Hysterical vigilantes against assertive women who wish to maintain their self-identity in public spaces.
Author: Ophelia Benson
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Ivory-bill Sightings Reported in Florida
No photos, but repeated sightings, suggestive physical evidence.
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Scott McLemee on Lawrence Levine
He looked at the diversity of cultural traditions making up American life.
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Man Sentenced to Prison for FGM of Daughter
Khalid Adem found guilty of aggravated battery and cruelty to children by a Georgia court.
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Swinburne Recycled
We’ve been having this lively discussion of Swinburne on suffering, so I thought I’d temporarily re-post this old comment from last June.
Richard Swinburne is interesting. I’ve said so before. So has Mark Fournier at Tachyphrenia. And now it’s time to say it some more. Because the things Swinburne says here are truly revolting, and yet they are, of course, what you get if you try to reconcile the omnipotent omnibenevolent God with the existence and abundance of suffering in the world – just what Darwin couldn’t manage to reconcile himself to. There’s an irony of sorts in the fact that it’s Swinburne’s view that is considered by many – by surprisingly many – to be the ‘devout’ and ‘holy’ and therefore (why? why therefore?) ‘good’ one, and Darwin’s that is considered the impious and wicked one. The approval of the deliberate causing and continuance of pain and suffering to billions of sentient beings is considered good, and the disapproval and rejection of that is considered wicked. That’s interesting, and it is, if you ask me, a sign of something badly corrupt at the heart of the whole swindle.
Theodicy provides good explanations of why God sometimes — for some or all of the short period of our earthly lives — allows us to suffer pain and disability.
Good? Good explanations? Good in what sense?
Although intrinsically bad states, these difficult times often serve good purposes for the sufferers and for others. My suffering provides me with the opportunity to show courage and patience. It provides you with the opportunity to show sympathy and to help alleviate my suffering. And it provides society with the opportunity to choose whether or not to invest a lot of money in trying to find a cure for this or that particular kind of suffering.
Well why stop there? It also provides pharmaceutical companies with the opportunity to develop pain medications, and nurses with the opportunity to apologize for the fact that the pain can’t be alleviated, and vicars and priests with the opportunity to pray that it will be alleviated, and God with the opportunity to refuse to alleviate it, and the funeral people with the opportunity to dispose of the corpse after the victim has committed suicide. Lots and lots of opportunities. Good. So – we should all act accordingly? We should all rush outside with our carving knives and soldering irons and distribute injuries generously around the neighborhood so that there will be further abundance of such opportunities? Suffering is a good thing because it creates these good opportunities so there should be lots more of it so we should all bend every nerve to create more of it?
No. We don’t actually think that’s the case. So why does Swinburne get to claim that it is the case, and that that’s a ‘good’ explanation? Why doesn’t everybody for miles around just tell him ‘That’s disgusting’ until he’s so embarrassed he stops saying it?
That’s a real question. I find it baffling.
Although a good God regrets our suffering, his greatest concern is surely that each of us shall show patience, sympathy and generosity and, thereby, form a holy character. Some people badly need to be ill for their own sake, and some people badly need to be ill to provide important choices for others. Only in that way can some people be encouraged to make serious choices about the sort of person they are to be. For other people, illness is not so valuable.
Oh, godalmighty. That is such crap, and such transparent crap – so carefully arranged to get the conclusion he wants (God is okay really even though it seems to be an awful shit) with that last little escape hatch – for other people, illness not so useful. Give me a break. Swinburne looks at the world: sees that some people get ill and suffer, others don’t; needs to make this harmonize with ‘a good God’; explains that suffering is good for some people and not for others; job done.
An analogy will show that what I have written is not an ad hoc hypothesis postulated to save theism from disconfirmation.
Hahahahahahahahahahahahahaha. Oh, that’s a good one. He’s not only interesting, he’s also a comedian. A sadistic comedian, but a comedian.
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US, Vatican Impede Sexual Health Goals
Religious zealots prefer STDs and unwanted pregnancies to birth control.
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Danny Postel and Nader Hashemi on Max Boot
Iranian dissidents want the support of human rights groups, intellectuals, NGOs, not of foreign powers.
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Turkish Archaeologist Acquitted
Charges were brought against her by a Turkish lawyer who took offence at her 2005 book.
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Michael Collins on Sen’s Identity and Violence
Fluid and evolving nature of identities, and differences within cultural groupings, are obscured.
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John Gray on Michael Burleigh on Secularism
Much of the book is a laboured defence of the Vatican against charges of complicity with Nazism.
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Odious beliefs
Oh yes – this sounds familiar.
Richard Dawkins once took part in a debate with the distinguished theologian and philosopher Richard Swinburne. The Holocaust, Swinburne suggested, had a positive element because it gave Jews an opportunity to be noble and courageous. Swinburne’s ‘grotesque piece of reasoning’, Dawkins writes in his new book, is ‘damningly typical of the theological mind’, and an attitude that reveals not just the redundancy of religion but also its immorality.
We’ve had a look at Swinburne’s grotesque reasoning before, more than once. Stuff like that gives philosophy of religion a bad name, I should think. David Attenborough is a useful counter to that kind of thing.
People sometimes say to me, “Why don’t you admit that the humming bird, the butterfly, the bird of Paradise are proof of the wonderful things produced by Creation?” And I always say, well, when you say that, you’ve also got to think of a little boy sitting on a river bank, like here, in West Africa, that’s got a little worm, a living organism, in his eye and boring through the eyeball and is slowly turning him blind. The Creator God that you believe in, presumably, also made that little worm.
It’s the devil’s chaplain. Darwin to Hooker: ‘What a book a Devil’s Chaplain might write on the clumsy, wasteful, blundering low & horridly cruel works of Nature!’
Kenan disagrees with Dawkins about religion as abusive to children though. But I in turn disagree with Kenan.
Parents indoctrinate their children with all manner of odious beliefs. That is the nature of parenting. And the nature of growing up is that young people decide for themselves, often rejecting the views of their parents. Dawkins’s argument seems to reveal less about the nature of religion than about his own pessimistic view of the human capacity for change and independent thought.
Well, no, not all parents, not necessarily, and to the extent that they do, that’s not desirable. One could make a similar sort of generalizing reply – parents beat their children, parents abuse their children, parents deny their children education, parents neglect their children. Some do, but when they do the state sometimes intervenes, and that’s a good thing. That’s not to say the state ought to intervene when parents pass on their odious beliefs, it’s just to say that it’s not necessarily desirable or okay or tolerable simply because it happens. Some children reject the views of their parents, but some don’t; the world is full of people who have odious beliefs, and the rest of us have to live with them. That’s not to say we should all zoom around indoctrinating one another and creeping into one another’s basement windows in order to murmur into the ears of one another’s children – it’s just to say the problem is not so easily dismissed.
Kenan’s amusing though.
Dawkins steamrollers over such complexities. The result, ironically, is that he ends up sounding as naive and unworldly as any happy clappy believer. ‘Imagine with John Lennon a world with no religion,’ he writes.
Hmmm I think I’ll start smaller. A world with no SUVs. That will do for a beginning.
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Cosmic variance
What I keep saying! But Sean Carrol says it a lot better in a review of Eagleton’s review of Dawkins.
Okay, very good. God, in this conception, is not some thing out there in the world (or even outside the world), available to be poked and prodded and have his beard tugged upon…The previous excerpt, which defined God as “the condition of possibility,” seemed to be warning against the dangers of anthropomorphizing the deity, ascribing to it features that we would normally associate with conscious individual beings such as ourselves…But – inevitably – Eagleton does go ahead and burden this innocent-seeming concept with all sorts of anthropomorphic baggage. God created the universe “out of love,” is capable of “regret,” and “is an artist.” That’s crazy talk. What could it possibly mean to say that “The condition of possibility is an artist, capable of regret”? Nothing at all…And once you start attributing to God the possibility of being interested in some way about the world and the people in it, you open the door to all of the nonsensical rules and regulations governing real human behavior that tend to accompany any particular manifestation of religious belief, from criminalizing abortion to hiding women’s faces to closing down the liquor stores on Sunday.
This is (she enunciated with quiet intensity) what I keep saying. You can’t do both.
The problematic nature of this transition – from God as ineffable, essentially static and completely harmless abstract concept, to God as a kind of being that, in some sense that is perpetually up for grabs, cares about us down here on Earth – is not just a minor bump in the otherwise smooth road to a fully plausible conception of the divine. It is the profound unsolvable dilemma of “sophisticated theology.” It’s a millenia-old problem, inherited from the very earliest attempts to reconcile two fundamentally distinct notions of monotheism: the Unmoved Mover of ancient Greek philosophy, and the personal/tribal God of Biblical Judaism. Attempts to fit this square peg into a manifestly round hole lead us smack into all of the classical theological dilemmas: “Can God microwave a burrito so hot that He Himself cannot eat it?” The reason why problems such as this are so vexing is not because our limited human capacities fail to measure up when confronted with the divine; it’s because they are legitimately unanswerable questions, arising from a set of mutually inconsistent assumptions.
That’s exactly it. Takes a cosmologist to say it so clearly. It’s not just a minor bump, it’s a deal-breaker. So Eagleton’s blithe one minute having God be ineffable and not like Gore or an octopus or his foot and the next minute having it be all kinds of specific and particular and just so and not otherwise – won’t work, and makes him look silly. Pick one and stick to it, but don’t pretend it can be both.
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Let’s start with vocabulary
A very interesting discussion last week at the Valve. Similar to many discussions we have, but also different, on account of different people conducting it. It’s about Dawkins and what the Valve poster, Bill Benzon, finds ‘bothersome’ about him. He puts it this way:
As far as I can tell, my target is a certain kind of discourse, a kind which Dawkins exemplifies particularly well, but others participate in it as well. And what bothers me about this discourse is not that it is against religious belief, but that it is against the religious as well.
That’s not as clear as it might be, but I think what he’s saying is, people who are sharply critical of religious belief are ‘against’ (attacking, hostile to, unfair to, aggressive toward, offensive to, unkind to) religious believers themselves. In other words it’s yet another voice swelling the already deafening chorus saying ‘shut up about religion because it is offensive to be critical about it because it’s not possible to be critical about it without attacking the people who believe in it.’ It’s saying that it’s not morally respectable to discuss religion in frank terms because there is no way to do that without insulting – without ‘being against’ – religious believers. I dislike that chorus, for several reasons, which I’ve referred to now and then: among them are the fact that that doesn’t apply to other beliefs, and the fact that it simply adds to the already very heavy social pressure to be extra extra extra-special kind about religion.
Most commenters, I’m happy to say, share my dislike, and do an excellent job of arguing. A biggish chunk of the morning flew away while I read the comments; I recommend them. John Horgan – the ‘end of science’ guy – drops in; so does PZ; so do other interesting people. Dan Green (a Valve author who is also a B&W author) notes:
It’s puzzling to me that otherwise smart, non-mystical people like Bill Benzon, Jonathan Derbyshire, and, indeed, Thomas Nagel have come down so hard on Dawkins’s book and its “deperate arrogance.” It suggests that atheism is still far from acceptable even in “intellectual” circles.
Just so; and that’s why this kind of thing is annoying and depressing. There shouldn’t be all this pressure to closet the atheism even in ‘intellectual’ circles. It shouldn’t be a consensus. It’s a consensus even among people who claim not to like consensus. Very odd.
Muriel Gray at the Herald is not silenced.
…a nutcase Britain utterly obsessed with religion. People were threatening Jack Straw with violence; some woman (we think – for all we know it could have been Paul Gascoigne under that niquab) was claiming her right to mumble lessons at children while wearing a bag over her head, and the pope had made the hilariously Monty-Python esque declaration that he was “considering” abolishing limbo for unbaptised babies, no doubt making intelligent Catholics squirm with embarrassment at the screaming silliness of heavenly admission by human whim.
Yes, but also giving me something to write a teasing N&C about. It’s an ill wind, etc.
Let’s start with vocabulary. Let’s stop describing these tax-funded establishments as faith schools. They are superstition schools, for that is what they teach. Alongside hard facts, innocent children are hoodwinked into accepting as real the mythology of virgin births, gods who regard women with bare heads as wicked harlots, that Noah’s Ark was real and that Darwin was wrong. It’s clear that, given the rising tide of superstition sweeping our country, no politician will help end this state-funded child abuse, and so it is time to try and fight back.
But be sure to do it without being, or appearing to be, ‘against the religious.’ Thass forbidden.
Once we got our schools and started churning out multiracial youngsters free from any kind of manipulation, save that of being taught to question everything, we could start our political lobbying. Why should religious concerns be put above ours? Why shouldn’t we have the right to be appeased when we are offended by religion, the way the religious whine like toddlers when someone shakes a stick at their myths? Why shouldn’t we be consulted and treated with respect as a community? Why are the sincerely held beliefs I’ve outlined inferior to those of a Christian, Jew or a Muslim?
Why indeed. I would very much like to know.
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Atheists’ ‘Nauseous Undertone of Racial Superiority’
White people are atheists, non-white people are theists, therefore atheists are as bad as Cecil Rhodes.
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Faith, Hope, and Selective Schools
Amendment will give greater freedom to discriminate on grounds of religion in hiring staff and teachers.
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Nick Cohen Reviews Debating Humanism
The politically literate will notice that this collection of essays comes from the RCP.
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Elephant Recognises Herself in Mirror
Showing self-awareness seen before only in humans, great apes and bottlenose dolphins.
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Terry Glavin on Salah Uddin Shoaib Choudhury
The phony charges against him were revived by a notorious Islamist judge; his trial is next month.
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Freud’s Perjuries as ‘Spots on the Sun’
The following is a condensed extract from an essay titled “Are Freud’s Critics Scurrilous?”, translated and published in Le livre noir de la psychoanalyse (Editions des Arènes).
Sigmund Freud may have been a great man but he was not an honourable one. Freud’s claims to greatness rest on his imaginative and expressive powers; his dishonour arises from his leadership of a movement in whose interests he perjured himself repeatedly.
The most striking fact about responses to documentation of Freud’s perjuries is how often they take the form not of denial but of extenuation.‘ONCE UPON A TIME THERE WAS A GIRL CALLED ANNA O.’
Here is one example of how this is done. Freud repeatedly put forward as a demonstration of the therapeutic power of psychoanalysis, even at its most primitive, the case of a patient, Anna O, although he knew she had to be confined to a sanatorium in spite of the ‘talking cure’.
What kind of response has this disconcerting revelation, that Freud’s repeated allusions to Anna O.’s cure were false, met?
This is how Elisabeth Roudinesco reconciles the historic facts with the Freudian falsehood in her history of the psychoanalytic movement. The false story of Anna O’s cure ‘…bears witness to an historical reality to which we cannot oppose the simplistic argument of a reality of facts…’ She argues that we must not confuse the construction of a fable with an intentional lie.
A stratagem analogous to Roudinesco’s has been imputed to the classicist Paul Verne who apparently argued on behalf of Holocaust deniers that ‘the denial of the reality of Auschwitz is not ‘a falsehood but a mythical truth’ Would Elisabeth Roudinesco have come to the rescue of holocaust deniers with her opaque distinction between a ‘historical reality’ and ‘a reality of facts’?
There are those who dismiss the demonstration of Freud’s numerous perjuries not because they doubt them but because they feel that they do not settle the issue of the esteem in which Freud ought to be held. The foremost British Stalinist of his day said, when compelled by Khrushchev’s revelations to concede the truth of Stalin’s crimes, they were no more than ‘spots on sun.’ This can easily be adapted to serve the needs of Freudian apologetic. If, as Eissler maintains, psychoanalysis is capable of effecting ‘the liberation of the west from the guilty feelings that are caused by the two Testaments.’, Freud’s various malfeasances can equally be viewed as no more than ‘spots on the sun’.
DEFENCES OF FREUD’S MENDACITY: LYING FOR TRUTH
There are those who concede Freud’s mendacity but excuse it on the grounds that though the evidence was fabricated the claims advanced were true. This rationale is not without precedent. There is a story that an American historian was so certain that Speer was lying when he denied knowledge of the final solution that he altered the minutes of a meeting at which it was discussed to make it appear that Himmler directly addressed Speer on the topic. An analogous mode of extenuation is implicit in the justification advanced of Freud’s mendacity by a Canadian philosopher of science, Ian Hacking. In his book Rewriting the Soul, Hacking writes, ‘Freud had a passionate commitment to Truth, deep underlying truth, as a value. That ideological commitment is fully compatible with – may even demand -lying through one’s teeth.’
There are also those who retreat to a different mode of truth. An English novelist convinced that the primal scene in Freud’s case history of the wolf man never happened argued that it nevertheless possessed ‘a different, deeper kind of truth.’ There are still others: those who appear willing to dispense with truth altogether in view of the moral grandeur of the Freudian vision. This too has its analogies in the history of Soviet apologetic. André Malraux once argued ‘Just as the inquisition does not detract from the fundamental dignity of Christianity so the Moscow Trials do not detract from the fundamental dignity of communism.’ It is my impression that no sooner has it been made impossible for Freudians to maintain that Freud’s discoveries are true in the sense in which they were advanced and taken, than they will discover that they possess a ‘a fundamental dignity’.
INADEQUATE RESPONSES TO DEMONSTRATIONS OF TENDENTIOUSNESS
It has been objected to Fred Crews that he finds Freudians ‘who take issue with him not just wrong but furtive or glib…’ What grounds are there for thinking Crews’s judgement harsh? What does it take to show that Freud’s partisans are ‘not just wrong but furtive or glib’? Crews’s charge of glibness has often been made against psychoanalysts by other psychoanalysts. In 1952 Edward Glover, a prominent figure in the British Psychoanalytic Society, described ‘a typical sequence’: ‘An analyst of established prestige and seniority, produces a paper advancing some new point of view or alleged discovery in the theoretical or clinical field…the chances are that without any check, this view or alleged discovery will gain currency, will be quoted and re-quoted until it attains the status of an accepted conclusion.’ The question Glover fails to address is how these merely ‘alleged discoveries’ are to be distinguished from the genuine ones Glover believed himself to be in possession of. Over a decade later the analyst Roy Grinker spoke of the ‘worn-out hackneyed reiterations and reformulations of Freudian literature and the stultifying stereotypes stated as positive facts’, once again posing the same unresolved question of how the distinction is to be made. In the 1980s still another analyst, Marshall Edelson, conceded that ‘rival claims… are frequently….presented and re-presented, as if the mere statement of them in more and more powerful rhetorical terms would settle the matter; or they are settled and resolved locally by a socio-political rather than by a scientific process.’ Edelson did not say how these socio-political claims were to be identified and distinguished from the rest.
Why did the implications of persistent and intractable divergence between analysts not sink in? Some will feel that there is nevertheless too large a step between the failure of apologists to deal adequately with the indisputable fact of persistent and intractable disagreement, and the inference that we are not dealing with rational conviction but with an infatuation of abnormal intensity.
Here are some examples of the distinctive affective relation in which Freudians often stood to their convictions. In his autobiography Wilhelm Stekel describes himself as ‘the apostle of Freud who was my Christ’. The same soterological note is struck by Hans Sachs – a member of Freud’s inner circle – who says of The Interpretation of Dreams, ‘when I had finished the book I had found the one thing worthwhile for me to live for; many years later I discovered that it was the only thing I could live by.’
WHY OUR SUSPICIONS THAT FREUD’S APOLOGISTS ARE ‘GLIB’ AND ‘SLIPPERY’ CAN RARELY BE MORE THAN JUST SUSPICIONS
The suspicion that Freud’s apologists are guilty of bad faith is not one which is ordinarily capable of demonstration, but is analogous to that raised in connection with apologists for the enormities of Stalin’s Russia. At what point did their credulity become morally reprehensible? Though it may be difficult to know with respect to the legend of Freud’s truthfulness where the cut-off point should be drawn, there are cases where we can be fairly sure it had been passed.
And yet I think it fair to infer from the complacency with which several apologists have responded to documentation of Freud’s mendacity, that even if the traditional testimonials to Freud’s honesty and truthfulness eventually take their place with aberrations such as the plethora of tributes to the humanitarianism of Joseph Stalin, this will make no great difference to the esteem in which Freud is held. The exposure of Freud’s deceptions and prevarications will be assimilated but dismissed as little more than ‘spots on the sun’.
Frank Cioffi is the author of Freud and the Question of Pseudoscience.
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Christopher Shea on Reading Nafisi at Columbia
Some observers question the intellectual merit of the brand of literary criticism Dabashi practices.
