Is the Ubiquitous Interesting?
Some people find inter-blog disputes tedious, other people fun. And no doubt many people who claim to find them tedious actually find them fun. But this at least is a dispute about a substantive matter…
So to business. Ralph on Clio. He claimed, a while ago, on B&W:
“When something is ubiquitous, the interesting question isn’t ‘how could it have been tolerated?’ because it was commonly and widely accepted.”
I think this is very silly. Ralph objects to my thinking it very silly. He says:
I made the claim in the context of a discussion of slavery and its ubiquity in the early modern world. Explaining the presence of pro-slavery arguments in a world in which slavery was ubiquitous is less interesting, I think, than explaining how an anti-slavery argument emerged in the face of slavery’s ubiquity. It is important to understand received frameworks and institutions and, beyond that, to understand how even a ubiquitous institution like slavery varied from place to place. But history’s drama is not found in received frameworks and institutions. Rather, it is found in the emergence of subversive challenges to and contentions with them. So, the interesting question is how anti-slavery emerged in the face of slavery’s ubiquity or, as certainly, how feminisms emerged to challenge the ubiquity of patriarchal “known worlds.”
So let’s unpack this paragraph.
I made the claim in the context of a discussion of slavery and its ubiquity in the early modern world.
Yes, but the claim was not a specific one about slavery. "When something is ubiquitous…" It would have been very easy to have phrased it in a more restricted way (e.g., "what was interesting about slavery"). Precision of language matters, if you want to be understood.
Explaining the presence of pro-slavery arguments in a world in which slavery was ubiquitous is less interesting, I think, than explaining how an anti-slavery argument emerged in the face of slavery’s ubiquity.
Sure. I can agree with that. But it isn’t the same claim. The fact that something is "less interesting" doesn’t mean it is not interesting. But the definite article in the first claim ("the interesting question") suggests that other issues are not interesting at all. Again, precision of language counts.
It is important to understand received frameworks and institutions and, beyond that, to understand how even a ubiquitous institution like slavery varied from place to place.
Agreed.
But history’s drama is not found in received frameworks and institutions.
There’s a hint of an argument by definition here. If the claim is that it is only drama which is of interest in historical terms, then that’s just wrong.
So, the interesting question is how anti-slavery emerged in the face of slavery’s ubiquity or, as certainly, how feminisms emerged to challenge the ubiquity of patriarchal “known worlds.”
And we’re back to the definite article again. The interesting question…
Well, I certainly think precision of language matters if you want to be understood. I’ve probably said as much here – no more than a couple of thousand times or so. Also a few thousand times in other places – the TPM board, the board at The Examined Life, etc. It keeps surprising me what a minority view that seems to be, and how content a lot of people are with approximations.
As for the central idea, I myself don’t entirely agree with that, I find the rationalizations (to label them pejoratively) for social practices that we now think unconscionable really very interesting. David Brion Davis’ book on slavery is fascinating, at least I think so.
“Having said all this, I agree with Ralph that the issue of dissent from majority opinion, etc., is very interesting.”
Sure, absolutely. They’re both interesting. Christopher Browning’s Ordinary Men is interesting, Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem is interesting, Schindler’s List is interesting. Both abolitionism and anti-abolitionism are interesting, and so on. Interesting enough to want five or six lifetimes in which to explore them, in fact.
Ekshelly, Evolution 101 would normally provide answers to these questions, regardless of whether they are ‘interesting’ or not. Practices that improve the likelihood of a society’s survival are normally pretty ‘ubiquitous’ and remain so unless some circumstances arise which make these practices less contributory to the survival of the fittest.
Examples: at a time when two out of three children failed to reach adulthood, societies which didn’t pressurize their womenfolk to have at least six kids on average were replaced by those that did. Similarly, at a time when employing slaves was more profitable than employing wage-earners, societies that found some moral justification for the former practice outdid the nice guys who didn’t, and who finished last. I know that sounds simplistic, but the answer to simple questions generally does.
The REALLY interesting question is how come you guys don’t seem to be familiar with such modern classics as Richard Posner’s ‘The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory’…
Cathal
I’m not sure about the Evolution 101 thing (although I had similar thoughts when I wrote the response).
Part of what makes the issue of social stability interesting is that different kinds of mechanisms can be employed to achieve it. So, for example, there’s an argument in Marxist theory whether ideology is key to understanding the stability of capitalist societies or whether it is down to “dull economic compulsion” (or some combination of the two).
Even if one thought one could employ the insights of evolutionary theory to understand the ubiquity of the social practices which contribute to a “well-functioning” society, I’m not sure how that would help you to decide between these two possibilities…
Yeah and besides even if evolution 101 does explain it (which it doesn’t, really, does it? Not literally. Figuratively perhaps, but not literally) – even then, the motivations and rationalizations remain interesting. All the more so in fact. It becomes a case of: Okay, we have to enslave and exploit and coerce these people in order to survive. That’s not good. Now, how do we pretty it up for ourselves so that we can sleep at night?
“the motivations and rationalizations remain interesting.”
Exactly right. One of the things which occurred to me with respect to Ralph’s slavery example is that it is an interesting question whether the Greeks had the kind of “narrative of the self” (or interior monologue, or whatever you might want to call it), which would mean that they would need to tell themselves a story at all about the fact that they owned slaves.
It is possible that they didn’t have a modern kind of self-reflective consciousness, which might mean that they would not engage in rationalisation (or whatever non-pejorative word you might like to substitute for that) at all.
All interesting questions, I think.
Well, they sure interest me, and they interested Moses Finley who wrote a whole, brilliant book on the subject of slavery in the ancient world.
They’re interesting partly because the more one thinks about it (it seems to me) the less sure one becomes that one would have done the right thing oneself.
There was a fascinating bit of that tv show ‘Colonial House’ I mentioned the other day – where the one black guy who was there quit the project because he was experiencing for himself how slavery came about. Because the work was so unrelievedly hard and exhausting, that’s why. He could imagine himself into the thoughts of the people who turned to slavery, and it (not surprisingly!) made him acutely uncomfortable.
“the less sure one becomes that one would have done the right thing oneself.”
Yes, except, of course, that one would not have been oneself, if one had been immersed in that context (if you see what I mean)!
“It keeps surprising me what a minority view that seems to be, and how content a lot of people are with approximations.”
I can tell you a faintly amusing story about this. When I first started doing this internet business (seventeen years ago, believe it or not – on a bulletin board called Minerva!), I had a discussion with some Welsh people who automatically supported their “celtic cousins” (i.e., Irish and Scottish people) in every sporting context they could think of.
A lot of the rhetoric they used made reference to blood ties, etc. I posted something which was very carefully worded saying that it was interesting that in certain contexts talk of blood ties was not seen as unacceptable, whereas in other contexts it would be seen as very dodgy.
I thought this was quite interesting; and that was all I said. They went absolutely ballistic, because they could not believe that I’d said exactly what I’d intended to say. They thought that I’d meant to imply that they were Nazis, even though I had said nothing of the sort. And I couldn’t convince them otherwise, precisly because they couldn’t believe that people would pay that much attention to precision in language.
Seventeen years ago! Golly. Well I suppose you had to do something until you were old enough to go to school. :- )
“They thought that I’d meant to imply that they were Nazis”
Just so. That’s similar to the phenomenon I call translation. Going ballistic at what one hasn’t in fact said.
“And I couldn’t convince them otherwise, precisly because they couldn’t believe that people would pay that much attention to precision in language.”
I know, I know – people think it’s not important. I have a friend who teaches linguistics, he tells me his students love to retort ‘That’s just semantics.’ Well, sure it is, what else would it be? But how could it not matter?!
“But how could it not matter?!”
Could this be a US thing?
On Clio, they’re teasing me because of my obsession with definite articles. :-)
But “The important thing…” and “An important thing” just mean something completely different.
I’m not certain, but here in the UK, I’m pretty sure that the average academic wouldn’t think this was trivial.
But perhaps this isn’t the case in the States?
Presumably it is possible that there would be this kind of cultural difference.
“Sure, absolutely. They’re both interesting. Christopher Browning’s Ordinary Men is interesting, Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem is interesting, Schindler’s List is interesting. Both abolitionism and anti-abolitionism are interesting, and so on.”
Yeah, very true. Just because something is ubiquitous, it doesn’t mean we shouldn’t find it interesting, or try to explain it. Arguably, ubiquity sometimes calls for more analysis than dissent, contrary to what Ralph said. The reasons for dissent often seem clear in retrospect in ways majority opinions do not, especially when they supported ideas we currently find wrong and/or immoral.
But even more to the point, it seems that we can’t really understand dissent unless we understand the reasons for the majority opinions. If we declare ubiquity an uninteresting topic, we surely can’t begin to understand the differences between those who supported the majority and those who dissented from it. That would have to result in large gaps in our understanding of dissenting political/cultural movements, which seems a high price to pay for our choice of “interesting” questions.
Phil
“Could this be a US thing?”
God, I hope not!
It’s undersgraduates who say that – US undergraduates are notoriously undereducated. But I hope it’s not a general thing!
“On Clio, they’re teasing me because of my obsession with definite articles.”
I know, I saw that, and wondered what they could possibly mean.
“But “The important thing…” and “An important thing” just mean something completely different.”
I know, I know. I don’t think most academics here would think it was trivial. Though as for the average academic – I don’t know. As you know, we have thousands and thousands of universities and colleges, so we must have vastly more academics than you guys do, even after correcting for different populations. I have read some pretty dismal accounts of the intellectual level at some of those thousands. So who knows.
Hell of a depressing thought.
“If we declare ubiquity an uninteresting topic, we surely can’t begin to understand the differences between those who supported the majority and those who dissented from it.”
Just so. And what’s normal at a given time and what isn’t, what troubles people and what doesn’t. It’s relevant to so many things – human psychology, ethical thought, conscience, compassion, ideas about justice, equality, progress, what people think about self-interest and altruism, and on and on. That is one reason Huck Finn is so interesting, for instance: a world where decent people simply take slavery for granted, and think opponents of it are wicked. Genuinely think that. That’s interesting! Not in order to feel superior, but to try to figure out how such ideas change, and how they work in their own time.
“Hell of a depressing thought.”
Well yes, but I had the charitable thought that maybe in the US it is more normal to fix meaning via context than perhaps it is here in the UK. So, for example, the fact that the statements were made in the middle of a discussion about slavery would fix their meaning in a way that was independent of the precise meaning of the words (I’m reaching here a bit, but you’ll get what I mean)?
Hmm. Interesting. I don’t know! My mind doesn’t work that way – but that’s not much help. Since my only skill is proof-reading, we can assume I pay hawklike attention to the actual words.
Really don’t know. Maybe we should do a B&W survey.
The funny thing about this is that I agree completely with Ralph about his compassionate history thing.
Indeed, I think one should extend the kinds of thoughts which might motivate a compassionate history to the present.
Ah well.
Well I do too – at least up to a point; I may have more reservations (or be more vindictive) than you, but I basically agree. That’s part of why the question of motivation is so interesting, and why I say the more one thinks about it, the less sure one is one would have acted well oneself. (Or not oneself, since as you point out one wouldn’t be oneself, but – er – )
Just for one thing, it’s inherently interesting – it’s almost like a puzzle – trying to disentangle the ideas one has because they’re what one has grown up in and the ideas one has because one is oneself. Or the ideas people have because they’re in the air and the ones they have because of who they are.
On grammar: US historians tend to be very context driven, which is what I was arguing about earlier.
Re: evolution 101. A classic mistake. Evolution applies to species filling ecological niches not societies filling ecological niches. Societies do all kinds of things that are anti-evolutionary. For example, sociobiologists insist that monogamy is not in an individual human’s evolutionary interest, yet many “successful” societies practice monogamy. As far as slavery goes, in the US case, the less economically efficient slavery became the more passionate the defense of it. By the 1850s when slavery was quite clearly the less economically rational choice compared to free labor, the defense of it was most rabid. So called Social Darwinism never – oops! make that rarely – explains historical phenomenon.
Surely ‘evolutionary’ arguments for the survival of institutions, social practices etc. must take the form of X survives because X brings about a situation that promotes the survival of X (e.g. it is succesful, it wipes out all opposition etc) – which is an intrinsically circular argument if you can’t back it up with specifics.
“Surely ‘evolutionary’ arguments for the survival of institutions”
It’s possible to put this differently, though.
X survives because X is functional for society as a whole, and, as a result, brings about a situation which promotes the survival of X.
And you’d flesh it out by showing how institutions change as society changes (so, for example, there’s an argument that industrialisation did for the extended family, since industrialisation required a mobile labour force, which tended to undermine traditional family ties).
“X survives because X is functional for society as a whole, and, as a result, brings about a situation which promotes the survival of X.”
I suppose we have two levels of selection here, institutions, beliefs etc competing with one another -within- a society or societies competing with one another using institutions as ‘adaptations’.
But what you need to is to establish that this society-organism analogy is actually valid – for instance does a ‘more succesful’ society reproduce, no, does it subsume other, less succesful societies, maybe. Which is what I meant by specifics, and why I don’t quite get how your “industrialisation did for the extended family, since industrialisation required a mobile labour force, which tended to undermine traditional family ties” argument relates.
All a bit close to the ‘meme’ business for my liking.
PM
I’m talking about the first of these things.
The organic analogy (as it is called) has a long history in sociology. It isn’t something I think is right, so I don’t have to demonstrate it is valid!
The point about the industrialisation argument is that the extended family was “functional” in a pre-industrial world, but no longer so in an industrial world. So whilst it had a selective advantage prior to industrialisation (it was useful, so it didn’t come under pressure from other arrangements), it lost this advantage with industrialisation (it was no longer useful), so it came under pressure from the nuclear family alternative.
But I’m just pointing out how it might be possible to argue for such a thing in a way which is not entirely circular! I’m not committed to the idea myself.
But, as you pointed out earlier, unlike naural selection, this is a teleological argument and doesn’t seem to be evolutionary at all (not in any real non-metaphorical sense). Because, without a mechanism of selection, ‘being useful’ doesn’t really explain why being useful to society helps an institution to remain, hence my claim of circularity. I suppose the most logical level of selection would be psychological/political – i.e. the institution was retained because people thought it was useful – pretty dull but not necessarily circular with that qualification I guess.
I think it would be possible to come up with something like a mechanism.
Take the family case. If you wanted to make a living in early industrialised society then you had to follow the work (this might not be true – there’s work by people like Laslett which puts this stuff into question – but for the sake of argument). This would exert a pressure on the extended family. But not so the nuclear family – so score one for the nuclear family. Capitalism requires the reproduction of labour power; there is also an argument that it requires a reserve army of workers. The nuclear family functions to achieve both these things (arguably – I don’t have time to fill in all the gaps here). Score two for the nuclear family.
Obviously, this analysis is far from complete (it would be necessary, for example, to show how it is that people end up in families at all), but nevertheless I think it does show how the argument could be constructed so that it isn’t simply teleological (given that we’re talking here about a transition from the extended family to the nuclear family).
But having said all this, I think in the end that it would fall out that there is incipient teleology in these kinds of analyses. It’s just that it is not an unsophisticated teleology.
What’s wrong with a teleological argument when the end result is known?
“What’s wrong with a teleological argument when the end result is known?”
It depends how it is couched. Someone like Parsons would argue, roughly speaking, that the family contributes to the social requirement (or, in his language, satisfies the functional prerequisite) that people learn the norms and values of the society. It isn’t plausible to argue that this is the reason that families exist, but it might be plausible to argue that it is one reason why they continue to exist (though again, it would be necessary to fill in the gaps).
What was all that guff the other day about non-scholarship? All that about pizza and ‘Neighbours’ and not knowing where the library was? Does that sit well with the functional prerequisite and incipient teleology and the organic analogy?
I know, I know, it’s all irony. Whether of the Alanis variety (the organic irony as it’s called) or some other kind.
I’m doing the internet equivalent of squinting at a textbook! :-)
Ah! Good idea; I’ll have to try that.
May I point out that between a purely immanent causal account and a (metaphysical) teleological account, there is a third alternative: a teleonomic system? In a teleonomic system, the component elements can behave purposively and the aggregation and cross-implication of their purposes may result in the formation of overall system-goals, which the system and its equilibriating mechanisms tend toward optimalizing. But 1) the purposes of component individuals or groups are not the same as the system goals, and 2) whereas the system-goals can feed-back through the structures of the system to constrain the purposes of its elements, equally the purposes of those elements can deviate or defect from the optimalization of system-goals, such that 3) the constraint of system-goals can alter the purposive behavior of the elements and the behavior of elements can aggregate to alter system-goals, and thus 4) there is no identity between initial purposes and “final” outcomes. Hegel’s philosophy is a metaphysical teleology of history, though a highly reflective one, meant to highlight the emergence of modern forms of rationality, but Marx’ “historical materialism”, once stripped of its Hegelian and Aristotelean teleological residues and probably of some of its economistic dogmatism, as well, would, in principle, be a teleonomic account.
The problem with Parson’s structural-functionalism, if I recall, is that he is too concerned with the stability of “society” as an “absolute” datum requiring explanation, that is, with a reproduction schema, and hence reifies “pattern-maintenance” as the prime determinant of human agency. But beyond the barest abstractions, the “functions” of a society are themselves a function of the basic set-ups in which they occur.
John
I agree with all that. If you’re a sociologist interested in social systems, then your theory would need to have this kind of “teleonomic” structure.
But obviously there’s a huge amount to unpack within that (the notion of a system-goal, for example, is highly problematic, I’d have thought).
Yes, I agree that historical materialism could be couched in this kind of way. Is it in his famous preface to “A Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy” where Marx alludes to the possibility of an interaction between the levels of system and social actors? Could be…
“Presumably the classic Marxian account would have to do with the reproduction of surplus-value,”
Yes. But obviously it is complicated in the case of Marxism because of the fact that Marx thought that capitalist economies were characterised by an inevitable tendency of the average rate of profit to decline and crises of overproduction.
Also, the whole question of investment in Marxist terms is moot. If I remember correctly – and it’s fifteen years since I’ve read this stuff, so that’s doubtful- the tendency of the average rate of profit to decline is partly determined by the fact that constant capital grows as a proportion of total capital.
But, in general terms, as you suggest; the moment that one begins to foreground the idea of “system goals” there is this tendency to marginalise other aspects of society. (This is one of the big criticisms of Giddens’s structuration theory, for example [not that he puts this stuff in terms of system goals, though].)