is morally unacceptable to cause offence to other cultures – is now widely accepted. In the 20 years between the publication of The Satanic Verses and the withdrawal of The Jewel of Medina, the fatwa has in effect become internalised. “Self-censorship”, Shabir Akhtar, a British Muslim philosopher, suggested at the height of the Rushdie affair, “is a meaningful demand in a world of varied and passionately held convictions. What Rushdie publishes about Islam is not just his business. It is everyone’s – not least every Muslim’s – business.”

    What’s wrong with that idea? Anything?

    Yes. What’s wrong with it is the implicit assumption that passionately held convictions deserve – perhaps even have a ‘right’ to? – forebearance and polite silence. But convictions aren’t things that need or ought to have forebearance and polite silence. Convictions that can’t survive the encounter with other convictions probably aren’t worth passionate tenacity; at any rate it isn’t possible to protect them without paralyzing mental life, and a universally paralyzed mental life is not a good thing.

    Norm has more.

    The liberal principle that we may interfere with the actions of another (only) to prevent harm to others does have its difficulties since, like many other conceptual boundaries, the boundaries of the concept of harm are fuzzy. But the principle, if it is one, that freedom of speech must be curbed to avoid offending people, is manifestly a qualification of the right of free speech that all but destroys the usefulness of the right. For there are no boundaries on what people can be offended by.

    Quite. And if you broaden the meaning of ‘harm’ to include ‘offense’ then you make speech and its cognates unable to do what they are centrally for. A thought or an argument or an idea that can’t possibly offend anyone is a very bland mild tame idea, that makes nothing much happen. Ideas like that aren’t worth bothering with. We can’t have ideas that matter without the risk of offending someone.

  • Martin Rynja in Hiding, Under Police Protection

    Cleric Anjem Choudhary called the book an ‘insult to the Prophet’s honour’, a capital crime under Sharia.

  • ‘Respect’ for Religion Makes Censorship Normal

    The firebomb attack on Gibson Square was an assault on one of the bravest publishers in the business.

  • India: At Least 147 Killed in Temple Stampede

    Scores more were injured, many seriously, in the crush at the Chamunda Devi temple in Jodhpur.

  • DR Congo: Things Get Even Worse

    Some civilians were trapped in combat zones and were killed, wounded, raped or illegally detained.

  • Saudi Government Calls Ismailis ‘Infidels’

    Preaches religious tolerance abroad, persecutes minorities at home.

  • Crazed Cyclist Returns Despite Heart Condition

    He returned to cycling after ’embracing’ a Japanese hands-on healing process known as ‘reiki.’

  • Conversions, Caste and Communalism

    In the past two years the debates on religious conversions, caste and communalism have gripped India in a serious imbroglio which is fallout of the present nature of state politics in the country. The years 2007-08 have been the most volatile ever since the anti-Godhra riots in the state of Gujarat in 2002, which exposed the role that the governments in India have played in arousing communal passions through state machinery. These are difficult times, and the time that would follow poses more complex challenges for state-politics in India. We can trace the beginnings of these events in the year 2007, though hypothetically, to a controversy in Punjab: the chief of Dera Sacha Sauda (a religious sect founded 1948, which has a large following among dalits), Gurmat Ram Rahim, supposedly emulated Guru Gobind Singh, the tenth Guru of the Sikhs, at a religious ceremony in Sirsa; this has led to often violent exchanges between the two groups. Since then the states of Punjab, Haryana and some districts of Rajasthan are boiling in religious tensions, reminiscent of the crisis between Akalis and Nirankaris in 1978. This year India is already in the midst of a communal backlash against Christian converts in Orissa, primarily among tribals, in the wake of the killing of Swami Lakshmananda of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), who had been spearheading an anti-conversion campaign in the tribal belt of Khandamahal. The fire has now spread to Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh and other parts of India.

    There is another issue of terror-strikes which has rattled major Indian cities this year. Fortunately it has not as yet led to any communal reaction against Muslims. But that is merely on the surface, as discrimination against Muslims in India is at an all-time high, which has now been transformed into a large-scale social discrimination. Since educated Muslims have now allegedly been framed in these events of terror, it only reflects how deeply religious discrimination in India now touches a class which was earlier related to the mainstream Indian elite. A prominent film and theatre personality like Shabana Azmi has come up with these startling revelations of denial of a residential flat merely because she is a Muslim. Even states like Punjab have reported a case of expulsion of a daughter-father duo from a school in Phagwara, because it was discovered that despite his name, Mangat Chaudhary, the father was a Muslim. (The name ‘Mangat’ is rare among urban Muslims of Punjab, both east and west.) The trend of branding ordinary Muslims as terrorists or sympathisers has serious implications for Indian democracy as the real issues underlined in the Sachar report on social exclusion among Muslims are undermined.

    The most significant aspect of the religious conflicts in recent times is that they now reach out to rural India, a domain which was earlier considered a symbol of communal brotherhood. Communalism in India is extending its tentacles. It is no longer an urban phenomenon and in this era of globalisation the anxieties of growth and economic security have started spreading its tentacles to the crude representation of religious identities. The fundamental right to practice the religion of one’s choice has been guaranteed in Article 25 of the Constitution of India. But violent and forcible closures of Dera naam charchas (religious congregations) and Christian congregations in various parts of India remind us that we are heading towards a new complexity where religion has become an instrument to fuel social tensions. The debate on conversion in India has generally been viewed as an expression against religious orthodoxy and its deep rooted social discrimination against dalits and tribals, but it also strikes at economic backwardness and lack of access to better ways of livelihood. The latter should be seen as the failure of the Indian state to reach out to the poor and needy.

    Poverty and social alleviation has been an integral part of Indian governance in the post independence period, but has become a farce in this era of globalisation, and it is precisely against this backdrop that we need to understand the claims of religion and re-conversion in India. India has traditionally been and continues be a caste-ridden society, where maintenance of caste-based hierarchies has been instrumental in defining the power structures. And this power-structure has traditionally been maintained by keeping dalits and tribals in a state of permanent economic dependency. Owing to the post-independence initiatives of the state for the socio-economic alleviation of dalits and tribals, and their political resurgence in the wake of the Mandal recommendations in 1980, national and regional politics in India today banks heavily on ‘politicised’ caste. But the question remains whether these developments brought any tangible change in the lives of the people. The dominant dalit and tribal politics in India is as elite as any other electoral politics in the country. The state and electoral politics has failed to have an impact upon the lives of the depressed among dalits and tribals.

    If we go through the organisation of these Deras in Punjab and missionaries’ institutions in various parts of India we are indeed struck by the infrastructure, primarily educational (both schools and colleges), hospitals and programmes for poverty alleviation (micro-credit, agriculture innovations, etc.) undertaken by them in the interior parts of India. The appreciable part of these programmes is that these interventions do create an impact on the lives of the poor and marginalised. Conversions have to be looked at from this perspective too. It is not inducement or force to convert but the force to bring about change in their living conditions that has been crucial to shifting religious identities. Here again, we see the near total absence of state infrastructure, the space which is continuously being taken over by non-state actors.

    Significantly the changing socio-economic condition of dalits and Christians has also given them political expression at the local level. It is pertinent to note that the forceful political articulation of Dera-followers, against the recent anti-Dera agitation by the various Sikh groups, has been the most significant expression of dalit politics of Punjab and Haryana. The incidents of forceful closure of naam charcha continue unabated in the rural parts of the Malwa region of Punjab, yet there is also opposition (often violent) to such incidents by the Dera-followers who are primarily dalits, Sikhs and Hindus. The Jat-dominated Gurdwaras have gone to the extent of announcing a social boycott of dera-followers, and have refused to give them access to the holy Guru Granth Sahib for their social and religious ceremonies. Conversely there have been instances of dalits adopting novel ways of marrying, for instance, by circumambulating the photograph of Bhagat Singh, a revolutionary Punjabi martyr of pre-independence India who is revered throughout India. Increasing instances of clashes between Sikh Jats and dalit-Christians in rural areas is a similar expression of social tensions in this region.

    The vocal and articulate assertion of dalits and tribals, and converts among them, has also led to a reactionary mobilisation of upper castes, for instance against Dera-politics in Punjab or religious conversions throughout India. The shifting economic base of dalits from agriculture, the tensions of the traditional rural structure, and articulation of ‘disobedient dalit subjects’ have important implications for the communal scenario in India. These debates are significant for an understanding of the future of democratic politics in India. Some scholars have suggested that the violent communal scenario at the present time is a result of the shrinking secular space in India. I would add that the failure of secular institutions of Indian democracy to reach out to the poorest and the needy has led to the growing menace of communal disharmony in this country. The decay of the rural infrastructure of schools and primary health centres has inadvertently led to the shrinking space of secular politics in India. This is the greatest challenge that Indian democracy faces today in a neo-liberal era of globalisation.

    Yogesh Snehi has been contributing to the broadening of debates on historical aspects of northern India, especially Punjab, Haryana and Himachal Pradesh, and has worked on areas such as conjugality, gender and social reform, development and literacy movements. His interest in social history has enabled his contribution to the understanding of popular syncretism and sufi shrines (dargahs) in Punjab. He is also critically engaged with the rhetoric and reality behind debates on female infanticide and foeticide in Punjab. Presently he is working on the issues of communalism in the popular history textbooks of Punjab. He teaches History and is working at DAV College, Amritsar.