Author: Ophelia Benson

  • ‘Faith’ Not Compatible With Law School

    Good – now by way of relief from the water-muddying of Ruse, let us turn to David Rudenstine, Dean of Cardozo Law School. At last, someone says it!

    In a provocative address last week…the dean of the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law warned of a “collision course with democratic order and social unity” as politically outspoken religious leaders wield increasing influence over the nation’s public policy. Dean David Rudenstine…further suggested that U.S. jurisprudence and legal education were “very much on the defensive,” in part because strict secularism as a legal paradigm is seen by the faithful — including some at Christian law schools — as an insufficient context for policy issues such as abortion rights, homosexual marriage, stem-cell research and Darwin’s theory of evolution. Mr. Rudenstine said that America’s law schools have a social responsibility, especially at a time of religious fundamentalism, to foster reasoned debate over the facts and science of such controversial matters.

    Thank you. Reasoned debate over the facts and science. Precisely.

    “Faith challenges the underpinnings of legal education,” Mr. Rudenstine declared. “Faith is a willingness to accept belief in things for which we have no evidence, or which runs counter to evidence we have.” He added, “Faith does not tolerate opposing views, does not acknowledge inconvenient facts. Law schools stand in fundamental opposition to this.”

    Bingo! That’s exactly it – and that’s what you’re not allowed to say. ‘Faith’ is not a virtue, ‘faith’ is not the right basis for discussion of public issues, in fact it’s exactly the wrong basis for discussion of public issues, for exactly that reason – because it’s a willingness to accept belief in things for which we have no evidence, or which runs counter to evidence we have. And it doesn’t tolerate opposing views and it doesn’t acknowledge inconvenient facts. But how often do people come right out and say that? In public, I mean. Not damn well often enough.

    Barry Lynn, executive director of the Washington, D.C.-based Americans United for Separation of Church and State, was quick to associate himself with Mr. Rudenstine’s thesis…”No one expects politicians and policy-makers to divorce themselves entirely from the roots of their belief system, but in the United States, our laws have to be based on secular justifications.”

    Just so. You can derive your moral views from any belief system you like, but when it comes to making actual laws, you have to give secular justifications, not religious ones. You have to come up with something more (and better) than ‘God said so.’ For one thing, ‘God’ said a lot of things, and some of them are quite disgusting.

    Regent Law Dean Jeffrey A. Brauch countered, “I don’t think you can understand the historic development of law in this country if you don’t understand the role that religion has played, the role that faith and the church has played.” Much of the U.S. legal system, he said, comes from British common law, which “has a theological basis. Why is it we believe a king or a government ruler is obliged to some higher authority? It’s because there was a belief that there was a God and a higher law,” he said.

    We don’t. We don’t, we don’t, we don’t.

    Mr. Brauch said he believes in a “reasonable faith” as opposed to a “blind faith,” and that Regent and other religious law schools simply add spiritual dimension to academic pursuit. “Let’s say we’re talking about family law,” said Mr. Brauch. “Somebody in the class has a strong belief that a family with both a mother and father in a heterosexual marriage is better for children. I would hope that our students wouldn’t merely say, ‘That’s what I believe because it’s what I’ve always been taught,’ but that they’d look at a tremendous amount of empirical research that would show that, and then ask what that could mean for public policy.”

    Well exactly, you fool! That’s what we’re saying! [takes deep breath] Look, if you look at empirical research and then ask what it could mean for public policy – that’s all we’re talking about. You’ll notice you forgot to mention your pal God there. This is our point. You don’t need it. It doesn’t add anything. You need the research and the analysis of the research and what it will mean, you don’t need God.

    But of course he thinks he does. It’s sad, isn’t it – he sees the basic point, and yet he can’t take it in. Too stuck in that ‘spiritual dimension.’

    But let’s hope more people will start doing a Rudenstine, and pointing out the problem with ‘faith.’

  • Who’s Insisting?

    More guilt-mongering of non-theism, more default assumptions that there is something wrong or wicked or suspect or in need of a damn good explanation about naturalism. Also more Michael Ruse.

    Professor Ruse takes a long look at why opponents of evolution feel so threatened and why evolutionists are so surprised and perplexed at the opposition…Although Darwin’s own work was a model of professional science, a great deal of evolutionary thought before and after him, in Professor Ruse’s judgment, deserves to be termed evolutionism, a kind of secular religion built around an ideology of progress.

    Okay, stop right there. A ‘kind of’ secular religion? That’s a weasel-term. Could be the reporter’s rather than Ruse’s – but either way it’s weasel-language. And then, what does ‘secular religion’ mean? And ideology is not the same thing as religion. Ideology can certainly do a lot to distort thinking, but it’s not the same thing as religion, and it just confuses things to talk about it as if it were. An ‘ideology of progress’ does not require any supernatural beliefs whatever; religion does; it’s the supernaturalism that’s at issue; so to conflate an ‘ideology of progress’ with religion in a context where supernaturalism versus naturalism is the subject, is cheating. People who defend or try to protect religion resort to cheating a lot. That’s annoying, and they ought to stop doing it.

    From the beginning, evolutionary theory has been drenched in religion. The aggressors in the warfare between theology and science were not just religious believers insisting that their ancient Scriptures were the basis of scientific truths but scientific enthusiasts insisting that evolutionary theory was the basis for conclusions about religion.

    More cheating, though of a milder kind. Tendentious language. For one thing, ‘drenched in religion’ turns out to mean pointing out that evolutionary theory doesn’t require religion, or makes religion superfluous. That’s an odd thing for ‘drenched in religion’ to turn out to mean. For another thing – aggressors? Why aggressors? Why is it aggressive to try to explain a naturalistic subject by naturalistic means? And then, more minor rhetoric: there’s ‘enthusiasts’ and ‘insisting’. It’s minor, but it all adds up: it adds up to the usual default assumption that no one has any business pointing out that there is no good evidence for the truth claims religions make, or that religious answers to naturalistic questions are not helpful and are not answers.

    But as Professor Ruse notes, as genuine science no less than as pseudoscience, “Darwinian evolutionary theory does impinge on religious thinking.”…Other elements of Darwinism go right to the heart of any belief in a caring, almighty God. The power of strictly natural interactions of random events and reproductive advantage over huge spans of time to explain the emergence of diverse and complex life forms appears to render the guiding role of such a God superfluous. The grim picture of those life forms, including humanity, emerging through a ruthlessly cruel process of natural competition appears to render such a God implausible.

    Yes, true. Although problems with the idea of a caring almighty God did not begin in 1859. (Actually it’s a rather depressing reflection on human history that so many people did manage to believe in a caring almighty God for so long. I mean – caring? Caring? How could they possibly have thought that?)

    Then there is the debate about the “methodological naturalism” that for purposes of scientific investigation restricts explanations to findings about material nature. Does “methodological naturalism” lead inexorably to a “metaphysical naturalism” holding that material nature is in fact the whole of reality? Professor Ruse says no. But he acknowledges that the slippery slope is there.

    There again – the slippery slope. That’s another pejorative. More cheating.

    In the end, Professor Ruse’s new book suggests that the religious resistance to evolutionary theory is a lot more understandable and a lot less unreasonable than its opponents recognize.

    Well of course it’s understandable: religious believers don’t like having their beliefs challenged. That’s not a secret. But less unreasonable? Well, only if you think it’s reasonable to let wishes determine beliefs about the world, and to let them control what other people write and teach, as well. It’s not self-evident that that is particularly reasonable, frankly.

  • Aren’t You Sorry You Missed Luce Irigaray?

    Remaining only in sameness or impersonal neutrality leads either to paralysis or to uncontrollable acceleration.

  • Murdered Nun Had Argued With Priest

    Was locked up with no food or water for four days before crucifixion.

  • Gödel was Irked by Wittgenstein

    Rebecca Goldstein on Gödel and Einstein, super-realism and Platonism.

  • Alan Wolfe on Jews, Assimilation, and Identity

    Assimilation and influence, identity and isolation.

  • Marx Out in Front

    Wittgenstein second. Wheen applauds, Blackburn and Grayling have doubts.

  • Endemic Confusion

    PZ Myers has an excellent post on – broadly speaking – the tension between religion and science. Narrowly speaking it’s on a non-excellent post by the widely over-rated Eugene Volokh (though I gather he’s less over-rated now, ever since that post on what a good thing it is to torture certain criminals to death in front of an enraged crowd). And he makes a point that I’ve made here more than once. It’s a very, very widespread mistake and confusion, even among people who – you would think – really ought to know the difference. It’s pretty ominous and disturbing that the confusion is so pervasive even among educated people like lawyers and journalists. Clearly everyone should be learning the difference in kindergarten and having it reinforced throughout their educations – possibly it ought to be the first thing anyone learns. It’s not really possible to think clearly without it.

    Here’s the confusion:

    What’s more, how exactly do scientists come to the conclusion that “God had no part in this process”? What’s their proof? That’s the sort of thing that can’t really be proved, it seems to me — which makes it sound as if scientists, despite their protestations of requiring proof rather than faith, make assertions about God that they can’t prove.

    It seems to him – what, as if he’s the only one who thinks so? Of course it can’t be proved! And ‘scientists’ know that perfectly well, and they don’t make ‘protestations of requiring proof rather than faith’ – they ask for evidence. Not proof, evidence. There’s a difference – a big difference. It’s so basic, and yet so many people seem to have no clue. That’s alarming.

    PZ commented on the confusion:

    Scientists don’t talk about “proof”, period. We leave that to the mathematicians. This is something I yell at my freshman biology majors, by the way. I know it’s out of the purview of a scholar of constitutional law, but if he’s going to make claims about science, shouldn’t he know the bare basics of the discipline?

    Yeah, he should, especially since the difference between evidence and proof is not just a basic of science, surely – it’s a pretty general basic of epistemology. It has to be – because it’s about the difference between certainty and non-certainty, doubt and no doubt, open questions and closed ones, how and when and if we know what we know. Susan Haack points out that scientific inquiry is continuous with other forms of inquiry, as opposed to being special in some way. Saying ‘there is evidence for X’ a very different thing from saying ‘it is proved that X’ in any empirical field you can think of.

    It’s odd, and interesting, and somewhat exasperating, to realize that probably most woolly beliefs rest on exactly this stupid confusion. ‘You can’t prove that God doesn’t exist, or that there is no space ship behind the Hale-Bopp comet, or that extra-terrestrials haven’t been abducting and impregnating humans, or that I don’t have a parking angel or a laundry angel or any other kind of angel’ – therefore we might as well believe any of them we want to. That’s probably how the default position works (we’ve been talking about the default position lately – that belief is right and good and it’s non-belief that has to explain itself) – since you can’t prove the belief is nonsense, therefore there is no reason not to believe it. That ‘therefore’ is idiotic, but it’s everywhere.

    Brian Leiter makes a similar comment.

    What interests me in particular here is what this display tells us about the limited understanding of science and scientific methods even among educated people and scholars. If professional scholars in fields like law have so little understanding of the nature and structure of scientific inquiry, is it any surprise that in the population at large nonsense like creationism and its offshoots, like Intelligent Design, have considerable traction?

    Exactly. Discouraging, isn’t it.

  • Planet of the Hats

    I know you will not believe me, but I swear it’s true: I’m not of this earth. I fled here years ago because my home planet was driving me crazy. Let me explain.

    My home world is very much like this one. It’s populated by billions of bipedal primates, who are just like people here: sometimes foolish, sometimes wise, sometimes hateful, sometimes generous. They are grouped into cities and nations, and sometimes they have wars, and sometimes they cooperate. You really would have a hard time telling our two planets apart, except for one thing.

    The hats.

    My people are obsessed with hats. Almost everyone wears them, and a lot of their identity is wrapped up in their particular style. Some people always wear cowboy hats, for instance, and others wear bowlers, and each think the other is exceedingly funny-looking, and would never consider switching. They have elaborate ceremonies for their children in which they confer the hats, and kids often go to special schools once a week where they learn about the history and significance of their hats. Everyone has the importance of hats drilled into them from birth to death.

    The particular type of hat was critical. Individuals only rarely changed hat styles, and when they did, it was considered grounds for sorrow by those who wore the abandoned style, and cause for rejoicing by those wearing the newly adopted style. Sometimes people would invent new kinds of hats, which were typically regarded as bizarre when one person was wearing it, but once a sufficient number switched to the new style, they were respected automatically. It meant that streets of our more cosmopolitan cities were filled with strange and comical hats bobbing along, but no one laughed. Laughing at a hat was considered a heinous crime.

    It sounds very silly, I know. A minority on my planet also find it pointless, myself among them, and didn’t bother with wearing a hat. This is tolerated in the more civilized nations, although there are places where wearing no hat, or a strange hat, can get you killed. And honestly, many people in my country only bothered to wear their hat once a week, although the rest of the time they would keep them on ornate hatstands in their home, and attached much significance to their presence.

    Now why should mere excesses of fashion compel someone to flee many light years to escape? There was something more. There was a near-universal notion of remarkable absurdity: most people believed that an important portion of their minds actually resided in their hats. The locus of their ethical sense was not believed to be in their brains, but somehow intertwined in the fabric of their hats. This led to strange customs: witnesses in trials were required to wear their hats to give testimony; soldiers were thought to be cowards without their hats; politicians vied to see who could wear the most ostentatious versions of their hats; sex was considered a filthy practice because people would take off their hats to do it. There was no scientific evidence for any of this, and the evidence actually contradicted the belief, but since it was hallowed by tradition, it persisted.

    Hatters, milliners, and haberdashers were highly regarded professionals, and every town would have numerous hatshops. Their numbers proliferated, because obviously you could not have the person who crafted miters also making berets, or vice versa, but still they prospered because, not only were the majority sinking a significant proportion of their income into the purchase and care of their hats, but the occupation was considered too dignified to be taxed. Huge sums of money were poured into hatteries, and the people considered this to be a virtuous act that made them more noble and right. The president of my country listened very closely to his council of hatters, and no television punditry was complete without a haberdasher to use his vast hat-based wisdom to pontificate on domestic and foreign policy. They were all talking out of their hats, which was considered a very good thing.

    I couldn’t help noticing, though, that the very idea that ethical thought was localized to a hat was a ridiculous notion, and that hatless people could be just as good and kind and wise as those with the most ornate hat (and that hatless people could also be wretched and cruel, of course, as could the hatted.) Our president had a rhinestone-covered 20 gallon cowboy hat with an airhorn and flashing strobe, and he seemed far less virtuous than my neighbor, with her simple and unostentatious cap. Hats obviously had nothing to do with morality, except perhaps in an inverse way: those who spent the most effort polishing the geegaws and flash on their hats usually put the least effort into honing their minds.

    I could see the writing on the wall. Being hatless myself meant my chances for promotion were limited, but even more worrisome was that the height of one’s hat was becoming the sole measure of nobility of purpose, and the genuine leaders were being replaced with loud poseurs who knew how to stretch a crown and use a Be-Dazzler. When the People of the Easter Bonnet started encouraging war with the Chador Wearers, citing deep philosophical differences, I bundled my family into our rocketship and flew away.

    We stayed briefly at the Planet of Shoes, but found the same problems there, so now we’ve settled here on Earth where, clearly, the situation is completely different.

    This interlude first appeared on Pharyngula and is re-published here by permission.

  • What’s All the Fuss About?

    Romanian nun dies in ‘exorcism’; common practice, priest says.

  • Eve Garrard Asks: Why is Israel Singled Out?

    It’s no good saying ‘Because we think it’s worse’ – that’s a circular argument.

  • Sally Satel on ‘The Ethical Brain’

    Untangling how we arrive at moral and ethical judgments.

  • Michael Ruse Eyes the ‘Slippery Slope’

    ‘Darwinism’ a threat to belief in a caring omnipotent deity.

  • Nicholas Kristof Phones Mukhtaran

    She is free, but her passport is still confiscated.

  • Words Matter, Differences Matter, Truth Matters

    Pavel Litvinov notes: exaggeration for the sake of attention is a bad move.

  • Maybe There’s a Paragraph Missing

    Had lovely fishing trip. Caught a shark, a couple of eels, a sting ray, and an otter that seems to have been dead for some time. All made a very nice bouillabaisse, served with aioli and a hearty pain de compagne and some Chef BoyArDee canned ravioli. That’s the best meal I’ve had in awhile!

    But life is not all holiday. Back to the dear old religious hatred bill. Frank Dobson does a not very compelling job of arguing for it in the Guardian, it seems to me. Maybe I’m missing something.

    Do you believe that anyone should be allowed to incite hatred against other people on the grounds of their religious belief? I don’t, even though I have no religious belief myself. That’s because I believe that nobody should suffer assaults, or live in fear, because of their religious beliefs.

    So – Mr Dobson – do you believe that people should suffer assaults, or live in fear, because of something other than their religious beliefs? Do you believe that people should suffer assaults, or live in fear, because of their fashion sense, or taste in fish soup, or nail-biting? Probably not – am I right? Don’t you just kind of think people shouldn’t suffer assaults, or live in fear, at all? Don’t you generally tend to think that assault and threatening ought to be against the law? Don’t you think they in fact are against the law? If so, what is the force of your question? What is that ‘because’ doing there? You might as well say, ‘Do you believe that people should be robbed at gunpoint because of their opinions on Star Trek? I don’t, even though I have no opinions on Star Trek myself. That’s because I believe that nobody should suffer assaults.’ See – the thing about opinions on Star Trek is completely superfluous. It’s not necessary. You don’t need it. Assault is already illegal, and adding ‘because of their religious beliefs’ to the end of it doesn’t make it any more so.

    I’m not saying there is no argument for laws against incitement to hatred. I tend to think there is, especially in view of what happened in for instance the Balkans and Rwanda lately. I’m saying Frank Dobson didn’t make that argument, and doesn’t seem to have noticed that he didn’t make it. He just jumped right over it. He does more jumping.

    If the proposed new law were widely drawn, it could in effect extend the blasphemy law. But it isn’t. It is narrowly drawn, confining the offence to expressions or behaviour intended or likely to stir up hatred. It wouldn’t outlaw The Satanic Verses or Jerry Springer – the Opera, just as the existing protection for Sikhs did not cover the play Behzti in Birmingham.

    And that’s that. On to the next item. That is – incredibly enough – all he says about that issue. You may notice a certain emaciation about it, a certain lack of corroborative material, a certain absence of elaboration or explanation. That surplus ‘because’ in the first paragraph would have come in handy in this one, but it isn’t there. The law wouldn’t outlaw The Satanic Verses because – why? He doesn’t say. He doesn’t say! He just says it is so, and leaves it at that. Well – since that’s the very point that’s at issue, that doesn’t really cut it!

    Not to mention that blithe assumption that it is obvious what ‘confining the offence to expressions or behaviour intended or likely to stir up hatred’ means – which it decidedly isn’t. Again, that’s the whole point – so just saying ‘it’s not a problem’ and nothing further is not really adequate, is it. But that’s all he says. Is this really the best they can do?

    And that brings us to the next objection – that comedians won’t be able to make religious jokes, and clerics will not be able to promote their beliefs or attack the beliefs, teachings and practices of other religions. This isn’t true either. To fall foul of the law, offenders must use threats, abuse or insults that are intended to stir up hatred against people on the grounds of their religion, or are likely to do so. If threats, abuse and insults alone don’t break the law, jokes certainly shouldn’t. Surely no comedian needs the right to stir up religious hatred. Nor does any cleric.

    Here we are again. Err – yes, we know offenders must use threats, abuse or insults that are intended to stir up hatred against people on the grounds of their religion – we know that, because that’s what this whole thing is about. Just keeping on repeating it isn’t going to answer our objections. How do you know when threats, abuse or insults are intended to stir up hatred against people on the grounds of their religion and when they’re not? How do you tell the difference? What are the criteria? And when are you planning to explain them to the people who will be subject to this new law? Ever?

    Changes in the law bring about changes in behaviour, partly by acting as a deterrent and partly by declaring that something is wrong. We know the law against incitement to racial hatred has had that effect. Incitement to religious hatred is just as wrong, so the law should declare it wrong. If we fail to change the law, we are declaring that we are prepared to tolerate religious hatred. That can’t be right.

    Again – yes, we know. Again, that’s the problem – we don’t want to change our behaviour, we don’t want a deterrent. You seem to be utterly convinced that you know religious hatred when you see it and that it’s not things like jokes or novels or plays, or articles or essays or tracts – but we’re not convinced, noisy disrespectful atheists that we are, and we’re even less convinced now you’ve shown us that you can’t even seem to see that there’s anything to be said on the subject. Nothing but ‘it won’t be a problem because it won’t be a problem.’ Not an encouraging sign, this level of obtusity.

  • Magic vs. Modernity

    In the European Enlightenment, the belief was that science and reason
    would soon sweep myth and magic into oblivion. For some, myth included
    religion while others operated in terms of some variant of Deism or even
    Theism, believing that there was an unknown power beyond what was known and
    knowable to humans. In fact, many scientists, then and now, could fully
    exercise their religious convictions and interpret them in such a way as
    not to allow them to interfere with scientific understanding. For those for
    whom there was no conflict between science and religion, it was because
    particular statements or religious beliefs about the way the things work
    always gave way to emerging facts and theories of scientific inquiry.
    Science and reason became the basis for advancing human understanding and
    enlightenment.

    By the time that I was an undergraduate, the enlightenment ideal was well
    established in my University. The opposition to evolution was thought to
    have been laid to rest in the 1920s; the religious groups that continued
    to oppose Darwin were small and marginal; their beliefs were expected to
    fade away as their children studied biology and other sciences in
    school. The various romantic reactions in literature and in such areas as
    the various arts and crafts movements, organic agriculture or homeopathy
    were likewise considered to be minor and relatively harmless. The
    literature professors who railed against science and materialism had
    ways of life not all that different from their colleagues in the sciences.

    More violent reactions to science and reason such as the Nazis were
    explained as reactions by those who had been harmed by the transition to
    modernity and signaled a dying gasp and not an indicator of anything to
    follow. In any case, this reaction had been permanently laid to rest in May
    1945. In the emerging post-colonial world, students were flocking to Europe and North
    America for education, and newly minted countries were establishing
    Universities with science, technology and engineering programs modeled
    on those of their former colonial masters. Contrary to post-modernist
    and other critics, few of us believed that Western Culture was a universal
    model for all to follow without question, but many of us believed
    that science and techno-engineering understandings transcended cultural
    boundaries and created a global discourse and mechanisms for advancing the
    human endeavor.

    Six decades after World War II, now into the 21st century, the area of
    basic human understanding of the world around us has greatly expanded and
    yet the enlightenment vision seems farther away than ever in my
    lifetime. The extent and horizons of modern knowledge are beyond the
    comprehension of earlier generations. And this knowledge and understanding
    is far more than merely being “theories” in the pejorative misuse of the
    term theory. Modern knowledge has pragmatically proved itself in helping us
    to live much longer, healthier lives and enjoy amenities undreamed of by
    our progenitors.

    It has to be one of the great paradoxes of our time that as our knowledge has expanded in
    recent decades, the opposition to it has become more assertive
    and politically potent. One of the crowning ironies of the anti-science
    brigades is that groups that are largely contemptuous of each other often
    frame their anti-science rhetoric in essentially the same terms. My
    colleagues in the Humanities cluck piously about those ignorant rednecks
    who oppose Darwin and promote ‘‘intelligent design,’’ yet they in their own way
    hold anti-science ideas no less absurd. One strains to find any difference, significant or minor,
    between the argument of intelligent design that there is in life an
    “irreducible complexity” and the post-modernist critique of modern science
    as being “reductionist” and not “holistic.” To both in their particular
    crusades, the species barrier is immutable, or at least should be.

    Clearly there must be considerable frustration among scientists as
    organized groups oppose various forms of science education or scientific
    research. One recent article included in its title “why scientists are
    angry” and spoke about the anger that grips scientists when demonstrably
    false statements are paraded as facts and influence public policy.
    As an economist with a layman’s knowledge of the natural sciences, I
    understand these frustrations. I am a member of various newsgroups involved
    in agricultural biotechnology, most of whose contributors are in the
    sciences. This piece was inspired by a recent extended discussion on the
    difficulty of combating absurd phobias about transgenic food crops that
    anti-biotechnology activists have so carefully disseminated.
    (Unfortunately, other writing commitments prevented me from being other
    than a passive participant at the time.) Each time one scare is seemingly
    laid to rest, another rises, as one scientist described it, like a hare
    from nowhere. Even those fears that are massively refuted never die, but
    seem to be in some Sargasso Sea of cyber space awaiting a new current to
    set them afloat again as part of the litany of
    horrors of genetic modification of plants.

    There were discussions about being proactive, but the question becomes how
    can one be proactive against opponents who may be ignorant of science but
    who lack nothing in imagination and talent for fear-mongering? On a
    typical day, a scientist awakens and is concerned with ongoing research . An activist wakes up thinking
    about what the next campaign should be or whom they should
    they contact in the local media and whose friendship they should cultivate. Some even have
    focus groups to help them select the scare terms
    that would be most effective. Like the multi-national corporations that
    they attack, some of the activist groups begin promoting one cause,
    then morph into all-purpose NGOs with a diverse
    agenda of causes with which to garner publicity and raise money.
    An anti-science agenda links the dangers of
    biotechnology to the evils of multi-national corporations along with destruction
    of the environment and cultural and biological diversity; all turn into
    lucrative sources for fund raising and membership recruitment.

    It is difficult to be proactive when you are dealing with carefully
    calculated rational irrationality.
    When one is confronting claims of transgenic bacteria that could destroy
    all life on earth or similar unscientific nonsense, one is responding to a
    kind of irrationality that is impossible to predict and therefore to be prepared to respond to in
    advance, let alone educate the public on the subject. However irrational various anti-science proclamations may be,
    their advocates are supremely rational in the sense of being very skilled
    at crafting their propaganda so as to win public support and influence
    policy. Some groups are so good at driving public opinion to support
    their anti-science agenda, some of us wonder whether their leaders may
    be dealing from the bottom of the deck to their own members as well as to
    the public.

    The media may often put an obvious pejorative like “Franken food” in quotation marks, but
    too often the media routinely accept the terminology of the activists,
    even though the habit introduces biases which violate professional journalistic
    standards. Pollen drift from transgenic plants is almost always referred to, tendentiously,
    as “contamination” even though there is no evidence of harm. Similarly,
    “organic” agriculture is described as “sustainable” and “earth-friendly”
    while their food crops are said to be better tasting, fresher and healthier,
    without a shred of evidence for any such claims. In Houston, the food
    writers for the main paper have become unwitting propagandists for
    “organic” agriculture, as has happened in many other large and small
    circulation newspapers.

    The 24 hour news cycle has led to a reverse feeding frenzy, with activist
    groups all too ready to conjure up a scandal, inflating a
    statistically insignificant variation in a clinical study to a threat to
    the human endeavor or even to the planet, and to label a defense as
    part of a corporate cover-up. Scientists attempt to respond to these scare
    stories on a case by case basis, trying to explain the nature of
    the scientific inquiry involved and the way it is used to interpret
    experimental results. That is how scientists work, and the only way to wear down the opposition to
    scientific reasoning.

    Countering falsehoods with facts is a necessary condition to promote better
    understanding of issues involving science, but unfortunately, it is not a
    sufficient condition. Scientists
    present their evidence with appropriate qualifications, and with recognition that
    there are no absolute truths. The anti-science ideologues have no problem
    with absolutes and certainties. The scientists’ answer to the often asked rhetorical question
    – can you guarantee that no harm will ever come from transgenic crops – is
    obviously no. The activist now moves in for the kill, making
    it difficult for a scientist to explain that one cannot give such a
    guarantee for any phenomenon. There is a blatant but unstated falsehood in
    the rhetorical question, in that it implies that there are alternative
    actions that carry a zero risk on into the indefinite future. That
    transgenic plant breeding may possibly be the most precise, predictable
    form of plant breeding yet devised by humans is simply lost in the rhetoric of fear.

    A further problem is that editors and other news professionals are rarely
    educated in science and have little understanding of the scientific method.
    My experience has been that newspapers hate to make substantive
    corrections to a major story. One case involved a major story of two
    columns with picture on the front page of the
    Sunday edition and over one full page inside. In this case (in which I was
    involved), a group of scientists wrote in and pointed out some of the
    many errors in the story. Even though the writer had traveled to Mexico
    to do a story on transgenic maize in the company of anti-biotechnology
    activists, the newspaper’s ombudsman defended the objectivity of her
    reporting. Not only were there errors in the story, but the institutions and
    individuals that were not interviewed, as well as those that were, made it
    clear that the activists were more than just good traveling companions. In
    an extended exchange with the ombudsman, it was admitted that the author
    did not even know of the existence of the world’s leading experts and the
    research and development institutions on maize and on the issues raised in
    the story that were available in Mexico and Texas
    to be interviewed. I have compared it to going to Rome to do story on a
    controversy in Roman Catholicism and not knowing about either the Pope or
    the Vatican.

    Had the writer traveled to Mexico in the company of employees of a
    biotechnology firm, we would never have heard the end of it and anything
    written would have been dismissed simply on this basis alone without the
    necessity of any factual refutation. A widely shared characteristic of
    anti-science groups across the political spectrum is a Manichaean view of
    the complete corruption of those they oppose, and the purity of their own cause.

    In many respects the problem is more complicated and therefore more
    difficult for scientists to address. It is becoming increasingly obvious
    that no matter how clear and meticulous in fact and scientific reason one
    may be in presenting a scientific theory or refuting pseudo-scientific
    falsehoods, a large portion of the public is simply not receptive.
    The question is why and what can be done about it? The why is easier to
    address than is what can be done about it.

    The very human curiosity that leads to scientific inquiry makes us
    creatures who wish to have answers and make use of these answers to
    navigate the world around us. I have often quoted, from John Dewey’s The
    Quest for Certainty (Dewey, 1929, p. 3):

    Man who lives in a world of hazards is compelled to seek for
    security. He has sought to attain it in two ways. One of them began with
    an attempt to propitiate the powers which environ him and determine his
    destiny. … The other course is to invent arts and by their means turn the
    powers of nature to account; man constructs a fortress out of the very
    conditions and forces which threaten him. … This is the method of
    changing the world through action, as the other is the method of changing
    the self in emotion and ideas.

    In many ways myth and science are two sides of the same coin as attempts to
    explain the world around us. It is thus understandable that some of us have
    believed that, as the realm of what could be understood is expanded, the
    realm of myth would give way and contract. What we failed to realize is
    that we essentially inherit the myths: we grow up with
    them as a part of our everyday culture, so it requires little effort in
    subscribing to them. Much basic science
    has become a part of this package, so people have no problem in believing in
    many cause and effect relationships. What takes effort is to learn
    of the larger dimensions of science that have been progressively displacing
    myth or simply superseding a lack of knowledge in a number of areas. It is
    far easier to cling to inherited ways of thought then it is to engage in a
    process of learning new things.

    Though many seek to cling to the old beliefs in a pure form, science and
    technology have transformed our world in ways that are too obvious to be
    totally ignored. There are a variety of pseudo-science beliefs that are an
    extension of traditional mythology and purport to be compatible with
    modern science, or better still, they purport to be science in a purer and less
    corrupted form. On this view intelligent design is better science than what is
    being offered by biologists, whose views are distorted by their secular
    ideologies. On the other side of the spectrum, beliefs in a natural harmony
    that is violated by biotechnology is superior science to that of scientists
    who have been bought off by large corporations (whether or not they have ever
    received any funding from them). Any argument that the conflict over the
    teaching of evolution or genetic modification is one of science vs.
    anti-science is vehemently rejected.

    The ease of mastering the rhetoric of contemporary pseudo-science is part of its appeal. “Training sessions” in which the
    pseudo-science vocabulary can be learned have become part of the activists’
    agenda. The appeal of these beliefs, in addition to their flowing
    seamlessly from what one has already learned, is that a few simple beliefs
    seemingly can explain everything – which to a scientist means that they
    in fact explain nothing.

    The world of contemporary knowledge is so vast that it is beyond the
    comprehension of any individual to master even the smallest part of it. It
    is far easier to accept an all encompassing pseudo-scientific formula. This
    worries those of us who wish to create a world where
    questions of fact are explored and resolved, at least provisionally, by
    science and reason. This does not preclude differing moral and ethical
    considerations, but it does mean that morals and ethics can not be based on
    factual claims that are demonstrably false. An anti-biotechnology
    referendum that was passed in a California county, defined DNA as a complex
    protein found in every cell of the body. This egregious error in basic
    biology seriously undermines the credibility of its proponents – except in the eyes
    of the believers.

    The fact is that we can navigate the world intelligently without the need
    for myths and pseudo-science. The immensity of knowledge may in some
    respects be a problem for each of us, but in more important respects, the way
    in which this knowledge was created provides us
    with a roadmap. Just because I am in a newsgroup in
    which scientists exchange ideas, explain issues and counter the errors of
    the anti-scientists, does not mean that I as an economist, have anything
    more than a superficial understanding of their explanations. What
    reinforces my acceptance of what is said is my trust in the scientific
    method, peer review, and the larger body of scientific practices. Part of my
    trust is simply that these methods are an integral part of my own work as
    an economist. It is what allows me to select between competing ideas and
    navigate my way through the world. And it is the success of this method in
    transforming our lives for the better that it gives it a moral and ethical
    dimension.

    In my judgment, the scientific method and the democratic ideal are integral
    to one another. Both scientific inquiry and democracy are self-correcting methods,
    one is correction by ongoing inquiry in which prior beliefs no longer stand
    the test of experimental inquiry and new more verifiable propositions
    supersede them. Democracies can correct this election’s errors in the next
    election or the one after that; both are a work-in-progress.

    Being self-correcting is an implicit recognition of possibly being wrong.
    Whatever the possibility of being wrong may be, the very self-correcting
    aspect of the process is one more factor that makes the outcomes of science
    or democracy more likely to be right today than any other way, and even
    more likely to be right tomorrow than any other form of inquiry. To
    paraphrase Winston Churchill, democracy is the worst form of government
    except for all others. Given the possibility of error, both science and the
    democratic ideal reject absolutism of all sorts, including those that
    entitle one to trample on the rights of others such as destroying a field
    of transgenic crops in the name of saving the planet. Tolerance is a key idea.

    In science, there is or should be a continued re-examination of the
    validity of the method as it is practiced. In recent days there have been articles in prestigious journals concerning the way in
    which biases are creeping into scientific research such as clinical tests
    for pharmaceuticals, and suggestions for ways of overcoming them. The
    activists will point to these studies, not as a strength of scientific
    inquiry, but as evidence of its corruption. However, when is the last time
    that any of the groups pushing a pseudo-science agenda stopped to question
    the validity of their beliefs or whether their actions were helping or
    harming humankind? A thriving democracy should always be involved in
    internal debate concerning its ideals and practices. Both science and
    democracy require freedom of thought and freedom of exchange of ideas for
    their effective functioning. Participating actively and intelligently in a
    democracy provides the same barriers as being knowledgeable about science;
    it takes concerted effort and is far more complicated than simply following
    the dictates of a peerless leader or a totalizing ideology. The widespread
    acceptance of the basic principles of democracy means that like science,
    many more claim to be adhering to it than is the case in practice.

    Evidence-based knowledge derived from experimental scientific inquiry
    allows policy formation on every level from the personal to the public, to
    be dynamic and respond to changing circumstances. Ideologically driven
    policy is almost by definition binding and static, capable of
    obstruction but not progress. John Dewey spoke about a “warranted
    assertion.” However ignorant each of us may be about other areas of
    science, technology, and engineering, we can each accept their findings as
    being both provisional as all knowledge is, and at the same time to be
    warranted assertions as a basis for action until better ideas come along.
    In other words, instead of the blind faith of believers, we can
    simultaneously have trust and still retain a measure of reservation and
    skepticism. This requires that all inquiry be kept open and that vigorous
    dissent be encouraged.

    It has often been noted that the critics of genetically modified food crops,
    who frame their opposition both as pseudo-science and as opposition to
    corporate dominance of agriculture, have had a perverse impact on the
    industry exactly opposite to what they claim to be their intent. By
    attacking the science of transgenic modification, they make it difficult to
    get the kind of public research funding for it that would give farmers public and private sources for the kinds of crop improvement that biotechnology makes possible. Not only do the protests reduce public research funding for agricultural biotechnology, but the
    cumbersome, expensive regulations that frightened politicians are
    imposing make it virtually impossible for small firms to afford them, which
    then leads to the kind of industry concentration that the critics claim to
    be fighting.

    The “precautionary principle” and other alleged safety concerns that have
    been driving up the cost of getting new crops marketed, have also had other
    perverse impacts. As I argued above, our trust in the scientific inquiry
    that provides us with the evidence for the most warranted actions,
    including considerations of safety, is predicated upon an open process,
    including dissenting views. In a kind of Gresham’s law of public attention
    span, bad criticism drives out good. Scientists are rightfully hesitant to
    voice criticism when it might identify them with anti-science activists.
    Further, there have been too many instances where research that
    raises a legitimate safety or environmental concern is seized and grossly
    distorted or publicized before a final analysis can be made. Scientists who
    seek to withold their findings until the research is completed, or who
    offer a more benign interpretation of their results than those of
    sensationalized media coverage, will have their integrity questioned and be
    charged with a cover-up.

    Technology Review had a recent set of postings where Stewart Brand suggested that critics not oppose nuclear power but embrace it and be involved as critics who want to see it done right rather than simply opposing it. Needless to say, his wise suggestion was less than
    enthusiastically accepted by those ideologically opposed to nuclear power.
    The major criticism against activist groups is that they are obstructing
    the introduction of new technology and new improved ways of doing things
    for human betterment and opposing the science that can continue this
    process. In my judgment, equally as deleterious, is their stifling of the
    critical component of the dynamics of scientific inquiry that appropriately
    restrains technophiles such as this author and makes the use of it safer,
    fairer and more intelligent and beneficial to the human endeavor.

    What has been happening is that scientists have been winning the battles
    but still managing to lose the war. The message here is that
    scientists have to operate at two levels, continually countering the
    pseudo-science of false fears and ideological driven beliefs, but at the
    same time working to bring about a fundamental
    transformation in the public’s understanding of the nature of scientific
    inquiry, and allowing scientists
    to operate within it.

    Scientists have to recognize that when they are countering a demonstrably
    false idea, they may well be entering a conflict with the total
    worldview of those who hold them. To the family in Kansas that rejects
    evolution, the biology teacher at the local school is doing far more than
    merely teaching science. The science teacher is in effect entering their
    home and family and undercutting beliefs upon which their family and sense
    of community is based. Is it any wonder that they feel like
    victims? To many activists, the plant bio-technologist is contaminating and
    polluting the planet as part of a corporate plot to dominate the global
    economy. Is it any wonder that they also feel like victims?
    To the absolutist mindset, breeching a principle is the same as abandoning
    it, and therefore any concession to differing views amounts to total
    surrender. This helps to explain why many disillusioned ex-communists became radical conservatives, why activists’ opposition
    to transgenic food crops is total, and why the scientific
    research use of embryonic stem cells is defined as taking a human life.

    As the new millennium was approaching, there were many candidates for the greatest achievement of the past 1,000 years; one
    such candidate was the development of the scientific
    method. That candidate has my vote. If we work
    at it, one of the greatest achievements of this new millennium
    could be the continued refinement of the scientific method, its
    integration into the beliefs and practices of everyday life for the greater
    part of humankind, and the continuous improvement in the quality of life of
    earth’s inhabitants that could be realized as a result.

    REFERENCE

    Dewey, John. 1929. The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of
    Knowledge and Action.
    1980 reprint, New York: Capricorn Books, G.P. Putnam
    & Sons.

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