Plan being considered to split Scottish school into two, one Protestant one Catholic, has local people worried.
Author: Ophelia Benson
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Is Religion Adaptive?
Perhaps, or perhaps it’s a spandrel or a virus, instead, says biologist David Sloan Wilson.
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Gossip Displaces Ideas
Shallow misunderstandings of Arendt, Heidegger, Foucault and others by writers more interested in laundry-inspection than analysis of thought.
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Quantum Foolery
Here is a very silly essay from Slate. Note the rhetoric, for one thing, the talk of atheists ‘trumpeting’ their beliefs, and the truculent demand for an explanation, as if atheism required more explanation than theism does. Note the failure to define what is meant by ‘God’. Note the default assumption that belief is normal and that it’s unbelief that requires justification. Note the circularity of the argument that non-believers have some ‘splaining to do because Garry Wills doesn’t agree with them. And note the resort to the often-cited ‘cosmic deists’ such as Paul Davies. Holt doesn’t trouble to point out that Davies is very much in a minority among physicists in drawing deist conclusions from his work. And then there is the even more obligatory mention of quantum something (theory, here, but almost any abstract noun will do). A nice little exercise in mass market PoMo for the holidays, how festive.
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Competing Goods
Should conservation trump treaty rights, or the other way around?
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Confused about a Virgin?
Confused and unfounded guesswork. Crude and offensive speculation.
So says the RC Bishop of Portsmouth, the Right Reverend Crispian Hollis, about a BBC documentary focussing on the life of The Virgin Mary.
But, alas, the really not right at all, Mr Hollis, is not talking about the nonsense of the virgin birth, the resurrection, Angels, wise men and talking snakes, but rather the questioning of these things.
Confusion indeed.
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Fundamentalists and Flexibles
Rhetoric everywhere. You can’t let your guard down for an instant, no rest for the wicked, hypervigilance is the price of accuracy, and so on. Just tweak one or two little words and you can guide your readers so very subtly in what they’re meant to think, without having to come right out and tell them. This is a story from the Observer about genetics.
The nature versus nurture debate revived from the Sixties, when it had revolved around IQ and had bitter, racial overtones. This time around, it was less to do with race but no less bitter, with genetic fundamentalists such as Steven Pinker and Richard Dawkins arguing that ‘the answer lies in our genes’. Opponents, such as media psychologist Oliver James, defended more flexible accounts of human behaviour.
See how it’s done? Just call the people you disagree with ‘fundamentalists’ and the other people ‘flexible’. Simple really. Dawkins and Pinker are in fact not ‘fundamentalists’, they’re just orthodox, middle of the road Darwinians. And Oliver James’ refusal even to listen to genetic explanations (witness his one-man shouting match on Radio 4 in October) is not conspicuous for its flexibility. Ah well. It’s all grist for the rhetoric guide.
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Hallelujah We’re Postmodernists
Here is an interesting little item I turned up in my never-ending quest for material for Butterflies and Wheels. The author is a curator at the Smithsonian Institution, which is a somewhat staggering fact in light of this article. He is also the author of a highly unfavorable 1997 review of The Flight From Science and Reason in the American magazine Science, which provoked such outrage that the book editor of Science resigned. So we know what to expect, and we get it. Rhetoric, rhetoric, and more rhetoric, and a procession of outrageous assertions. I am tempted to quote and quote, but you can read the piece for yourselves. Perhaps just one or two…
…the more sophisticated paladins of transcendent science…recognize their want of ‘affirmative defenses’ of the quintessential truth of scientific facts and concepts, and for this very reason have limited themselves largely to ridiculing particular expositions and expositors of a heresy that they are unable generally to refute. When, rarely, they do come forth with an argument to demonstrate the innate superiority of the knowledge produced on their side of the chasm, it is invariably an appeal to the wondrousness of contemporary technology.
Needless to say, in turning away from that unconditioned “scientific truth” so prized by Clark Kerr’s Berkeley scientists, away from unconditioned truth generally, postmodernity ceases to regard Truth as a prime value. No longer is truthfulness expected anywhere in our culture, and its breach is regarded as excusable in any circumstance covered by a moral intent and guided by a sense of responsibility.
It’s funny, I don’t recall ever reading a scientist calling truth ‘transcendent’, or even capitalizing it; it seems to be only the critics who ever do either of those, as if sneering could do the work of argument. But maybe that’s yet another of the joys of our ‘step into postmodernity’.
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Simon Hoggart is Not Amused
What is the Observer doing running an astrology column, even though it is semi-jokey?
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Stories in Mind
There was an interesting article in the New York Times a few days ago about the way the human mind constructs explanations for everything, frequently out of whole cloth. Mood shifts that are caused by diurnal changes in hormone levels are explained as job stress and evening relaxation or alternatively as job interest and evening boredom. Whatever works. Stimulate a piece of the brain electrically to cause a laugh, and the laugher will find something amusing in the environment. Tell Freud a story, any story, and he’ll concoct a sexual etiology for it.
The article is written by a therapist who frankly admits that therapists “are, after all, hardly exempt from the need to create satisfying cause-and-effect story lines. Quite the contrary.” True enough, and the side effects of some of those stories have become well known in recent years. It is interesting to get an idea of how the confabulation process works, and refreshing to see a therapist admit to it.
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Economists Beginning to Learn: Humans Not Rational
The invisible hand is invisible, at least in part, because it is not there, says a winner of last year’s Nobel Prize in economics.
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Elephants Never Lie
Department of Amplification, as The New Yorker used to say. Allen Esterson takes issue with Jeffrey Masson in his new article on this site, so I thought I would recount a little dispute I once had with Masson at a book signing. The occasion was about three years ago, Masson was on tour with his new book that said dogs don’t lie about love, and a somewhat, shall we say, New Ageily-inclined friend of mine dragooned me into accompanying her. During the lecture phase of the signing, Masson was quite insistently dismissive of science and scientists. They were unimpressed with his ideas about animal emotions, they hung up the phone when he called, they were narrow-minded and prejudiced. So when he opened the reading up for questions, I asked one along these lines: ‘I have some doubts about all these sweeping attacks on science. Could it be that the scientists who don’t take your claims seriously actually have good reasons, having to do with evidence and so on, as opposed to just being narrow and prejudiced as you seem to be implying?’ He answered, ‘No. They were just being stupid and prejudiced.’ Later I asked another question: exactly how did he know that his dogs had the elaborate (human-like) emotions he was describing. He answered, ‘I look into their eyes.’ I have to admit I laughed a bit scornfully at that.
The depth of his insight into animal nature is perhaps revealed by an anecdote he told, admittedly by way of confessing his own naivete. He was once taken to an area where there was a herd of wild elephants (in Thailand or India I believe). He was so thrilled by their majesty that he walked up to one, talking to her in a respectful and admiring way. I used to be an elephant keeper in a zoo, and I could hardly believe what I was hearing. ‘So she turned and charged and tried to kill you,’ was my thought, ‘and you’re bloody lucky to be here telling us about it.’ Sure enough–she charged and tried to kill him, he ran like hell and found some tall grass to hide in, and the elephant got bored and wandered off. He did say it was foolish of him. But that insight did not appear to have taught him to take his other insights with becoming modesty. An interesting evening at the bookstore, one way and another.
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Her Left Foot
Oh honestly. Sometimes I want to exclaim with Lear’s Fool, ‘I had rather be any kind o’thing than a fool’. Only I would change ‘fool’ to ‘woman’. There are moments when it all just becomes too embarrassing. Such as when reading silly self-parodying nonsense in the Guardian. Who needs sexism or misogyny when women elbow each other aside to say fatuous things like that, eh?
One of the unnoticed casualties of late 20th-century feminism was that old enfeebled virtue: women’s intuition.
Oh really? Where is that exactly? Speaking of unnoticed. Has Bathurst not noticed that whole large branch of feminism which does indeed pride itself precisely on embracing dear old female ‘virtues’ like intuition and gut feelings and hunches and instinct and messages from the ‘heart’? If not, she hasn’t been paying attention. The sneering at science and statistics and logic is bang up to date, too, not the bold and paradoxical move Bathurst seems to take it to be. Perhaps her toe has misled her.
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Don Boffin’s Cod Twin Study
Statistics, nature v. nurture, ethical considerations, Luce Irigaray: it’s all there.
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Psychoanalytic Mythology
During the last decades of the twentieth century researchers showed that much
of the received history of psychoanalysis consisted of stories that were largely
mythological. Perhaps the most enduring of all these myths is that Freud postulated
his seduction theory as a result of hearing frequent reports from his female
patients that they had been sexually abused in childhood. In this article I
want to focus on this story, one that for most of the twentieth century was
taken as historical fact, and is still widely believed to be so.
According to the traditional account, in the 1890s most of Freud’s female patients
told him that they had been sexually abused in early childhood, usually by their
father. How the story continues depends on whether it is based on received history
or on the revised version embraced by many feminists and popularised by Jeffrey
Masson. In the orthodox version we are told that within a short time Freud came
to realise that many of the reports he was hearing were not authentic, that
the women were fantasizing, and that this led to his epoch-making discovery
of infantile incestuous fantasies. But according to the feminist account, it
was the staunch opposition of colleagues outraged by his claims of widespread
childhood sexual abuse that led Freud to abandon the theory. Previously a sympathetic
listener, Freud now betrayed the women who had had the courage to reveal their
terrible experiences of abuse.
Whichever version you choose to believe, both make dramatic stories, and each
has its strong adherents. The basic elements are the same, but the interpretation
of them is very different. I suspect that most people rely on their gut feeling
and opt for Masson and the suppression of the truth about the widespread sexual
abuse of girls at that time. But it’s time for a reality check.
The articles that Freud published in the 1890s, and his correspondence with
his confidant Wilhelm Fliess, tell a very different story. Putting it briefly,
Freud’s patients in the mid-1890s did not tell him that they had been
sexually abused in early childhood. In contrast to what he was to assert in
his later accounts, at the time he wrote that they assured him “emphatically
of their unbelief” in the preconceived infantile sexual traumas that he
insisted they had experienced.
The essential features of the episode can be outlined as follows. During the
early 1890s Freud had become convinced that repressed memories of sexual ideas
or experiences, not necessarily from childhood, lay at the root of the symptoms
of patients he had diagnosed as hysterics. Then in October 1895, on the basis
of a speculative notion, he alighted on a theory that he was convinced had solved
once and for all the problem of the causes of the psychoneuroses. Hysterical
symptoms were invariably caused by unconscious memories of sexual molestations
in infancy.
Using his newly developed analytic technique for uncovering unconscious ideas
in the minds of his patients, he immediately set about showing that he was right.
Although he had not previously reported any instances of his having uncovered
sexual abuse in infancy, within four months of announcing the new theory to
Fliess he completed two papers in which he claimed that with every one of thirteen
“hysterical” patients, plus some obsessionals, he had been able “trace
back” to infantile experiences of sexual abuse. A few months later he delivered
a lecture, “The Aetiology of Hysteria”, in which he gave a more detailed
exposition of his theory, claiming confirmation for eighteen patients diagnosed
as hysterics.How did he manage to access deeply repressed experiences of this nature with
all his patients in such a short time? Although he claimed that he had induced
patients to “reproduce” the infantile experiences (what he meant by
“reproductions” is open to a wide range of interpretations), it is
evident that he typically arrived at his clinical findings by the decoding of
symptoms, and the analytic interpretation of patients’ ideas produced under
the influence of the “pressure” procedure he was using at that time.
He explained that patients’ symptoms correspond to the “sensory content
of the infantile scenes” of sexual abuse that he had inferred to lie at
their root. His analytic procedure, he wrote, was analogous to that of forensic
physician who can arrive at the cause of an injury “even if he has to do
without any information from the injured person”.This is exemplified by the case of a patient who had a facial tic and eczema
around the mouth. On the basis of these symptoms Freud analytically inferred
that she had in infancy been forced to engage in fellatio. “I thrust the
explanation at her”, he told Fliess. And when she expressed her disbelief
he “threatened to send her away” if she persisted in her scepticism.
Of course for Freud a rejection of his inference was evidence of the patient’s
“resistance”, providing further confirmation that his analytic reconstruction
was valid.
For reasons impossible to deal with in a short space, within two years of announcing
publicly his solution to the aetiology of the neuroses Freud lost faith in it.
But instead of this leading him to question the reliability of his newly developed
technique for reconstructing unconscious memories, he sought to explain his
claimed findings as patients’ unconscious fantasies. This necessitated some
retrospective emendation of the original claims to make the new theory minimally
plausible. In fact the story went through a number of stages before finally
arriving at the familiar version in New Introductory Lectures in Psychoanalysis
(1933): “In the period in which the main interest was directed to discovering
infantile sexual traumas, almost all my women patients told me that they had
been seduced by their father.” (Incidentally, no one seemed to think it
odd that it was only in this short period that “almost all” his female
patients should have reported early childhood sexual abuse.)
It is important to appreciate that the traditional accounts give no idea that
the putative “fantasies” were unconscious ideas or memories
in the patients’ minds that Freud believed he had uncovered (i.e., reconstructed)
by his analytic technique of interpretation. (Freud’s use of the word Phantasie
is translated as ‘phantasy’ by James Strachey in the Hogarth Standard Edition,
but usually as ‘fantasy’ elsewhere in the literature, giving readers the misleading
impression that Freud was generally referring to conscious ideas that
patients reported to him.)
There are a considerable number of anomalies in Freud’s retrospective accounts
of the episode, too many to be dealt with here. One of these is that originally
he had claimed that the “infantile traumas” he had uncovered could
be described “without exception” as “grave sexual injuries”.
How putative ‘memories’ of experiences that he had described as “brutal”
and “absolutely appalling” could plausibly turn out to be unconscious
fantasies of “seduction” that had the purpose (according to his first
explanation) of “fending off” patients’ disturbing memories of infantile
masturbation, Freud made no attempt to explain. The same objection applies to
his later story that the putative “seduction fantasies” were projections
of patients’ Oedipal desires. In any case, he was in no position to know whether
his analytic reconstructions represented repressed memories of actual events,
or patients’ unconscious fantasies — or indeed, as was actually the case, imaginative
scenarios originating in his own mind.
A little known fact is that, in accord with his theoretical requirements, Freud
claimed in 1896 that for each of his six obsessional patients he had uncovered
repressed memories not only of passive infantile sexual abuse scenes, but also
of active sexual experiences at a slightly older age. Nothing was heard again
of these remarkable clinical ‘findings’, and Freud made no attempt to explain
how his later unconscious fantasy theory could possibly account for them.
The above arguments, of course, refute Jeffrey Masson’s version of events as
well as the received psychoanalytic story, though his case lacks cogency for
other reasons. He suggested in The Assault on Truth that Freud’s motive
for abandoning the seduction theory was in part an attempt to ingratiate himself
with his colleagues, who supposedly were outraged by his clinical claims. This
thesis is undermined by the fact that Masson’s account of the ostracizing of
Freud by his colleagues is entirely erroneous. But it is also invalidated by
the fact that Freud did not reveal his abandonment of the seduction theory to
his colleagues for some seven years after he had privately renounced it. (Masson
erroneously stated that “the critical period for Freud’s change of heart
about the seduction hypothesis” was “during the years 1900-1903”.
This vague dating effectively closes most of the gap between the abandonment
of the theory and Freud’s public announcement of his change of view, and tallies
with Masson’s thesis, but Freud’s letters to Fliess show clearly that he had
completely given up the theory by the end of 1898.)
That the traditional story of the seduction theory episode is false in all
its essentials is especially important in recent times, when it has been drawn
into the debate about the repression of memories of childhood abuse that are
supposedly ‘recovered’ some decades later. People need to get the historical
facts straight before Freud’s supposed early clinical experiences are erroneously
cited to support the arguments of one side or the other. More generally, as
Cioffi has emphasized, an accurate account of the transition from the seduction
theory to its successor fantasy theory calls into question the reasoning which
Freud was to employ for the rest of his career to reconstruct infantile fantasy
life and the contents of the unconscious.
References
Cioffi, F. (1998 [1974]). “Was Freud a liar?” In Freud and
the Question of Pseudoscience. Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, pp. 199-204.
Esterson, A. (1993). Seductive Mirage: An Exploration of the Work of Sigmund
Freud, Chicago: Open Court.
Esterson, A. (1998). “Jeffrey Masson and Freud’s Seduction Theory: a New
Fable Based on Old Myths.” History of the Human Sciences, 11
(1), pp. 1-21.
Esterson, A. (2001). “The Mythologizing of Psychoanalytic History: Deception
and Self-deception in Freud’s Accounts of the Seduction Theory Episode.”
History of Psychiatry, xii, pp. 329-352.
Esterson, A. (2002). “The Myth of Freud’s Ostracism by the Medical Community
in 1896-1905.” History of Psychology, 5 (2), pp. 115-134.
Freud, S. (1953-1974). The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological
Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. and trans. by J. Strachey et al. London: Hogarth
Press.
Israëls, H. and Schatzman, M. (1993). “The Seduction Theory.”
History of Psychiatry, iv, pp. 23-59.
Masson, J. M. (1984). The Assault on Truth: Freud’s Suppression of the Seduction
Theory. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Masson, J. M. (ed. and trans.) (1985). The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud
to Wilhelm Fliess 1887-1904. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Scharnberg, M. (1993). The Non-Authentic Nature of Freud’s Observations:
Vol. 1. The Seduction Theory. Uppsala Studies in Education, No
47 and 48. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International.
Schimek, J.G. (1987). “Fact and fantasy in the seduction theory: a historical
review.” Journal of the American Pyschoanalytic Association, 35,
pp. 937-965. -
Having a Bad Argument Day
Here is an article by Oliver James in which he tries to argue for environmental explanations of sexual proclivities, in particular the male preference for very young women not to say girls, rather than or in addition to genetic ones. This is surely an idea for which a case can be made, but James makes a hash of the job here. Take this passage for example:
Evolutionary psychologists regard these facts as grist to their mill – youthful looks are a signal of fertility: get a young wife to get more children out of her, blah, blah, blah, ad nauseam. But they could just as well be explained by the fact that, whereas men can reproduce at any age, women’s clocks are ticking, so potential mothers are always in much shorter supply than potential fathers.
Er…am I missing something? Isn’t his alternative explanation at least arguably every bit as much of a ‘genetic’ or evolutionary one as the first? Aren’t they in fact the same explanation, worded slightly differently?
And then this one:
Men may be sex maniacs, but they are not completely thick. They can work out that if they want to have a baby, a pensioner is not likely to be much help; their attraction to youth could be a rational decision rather than a genetic script.
Same again only more so. One, attraction to youth can still be both a rational decision and hard-wired, and two–the research that shows men preferring young women across cultures applies to all men, not only the ones who want to have children. Has Oliver James never met or heard of a man who in fact doesn’t want children but is still more attracted to young women than to old ones? Surely he can do better than that…
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Pseudo-investigation
A show of journalistic digging without the reality lets the powerful off the hook.
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Abductees Go to Harvard
Do we construct memories of sexual abuse the same way we construct memories of alien abductions? Harvard researcher finds the question is highly political.
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Scientists Against Boycott
The universality of science is too important to give up lightly, four Oxford professors say.
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Listen Up, Sir
SciTechDaily gives us an item from the archive today: Richard Dawkins explaining to the future king why scientific reason is a better way of thinking about issues than intuition. As he points out (and it seems so obvious one shouldn’t have to point it out), Hitler and Saddam Hussein and the Yorkshire Ripper had their intuitions too. John Stuart Mill made, mutatis mutandis, the same point in On Liberty a century and a half ago.
Dawkins also points out that nature is not necessarily admirable or something humans ought to imitate in all respects.
No wonder T.H. Huxley, Darwin’s bulldog, founded his ethics on a repudiation of Darwinism. Not a repudiation of Darwinism as science, of course, for you cannot repudiate truth. But the very fact that Darwinism is true makes it even more important for us to fight against the naturally selfish and exploitative tendencies of nature.
A simple but very important point, and one often overlooked. The fact that biologists and evolutionary psychologists think there is good and ever-increasing evidence that there is such a thing as evolved, naturally selected human nature does not have to mean that they don’t think we should fight against our natural selfishness. Mind the gap.
