Month: March 2006

  • Newsweek and the Undead Freud

    Readers of the March 27, 2006, issue of Newsweek were greeted with the cover-story “news” that “Freud Is Not Dead.” Three items attempted to make that point in different ways. The author of the main article, Jerry Adler, consulted many people, including me, before writing his article. Readers of Butterflies and Wheels who took note of Newsweek’s spring offensive may be interested to see the e-mailed answers I gave to Mr. Adler’s questions, along with two subsequent assessments that I offered him after his piece was published. You will see, below, that I among others offered Newsweek reason to think clearly about the dubious nature of the editors’ attempted Freud revival.

    The inconsecutive nature of my paragraphs reflects the various questions that Mr. Adler posed to me.

    First response:

    My answers to almost all of your questions can be found, with
    references, in the editorial parts of my anthology Unauthorized Freud
    (Viking, or a Penguin paperback, 1998), which you may or may not have
    had time to peruse.

    One set of questions can be answered summarily: of course Freud’s
    influence in our culture has been pervasive. Nobody doubts it, so
    that surely can’t be the news item.

    A more interesting question would be whether any evidence–recognized
    as such by uncommitted and scientifically well-informed parties–has
    recently, or ever, come to light in support of Freud’s specific
    propositions about the mind. That issue was thoroughly addressed a
    few years ago by the philosopher of science Edward Erwin in a book
    called A Final Accounting. Its conclusion was that no corroborative
    evidence whatsoever has been found. The same conclusion emerges from
    Malcolm Macmillan’s great study Freud Evaluated: The Completed Arc
    (1991; revised 1997, with a foreword by me).

    How can this be, if, as you say, your own dreams and slips appear to
    vindicate Freud’s views? The answer is that scientific validation
    requires more than the reporting of phenomena that seem consistent
    with a given theory. The same phenomena may admit of any number of
    other explanations, some of them more consistent with Ockham’s razor
    (the fewer gratuitous assumptions, the better). Thus, e.g., Sebastian
    Timpanaro’s important book The Freudian Slip, while admitting the
    possibility that deep unconscious conflict may explain some slips,
    shows that Freud and his followers have ignored a range of much
    simpler explanations. Until such explanations have been tested and
    ruled out on strict empirical grounds, the theory of the Freudian slip
    remains a parlor game and nothing more. And the same critique can be
    applied to Freud’s dream theory, which (in The Interpretation of
    Dreams
    ) presumes the truth of its own suppositions and makes a number
    of arbitrary and sneaky moves. The fact that you yourself can see
    something “Freudian” in one or another of your dreams attests to the
    theory’s influence but not to its cogency.

    Two years ago, your colleague Fred Guterl wrote a rather sensational
    cover story about “What Freud Got Right,” relying heavily on the
    testimony of the neuroscientist Mark Solms, who purported to find the
    neurobiology of dreaming to be strongly supportive of Freud’s notions.
    What Mr. Guterl neglected to mention was that Solms is a
    psychoanalyst, an editor of Freud’s writings, an official of the Anna
    Freud Centre, and an ardent public advocate whose views about
    psychoanalysis-&-dreaming are by no means shared by his scientific
    colleagues, who find them amusing at best. On a deeper level, Mr.
    Guterl failed to understand the point I have made above: that
    resemblances between a given phenomenon–e.g., dreaming–and a given
    theory in no way constitute a triumph for the theory. (Guterl and I
    had a civil correspondence about this.)

    One rational way of judging whether Freudian propositions have found
    empirical support might be to bypass the print wars between Freudians
    and anti-Freudians and simply look at the research being done in
    academic psychology departments. A recent citation study (by Robbins
    et al.) found that, for several decades now, the major journals of the
    field have completely ignored all psychoanalytic claims. Nor, I
    believe, can you find a single course, in the psychology department of
    any reputable American university, that treats Freudianism as anything
    other than a historical curiosity.

    Why not? It’s because academic psychology concerns itself with
    testable hypotheses that stand a chance of vindication through
    controlled experimentation–and because nothing in Freudian psychology
    is sufficiently free of ambiguity and self-contradiction, or
    sufficiently close to raw experience, to be of empirical interest.
    This virtually unanimous verdict of the people who are most qualified
    to pass judgment ought, I think, to count more with Newsweek than the
    perpetuation of folklore that has been culturally, but never
    scientifically, accepted since the early years of the twentieth
    century.

    I don’t know whether you yourself are a veteran of psychoanalytic
    therapy, but at present nearly all of the remaining enthusiasm for
    Freudian theory comes from such veterans, who feel that their
    experience on the couch has borne out some of Freud’s propositions.
    Suffice it to say that all therapeutic regimens produce such
    conviction in their satisfied clients. Indeed, the beliefs thus
    acquired may actually work some positive therapeutic effects–why not?
    But at the same time, the highly suggestive conditions under which
    they are acquired disqualifies them as evidence for the objective
    truth of any given proposition.

    You ask, in a different vein, about the credit Freud ought to receive
    for having recognized our darker nature and freeing us from
    common-sense verities. Well, I agree that there is nothing
    commonsensical about psychoanalysis and that the Freudian movement
    stirred intellectuals and artists to value and explore “the
    irrational.” But Freud greatly, and systematically, exaggerated his
    originality, and his followers have maintained the sham to this day.
    Nietzsche alone, to mention no other name, anticipated Freud in a
    number of ways–but without the shallow pretense of having
    scientifically demonstrated the mechanics of the mind.

    Have you seen Henri Ellenberger’s historical masterpiece of 1970, The
    Discovery of the Unconscious
    ? In it you would find that virtually all
    of Freud’s general ideas about the unconscious, psychic conflict,
    dream life, etc., were richly anticipated by authors whom he had
    assuredly read. And on the central topic of sexuality, Freud
    plagiarized notions that were current in the “sexology” of his
    day–and he placed a more prurient and prudish construction on those
    notions than did their actual originators (Moll, Krafft-Ebing, Ellis,
    et al.). Freud’s great public success lay in portraying himself as
    the only anti-Victorian in the game, a man of tremendous courage and
    ascetic scientific integrity. It was all utter bullshit, and his
    contemporaries knew it and were justly scornful of his pretensions.
    For extensive documentation of that fact, see a wonderful new book in
    French, Le dossier Freud, by Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen and Sonu
    Shamdasani.

    Of course, there are a number of points on which Freud was quite
    original; and those are the ones that deserve to be scrutinized if you
    are seriously interested in his “contribution.” There are, e.g., the
    death instinct, the inherent penis envy and masochism of women, the
    universal Oedipus complex, the latency period, the vaginal orgasm, the
    primal crime committed by the primal horde, and the phylogenetic
    inheritance of memory traces from that event. All of these ideas are
    now embarrassments. Consequently, Freudians fall back on the banal
    commonplaces about the deep, dark soul–ideas whose genealogy goes
    back at least to Mesmer and in some cases to Plato. What needs to be
    emphasized, in any case, is that the same daffy method that led Freud
    to psychoanalyze our first non-simian ancestors also underlay his
    “clinical discoveries,” none of which were actually inferred from
    inductive experience. The man was simply a wild speculator whose
    habit was to invent after-the-fact “evidence” for whatever pet idea he
    harbored at the moment. The evidence was always a perfect match for
    the theory–a sure tip-off to scientific fraudulence.

    I do hope that Newsweek will recognize this time, as it didn’t two
    years ago, that matters of psychological theory are best decided not
    by partisans like Solms and me but by the relevant scientific
    community, whose critiques of one another’s hypotheses guarantee a
    certain level of rigor. As I’ve said, there is no longer any doubt
    about the standing of psychoanalysis among serious independent
    inquirers into mental processes. If your editors recognize that fact
    but persist, once again, in dredging up the perennial saws about “what
    Freud got right,” they will have shamed themselves once more.

    Second response:

    In the 50s and 60s I absorbed the standard Partisan Review truisms
    about the courageous Freudian exploration of the deep, dark human mind.
    But in the later 60s I found myself unable to answer penetrating
    criticisms by Karl Popper, Ernest Nagel, Sidney Hook, and others, all
    showing quite damningly that psychoanalytic theory is an exercise in
    circularity. That is, the “proof” of Freudian concepts is an illusory
    effect produced by the application of those same concepts to
    experience. It’s scarcely different in kind from materializations of
    the Virgin Mary, which, as I’m sure you’ve noticed, are granted only to
    gullible Catholics. If the Virgin manifested herself to me, that would
    be news; but it is just as unlikely as a Freudian’s finding anything
    non-Freudian about some aspect of mental life.

    People of a Freudian bent just can’t bring themselves to believe that I
    and other apostates have found rational grounds for disbelief that
    proved compelling on rational grounds. That’s because an essential
    feature of the system is ad hominem slander of any and all critics,
    whose dissent must be caused by Freudian factors within their twisted
    minds. As someone (Richard Armstrong) recently wrote, it’s as if Darwin
    were to have answered his opponents by saying that their failure to
    appreciate his theory resulted from their being insufficiently evolved.

    Psychoanalysis remains seductive for a number of reasons, of which I
    will mention just a few. Secular intellectuals vibrate to Freud’s
    sardonic attack on religion and his invitation to “deep knowers” to see
    through the sunny illusions of the bourgeoisie. Academic humanists find
    that by entering Freud’s world of interlocking symbols and facile
    causal assertions, they will never run out of shrewd-looking,
    counterintuitive things to say in their essays and books. (It isn’t
    always easy to distinguish between actual belief in psychoanalysis and
    tenure-minded careerism.) People who are just now overcoming a
    repressive provincial upbringing are often dazzled by, and grateful
    for, the Freudian emphasis on sexual health. Many top editors,
    publishers, and pundits are brainwashed graduates (or perennial
    undergraduates) of psychoanalytic therapy. And finally, the Freud
    legend–that Promethean story about a single individual who heroically
    overcame his repugnance, unlocked humankind’s best-kept secret, the
    repressed unconscious, and returned from the underworld to save us
    all–continues to be successfully peddled. Newsweek, it must be said,
    has done its part in keeping this myth from joining that of Orpheus on
    the fiction shelf.

    [Peter] Swales’s thesis about Minna [Bernays] has much going for it, including direct testimony by several knowledgeable parties, such as C. G. Jung. But of course it has nothing to do with the correctness or incorrectness of Freudian theory. The people who mention it most often are Freudians,
    who cite it as an absurdity that typifies the thinking of all “Freud
    bashers.” If you’re really interested in this sidelight, see John
    Kerr’s book A Most Dangerous Method.

    As for Swales’s aliquis case, which is intimately connected to his
    thesis about Freud and Minna, Swales’s 1982 article has been
    spectacularly vindicated, with quite conclusive new evidence, in a
    recent article by Richard Skues; and that vindication is all the more
    impressive because Skues himself has been a fierce defender of Freud.
    For those of us who are more concerned with Freud’s scientific ethics
    than with his sex life, the bottom line in the aliquis matter is this:
    Freud was so unscrupulous that he was willing to invent whole
    personages who would attest to the rightness of his theory and the
    infallible brilliance of his deductive powers. In other words, once
    again, you are dealing with a charlatan here.

    The Freud Archive was assembled by Kurt Eissler, who urged the various
    donors to stipulate ridiculously long periods of censorship in their
    bequests. Eissler’s explicitly stated view was that the world was not
    yet ready to learn what the documents contained about the man Freud;
    there were too many anti-psychoanalytic types out there who would
    misuse the information.

    It wasn’t Masson’s (invaluable) Freud-Fliess letters that broke the
    logjam, but rather Janet Malcolm’s book of 1984. Malcolm, a loyal
    Freudian, made fun of both Masson and Swales, implying that their
    strange personalities were more or less what you’d expect from any
    anti-Freudian; but as an investigative journalist, she also mocked
    Eissler for his timid secrecy. Eissler’s successors at the Library of
    Congress have been mightily embarrassed by Malcolm’s scorn, and they’ve
    done what they can to undo Eissler’s Orwellian effort. A great many
    documents were finally declassified in 2000, and the Library is very
    cooperative now in dealing with scholars. Even so, many transcripts of
    documents retain Eissler’s blacking-out of patients’ names, as if
    people who have been dead for 70 years or so are still at risk of
    shame. Moreover, censorship of some files remains in place.

    You could do me a favor by sending me some version of your article when
    it’s done. I gave up my subscription to Newsweek when, for the
    umpteenth time, it indulged in its bad habit of pandering to Christian
    superstition. The big “news” question on the cover, as I recall, was
    whether the Virgin did or didn’t ascend bodily to heaven–but the
    details escape me now.

    First post-publication response:

    There is indeed much pro-&-con in your article, and I was glad to see
    Swales’s aliquis thesis affirmed. The fact that Jonathan Lear doesn’t
    care a whit about manufactured evidence is also useful news, I’d say.
    But in general, the three items leave a distinctly biased impression,
    ranging from a failure to address the (missing) evidential base of
    Freud’s ideas to subtle ad hominem shading. Yours truly, e.g., is
    portrayed as a “caustic” climber who “made his reputation” at the
    expense of the defenseless Freud, whereas Lear, a lay analyst, is
    presented as a serenely reliable authority on what Freud taught us all.
    More important, it simply isn’t true that neuroscience is validating
    repression in particular and psychoanalysis in general. But what’s the
    use of complaining, when Newsweek‘s devotion to Freud is second only to its devotion to Jesus?

    Second post-publication response:

    You did do a good job of juggling all the balls that were tossed at
    you. For me, however, the bottom line is that Newsweek can look
    straight at scientific fraud–that “sinkhole of circular logic,” plus
    the brazen invention of “evidence”–and nevertheless declare its
    gratitude to Freud for having uncovered the essentially conflictual
    nature of the mind (a nature already acknowledged as such by Plato).
    Those of us who ask that a scientist meet ordinary criteria of prudence
    and honesty continue to be treated as suspect gadflies whose objections
    must stem from some private compulsion or ambition; but when
    psychoanalysts praise psychoanalysis, that’s still regarded as weighty
    information.

    Newsweek had an opportunity to distinguish clearly between the vague honor that Freud heaped upon himself for facing our “dark nature” and
    his actual, specific propositions, not a single one of which has been
    corroborated. Instead, the net effect of the three articles is to keep
    the threadbare legend intact.

    By the way, Jonathan Lear is no “psychiatrist.” He’s an academic
    philosopher who underwent Freudian therapy and was so impressed by it
    that he took the requisite courses and became a lay analyst. All
    psychiatrists, as I’m sure you know, possess the M.D. degree.

  • One K

    Good, excellent, supa. Perfect. I was still worrying about the update because about 300 people signed up but about 700 didn’t. Google changed my ‘add’ to ‘invite’ (I suppose because it’s a big list, and they don’t know me, so for anything they knew it was all a scheme to enlarge the genitalia of everyone in the whole world, which would be irksome) and I worried that the email they sent looked like spam, so a lot of them could have been filtered and a lot more deleted unread. Plus there was a thing in the email about having to set up a Google account in order to view the group website, and I figured a lot of people would have thought they had to do that to subscribe and not wanted to. In other words [draws a deep breath] I thought those 700 people probably still wanted to get the update but didn’t really know about it. So I danced a stately minuet with the people at – with the Google Team, as they always signed themselves, for a few days, and finally we got everything lined up nicely and pressed the right buttons and hooray hooray, the 700 have been added. So B&W has its mailing list back (yaboosucks hacker) and it is a healthy thousand-plus strong and most important (this was really bugging me) almost no one has been accidentally left out. (There were five left out for cryptic reasons; I could always try to email them; don’t worry about it.) So that’s that.

    (I’m really pleased. It has been bothering me [well you know how I get]. It’s nice to solve something that’s been bothering you. Champagne all around! On the house [not my house, but someone’s, I’m sure].)

  • Protectionism

    Let’s think a little about this idea that there is a tension or conflict or contradiction between freedom of speech and religious freedom.

    What is meant by religious freedom? One, individual belief. No problem. However, that does not entail protection and insulation from disagreement – from awarness of other people who don’t share one’s beliefs. That is not how we understand freedom. My freedom to run up and down hooting and waggling my fingers does not mean that other people can’t laugh and point and make remarks. Freedom just means freedom, it doesn’t mean freedom plus nice pleasant soothing feelings of calm self-satisfaction free of all disruptive challenge. If you want insulation from awareness of people who don’t agree with or unconditionally admire your religion, you have to enter a closed religious order. You have to insulate yourself, you can’t call on the state or international law to insulate you. Two, practice. That’s different, because it may affect other people (and other sentient beings). Familiar stuff – drugs, animal slaughter, education, pacifism and the draft, medical attention, underage marriage, female genital mutilation, forced marriage, caste systems, female subordination, punishment, law – and a great deal more. Practice is where religious freedom really can be in tension with other very important values and commitments, which is why disputes over the tension often end up in court. But the idea that freedom of speech and religious freedom are in tension seems to be about belief rather than practice. It seems to be about claiming that one is not free to believe what one wants to unless other people are prevented from interfering with that freedom by mentioning their refusal to believe the same thing. But an irrational belief that depends for its survival on the assent of everyone else is no kind of irrational belief at all; it’s just sissy stuff. Surely real zealots ought to be embarrassed at themselves for turning to the UN to help them hang on to their beliefs! True ‘faith’ comes from within, and laughs to scorn the idea that it needs outside help – especially from the UN of all places.

  • De Profundis

    What a relief it is to read Kenan Malik after Doudou Diéne.

    At the beginning it feels not so much like reading Kenan Malik as like stumbling into an echo chamber.

    “I believe in free speech, but…” That has become the rallying cry for the liberal left in the wake of the Danish cartoon controversy. The Guardian “believes uncompromisingly in freedom of expression, but not in any duty to gratuitously offend.” For Jack Straw freedom of speech is fine but not if it leads to an “open season” on religious taboos.

    Part of the liberal left, I would urgently interject. Not all! By no means all. Not B&W and not Kenan to name two; not Nick Cohen and not the people who organized the March for Free Expression, not Maryam Namazie and not Norm – and so on. There are a lot of us, and we’re a talkative bunch. But his main point is – well, one I’ve made in almost the same words, so I agree with it.

    So free speech is good, but has to become less free in a plural society. “If people are to occupy the same political space without conflict,” the sociologist Tariq Modood argues, “they mutually have to limit the extent to which they subject each others’ fundamental beliefs to criticism.”

    Well, there’s one of the more revolting ideas I’ve seen in awhile. One could take it as a mere banal definition, of course – he could simply be saying that subjecting fundamental beliefs to criticism can lead to conflict, can be seen as a kind of conflict itself. This unstartling observation can be followed with ‘and a good thing too’ along with the observation that fundamental beliefs that never get subjected to criticism are about as exciting and inspiring as one’s own pancreas. They’re just there, they’re inert, they’re like wallpaper; who cares. But that probably isn’t what Modood means. (If it were, Kenan probably wouldn’t have quoted it.) There is that ‘have to’ for instance – that has that familiar whiff of intimidation and coercion about it, that we’re all getting so immensely tired of. ‘You have to limit your criticism of my fundamental beliefs – limit it to zero, please – or else I will show you some conflict, if you get my drift.’

    It’s a Rawlsian view of sorts, I suppose. A slightly bullying version of Rawls’s political liberalism. It depends among other things on what one means by ‘political space’. Does Modood mean literally, narrowly political space, where laws are made? Or does he mean the social world in general? If the former, it can mean (if I understand Rawls properly, which I’m not sure of) something like bracketing fundamental beliefs and disagreements about them for the sake of agreeing on something that needs doing. But if, as I suspect, it means the social world in general, it just means the same old crap. ‘Shut up because I don’t like what you’re saying’ – dressed up in grand talk about occupying space without conflict. Not a modification of free speech then, but its flat obliteration.

    Ah, say the would-be censors, the problem is that you secularists simply do not understand religious believers’ depth of attachment to their faith, and hence their outrage at any insult to it…This argument reveals how little attached many liberals are to their own beliefs…There is no reason to treat Muslims – or, indeed, any religious believers – as special cases. Communists were often wedded to their ideas even unto death. Racists have a visceral attachment to their prejudices. Should I indulge them because their beliefs are so deeply held? Of course not.

    Of course not indeed. Depth, intensity, passion, fervour, devoutness, warmth, zeal, profundity of feeling are no guide whatsoever to the merit of the object of the feeling. Absolutely none. Hitler was deeply attached to the mess he believed in, Timothy McVeigh was similarly attached to his, zealots in general are fervent and intense about what they believe; it does not follow and it is not true that what they believe is true or right or just or good for other people. The merit of the content of beliefs has to be evaluated quite separately from anyone’s emotional attachment to said beliefs.

    In any case, I would challenge anyone to show me that my humanism is less intensely felt than the faith of a Muslim or of any other believer. There is something almost racist about the claim that Muslims are so different from everyone else.

    I would just drop the ‘almost’, myself. I think it is exactly inverse racism (except that Muslim isn’t a race, but the people who go in for this kind of inverse racism are just the people who insist on pretending it is, and they certainly think about it as if it is). It makes a special category of Muslims and then treats them with special rules it would never apply to, say, the BNP or Fred Phelps. No matter what the depth of Fred’s attachment to his ‘faith’.

  • Ignatieff on Torture

    Problems begin when we descend into the particular, when we ask what exactly counts as torture.

  • Kenan Malik on ‘Too Much Respect’

    ‘There is no reason to treat Muslims—or, indeed, any religious believers—as special cases.’

  • On Wieseltier on Dennett’s Breaking the Spell

    ‘The first question…about Wieseltier’s review is why he was asked to submit it in the first place.’

  • Blow Up Those Guilty Women

    ‘The biggest nightclub in central London, no one can put their hands up and say they are innocent – those slags dancing around.’

  • The Selfish Gene Event

    Dennett, Ridley, McEwan, Krebs, Dawkins speak.

  • Blame Denmark

    So the UN rapporteur explains what’s going on and whose fault it is. His report is apparently not available in English yet; this rather right-wing blog translates from the excerpts Politiken and Jyllands-Posten published.

    Finally, the Danish government’s first reaction – rejecting to take an official position on the nature and publication of the cartoons while referring to Freedom of Speech as well as rejecting to meet with the ambassadors from the Moslem countries – is symptomatic not only for the political trivialisation of Islamophobia but also, due to its consequences, to the central role those politically responsible have for the national extent and the international consequences in the shape of demonstrations and expressions of Islamophobia…Judicially, the Danish government ought therefore, especially considering its international obligations, to have, respecting Freedom of Speech, taken a position not only on the consequences of the caricatures for its community of 200.000 Moslems but also for the protection of peace and order.

    So it’s the Danish government’s fault. It should have met with the ambassadors from ‘the Moslem countries’ and – what? Agreed to arrest, prosecute and punish the cartoonists and editors? Pass new laws banning prophet-mocking? Sworn a great oath that no Dane would ever make a joke about anything to do with Islam from now until the ending of the world?

    Their uncompromising defense of a Freedom of Speech without limits or restrictions is not in accordance with the international rules which are based on a necessary balance between Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Religion, especially to combat calls for racial and religious hatred, and which all the member countries of UN have decided are the basic rules for Human Rights. This attitude shows an alarming lack of sensitivity and understanding of the religious conviction and deep emotions of the groups of society in question.

    There it is again. Just what Frattini talked about: the ‘very real problem’ of balancing ‘two fundamental freedoms, the freedom of expression and the freedom of religion’. The idea that freedom of religion requires silencing people who would mock or dissent from a particular religion – thus making freedom of religion itself a joke, and a very unfunny one at that, and making freedom of expression an empty phrase. The freedom of religion does not require the ‘freedom’ never to hear anything one might find irritating or disconcerting. That is not the meaning of freedom. That has never been the meaning of freedom. Translating it to that is a shortcut to theocratic tyranny. It takes considerable gall to name censorship and tyranny and silencing ‘freedom’. The idea that religious conviction and ‘deep emotions’ should determine which speech can be free is also not a very good idea.

    There are more extensive excerpts here.

    More later.

  • Ill Wind

    Boy, Conservative MPs don’t talk this way around here. Conservative MPs, conservative Representatives; whatever – anyway they don’t talk like that around here. We should be so lucky.

    The whole climate in which religion is discussed has chilled notably in the past few months. After the Danish cartoon controversy, the momentum is with those people who use their particular, narrow faith to silence other voices. If you doubt that’s so, just ask why no British newspaper felt that it could reproduce those cartoons. And reflect on why the British and American governments had to apologise for the offence caused. What were governments doing saying sorry for the independent actions of free citizens? Bending before a very ill wind.

    Exactly. And not only apologizing for the independent (and legal, and in the view of rational people, moral) actions of free citizens, but telling us we mustn’t do them. Telling us we were (technically, if we insisted) free to do them, but we mustn’t, that it was unacceptable. That we ‘enjoy’ normal freedoms but that if we exercise them we will be suspended and our newspapers will be seized and shredded. That we have freedom of expression but no duty to gratuitously offend. Not so much bending before an ill wind as falling face down on the ground and then burrowing their way into the earth until nothing but a centimeter of buttock remained visible, before an ill wind.

    When the House of Commons debated the Religious Hatred Bill, the argument was made that criminalising what one said about faith would have a chilling effect on debate overall. And, even without the law having been passed, one section of our community has succeeded in just that aim…I’m sure that Trapped in the Closet is wildly offensive. I certainly hope so, anyway. Because the one thing that Scientologists need more than anything else is ridicule. A religion founded by a science-fiction writer in the 1950s which invites its followers to believe in an inter-galactic tyrant called Xenu and offers them the chance to control time itself by becoming “Operating Thetans” deserves nothing less.

    It’s funny the way people keep on using the word ‘faith’ without quotation marks. It’s such a horrible word – wouldn’t you think everyone would want to sneer at it with sneer-quotes? But no, people keep on taking it seriously. That’s odd.

  • Who Was That Young Man?

    So that’s how it went.

    On 3 September 2002, the first day of the autumn term, the respondent (then aged nearly 14) went to the school with her brother and another young man. They asked to speak to the head teacher, who was not available, and they spoke to the assistant head teacher, Mr Moore. They insisted that the respondent be allowed to attend the school wearing the long garment she had on that day, which was a long coat-like garment known as a jilbab. They talked of human rights and legal proceedings. Mr Moore felt that their approach was unreasonable and he felt threatened…The young men said they were not prepared to compromise over this issue.

    Who was the other young man, and how was he explained to the assistant head teacher, one wonders. How was his presence explained? How was his interest in the matter explained? How was it made clear why it was any of his business what an unrelated thirteen-year-old schoolgirl wore to school? ‘This is a friend of mine’? ‘This is our imam’? ‘This is Knuckles’? ‘This is our “spiritual advisor”‘?

    The school was anxious to establish contact with the respondent’s guardian and accordingly, on 4 September 2002, a member of the support team telephoned her house and spoke to a male member of the family who said that the respondent had seen her solicitor and was going to sue the school. On 5 September 2002 Mr Moore telephoned and spoke to the respondent’s brother. Mr Moore inquired why the respondent was not in school. The respondent’s brother told Mr Moore that he (the brother) was not prepared to let the respondent attend school unless she was allowed to wear a long skirt.

    He didn’t say whether the other young man was prepared or not. The other young man seems to have disappeared from the story. I wonder what he thinks about it all.

  • Heroism

    I’ve noticed something interesting. Ever read any Deborah Tannen? Differences in the way women and men use language? Women say ‘sorry’ a lot more than men do, that kind of thing? Somewhat worrying, a tad too similar to the Gilligan-Harding school of feminism which is too inclined to characterize women as big soppy soft-headed damp-palmed lachrymose huggy squishy melty getOFFme fools – but interesting all the same, and she is better at both gathering data and thinking about the data once she’s gathered. Anyway – differences in the way men and women use language. I think I’ve noticed a new one (new in the sense that I hadn’t noticed it before, though Tannen probably has). Here is my theory. [protracted pause to cough and clear throat] When men report on something they’ve done in collaboration with someone else they say ‘I’ve done this (with X).’ Women say ‘X and I have done this.’ I find that really profoundly interesting, and indicative of something or other. (Well, it’s fairly obvious of what, but it would be unkind to spell it out. snigger, snerk.) It reminds me of a guy I used to work with at the zoo. He once did a written report of something we had worked on together – and he used the pronoun ‘I’ throughout. ‘I did this, I did that.’ I pointed out to him that actually we had done this and that – and he was entirely uninterested. There’s something hilariously funny about that, in a tragic sort of way.

    (And no, that still does not mean that Mileva Marić collaborated with Einstein!)

  • Excerpts From Rapporteur’s Criticism of Denmark

    Diéne talks a lot of sinister nonsense.

  • UN Rapporteur Warns Racism is on the Rise

    Prophet cartoons illustrate the emergence of racist and xenophobic currents in everyday life.

  • The Begum Judgment in Full

    Brother and ‘another young man’ went to the school and spoke to assistant head, who felt threatened.

  • No Upside-down Hobbesian Contract

    ‘We are not consumers who buy our security and we are not living in Hobbes’s imaginary state of terror.’

  • Swedish Foreign Minister Quits Over Cartoon Fuss

    Laila Freivalds resigned after allegations she shut down far-right website for soliciting new caricatures.

  • Climate for Discussing Religion Has Chilled

    ‘The momentum is with those people who use their particular, narrow faith to silence other voices.’