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  • The Free Speech Deniers

    The Holocaust denying author and publisher Ernst Zündel is currently serving a prison term in his native Germany, having received a five year sentence in 2007 for denying the Holocaust.[1] The books, pamphlets, and websites in which Zündel’s Holocaust denying and far-Right views are expressed were neither written nor published in Germany, but rather in Canada, where Zündel had lived for four decades.

    Having failed to secure Canadian citizenship, Zündel spent a couple of years in the United States, but was sent back to Canada after he violated the terms of his stay by missing a meeting with an immigration official. Canadian officials then handed Zündel over to the German authorities, deporting him on the bizarre grounds that he, a 64 year old with no influence outside the Holocaust denial subculture, constituted ‘a threat to national security’.[2]

    In deporting Zündel, Canadian authorities were knowingly sending him to a German jail cell. The answer of many will undoubtedly be, ‘so what?’ or ‘he got what he deserved’. This reaction is understandable – Zündel is clearly an odious propagandist of the far-Right and of pseudo-history – but at the same time flawed and dangerous for the concept of freedom of speech.

    Put simply, the ‘crime’ for which Zündel has been incarcerated should not be considered such in free Western liberal democracies. In Iran, it is a criminal offence to deny the existence of God; in Europe, this was also once the case, yet with the emergence of our secular human rights culture came the establishment of the right to deny the truth of anything, no matter how widely accepted as fact, and no matter how emotive it may be. In criminalising denial of the Holocaust, the governments of a number of European countries are coming dangerously close to ascribing to it a sacred status, a status shared by no other historical event. In these countries, it is not a criminal offence to downplay or flatly deny the horrific crimes perpetrated by the likes of Stalin, Pol Pot, Ide Amin, Slobadan Milosovic, or Saddam Hussein, yet to deny the crimes of Hitler will result in a jail sentence. In addition to the worrying association of the Holocaust with a sort of sacredness, there is also the issue of State intervention in the telling of history. Germany is exhibiting an authoritarian approach to history which has echoes of the Soviet Union, with its ‘official’ version of history. It is not the place of government to legislate on the status of historical fact. As Deborah Lipstadt, author of Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory (1994), puts it: ‘I shudder at the thought that politicians might be given the power to legislate history. They can hardly fix the potholes in our streets. How can we expect them to decide what is the proper version of history?’[3]

    Zündel’s denial of the Holocaust and promotion of far-Right views is deeply offensive to the memory of those who died under the Nazis, offensive to Jews in general, and offensive to anyone with respect for historical truth, yet offensiveness cannot be considered a crime in a free society. Thankfully, there are still signs that genuine freedom of speech does exist in the West, as witness the republication of the Muhammad cartoons (which have caused such global uproar) in a number of magazines, but this freedom is under assault now on an almost daily basis. Claims of the harm caused by ‘offensiveness’ are rapidly eroding the principles of free speech and free expression. It has become commonplace for Western politicians to claim to support freedom of speech but then immediately undermine this with the slippery concept of ‘responsibility’ and the notion that freedom of speech should be tempered by the higher principle of not ‘offending’ people. Sadly, even the United Nations has now become effectively useless as a bulwark against creeping censorship; indeed, worse still, it has become an active agent of intellectual suppression, with the United Nations Commission on Human Rights bowing to Islamist pressure and basically shredding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As the International Humanist and Ethical Union reports:

    With the support of their allies including China, Russia and Cuba (none well-known for their defence of human rights) the Islamic States succeeded in forcing through an amendment to a resolution on Freedom of Expression that has turned the entire concept on its head. The UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression will now be required to report on the “abuse” of this most cherished freedom by anyone who, for example, dares speak out against Sharia laws that require women to be stoned to death for adultery or young men to be hanged for being gay, or against the marriage of girls as young as nine, as in Iran.[4]

    All too often, supposed Human Rights advocates are now inverting the concepts they pay lip service to, apparently viewing people’s sensitive ‘feelings’ as more important than the right to express ideas freely and without fear of censorship. Canada, which sent Zündel to face a thought crime conviction, was the venue for a disgraceful recent witch hunt against Ezra Levant, publisher of the Western Standard, a magazine that re-printed the infamous Muhammad cartoons. Complaints were made to the Alberta Human Rights and Citizenship Commission by the Islamic Supreme Council of Canada and the Edmonton Muslim Council, leading to Levant being dragged before the Commission for questioning regarding this supposed ‘hate crime’.[5] The case was ultimately dropped, but the fact that it was even taken up to begin with says a lot about the precarious state of free speech and free expression in the West today. As Levant has noted of both self-styled anti-racists and the Islamists they lend their support to, they are ‘illiberal censors who have found a quirk in our legal system, and are using it to undermine our Western traditions of freedom’.[6]

    While in the cases such as that of Levant, the legal system is indeed being turned into a weapon against free speech, in Germany and other European countries the legal system actively prohibits full freedom of speech, with its criminalisation of Holocaust denial. Arguably, a country that outlaws one form of non-violent expression because of its ‘offensiveness’ is on shaky ground when it comes to defending free speech as a general principle.

    In a 2006 interview with Der Spiegel, noted scholar of Islam Bassam Tibi argued that ‘Europeans have stopped defending their values’ and that ‘[w]hen it comes to Islam, there is no freedom of the press nor freedom of opinion in Germany. Organized groups in Islamic communities want to decide what is said and done here’.[7] So, on the one hand we have a country that allegedly supports freedom of speech, yet imprisons one of its own citizens for his views on the Holocaust, and on the other hand we have a country that claims to support freedom of speech while frequently engaging in a kind of ‘politically correct’ self-censorship, caving in to the demands of Islamists. Freedom of speech in Germany and across Europe is increasingly looking like the privilege of those who are saying ‘the right things’, when true freedom of speech is based on the assumption that very ‘wrong’ things can be said as well. As Noam Chomsky argued in his defence of the French Holocaust denier Robert Faurisson:

    even if Faurisson were to be a rabid anti-Semite and fanatic pro-Nazi … this would have no bearing whatsoever on the legitimacy of the defense of his civil rights. On the contrary, it would make it all the more imperative to defend them since, once again, it has been a truism for years, indeed centuries, that it is precisely in the case of horrendous ideas that the right of free expression must be most vigorously defended; it is easy enough to defend free expression for those who require no such defense.[8] [Emphasis mine]

    Without doubt, Zündel’s historical method is deeply flawed (as is that of all Holocaust deniers), and his scholarship is in fact pseudo-scholarship, skewing evidence to fit an ideologically predetermined conclusion. The answer to this in a free society is to point out the flaws of his thesis, meticulously demonstrate his abuse of evidence, and therefore consign his crackpot theories to the intellectual dustbin. This is how we deal with nonsense masquerading as fact.

    Raul Hilberg, author of The Destruction of the European Jews (1961), argues:

    If these people want to speak, let them. It only leads those of us who do research to re-examine what we might have considered as obvious. And that’s useful for us. I have quoted Eichmann references that come from a neo-Nazi publishing house. I am not for taboos and I am not for repression.[9]

    And Deborah Lipstadt, who defeated a libel action brought against her by the British Holocaust denier David Irving, rightly notes that

    genocide denial laws suggest that we do not have the facts and the documentation to prove that these people are liars. We defeated David Irving in court not with law but with facts. We followed his footnotes and demonstrated that, in the words of Professor Richard Evans, Irving’s work on the Holocaust was a ’tissue of lies’.[10]

    The Irving court case provided an interesting example of how Holocaust denial can be publicly and forcefully refuted. The Judgment handed down in the British High Court action by David Irving against Penguin Books Ltd and Deborah Lipstadt dealt a devastating blow to Irving’s credibility. Mr. Justice Gray concluded:

    it appears to me that the correct and inevitable inference must be that for the most part the falsification of the historical record was deliberate and that Irving was motivated by a desire to present events in a manner consistent with his own ideological beliefs even if that involved distortion and manipulation of historical evidence.

    […]

     
    The charges which I have found to be substantially true include the charges that Irving has for his own ideological reasons persistently and deliberately misrepresented and manipulated historical evidence; that for the same reasons he has portrayed Hitler in an unwarrantedly favourable light, principally in relation to his attitude towards and responsibility for the  treatment of the Jews; that he is an active Holocaust denier; that he is anti-semitic and racist and that he associates with right wing extremists who promote neo-Nazism.[11]

    Arguably, Irving has been defeated and has no credibility as a serious historian of the Holocaust. For Austria, however, it is not enough for bad ideas to be taken apart, the ideas themselves are seen to exist in some realm outside the normal understanding of free speech, and their originators are seen as criminals. So, in February 2006, Irving was sentenced to three years imprisonment for ‘trivialising’, ‘playing down’, and denying the Holocaust. Again, Lipstadt condemned the use of laws to silence Holocaust denial, telling the BBC: ‘I am not happy when censorship wins, and I don’t believe in winning battles via censorship … The way of fighting Holocaust deniers is with history and with truth’.[12]

    Just as Austria has a somewhat strange understanding of free speech, so we find the same problem in Germany. Rather than following the traditional methods of debunking lies dressed up as truth, German legislators have simply claimed that to tell such lies is so offensive that one must be imprisoned for doing so. Hence, Ernst Zündel currently sits in a German prison cell – convicted under laws that equate Holocaust denial with advocating racial hatred – for the ‘crime’ of writing and publishing offensive materials in another country.

    We in the West do not live in the Middle Ages, nor do we live in the Middle East. In Europe and the United States we share a common tradition of free inquiry and free expression, and with such freedom comes the freedom to be wrong, and the freedom to cause offence. To politicise freedom of expression by setting State boundaries on what is acceptable in terms of assertions about historical events is preposterous. If governments can do this with regard to the Holocaust, then how long before other politically motivated restrictions on expression follow? (In fact, arguably such restrictions are already creeping in.) If governments start legislating on the status of historical fact based on how offensive it is to the majority to deny these historical facts, then how long before all scholarship across the board has to be produced within narrowly defined margins of what is acceptable to the prevailing political climate? Many Muslims across Europe want to see freedom of expression restricted when it comes to forms of expression which ‘offend’ their religion. This is barely being resisted, but, for now, forceful resistance can still be heard.

    However, when, in a modern Western liberal democracy, one can be imprisoned for telling the ‘wrong’ version of history, it is only a matter of time before governments start considering what other ‘offensive’ ideas they might wish to ban. One cannot argue in favour of publishing ‘offensive’ cartoons when ‘offensive’ history books are banned.

    The Holocaust denial laws need repealing, and repealing right now.

    References

    [1] ‘Ernst Zundel sentenced to 5 years for Holocaust denial’, CBC News, 15 February 2007.

    [2] ‘Zundel turned over to German authorities’, CBC News, 1 March 2005.

    [3] Deborah Lipstadt, ‘Denial should be defeated by facts, not laws’, Spiked, 16 July 2007.

    [4] International Humanist and Ethical Union, ‘Vote on freedom of expression marks the end of Universal Human Rights’, 30 March 2008.

    [5] Keith Bonnell, ‘Defiant Levant republishes cartoons’, National Post, 12 January 2008.

    [6] Ezra Levant, ‘Censorship In The Name Of “Human Rights”’, National Post, 18 December 2007.

    [7] ‘Europeans Have Stopped Defending Their Values’, SPIEGEL Magazine, 2 October 2006.

    [8] Noam Chomsky, ‘Some Elementary Comments on The Rights of Freedom of Expression’, 11 October 1980.

    [9] Quoted in Christopher Hitchens, ‘Hitler’s Ghost’, Vanity Fair, June 1996.

    [10] Deborah Lipstadt, ‘Denial should be defeated by facts, not laws’, Spiked, 16 July 2007.

    [11] Judgment handed down in the British High Court action by David Irving against Penguin Books Ltd and Deborah Lipstadt, 11 April 2000.

    [12] ‘Holocaust denier Irving is jailed’, BBC News Online, 20 February 2006.

    Posted September 15 2008

  • God’s Messenger

    In the Cape Argus for July 24, 2008, I was drawn to an article about a “cult”. The article was your typical shocking piece of journalism, where the accused are a “deranged” lot. Their beliefs most would scoff at: “How could they have done that?” “Anyone can see they were crazy to belief that nonsense!”.

    It says:

    Durban (in the province of Kwa-Zulu Natal, in my country South Africa) brother and sister Hardus and Nicolette Lotter [who are] charged with murder of their parents, had apparently belonged to a cult. They had been influenced by Nicolette’s boyfriend, Mathew Naidoo, who claimed he was “God’s messenger”.

    After being called to the house, 20-year old Hardus told police he was accosted in his house and locked in his bedroom. His 26-year old sister returned from work to find both her parents slain. Their father had been strangled, their mother stabbed several times. After picking up Naidoo for questioning, all three were charged and brought before the court.

    And this was not the first time.

    Apparently the three had conspired previously to kill the parents, Johan and Riekie Lotter. One of the previous attempts involved poisoning Johan Lotter’s drink. The Lotter siblings retracted their statements, saying “they were under the influence of Naidoo, who told them he was ‘God’s messenger’ and the ‘third son of God’ and that he [Naidoo] had received a message from God that they should kill the [Lotter] couple.”

    Which God, you might wonder? I expect all sorts of No-True-Scotsman fallacies to be quivering in most reader’s thoughts. The article ends with: “Johan and Rieikie had received several anonymous death threats with messages from the Bible.”

    Let me summarise: Naidoo believed that the God from the Bible had chosen him as His third Son. The God from the Bible, as Naidoo believed, had then told him that the Lotter couple must die. The newspaper article defined them as belonging to a “cult”. But why? What is a ‘cult’? And why does the article not say “religious fanatics”?

    I find this a reasonable question: What is the difference between a cult and a religion? To answer simply: not much, only in so-called mild religions, people can still live open, thriving lives. Michael Shermer gives these characteristics of one of these (I ask you whether he is talking about a cult or a religion. I will give the answer at the end):

    • Veneration of a leader: Glorification of the leader [to the point of virtual sainthood or divinity].
    • Inerrancy of the leader: Belief that the leader cannot be wrong.
    • Omniscience of the leader: Acceptance of the leader’s beliefs and pronouncements on all subjects, from the philosophical to the trivial.
    • Persuasive techniques: Methods, from benign to coercive, used to recruit new followers and reinforce current beliefs.
    • Hidden Agendas: The true nature of the group’s beliefs and plans is obscured from or not fully disclosed to potential recruits and the general public.
    • Deceit: Recruits and followers are not told everything they should know about the leader and the group’s inner-circle, and particularly disconcerting flaws or potentially embarrassing events or circumstances are covered up.
    • Absolute truth: Belief that the leader and/or the group has discovered final knowledge on any number of subjects.
    • Absolute Morality: Belief that the leader and/or group has developed a system of right and wrong thought and action applicable to members and nonmembers alike. Those who strictly follow the moral code become and remain members; those who do not are dismissed or punished.[1]

    Shermer here is describing characteristics of cults. But perhaps the terrifying similarity to religion was demonstrated by a silent reading, stemming the tides of self-veneration upon contemplation. This is not a unique case, I am not claiming it as such. Call it a reminder, call it a question. Why is Naidoo and the Lotter’s grouping called a ‘cult’ and not religion?

    Perhaps the question lies in: Who is the cult-leader? Is it Naidoo or the God from the Bible? I feel this is a legitimate question. I think we need to radically assess this in light of the source of Naidoo’s absolute truth, his morals and his beliefs. The source lies in the drawers of nearly all hotels around the world: a Bible. Once again, I am not attacking religion as a cult because that is an old argument. I am simply assessing the usage of the term ‘cult’.

    The line of separation is as thin as dust between fanatical religious belief and cults. In Shermer’s case, he was making the claim that there is in fact a cult surrounding Ayn Rand, in the US. It fit the criteria I have highlighted above. I won’t go into detail as it does not play a part in this discussion but I urge you to read this very important book to understand why (I myself love Ayn Rand, but do not subscribe to her bizarre philosophy in any way, shape or form. Her abilities as a ficiton writer are all that fascinate me).

    Let me reiterate: Why did the Argus dub these people belonging to a cult? After all, Naidoo was using the Bible, the Christian Holy Book. He claimed he was the “third son of God” – I have yet to discover who the second is if Jesus is the first (if we’re all God’s children, what use is a Son?). Unless we are speaking of Adam – but I do not think that Naidoo was being austere to technical theological obscurity. He claimed he was God’s messenger.

    I just find it strange that we label him a ‘cult’ leader (or member) and not a religious one. I find it strange that because “ordinary” people branch off into violence, like a burst vessel of the body of society, and claim a religious justification they are a ‘cult’. Yet when someone who believes he is doing Allah’s work blows himself and many others to pieces, he is a ‘religious fanatic’.

    Let us drop the semantics and the playground name-calling. Let us call it what it is: blind faith. This the damage that absolute faith in a personal deity can have. Sure – the Lotters and Naidoo balance on the so-called fringe of ordinary, humble religious people. But those same good people who would reply: “They are crazy to believe such nonsense”, I ask this: How can you prove Naidoo is not “God’s messenger”. Is he not a “true Christian”? A “true believer”?

    A true Christian would never commit such atrocious acts you say, but that is the “No True Scotsman” fallacy.

    You can not disprove he was God’s messenger. You can not say his God was any different from the God of Abraham (who also asked for strict obedience and no-questions when commanding Abraham to slaughter his son); the God of Deuteronomy (who commands you to kill any person who professes sympathy for other gods even if he/she is family); or the God of the New Testament. He used the same book did he not? The same book that justifies abortion, that justifies slavery, and also abolishment and so on.

    I can see no way for a Christian to display Naidoo being any different in his belief. Yes, you are correct: his beliefs are bizarre. But why are they different from any religious believers’. I think we have seen that it is incorrect to label this a ‘cult’ activity because there is no difference. Why is this a ‘cult’, but not Al’Quaeda? Why is Naidoo a cult leader, but the Ayatollah Khomeini was not?

    We need a radical reversal of understanding. We need to tear these veils and see them for the blind-faith that encompasses it all. As Žižek highlights, ‘With God, everything is permitted.” Even the coercion of ordinary people into murdering their parents. Why? Because God said so.

    ********

    UPDATE: The replies I have received from people reading this have fairly attempted to answer the question: “Why is Mathew Naidoo considered a cult leader but not the Ayatollah Khomeini, Bin Laden, Ted Haggard, Rick Warren, Paul Hill, etc.?” The answer I predicted was going to be “Well, they had a political agenda and it’s wrong to place all those kinds of people into one category.”

    1. I speak about Paull Hill a lot, but he is once again an appropriate example. His agenda was not politcal. His agenda was based on the fact that the doctor was “killing babies”. Readers are welcome to view it for themselves by looking at Rev. Spitz’s comments on my article “Belief as Poison”. You can even visit the Army of God website. There is no political agenda here, unless you want to get into the pathetic semantics of what constitutes “political”.

    The opening words are from Psalms, their basis for attacking and killing doctors is based on the Bible. What does this sound like? Blind faith, yet again. There is nothing political here so this answer does not work. I ask how we define the difference between this radical right-wing Christian group that believes that “babies” are being killed by doctors and God has told them to stop this at any cost – and Naidoo being told he is God’s messenger, and being told to kill the Lotter family at any cost.

    2. Sure, lots of these are political. I do not ever make the claim that religion is the source of evil or dismay in the world. In a lot of cases, people are actually made happy by it. But if you accept this, I feel that you must accept that people unconsciously separate ‘cults’ and ‘extremists’ groups. Though the one might have a political agenda, it still fits the criteria for a cult. I still think we need to radically reassess our views on cults and so-called fringe religious mindsets. Both will give their lives to the cause, both obey the leader as speaking for or from God, etc. This also raises no opposition to my point.

    Reference

    1. Michael Shermer (2002) Why People Believe Weird Things: Pseudoscience, Superstition, and Other Confusions of Our Time. New York: Owl Books. Pp 119-120

  • The Barbarians’ Raw Deal

    For the past 1,500 years the assortment of Germanic, Slavic and Asian tribes known collectively as the barbarians have gotten a raw deal. Blamed largely for initiating the collapse of the Roman Empire, extinguishing the lamp of learning and precipitating the Dark Ages, they have been unable to defend themselves in a court of inquiry. Here is one case where the victors did not write the history (perhaps because most of them couldn’t write). But while the barbarians (literally “babbler” or one who does not speak Greek) did wreak a great deal of havoc, an impartial look at the facts will show that their role in abolishing Greco-Roman culture was almost nil.

    In fact, most barbarian kings and warlords greatly admired Greco-Roman culture-when it did not conflict with the tenants of their Christian faith. Take the Roman general and first Germanic king of Italy Odoacer (CE 435-493). During his rule, Odoacer retained Roman law, administration, even the Roman Senate, and, though an Arian, tolerated orthodox Christianity. Then there was the greatest of barbarian kings, Theoderick the Ostrogoth, whose armies defeated Odoacer. Hardly a textbook Goth, Theoderick was raised at court in Constantinople. His father, a political and military ally of a Byzantine emperor, handed over his son as a hostage, a standard practice for the time. Theoderick was known to tell his fellow tribesmen that “an able Goth wants to be like a Roman.” Despite conquering much of the Italian peninsula, most barbarian rulers wisely recognized the Eastern Emperor as their sovereign. And in order to facilitate their assimilation into Roman society, Goth and Vandal kings often married the daughters of Roman or Greek Emperors and nobles. Destruction was seldom on their minds and Rome, though sacked repeatedly, was never destroyed by barbarians.

    By time of the first invasions, the barbarians were well established in the Western Empire, not only in the Roman military, but in the upper echelons of imperial Rome. The first large-scale invaders, the Visigoths, were commanded by the well-born Alaric I, leader of Rome’s foederati (or Germanic irregular troops). For reasons both economic and political, Rome preferred to leave the defense of the empire to Gothic generals, who were banned from imperial rule, and thus less likely to follow in the footsteps of Julius Caesar. In return for their service Gothic tribes were billeted on Roman lands. When Alaric’s Visigoths attacked the Empire it was because his army was tired of being subjegated, disrespected, and poorly rewarded by a weakened and chaotic Roman Empire.

    When Alaric sacked Rome in the early 5th century, the Western Empire was effectively ruled by a semi-barbarian, the Roman General Stilicho. The German-born son of a Vandal father and Roman mother, Stilicho was both military commander and guardian of the young emperor Honorius. Arguably the greatest of Roman generals, Stilicho was Rome’s bulwark, frequently defeating greater Visigoth, Ostrogoths, Alan, Sueve and Vandal armies. Then the emperor, fearful that Stilicho was becoming too ambitious, had him beheaded. Within two years, the Visigoths sacked Rome.

    Forty-five years later it was the Vandals’ turn, this time upon the invitation of the Empress Eudoxia. They, in turn, were followed by the Ostrogoths, who were induced to invade by the Eastern Emperor Zeno, before they themselves were crushed by an army from the Byzantine Empire at the Battle of Mons Lactarius in 553. Then came the Lombards, who were ultimately defeated by the last and greatest of barbarian tribes, the Franks.

    More important were the characteristics these tribes held in common. Foremost was their Christianity. The Vandals, for instance, believed they were waging a holy war in North Africa against the heretic Augustine of Hippo and his orthodox Christian followers. It took the most influential of the Germanic tribes-the Franks-to note that unorthodox Christian tribes would never be left unmolested, and thus wisely converted to Roman Catholicism. The Franks were also responsible for the Carolingian Renaissance (in the late eighth and ninth centuries), yet another attempt to recreate the late culture of the Roman Empire by standardizing Medieval Latin and establishing schools. Though, of course, without its traditional pagan – i.e., cultural – aspects.

    Indeed much of what we have come to regard as the savagery of the barbarians was a consequence of their Christianity and their attempts to stamp out the orthodox heresy and paganism. After the Visigoth leader Alaric took Athens, he proceded to crush the last remnants of the pagan cult of Demeter and Persephone based at Eleusis, which was heretical to his Arian Christian beliefs. Augustine, in CE 430, encouraged his fellow Romans to resist the siege of Hippo primarily because the Vandals were Arian Christians, and not because they were barbarian hordes. And indeed orthodox Christians fared badly under Arian rule. Bishops were exiled or killed, while laymen were excluded from office and frequently suffered confiscation of their property. The Vandals tried for several decades to force their beliefs on their North African subjects, exiling clergy, dissolving monasteries, and exercising heavy pressure on non-conforming Christians. The Vandal king Geiseric demanded all his close advisors follow the Arian form of Christianity and banned conversion for Vandals. It was, in other words, internecine warfare.

    A case could be made that the Roman Empire was doomed long before the birth of Christ, or before Caesar even thought about crossing the Rubicon. One might trace the beginning of the end to the defeat of Xiongnu tribes by the Han Chinese at the Battle of Ikh Bayan, some 50 years earlier, which precipitated the Xiongnu’s (or Huns’) westward migration.

    Yet Greco-Roman culture might have survived and prospered regardless of the Western Empire’s fate. After all, Greek culture survived near constant warfare, from the Greco-Persian wars (the Persians sacked Athens twice) to the Peloponnesian War and, later, the conquest by the Macedonians. If barbarism were to blame for the near-extinction of Greco-Roman culture, how does one explain the fact that important cultural areas were relatively untouched by barbarian hordes, including Constantinople, Alexandria, indeed most of the Eastern Roman Empire? The Empire continued to produce important pagan thinkers and scientists to the end. In the second, third and fourth centuries CE, thinkers such as Plutarch, Galen, Ptolemy, Plotinus, Proclus and Hypatia flourished, though by the fifth century few thinkers of any importance remained. The tide had turned in Christianity’s favor.

    Nothing is more illustrative of Church’s attempted suppression of Greco-Roman culture than the murder of Hypatia of Alexandria. In CE 415 the young Greek philosopher and mathematician was accused of stirring up religious turmoil, and was flayed alive and burned by a Coptic Christian mob, likely monks. As if to put too fine a point on it the murder was carried out in a church. By the early sixth century Boethius (c.480-c.525 CE), considered the last Roman philosopher, saw the writing on the wall and tried to salvage something of Greco-Roman culture by translating much of Aristotle into Latin (since the Greek language was fast disappearing from the West). But Christianity too undid him. The latter’s orthodox Christianity was suspected by the Arian Christian King Theodoric, who had his old mentor executed for allegedly conspiring with orthodox Byzantine Emperor Justin I.

    The eradication of Greco-Roman culture remained the top priority for the early Church, a sentiment captured perfectly some one thousand years later in Renaissance painter Tommaso Laureti’s Triumph of Christianity, which shows a crucifix placed on a pedestal and a toppled Greek or Roman statue broken into a dozen pieces. With the exception of Plato’s Timaeus, philosophy was considered subversive of Christian belief. The highly influential Tertullian rejected all philosophy as anti-Christian and heretical. True, one or two works of Plato were tolerated, but “heretical Aristotle” was taboo. Even so-called moderates, like Clement of Alexandria, considered philosophy a preparation for paving the way for Christ, though one no longer necessary. Then there was the eternal warfare between science and religion, with the former considered futile, and a greater threat to faith than philosophy. Augustine set the anti-skeptic tone of the early Church when he wrote: “When it is asked what we ought to believe in matters of religion, the answer is not to be sought in the exploration of the nature of things, after the nature of those whom the Greeks called ‘physicists.’…For the Christian, it is enough to believe that the cause of all things, whether in heaven or on earth, whether visible or invisible, is nothing other than the goodness of the Creator.” Meanwhile Augustine’s colleagues Ambrose of Milan, Gregory of Nyssa, and John Chrysostom considered Jews and pagans enemies of the church, and with their tacit approval Jewish pogroms begin in earnest in CE 415, causing many scholars to flee to Babylon with its large Jewish population.

    If Greeks, Romans or Jews who stubbornly refused to accept orthodox Christianity were in for a hard time, it was equally bad for churchmen who dabbled in Aristotelian science. Those who did, like Bishop Diodor of Tarsus, couldn’t help but develop unorthodox views (i.e., an earth without beginning, the soul not surviving the death of the body) and were soon condemned as heretics.

    High culture fared no better in the Eastern Empire, particularly in Alexandria. In the fourth and fifth centuries it was principally Christian mobs that razed Greek temples and libraries and the artwork within. The famed Sarapeum library founded by Cleopatra met a similar fate. Indeed the destruction of the Sarapeum was seen as representative of Christianity’s triumph over Greco-Roman religion and culture. In his attempt to eradicate “profane” learning, Justinian I closed the Platonic Academy in CE 529; what education remained available was soon taken over by the Church and would remain under its thumb until power-struggles between the papacy and French monarchs drove the latter to found their own universities in the late Middle Ages.

    As the Empire crumbled, faith, not reason gained momentum. Countless classical works, including manuscripts by Aristotle and Plato, were lost forever, probably destroyed on the orders of bishops and emperors. Richard Rubenstein, author of Aristotle’s Children: How Christians, Muslims, and Jews Rediscovered Ancient Wisdom and Illuminated the Dark Ages, characterizes the resultant Dark Ages as “half a millennium of endemic violence, poverty, and disorder.” It was, he writes, “little wonder that, during this seemingly endless winter, those seeking comfort and meaning would turn to the certitudes of faith rather than the conundrums of philosophy.”

    Scholars have suggested that in addition to providing comfort and meaning to the huddled masses, Dark Age Christianity was responsible for civilizing the barbaric hordes, for keeping the lamp of learning lit (albeit dimly), and for bringing order and civilization to Western Europe once the empire ceased to exist. “I do not agree with [Gibbon] that intellectual thought in the early Christian centuries was dead and I believe that the well established hierarchy of the church strengthened not undermined the empire,” writes historian Charles Freeman. “After all it was the church which survived the collapse of the western empire.” Gibbon expressed a similar sentiment in chapter 39 of Decline and Fall: “If the decline of the Roman empire was hastened by the conversion of Constantine, his victorious religion broke the violence of the fall, and mollified the ferocious temper of the conquerors.” But what Gibbon and Freeman are forgetting is that the ferocious conquerors – with the exception of the Lombards – were already Christians when they sacked Rome, Hippo, Carthage, etc. What little learning Christianity brought to the barbarians was based on pagan Roman culture (The early church fathers, like Augustine, were raised in a rich Roman culture). Once the Orthodox Church established its dominion over what would become the Holy Roman Empire, it did create an atmosphere of servility and passive obedience, but this sort of tyranny is a far cry from fostering an environment of scientific, philosophical and artistic pursuit. The fact the Dark Ages persisted so long is a testament to the absence of that ancient culture and civilization.

    Despite the Church’s best efforts, reason and science did not to completely perish from the West. As Rubenstein documents, soon after Boethius’ execution, his colleague Cassiadorus collected the philosopher’s translations and other manuscripts and asked the Pope to use them as the foundation for a university in Rome. The pope, naturally, hemmed and hawed until Cassiadorus, weary of waiting, removed the manuscripts to Vivarium where he founded an abbey that included a monks’ library. There the works were copied (sometimes by illiterate monks) and shared with monasteries across Europe, finally ending up, some six centuries later, in the hands of men like Peter Abelard, Roger Bacon and Siger de Brabant who would revive classical learning.

    We can hold the barbarians responsible for defeating the Roman legions and conquering nearly all Roman territory, but they were not responsible for nearly eradicating Greco-Roman culture. Only the Church hierarchy was organized enough and powerful enough to do that.

    Christopher Orlet is a columnist, essayist and book critic based in St. Louis, MO.

  • The MCB and the Muslim Marriage Contract

    On 21st August 2008 Reefat Drabu of the Muslim Council of Britain posted an article on the Guardian’s Comment is Free website in which she defended the decision of the MCB to withdraw support from the proposed
    Muslim Marriage Contract as follows:

    The marriage contract produced by the Muslim Institute is simply one interpretation of shariah. It is not the shariah that needs to be re-invented, but a change in behaviour among some sections of our diverse Muslim communities. This is an onerous task that cannot be achieved through blustering demands and emphatic slogans that will only resonate in the salons of Islington and Notting Hill…

    MCB represents and serves diverse Muslim communities…The MCB is a broad-based inclusive organisation of Muslim communities living in the United Kingdom. It recognises and respects the choice of Muslims to follow such interpretation of the shariah in relation to marriage as they wish.

    Perhaps inevitably, Drabu also made the right noises as appropriate for living in a modern state: “Marriage governed by shariah should give women respect, protection and empowerment.”

    But the reality behind the MCB decision is hidden away in this statement in the last paragraph:

    Disappointed by the initiative, we would like to start again, create a wider consensus and deliver real change based on traditional scholarship and community buy-in.

    I did not realise the full implications of this sentence until I heard the early morning BBC Radio 4 “Sunday” religious affairs programme on 24th August on which there was an item on this issue. Shaykh Ibrahim Mogra of the MCB was invited to explain why the organisation would not endorse the proposed marriage contract. He stated:

    Sharia and religious law is the domain of the theologians and the jurists and they are the experts. They will apply the laws according to their knowledge and their understanding…”

    According to Trevor Barnes, the BBC religious affairs reporter who spoke next, there are chiefly two aspects of the new marriage contract that have caused controversy:

    One is that the British Muslim men waive their religious right to take another wife, and [the other], that the woman be allowed to marry whomever she wishes. Traditionally it’s the father or close male relative who gives permission for the woman to marry. Under the new proposals this so-called “marriage guardian”, or wali, may be female, and even non-Muslim…

    When asked which current marriage arrangements are at odds with British culture, Mogra said that, as on issues such as the drinking of alcohol, “the attitude that many jurists have taken with regards to the conditions to the marriage [is that] if the law requires the woman to be represented by her male guardian, that is the law.”

    His MCB colleague Reefat Drabu agreed:

    What MCB would like to do is to have one document that encompasses all the different schools of thought and sort of kitemarks it so that it is something that everybody can use.

    So now we know the reality behind the sentence I highlighted above from Drabu’s last paragraph in the Guardian article. The MCB wants a marriage contract that is what we might call Muslim inclusive, encompassing “all the different schools of thought” among Muslim jurists. In other words, they want a document that allows the woman’s father, or nearest male relative, to be designated as the wali even if she would rather have someone else of her own choice, and allows men to have more than one wife. Beneath the high-flown phraseology about giving women “respect, protection, and empowerment” in the Guardian article, that is the reality behind the MCB’s opposition to the new marriage contract. They may point out other items they object to, but in the final analysis it is evident that they will not accept a marriage contract that ensures that the woman may choose her own wali, or that prevents a man having more than one wife.

    I leave the last word to Dr Usama Hasan, Director of The City Circle:

    Too many fathers have abused their right of wilayah (guardianship) over their daughters and too many husbands have abused their right of initiating divorce for us to continue with law rooted in patriarchal societies. It is high time that Muslim women enjoy the same rights and freedoms under Islamic law as they do under present legal systems in the UK.

    August 2008

  • On Intellectual Ethics

    The story

    From ‘You Still Can’t Write
    About Muhammad’
    by Asra Nomani in The Wall Street Journal.

    A journalist named Sherry Jones wrote a historical novel about Aisha, who was married to Mohammed when she was 6, though he waited until she was 9 before having sex with her. The novel was due to be published this August; last April Random House sent it to several people for comment, including Denise Spellberg, an associate professor of Islamic history at the University of Texas in Austin. Jones has put Spellberg on the list because she had read Spellberg’s book, Politics, Gender, and the Islamic Past: The Legacy of ‘A’isha Bint Abi Bakr. Spellberg thought the book was terrible; on April 30 she called Shahed Amanullah, a guest lecturer in her classes and the editor of a popular Muslim Web site. Amanullah says she was upset and that she told him the novel ‘made fun of Muslims and their history’; she asked him to ‘warn Muslims.’

    Jane Garrett, an editor at Random House’s Knopf imprint, dispatched an email on May 1 to executives, telling them she got a phone call the evening before from Spellberg (who is under contract with Knopf to write Thomas Jefferson’s Qur’an).

    “She thinks there is a very real possibility of major danger for the building and staff and widespread violence,” Ms. Garrett wrote. “Denise says it is ‘a declaration of war…explosive stuff…a national security issue.’ Thinks it will be far more controversial than the satanic verses and the Danish cartoons. Does not know if the author and Ballantine folks are clueless or calculating, but thinks the book should be withdrawn ASAP.”

    Random House also received a letter from Spellberg and her attorney, saying she would sue the publisher if her name were associated with the novel.

    Spellberg told the WSJ reporter, ‘”I walked through a metal detector to see ‘Last Temptation of Christ,’” the controversial 1980s film adaptation of a novel that depicted a relationship between Jesus and Mary Magdalene. “I don’t have a problem with historical fiction. I do have a problem with the deliberate misinterpretation of history. You can’t play with a sacred history and turn it into soft core pornography.”

    OB

    The question

    B&W is asking academics, journalists, free speech advocates and the like the following question:

    Given the Wall Street Journal’s account, what do you think of Spellberg’s actions?

    Stephen Law

    The qualification, “Given the Wall Street’s account” is important. It’s difficult to be sure, on the basis of a newspaper article containing second-hand quotes, precisely what Spellberg said and did. She may have been subtly or not so subtly misunderstood. I would be wary of launching any sort of attack on Spellberg on the basis of just this evidence.

    If Spellberg did not like the book, then of course she should be free to say so. She should also be free to warn the publisher that, in her opinion, its publication is likely to result in violence. Certainly, that information shouldn’t be denied the publisher, should it? If Spellberg knew the book would probably provoke violence, it would be irresponsible of her to keep that information form the publisher, particularly as that seems to be have been one of the publishers concerns.

    Again, if Spellberg is being asked her opinion on whether it is wise to publish, given this threat, and her view is that it’s not, she should be free to say so. We don’t want to curtail Spellberg’s freedom of speech in order to defend freedom of speech, do we? I wouldn’t want to censor Spellberg’s views; nor would I encourage her to censor herself.

    However, if the news report is accurate, it seems that Spellberg went further. The phone call to Amanullah asking him to “warn Muslims” is peculiar. Why would she do that? Deliberately drawing widespread Muslim attention to the book – indeed “warning” them via a Muslim website – is obviously likely to provoke exactly the violent response she wants to avoid. My guess is that Spellberg was, at this point, panicking about her own safety, and doing whatever she could publicly to dissociate herself from the book lest violent Muslims later pronounce her guilty by association. If so, that doesn’t reflect quite so well on her.

    As for Spellberg’s views – well, mine differ. I don’t think we should allow ourselves to be silenced by violent religious zealots. The more of us are prepared to stand together and say, “No – we will say what we want”, rather than just pathetically cave in to the nutters, the better.

    But that’s a criticism of Spellberg’s views, not her actions, which is what the above question specifically addresses. Actually, most of what Spellberg did, I have no problem with. True, the alleged contacting of Amanullah to “warn Muslims” doesn’t reflect well on Spellberg. But of course, we can’t be 100% sure that this even happened as described (perhaps Amanullah’s account of what Spellberg said is not entirely accurate). At this point, I’d give Spellberg the benefit of the doubt.

    Stephen Law is senior lecturer in philosophy at Heythrop College, University of London. He is the author of several books, including The War for Children’s Minds.

    R. Joseph Hoffmann

    One of these things is not like the other. Apud Professor Spellberg: ‘”I walked through a metal detector to see ‘Last Temptation of Christ,’ the controversial 1980s film adaptation of a novel that depicted a relationship between Jesus and Mary Magdalene. “I don’t have a problem with historical fiction. I do have a problem with the deliberate misinterpretation of history. You can’t play with a sacred history and turn it into soft core pornography.” A cynic would say, “But isn’t that precisely what Katzanzakis, and Andrew Lloyd Webber, and Dan Brown, and Denys Arcand and, for all I know, even what the author of the Gospel of Judas did (and lived to see another day)? And an historian would say that the same uncrictical bias that immunizes the Islamic tradition from the kind of historical scrutiny that has been applied to the gospels (and other bits of the Bible) for two centuries is not just an example of special pleading but an illustration of a crisis in critical thinking.

    It is an unclosely-guarded secret in religious studies, for example, that part of the atoning process for an overemphasis on the western biblical tradition from the fifties to the dawn of the millennium has been to “pluralize” college religious studies programs: more Buddhism, more Tao, and recently, more Muhammad. There is nothing wrong with giving “other men’s faiths” (the title of a standard DWEMish primer from the sixties) the position they deserve. It’s long overdue. But the Spellberg episode reveals something more troubling in the suggestion that this epsode in the Prophet’s life – which, dripping with legend as it is, and composed as much of folkloristic snippets as of hard fact – constitutes a “sacred history” that cannot be used for fictional embellishment. Evidently the measure of unacceptability here is the potential to do harm – crying “fire” in a crowded bookstore? If this is the measure, then any commentary, scholarly or literary – the Satanic Verses, the Danish cartoons, Daniel Pipes’s musings – that deviates from the axiom that Islam is unlike other religions, and must therefore employ a methodology for understanding and interpretation different from those we use to analzye those religions, has to be rejected. There are two problems with this approach. Historically, we have developed (since the much maligned Enlightenment) a canon of principles that depend on the principle of analogy. We know more about how religions originated and how they “work” because of similarities in the structures of belief and our ability to analyze those similaritities. We have not developed methods for analyzing exceptions asserted to transcend the rules. (The uniqueness of Islam falls into the same category as the resurrection of Jesus, according to believers who cling to the doctrine of exceptionalism). Second, the idea of a “sacred history” is a term that belongs to theology and phenomenology of religion. The claims made by believers in a tradition can be understood as telling us something about the religion, and for social scientists even something about the person holding the belief. But the belief in a “final prophet” and the belief that Jesus is the “Way, the truth and the life,” and that no one comes to the Father except through him, are not historical claims. They are religious claims.

    In fairness, I have not read Professor Spellberg’s book on Aisha, but I have no reason to doubt that it is a work of substance. I am however unaware of any recent discoveries that would lift the discussion of this relationship between the Prophet and his young bride out of the fog that permits people, friendly and unfriendly to Islam, to exploit its implications. (“And some say it was the curtain from her tent that the Prophet used as his battle standard.”) I am also aware of a well-established trend in religious (and other) scholarship that exploits the historical ambiguity to turn fog into stone. In biblical stuides, the Gospel of Judas and the Talpiot Tomb “discovery” (the burial site of Jesus and his family?) is being used in that way, almost as though the line between serious scholarship and fiction has become irrelevant. If Sherry Jones’s book is that bad, then let’s have it and let historians, not growling mullahs, be the judge of its value.

    Joseph Hoffmann is a historian of religion at the State University of New York at Buffalo; his latest book is The Just War and Jihad: Violence in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, editor.

    Nick Cohen:

    The cult of the dissident is one of the most absurd in academia. Intellectuals with conformist views and security of tenure talk as if the Bush administration could at any moment send the FBI to arrest them. Suppose, however, that the authorities were to tell the University of Texas that Ms Spellberg was unfit to teach the students of a liberal democracy -they would have an embarrassment of evidence if they did. Or imagine them ordering her to appear before a reconstituted House of Un-American Activities Committee in Washington D.C. How would she defend herself? She would, I am sure, argue that she is a free woman in a free country who is entitled to express her opinions, however unpopular they may be. If others found her ideas ‘upsetting,’ or ‘very bad,’ then they would just have to live with their anger and accept that the battle of ideas is necessary and desirable in a free society. If the government were to claim that she might inspire terrorist attacks against the University of Texas, she would reply that the government had a duty to arrest the criminals and defend the right to free speech guaranteed in the Constitution.

    In short, she would appeal to the very principles of freedom of expression, thought and publication she so comprehensively and maliciously trashed.

    Nick Cohen is a columnist for The Observer and the author of What’s Left?.

    Daphne Patai:

    Her actions are silly and only succeed in calling attention to a book she disapproves of. Someone else will publish it and it will sell even more copies as a result of this non-event.

    If everybody acted on the same principle and all the books one or another group (and why only groups? aren’t groups made up of individuals?) might find offensive are taken off the market, or never published to begin with, there won’t be much left to read. This hardly makes the world a better place.

    Daphne Patai is a professor in the Department of Languages, Literatures, and Cultures at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst; her newest book is What Price Utopia?: Essays on Ideological Policing.

  • The State of the Nayshun

    As we wait for the inevitable decline in Barack Obama’s fortunes and lament the fact that the political campaign being waged in the world’s greatest democracy has become a battle between a feisty old man in a baseball cap and a young Cicero increasingly prone to leaden rather than silver tongued oration, it’s appropriate to take stock of the intellectual condition of the nation.

    My friends, as the feisty old man likes to say, Things are Not Good. Nearly half a century ago the mini-genre of “Why Is America So Fucking Stupid” was born with the publication of Richard Hofstadter’s 1963 book Anti-Intellectualism in American Life, though some would argue (I would) that the genre can be dated from Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (1835/40). And surely Sinclair Lewis, H.L. Mencken and Walter Lippmann form part of a chorus of voices decrying the pure turnip-headedness of Americans. For Lewis, George F. Babbitt was the epitome of the clueless American whose world was circumscribed by small ideas, uninterested in just about everything beyond his picket fence in Zenith, Winnemac (“which is adjacent to Michigan, Ohio and Indiana”), and “whose religion was boosterism.” That was 1922: the Great Depression and the second of the century’s world wars lay ahead. The bad news is that in Bush’s America ‘08, George Babbitt might be able to pass himself off as an intellectual.

    In a recent article for the Chronicle of Higher Education William Pannapacker (aka Thomas H. Benton) explains the decline this way: “The anti-intellectual legacy [Hofstadter] described has often been used by the political right — since at least the McCarthy era — to label any complication of the usual pieties of patriotism, religion, and capitalism as subversive, dangerous, and un-American. And, one might add, the left has its own mirror-image dogmas…Now, in the post-9/11 era, American anti-intellectualism has grown more powerful, pervasive, and dangerous than at any time in our history.” This is an important statement, because it rightly states that the right has no exclusive claim to anti-intellectualism, and some would argue that Neo-conservatism was a rarefied and acute intellectual moment in American culture, packaged as grits.

    A slough of books attempts a diagnosis: Elvin Lim’s The Anti-intellectual Presidency (2008), Richard Shenkman’s Just How Stupid Are We? Facing the Truth about the American Voter (208) (Let’s not and say we did?); Al Gore’s somewhat disappointing The Assault on Reason (2007), Nicholas Carr’s July 2008 Atlantic Article, “Is Google Making Us Stoopid?” and, most poignant of all, Mark Bauerlein’s recent book, The Dumbest Generation: How the Digital Age Stupefies Young Americans and Jeopardizes our Future. Bauerlein’s book rings true especially in an academic world divided like Gaul among a tech-savvy, tech-comfortable, and tech-intimidated professoriate that struggles to fight battles about academic honesty, the use of critical reasoning and sources, the almost utter dependence on unvetted, under-assessed and often mistaken opinions taken from blogs as being as good as Britannica, and the quick-search culture in which, desperate to know the age of a rock star, American Idol winner, or the date when the Middle Ages officially ended, we just Google It.

    Fortunately, Americans have a strong tradition of gifted intellectual leaders to offset the brain-deadening cost of internet dependence – as Borat would say, Not. As we listen to the looped and loopy tropes of Jeremiah Wright, John McCain’s proposals for a “gas tax” holiday,” Obama’s stuttering attempts to defend himself against charges of inexperience and MTV celeb stature, we can count on the fact that all hesitation is an attempt to find the right one-syllable word or to make a long sentence short – preferably very short.

    “Senator, are you playing the race card?”

    “Well, I’ll leave it up to my opponent to answer that one.”

    The sentences are convertible, candidate to candidate. What has some of us worried is that the Democratic candidate’s slow-on-the-draw ability to both think and speak on his feet is being interpreted as “intellectual arrogance.” As Lim suggests, the nature of the modern political campaign is an exercise in mocking complexity and analysis, so to the extent Obama can be “interpreted” as analytical and complex—whether he is or isn’t—his risk of non-election increases ten-fold. To speak carefully is to be conceited, probably untrustworthy, unsmart in ways politicians need to be smart. Remember Dan Rather (rip) to John Kerry: “Senator, do you think you have enough Elvis in you to get elected?” Evidently he did not.

    But the real cost of America’s hate-affair with knowledge is paid by children, for whom words like “learning” and “wisdom” sound biblical and words like “intelligence” elitist and judgmental. Those of us old enough to remember the sixties well remember that every classroom had at least one kid (usually an immigrant from Canada or Pakistan) whose father (usually an academic or ACLU attorney) had turned the television set into a planter. But those of us who have survived The Love Boat, Three’s Company and Charlie’s Angels to enter the world of Rap and shows about whinnying wannabe Britneys celebrating million dollar Sweet Sixteen parties have survived to witness the reversal of culture—a new barbarism and a vulgarity that, unlike the old vulgarity, incoherently accepts political correctness while exploiting and expanding every stereotype, every dumb opinion, every rude form of discourse. It’s a barbarism fueled by technologies made available to the know-nothings by the know-hows, free speech driven to the limits of incivility, and a generational clash that makes the “generation gap” of my own teenage years look like a catechism class at St Marty’s.

    “Reversal of culture” sounds excessively dramatic, perhaps—but consider. Men and women of eighteenth century Europe actually knew and named their era the Enlightenment. The “optimism” of a Leibniz may have been balanced by the cynicism of a Voltaire, but in general the sense of discovery and progress ignited then was real enough to last through—say—the first lunar landing. Among the troglodytes whose idea of entertainment is waiting for Tila Tequila to choose her male or female mate, I’m uncertain that anything short of the Apocalypse would grab and keep their attention. Benton again: “The last eight years represent the sleep of reason producing the monsters of our time: suburban McMansions, gas-guzzling Hummers, pop evangelicalism, the triple-bacon cheeseburger, Are You Smarter Than a Fifth-Grader?, creation science, water-boarding, environmental apocalypse, Miley Cyrus, and the Iraq War — all presided over by that twice-elected, self-satisfied, inarticulate avatar of American incuriosity and hubris: he who shall not be named.” And why not: among our sleepy children there is a strange belief that coming out as gay, bisexual, undecided, trans, punctured rather than pierced is an act of heroism. Among the gifts of the postmodern university is the gift of sexual ambiguity and an oddly anti-existential amorphousness in which the self is not created by the individual but imposed by the tribe. Cultural reversal.

    If it is not enough that our point and click culture leaves us chained in Plato’s cave, before our screens (Nick Carr makes the point in The Big Switch), consider that the surfing, skimming, and deselecting of information that accompanies the reversal means that careful reading and listening and sustained attention must be devalued. University teachers across the land have introduced “warnings” about what should not be done with a classroom PC. The most usual prohibitions: No chatting to friends, no downloading music, no bidding for I-pods on E-Bay. Those are ridiculous rules, of course, when the inevitable take-home examination is going to be executed without recourse to any of the skills the traditional classroom is designed to cultivate.

    Almost all the current spate of books on American dumbness see a further dimension to the problem. Partly because of political leaders who talk, look and act dumb, stupidity is the most respectable life-stance available in New Millennium America. Our children are not only ignorant of history, geography, math and science, but – having taken a look at MTV, their parents and their government – persuaded that skills in any of those areas don’t matter, proud that they are as dumb as their friends, certain (as Benton notes) that all shortcomings are professorial or institutional à la RateMyProfessor.com rather than personal.

    Bauerlein blames a soft academic culture and indifferent Gen-X parenting for creating a generation of tech-savvy-world-dumb monsters. Ho-hum. But then, he is half right. As a professor – no, too pompous; as an educator, I know I have capitulated with Mammon in trying to make my classes more entertaining, my jokes funnier, my tests more “creative,” reading assignments less extensive than ever was the case when I was a college student. I know that I did this because I wanted something from the deal—good student evaluations, tenure, the envy of my colleagues, gratitude and undying affection from my students. All the best reasons.

    But the monster we have created has something Frankenstein’s lacked: self-esteem. We have created intellectual weaklings who are absolutely convinced that they have to be “defined” by the culture they live in, not by the (archaic) standards of old people (anyone born before 1960), whether teacher, parent, or employer. Bauerlein sees them as impervious to criticism because the I’m OK You’re OK platitudocracy into which they were born caused them to see criticism as a form of abuse. Praise, good grades, promotions and success are not exceptional but expected. And even that might be OK, Jack, except for a cloying sense that Orwellian mysticism undergirds the system, and the fear (even among panderers like me) that we are now calling mediocrity excellence and failure a new challenge.

  • Investment in the Placebo Effect

    Advised Daniel Cathell in a much-consulted manual for physicians published in 1922, “It is often very satisfying to the sick to be allowed to tell, in their own way, whatever they deem important for you to know. Give to all a fair, courteous hearing, and, even though Mrs. Chatterbox, Mr. Borum, and Mrs. Lengthy’s statements are tedious, do not abruptly cut them short, but endure and listen with respectful attention, even though you are ready to drop exhausted.”[1] The physician doomed to such recitations would have been that much more exhausted if instead of sitting in the comfort of his own quarters he made house calls one after another. In its own way, even medicine was a laborious trade. “It is, to our postmodern minds, quite incredible,” writes Edward Shorter, “that in those days patients expected the doctor to call virtually every day”—three or four days successively for the mumps, five days for a nervous condition, and so on.[2] Clearly the physician had to spend time with his patients if they were to gain the consoling feeling that they were being attended to in the full sense of the term. The doctor had to be patient.

    Compared to the postmodern physician, the attentive physician of 1922 had little in his armamentarium. Hence the use of bromides. Allowing patients to tell their story and hearing them out in full was itself a sort of bromide, which is not to say that this rite was without some therapeutic effect. On the contrary, it is probable that many complaints were alleviated by the release of telling and the consolation of being heard by a gentleman of science, especially if they were nonspecific to begin with. As is well known to drug manufacturers who conduct clinical trials only to discover that impressive numbers of placebo-takers report the benefits in question, suggestion is a potent force. “Suggestion,” concludes Shorter, “plays an enormous role in the practice of medicine, even though neither doctors nor patients like to admit it. What interests me is the declining ability of doctors today to cure by suggestion”[3]—declining if only because they no longer have either the inclination or the luxury to devote hours on end to the passivity of listening.

    Indeed, the entire model of doctors dispensing bromides (or vitamins or pink pills) and offering the sympathy of the ear seems to have been swept away by history as surely as the house call. Physicians today have at their disposal not only antibiotics and the fruits of a pharmacological revolution but an entire armory undreamed of a century ago when the ability to diagnose disease ran well ahead of the ability to treat. If physicians no longer dabble in talking cures, neither are they as powerless in the face of disease as their scientifically trained but otherwise ill-equipped predecessors. But the medical doctor’s abandonment of the rite of listening does not mean this practice has disappeared from among us. Psychotherapists, often popularly confused with medical doctors, have rushed in to fill the gap. When medical doctors with the exception of psychiatrists could or would not listen by the hour, therapists offered to do just this. Even as medicine became more powerful but less personal, psychology surged in popularity, quite as if it had taken up not only the functions of consolation abandoned by medicine but the very defense of the person. By the turn of the twenty-first century there were some 50,000 clinical psychologists among a quarter million psychotherapists of one stripe or another in the United States.

    The field of clinical psychology dates to the Veterans Administration Act of 1946 but soon enough outran its original mandate (as, indeed, post-traumatic stress disorder was eventually extended to cover patients who knew no battlefield beyond that of the family). Associated as it was with the defense of the person, clinical psychology’s growth-spurt coincided with a rights revolution that overthrew the paternalism etched all too plainly into Cathell’s portrait of the physician “enduring” the narratives of his patients. Even while the Cathellian physician performs the part of the listener and radiates a comforting humanity, he is filled with cynicism at his own charade. Nicknaming those to whom he shows courtesy and classifying them as “the sick,” he doesn’t seem to acknowledge these persons as independent beings and competent agents. It was against such attitudes that the bioethical principle of autonomy was asserted.

    As the discipline of bioethics came into being in tandem with the affirmation of patient rights, at its core lay recognition of the patient as a self-determining being. Following the publication of Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions in the 1960s the notion of the paradigm shift caught on, and many would characterize the emergence of bioethics not long thereafter as a paradigm shift in its own right—a decisive emancipation from the ways of the past. Such a description risks dividing history into the bad old days and the enlightened present.[4] Then people saw through a glass darkly; now we see things as they are. Then was deception and mystification; now is transparency. Even in the age of transparency, however, the psychotherapist operates in strict secrecy, claiming privileges of confidentiality that once invested the priest’s confessional and employing methods whose soundness has never been verified. Many would date the repudiation of the medical use of placebos to the advent of bioethics.[5] But even as placebos were banished from medical practice, the placebo effect flourished in the therapist’s office. If a placebo effect is a benefit (1) derived from the expectation of benefit (an expectation encouraged by the receipt of clinical attention itself) and (2) registered in the form of feeling better, then psychotherapy that lavishes attention on the patient in the interest of helping him or her feel better about things will almost necessarily engage the placebo effect. Moreover, where placebo effects can be distinguished both in theory and practice from the clinical effect of drugs—hence the methodologically demanding clinical trials pitting drug against placebo—such effects are so woven into the very practice of psychotherapy as to frustrate the attempt to distinguish them from actual benefits even in theory. Psychotherapy is a playground of placebo effects.

    Just as “it is often very satisfying to the sick” to pour forth what is on their minds, so the mere act of relating their troubles to an understanding therapist will tend to make patients feel better. Therapy is virtually designed for the placebo effect. As noted, it is no easy matter to differentiate the consolations of therapy even in theory from the mere sense of feeling better. Studies, and of these there are many, that find that patients receiving different modes of psychotherapy enjoy comparable benefits yield presumptive evidence that the benefits in question derive more from the happy effects of professional attention than from the specifics of this or that treatment. (Such studies also suggest that any given mode of psychotherapy tends to generate confirmation of its own value.) But in addition to respectful attention the therapist can offer many ingenious elaborations of the placebo effect. The therapist not only recognizes me as a self-determining person but helps identify the forces hindering me from achieving the self I wish for, not only refrains from judgment but assures me that the self is not subject to moral judgment at all and that those who so label me, wrong me. He or she believes in the potential for a richer existence I bear within. That all of this language is loaded; that one decade’s ethos of deferred gratification becomes another’s rhetoric of crimes against the self; that the manual of accredited mental disorders grows dramatically from edition to edition; that psychological diagnoses follow trends, as with PTSD, ADHD, bipolar disorder (now much on the rise), or the wave of imputed cases of child sexual abuse some years ago—all of this suggests that the discourse of psychological practice is epistemologically weaker and more fashion-driven than is commonly conceded; but because it rides trends, it is that much catchier and therefore that much more efficient as a conductor of placebo effects. In order for placebos to work, if only for a time, we have to trust in them, and psychologists and even their less trained brethren now seem to enjoy the kind of confidence that, as Shorter tells the story, was forfeited by postmodern physicians when they gave up the more personal mode of their merely modern predecessors.

    Medical history is a museum of discarded fashions, with the tempo of fashion accelerating during the twentieth century, as in the marketing of drugs for the treatment of psychiatric conditions. Many pharmaceutical remedies for schizophrenia, including super-doses of vitamins, were enthusiastically adopted only to be abandoned after proving to be nothing but placebos. Anti-anxiety drugs followed the same pattern, with the twist that some effective agents were prescribed, wittingly or not, at placebo levels. In studies of anti-depressants the success rate of placebos is high, in some cases approaching the rate of the drug in question. Mood-altering drugs are now vigorously advertised, thus tapping directly into the dynamo of fashion. The fact is that far from being exempt from fashion, drug treatments for psychiatric problems have shown themselves to be subject to that power and borrowed charisma straight from it. In psychiatry as in medicine generally, “Therapies are initially deemed veritable panaceas by patients and enthusiastic healers who describe impressive results. With time, the results falter, skeptical healers report flagging therapeutic efficacy, and new therapies take the place of the older ones.”[6] There is no reason to believe that psychotherapies enjoy an exemption from the influence of fashion that has played tricks with the use of psychiatric drugs. Quite the opposite. Standards of evidence are if anything less rigorous in talking therapies than in the use of drugs, which are after all subject to testing in double-blind clinical trials designed to control for the placebo effect. In talking treatments where all depends on the patient buying into the therapy, the fashionableness of the therapeutic language can be a great selling point, and an unfashionable language a patient lost. The power of fashion may bedevil psychotherapy epistemologically, but serves it otherwise. Oprah’s magazine offers tips on style along with psychological tips. If placebo controls in clinical trials “are our surest protection against fads and fashions that come and go,”[7] the placebo effect sustains the fads and fashions of psychotherapy.

    If we look into books written for the general market by therapists, books which after all constitute examples of therapeutic language in action, we had better be prepared to suspend ordinary standards of evidence. A chapter in the celebrity psychologist Phil McGraw’s Life Strategies is characteristically entitled “There Is No Reality, Only Perception.” A universe where perception is reality constitutes both an alternative to our own and a uniquely favorable medium for something as subjective as the placebo effect. As in this case, the authors of self-help manuals (many of them, like McGraw, PhD’s) are willing to say in print the sort of things others wisely keep behind closed doors, and the self-help genre is a theater of placebo effects, filled with vacuous language tricked up to console or inspire.[8] The literal meaning of “placebo,” “I will please,” could stand as the motto of many a self-help author, concerned as they are to ingratiate themselves by every possible means to their readers, whom they insist on addressing in the second person. As if the delegation of the role of the comforter to the psychologist were being dramatized, the self-help author reminds us that even in a world implacably hostile to the authentic self, he or she stands by us like a true friend. If there is no empirical basis for the effects ascribed to an inert pill in a clinical trial, neither is there an empirical foundation for many of the authors’ postulates, such as the existence of this authentic self or the possibility of reprogramming the self I now have.

    *

    A notoriously cynical use of a placebo was in the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment, launched a decade after Cathell’s Book on the Physician Himself with the aim of providing medical science with data about the effects of untreated tertiary syphilis. In the hope of claiming bodies for the autopsy table, the architects of the Tuskegee study recruited some hundreds of syphilis-infected black field workers from Macon County, Alabama under the pretense of treating their “bad blood.” Once well in the study’s net, the men were in fact treated only with iron tonic and aspirin, the latter of which, being new to them, seemed a wonder drug. When an actual wonder drug, penicillin, came onto the market after the study had already acquired its own inertia, they were not only denied it but prevented from getting it. While the authorities behind the Tuskegee study may have convinced themselves that their placebos were the very best sort of placebos inasmuch as they did the men a bit of good instead of being merely inactive, and that the study did the men no harm by denying treatment of a disease for which no good treatment existed, both rationalizations crumbled as they were overtaken by history. In any case those in charge of the study were guilty of drawing in the field workers with false promises and systematically deceiving them for decades thereafter. In the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment the deceptions to which the medical use of placebos lends itself appear in the most glaring light.

    By the time the Tuskegee infamy was exposed in the press in 1972, concern over the abuse of human subjects in medical research was such that safeguards of the subjects’ rights and interests were already being put in place. Two years later appeared a paper on “The Ethics of Giving Placebos” in Scientific American, to be followed in short order by a study of Lying, both by Sissela Bok. At the center of the bioethics revolution that began before and crested after Tuskegee came to light was the principle of informed consent, and it is a measure of commitment to this principle that subjects in randomized clinical trials now had to be notified that they might receive placebos.

    With the invocation of fuzzy if appealing constructs from “potential” all the way up to “authentic self,” therapists have devised a way to use the placebo effect free from the moral taint attaching to medical deceptions. In contrast to an experimenter knowingly administering a substance of little or no medical value to a duped subject as in Tuskegee, therapists do not seek to fool patients into believing in their own potential, or whatnot. They may tell themselves that the benefits of psychological counsel cannot possibly fall under the placebo effect because the placebo effect depends on deception, and they do not use deception. They may believe that the placebo effect kicks in only with the use of drugs, and because they do not prescribe drugs, they cannot possibly be invoking the placebo effect. Nevertheless, if the placebo effect refers to a perceived benefit that stems from the power of suggestion and the expectation of benefit alone, some of the benefits derived from an encounter as tailor-made for suggestion as the therapeutic transaction almost necessarily come under that heading, even if the transaction satisfies every bioethical requirement. Arguably, it was the ability to tap straight into the power of suggestion with a clear conscience, in the conviction that no ethical rule was being broken—indeed, that the therapeutic encounter uniquely respects and cherishes the autonomy of the patient—which cleared the way for the dramatic expansion of the psychological market over the decades since the principles of bioethics were first set down.

    *

    In the light of history it is clear that a seismic shift in the medical landscape took place in the second half of the twentieth century, more or less in tandem with the social revolution that broke out in the 1960s. Even as medicine acquired power that physicians early in the century could only have dreamed of, the physician’s right to the patient’s trust was sharply questioned (the abuse of trust in the Tuskegee experiment being fresh in everyone’s mind), and medicine itself became more impersonal and system-like. No sooner had the word “alienation” come into vogue than many learned what it was to feel alienated from the powerful institution of medicine. Doctors had less time to spend with patients. Around the same time, however, psychotherapy boomed. “Credibility,” the word of the hour, was invested in psychotherapy even as it was withdrawn from other institutions. Not only did psychotherapists spend time with their patients as doctors now rarely did, but, enjoying a credit that few others were able to command, were well positioned to exercise the power of suggestion. At a time when the notion that American society is sick had the status of Jane Austen’s “truth universally acknowledged,” the therapist claimed a special believability, and belief is the soul of the placebo effect.

    My sense, then, is that the erosion of the doctor-patient bond to which Edward Shorter refers and the burgeoning of the market for psychotherapy occurred not just at the same time but together. Even as medicine underwent the narrowest scrutiny at the hands of the new discipline of bioethics, psychotherapy received a kind of plenary grant of credulity, supporting which was and is a conception of the therapist as a priest of health whose office is a confessional. The counsel dispensed in the therapist’s office is accordingly wrapped in a semi-religious secrecy, in contrast to doctrines like human potential or the authentic self that fly in full view in any bookstore you like. The confidentiality of therapy serves not only to shield the patient but to protect the therapist’s theories and practices from the sort of scrutiny to which words and deeds are generally liable in our contentious world.

    And yet the epistemological embarrassment of the placebo effect is hardly a secret. That the therapeutic benefits of psychoanalysis might derive from nothing more solid than the placebo effect was recognized almost a century ago by Freud himself, though he purported to answer this potentially annihilating objection to his method.[9] As for psychotherapy in general, it is well known that over the years evidentiary support has lagged behind the practice of that art. The hospitality of therapy to the placebo effect was conceded fifty years ago. Wrote David Rosenthal and Jerome Frank in a 1956 paper on “Psychotherapy and the Placebo Effect”:

    It is by now generally recognized that all forms of psychotherapy yield successful results with some patients and that these successes depend to an undetermined extent on factors common to many types of relationship between patient and therapist. This poses a knotty problem for proponents of various specific forms of psychotherapy who are convinced that their successes result from their particular theory or technique and wish to convince others of this. . . . Certain general aspects of the psychotherapeutic relationship seems very similar to those responsible for the so-called placebo effect, which is well known to investigators of the therapeutic efficacy of medications.[10]

    A candid admission. In the intervening half century the double-blind clinical trial became the norm of verification, and experience has shown that “for afflictions that have a strong psychological component, like pain, anxiety, and depression, the placebo response rates are often high, making it more difficult to prove a drug’s efficacy” in such trials.[11] And if it isn’t common knowledge that of all medical or quasi-medical treatments, “psychotherapy, whether provided by psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, nurse therapists, clerics, or other professionals, is the treatment most subject to placebo effects,”[12] it ought to be. Yet even critical minds seem reluctant to question the basis of psychological treatments that minister directly to the placebo effect.

    Why don’t medical doctors in particular, familiar as they are with the trickery of placebo effects in drug trials, call the psychotherapists on their claims? Perhaps because they are too busy or don’t care or think it comes too close to criticizing a fellow medical doctor or think engaging in argument beneath the dignity of a medical doctor or don’t want to intrude into a confessional or believe psychotherapy to be, if of doubtful good, at least harmless. But recall that physicians decades ago defaulted the listening and consoling functions of their profession to psychology. They are not about to reverse this arrangement. “The inrush of ‘science’ . . . has crowded out some of the doctor’s former empathy and ability to communicate concern.”[13] The rhetorical effect of this streamlining of medicine has been to charter psychotherapy as a complement to medicine, or a sort of complementary medicine in its own right. Not only has psychology has taken empathy and the communication of concern as its very mandate, it has embraced and exploited the placebo effect that no longer has an acknowledged place in medicine beyond the modest supporting role of a control in a clinical trial.

    Bioethics is governed by such august terms as moral norms, moral virtues, moral principles, moral ideals, moral excellence (all of which appear prominently in Beauchamp and Childress’s Principles of Biomedical Ethics). In the therapist’s office language like this will appear in scare quotes if at all, its nullification probably contributing to the soothing effect of therapy. As was noted fifty years ago, in and of itself the “undemanding attitude” of the psychotherapist is likely to activate the placebo effect.[14] Not only do psychotherapists not speak for moral norms (now reduced to a puerile if vicious blame game), some are willing to dismiss moral evaluations as a pious fraud and a menace to authenticity. Take up anything written by a therapist for the mass market and you will probably find morality portrayed just so—as a lie perpetrated by the world to keep us from discovering our true selves. Morality itself is thus identified as a radical threat to one of the animating ideals of the bioethics revolution: human self-determination. Perhaps so many find therapists specially believable because they present themselves as uniquely exemplifying the guiding bioethical principles of beneficence, nonmaleficence, and respect for autonomy all at once.

    If, as Shorter observes, physicians hesitate to acknowledge the role of suggestion in medicine, psychotherapy deals liberally, almost openly in suggestion. But the strictly private transaction between Mr. Borum and the Cathellian physician hardly bears comparison with the massive social investment in placebo effects in an era when psychology has its own category in the Yellow Pages and insurance plans cover visits to the therapist. The things in which we invest in common as a polity must presumably meet a higher standard than those we buy into as private citizens. In my view a good as obviously laced with suggestion, indeed as difficult to distinguish from suggestion, as psychological counsel fails that standard. Much as I would not care to see the caricature of morality made a public principle, neither would I care to give public authorization to the practice of suggestion and the cultivation of the placebo effect.

    Some might say that if psychotherapy trades on the placebo effect, so be it—that in this realm whatever makes the patient feel better, works. I would answer that psychotherapy became institutionalized in American life to the point of being covered in insurance plans by advertising itself as an art with a foundation in science, not as a channel for the placebo effect. History suggests that all kinds of things help people feel better: potions, relics, waters, confession, leeches, purgatives, tonics, autosuggestion, the laying on of hands, any of the million and one treatments purveyed through the ages by healers playing on the placebo effect whether they knew it or not. Of course to consult history is to deny the assumption, now a fashion in its own right, that the consumer society stands above history, emancipated from the ignorance that was the plague of the past. With some 250 varieties of psychotherapy already on the market a quarter of a century ago,[15] and with fads like encounter groups, orgone therapy, Rolfing, and a Bartholomew Fair of similar wares continually going into and out of existence, their forms limited only by human invention and the life-span of fashion, it would be amazing if patients with psychological ailments could find nothing that made them feel better, at least temporarily. But for a citizen the question is not whether this or that therapy makes Smith feel better. It is whether making Smith feel better is enough to warrant the investment of public trust.

    References

    [1] Edward Shorter, Doctors and Their Patients: A Social History (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1991), p. 158.

    [2] Doctors and Their Patients, p. 160.

    [3] Doctors and Their Patients, p. 151.

    [4] “Medical ethics enjoyed a remarkable degree of continuity from the days of Hippocrates until the middle of the twentieth century. Developments in the biological and health sciences then led to critical reflection . . .” Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Fifth Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 1. Cf. Orwell’s 1984: “The history books say that life before the Revolution was completely different from what it is now.”

    [5] Paul J. Edelson, “Patient, Heal Thyself,” Hastings Center Report, September-October 1998.

    [6] Arthur K. Shapiro and Elaine Shapiro, The Powerful Placebo: From Ancient Priest to Modern Physician (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 95. My information about psychiatric drugs comes from this source.

    [7] Paul Leber, “The Placebo Control in Clinical Trials,” Psychopharmacology Bulletin 22 (1986): 32.

    [8] On the pop psychology movement, see my Fool’s Paradise: The Unreal World of Pop Psychology (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2005).

    [9] Adolf Grünbaum, “Empirical Evaluations of Theoretical Explanations of Psychotherapeutic Efficacy: A Response to Greenwood,” Philosophy of Science 63 (1996): 622-41. See also John D. Greenwood, “Placebo Control Treatments and the Evaluation of Psychotherapy: A Reply to Grünbaum and Erwin,” Philosophy of Science 64 (1997): 497-510.

    [10] David Rosenthal and Jerome Frank, “Psychotherapy and the Placebo Effect,” Psychological Bulletin 53 (1956): 294.

    [11] Martin Enserink, “Can the Placebo Be the Cure?” Science, 9 April 1999: 238.

    [12] The Powerful Placebo, p. 85.

    [13] Doctors and Their Patients, p. 201.

    [14] Rosenthal and Jerome Frank, “Psychotherapy and the Placebo Effect”: 296.

    [15] The Powerful Placebo, p. 103.

    Stewart Justman is the author of Fool’s Paradise: The Unreal World of Pop Psychology.

  • David Littman’s Statement to UN HRC June 16 2008

    UNHR Council: 8th Session (2-18 June 2008): President: Ambassador Doru Romulus Costea Speaker: AWE Representative David G. LITTMAN. Monday (4:40-6:05p.m.) 16 June 2008

    Follow-up to and implementation of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action:Integrating the human rights of women throughout the United Nations system (item 8)

    Mr President
    [Words in red not pronounced on President’s advice, after the meeting was suspended 30 minutes]
    In the context of integrating the human rights of women throughout the United Nations System, we wish to draw attention to four examples of widespread violence against women that we believe merit far greater attention from the Council.

    1. Regarding FGM, our detailed written statement [The 1st interruption by Egypt’s delegate occurred here; about 15 others followed.] [E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/NGO/27: Background on “Traditional or Customary Practices” /Female Genital Mutilation and the Arabic text (& translations), certified by Al-Azhar University, the authoritative source for the Shafi’i school of Sunni law, widely adhered to in Egypt] discusses the reasons why 96% of Egyptian women are still subjected to FGM despite State legislation in 1997 outlawing the practice [Sara Corbett, “A Cutting Tradition”, NYT, Sunday Magazine, 20 Jan. 2008]. “Almost 90% of the female population in the north of Sudan undergo FGM which, in many cases, is practised in its most extreme form known as infibulation” – we are quoting from the Report of Special Rapporteur Halima Warzazi [E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/41, §24]. UNICEF figures indicate that over 3 million young girls are mutilated each year in 32 countries, 29 of which are Member States of the OIC. We believe that only a fatwa from Al-Azhar Grand Sheikh Sayyad Tantawi – replacing the ambiguous fatwas of 1949, 1951 and 1981 – will change this barbaric, criminal practice, which is now growing even in Europe.

    2. The number of “honour killings” is on the increase, worldwide. Ten years ago in 1998, there were a reported 300 cases of honour killings in one province of Pakistan alone [Mufti Ziauddin “Status of Court Cases for Murdered Women; and BBC film, Home programme, 8 April 2000.] On 28 April 2000, President Musharraf declared that “The Government of Pakistan vigorously condemns the practice of so-called ‘Honour Killings’ and that such actions do not find any place in our religion or law.” Yet this murderous practice seems to be on the increase in Pakistan and elsewhere – even in Europe in certain communities. It must be criminalised and the law strictly applied.

    3. The stoning of women for alleged adultery still occurs regularly in Iran, Sudan and other [Muslim] countries [that apply Shari’a law]. In Iran, they are buried up to their waists in pits and [by law] blunt stones are used thereby increasing their agony in death.

    4. The marriage age for girls in Iran remains at 9 years [based on Shari’a law]. In the year 2000, the Iranian Parliament attempted to increase the age to 14 but the law was overturned by the Council of Guardians, [claiming Quaranic justification] [“Islamic scholars have put a lot of efforts into these laws.”– “Iran Bill to End Marriage at 9. Guardian Consent Still Needed”, IHT, 10 August 2000] Last week, Noble Peace Prize Laureate Shirin Ebadi, speaking in Geneva, denounced the fact that in Iran a girl is considered an adult and liable to punishment, even execution at 9, and a boy at 15. [Le Temps, 10 June 2008]. She rejects the concept of cultural relativism, as does the French Secretary of State for Urban Affairs, Fadela Amara, who recently strongly criticised the ruling of a French judge in Lille for annulling a marriage between two Muslims because the girl lied about her virginity in the marriage contract. Ms. Amara rightly called this aberration “a real fatwa against the emancipation and liberty of women.” [Steven Erlanger, “Muslim minister tackles French suburbs: Blunt talker refuses to accept ‘injustices’”, Int. Herald Tribune, 14-15 June 2008]

    Thank you Mr. President. These crimes should not be treated as taboo subjects.

    AWE c/o Case Postale 205 – 1196 Gland – Suisse

  • Calls to Kill in the name of God or Religion

    Joint written statement submitted at the Sixty-second session of the UN Commission on Human Rights by the International Humanist and Ethical Union (IHEU), and the Association for World Education, and the Association of World Citizens, February 28, 2006.

    1. The legitimacy of the use of violence and acts of terrorism in the name of Islam is
    the subject of continuing debate within the Islamic world. The debate, which is clearly
    divisive, turns on interpretations of the concept of Jihad when carried out as “Holy War.”

    2. It is significant that persons close to those who carried out the London bombings on
    7 July 2005 and the earlier attacks in Madrid, as well as other terror attacks, claimed that
    they did so in the name of Jihad.

    3. On 18 July 2005, following the London bombing, a fatwa was issued by the British
    Muslim Forum and approved by 500 UK Muslim clerics, scholars and imams. It stated
    inter alia that: “Islam strictly, strongly and severely condemns the use of violence and the
    destruction of innocent lives… Such acts, as perpetrated in London, are crimes against
    humanity and contrary to the teachings of Islam.”[1]

    4. In order to analyse certain aspects of this debate within the Islamic tradition, three
    NGOs – the Association for World Education (AWE), International Humanitarian and
    Ethical Union (IHEU) and Association of World Citizens (AWC) – organised a Parallel
    One-Day NGO Conference on 18 April 2005 at the 61st session of the Commission,
    entitled: ‘Victims of Jihad: Muslims, Dhimmis, Apostates, and Women.’ The conference
    analysed the history and current understanding of Jihad within Islam, and the devastating
    impact of the ideology of Jihad on its victims. The speakers included historians, writers,
    and human rights defenders. They presentations included:

    • -A background historical analysis of Jihad by Dutch academic Johannes J.G. Jansen
      of Utrecht University; and an analysis by Caroline Fourest, French author on
      religious extremism.

    • An analysis of The Culture of ‘Jihad and Martyrdom’ in Egyptian school textbooks,
      and The Culture of Hate in Saudi Arabian textbooks by David G. Littman;

    • Negationism by Bat Ye’or, expert on Jihad, dhimmis, dhimmitude and “Eurabia”
    • The treatment of Apostasy in Islamic law and its inconsistency with International
      Human Rights Instruments by Ibn Warraq;

    • Women in Islam by Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Dutch Parliamentarian, author of
      “Submission,” a TV film produced with Theo van Gogh, who was murdered in an
      Amsterdam street in November 2004 by a fanatical Muslim.

    • Personal testimonies by Taslima Nasrin, Bangladeshi exiled writer; Azam
      Kamguian, Iranian writer and women’s rights activist; Hamouda F. Bella, Sudanese
      Muslim human rights activist; and Simon Deng, Sudanese Christian former slave.[2]

    5. Dr. Ahmad Abu Matar, a Palestinian academic living in Oslo, in a statement
    published on a website one day before the NGO Conference, argued that many Muslims in
    Europe foster conflict instead of coexistence and they are being influenced by extremist
    fundamentalist brands of Islam – and moderate Muslims are not speaking out adequately
    against this activity.[3]

    6. On 8 July, the day after the London carnage, Amir Taheri – reputed author and
    columnist for the London Arab daily, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat – made a crucial point:

    Until we hear the voices of Muslims condemning attacks with no words such as ‘but’ and ‘if,’ the
    suicide bombers and the murderers will have an excuse to think that they enjoy the support
    of all Muslims. The real battle against the enemy of mankind will begin when the ‘silent
    majority’ in the Islamic world makes its voice heard against the murderers, and against
    those who brainwash them, and fund them.[4]

    7. A similar view was presented in the same newspaper a day later when Al-Arabiya
    TV Director-General Abd Al-Rahman Al-Rashed wrote, under the title, “Expel Extremism
    Today”:

    For over 10 years now, I myself and other Arab writers have warned against the
    dangers of the reckless handling of the extremism that is now spreading like a plague
    within the British community. (…) Like many other diseases, extremism is a contagious
    one. (…) The British authority’s leniency regarding fundamentalist fascism has allowed
    many, including Arab and Muslim intellectuals and journalists, to adopt ideologies that
    promote extremism and defend criminals such as bin Laden and Al-Zarqawi. The situation
    has escalated to the extent that Arab and Muslim intellectuals fear the repercussions of
    condemning extremists. The battle we face is against the ideology, as opposed to against
    the terrorists themselves. (…) The time has come for British authorities to deal harshly
    with extremism, before complete chaos is un-leashed onto British society. In the past, we
    talked about stopping them. Now, it is time to expel.[5]

    8. The ideology to which Al-Rashed refers is often expressed by Islamists extolling
    the legitimacy of violence. Among many examples: on 30 December 2002, before the war
    in Iraq began, the then Hamas leader Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi posted a Hamas website
    Appeal for Muslims to flood Iraq with ‘martyr -shahid ’ bombers. It stated: “The enemies of
    Allah…crave life while the Muslims crave martyrdom. The martyrdom operations that
    shock can ensure that horror is sowed in the [enemies’] hearts – and horror is one of the
    causes of defeat.”[6] This widely-propagated call by the Hamas leader over the internet was
    taken very seriously and many young men – encouraged also by Al-Qaeda – poured into
    Iraq in order to perform ‘Jihad in the path of Allah.’

    9. Unfortunately, the concept of deliberately sacrificing one’s life while killing
    infidels and those targeted as Muslim ‘apostates’ – including any collateral bystanders – is
    sanctioned by tradition and currently revived in fatwas by several Islamic religious
    authorities.[7]

    10. The 1988 Hamas Charter, co-authored by the late Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and Abd
    al-Aziz al- Rantisi embodies Jihadist interpretations of Islam. Article 8 of the Hamas
    charter, borrowed from the Muslim Brotherhood Charter of 1928, has since become the
    blueprint for global terror. It declares: “Allah is its target, the Prophet is its model, the
    Koran its Constitution; Jihad is its path, and death for the sake of Allah is the loftiest of its
    wishes.”[8]

    11. Regrettably, this and other extremist Jihadist interpretations of Islam have been
    approved by several Muslim clerics worldwide, including Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradhawi
    (head of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, president of the International
    Association of Muslim scholars (IAMS) and spiritual guide of the Muslim Brotherhood
    and other Islamic groups).

    12. Speaking on Qatar TV 25 February 2006. Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradhawi made his
    position clear:

    We are fighting in the name of religion, in the name of Islam, which makes this Jihad an
    individual duty, in which the entire nation takes part, and whoever is killed in this [Jihad]
    is a martyr. This is why I ruled that martyrdom operations are permitted, because he
    commits martyrdom for the sake of Allah, and sacrifices his soul for the sake of Allah.”[9]

    13. There are also those who are not willing to offer a definitive opinion on the question
    of the legitimacy of violence within Islam. It has been argued that those who issue fatwas
    to kill innocent people in the name of Islam are not true Muslims and should be treated as
    apostates. But on 6 July 2005, a day before the London bombing, a major conference of
    170 Muslim scholars from forty countries meeting in Amman, Jordan provided an opinion
    in a Final Communiqué: “It is not possible to declare as apostates any group of Muslims
    who believes in Allah the Mighty and Sublime and His Messenger (may Peace and
    Blessings be upon him) and the pillars of faith, and respects the pillars of Islam and does
    not deny any necessary article of religion .”[10]

    14. From the above opinion, it is clear that according to some of the most influential
    voices in the Islamic world, Muslims who perform terrorist attacks in the path of jihad
    remain Muslims however reprehensible their actions.

    15. In several statements to the Commission and Sub-Commission, IHEU, AWE and
    other NGOs have called upon the Commission and the Organisation of the Islamic
    Conference to condemn unequivocally those who kill or who call on others to kill in the
    name of God or religion. We regret that the OIC and the Commission has thus far failed to
    respond to these calls.

    16. We continue to believe that such a condemnation by the Commission and the OIC
    would encourage other Muslim organisations to speak our against the terrorists and
    extremists and would have a salutary effect in dissuading potential terrorists from carrying
    out further outrageous attacks in the name of Jihad.

    17. We again call on the Organization of the Islamic Conferenc e (OIC), the Arab
    League, and individual Muslim religious, cultural and political leaders to join in an
    unambiguous condemnation of those who defame Islam by calls to kill in the name of
    Allah, or of Islam. We respectfully suggest that the OIC have an urge nt responsibility to
    include such a condemnation in the resolution: Combating defamation of religions which
    they have co-sponsored at the Commission since 1999.

    18. We also call once again on the Commission to adopt a clear resolution or – failing
    that – a Chairman’s statement, in which any call to kill, to terrorise, or to use violence in
    the name of God, or of any religion, is condemned without qualification.

    1 BBC NEWS. Published: 2005/07/19 15:41:43 GMT.

    2 UN Human Rights Docs.

    3 http://www.elaph.com (17 April 2005)
    MEMRI, Special Dispatch Series – No. 921, 10 June 2005. Reproduced: E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/NGO/4. See also,
    for further references, written statements: E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/NGO/2 and E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/NGO/3.

    4 Amir Taheri, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), 7 July 2005, translation in MEMRI Special Report, 8 July 2005, N° 36:
    Arab Media Reactions to
    London Bombings: “A Chapter in Word War III”
    . Also Amir Taheri: “And this is why they do it”, in
    TimesOnline (London), 8 July 2005.

    5 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), 9 July 2005. MEMRI: Special Report – Jihad & Terrorism, 12 July 2005, No.
    37: Arab and Iranian Media Reactions to the London Bombing-Part II: “The Attacks Were Anticipated Due
    to British Leniency to Extremists Acting in Britain”/“Expel Extremism Today”
    .

    6 MEMRI, Special Dispatch Series – No. 457, 9 January 2003, English trans., “Hamas spokesman: Iraq must
    Establish a Suicide Army”
    . See, Raphael Israeli, Islamikaze: Manifestations of Islamic Martyrology (London /Portland, OR: Cass, 2003).

    7 Extracts reproduced in E/CN/Sub.2/2004/NGO/25*. See also E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/NGO/26, for references
    to Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Hizbullah, and Al-Qaeda.

    8 English translation.

    9 MEMRI Special Dispatch – Jihad & Terrorism Studies Project, No. 1102, Qatar TV, 25 February 2006.

    10 “Islam struggles to stake out its position,” by Judea Pearl, International Herald Tribune, 20 July 2005,
    p. 8. This article appeared in the Boston Globe. King Abdullah’s conference address is at:
    www.MaximsNews.com. In this specific context, see also the report by the Intelligence and Terrorism
    Information Center (Center for Special Studies / C.S.S.), entitled: “Islamic Legitimacy for the London
    Bombings,”
    dated 20 July 2005, prepared, edited and translated by Reuven Paz, Director and Editor of the
    Project for the Research of Islamist Movements (PPISM ).

  • To be a moderate

    There are only so many areas in life where it is possible to be moderate. In fact, the term “moderate” has the feeling of an insult implying a less than desirable condition. Even Dante seemed more annoyed with the Agnostics than with homosexual clerics and corrupt politicians. However, in socio-political circles it is possible to be moderate and get away with it.

    If you don’t subscribe to any political party it gets even easier. You can believe in free trade, feel that there are significant benefits to globalisation, and that this can be achieved without compromising fundamental worker rights. The two are not mutually exclusive.

    You can feel that there has to be a system to retain and encourage entrepreneurs within a country, possibly in the form of tax relief, but not at the expense of everyone else picking up the slack in tax revenue. A healthy, educated population is a benefit for everyone in a sovereign state after all.

    And so on and so forth. Sitting on the fence, seeing merits or points in parts of both left and (slightly) right politics, it can be done.

    However, moderation does not translate to religion. From Tony Blair’s troop of super heroic religious police forces, helping to ease suffering and intolerance (handy, given they usually had a hand or started the suffering and intolerance in the first place), to Saudi Princes, religions seem to be clambering to prove they are a force for tolerance and moderation.

    It is perfectly possible to be politically in the centre and still maintain your own principles; however, it is not be possible to be moderate in religion, as this defeats the central tenet of the faith itself.

    How can, say, Tony Blair convert to Catholicism, yet support and have a major hand in introducing legal rights for homosexuals in the UK, taking on the Catholic Church in the process? Is his god wrong on this issue? I mean, it’s a big thing to get wrong, given all the oppression and suffering it has caused. It’s not like getting the meat on a Friday wrong, no one suffered because they had a bacon sandwich on a Friday (apart from those who ended up in Purgatory before repeal of that requirement).

    How can you be moderate in the face of such clear instruction from a god to oppose so many things?

    Part of the problem with the Church of England is just how it tried to move to a moderate chocolate-digestive-and-cup-of-tea type of faith; in the end, this completely undervalued the whole basis for the religion in the first place. Why bother with God when a little bit of everything is ok?

    Even the most middle-of-the-road of all faiths, Buddhism, has some problems, especially over killing and harm to humans. Is it never right to harm someone else or kill them? If it is unethical to raise a fist under any circumstance or to kill even in self-defence, then how does this work for most of Europe during Hitler’s reign? How does this help meet the other aim of alleviating suffering? If you feel that there are certain circumstances where killing a sentient being is justifiable, then how can you be a Buddhist?

    The implication is that all religion needs fundamentalism; it cannot exist as a moderate entity. Religion is about control and oppression, setting and obeying of moral codes, justifying these through the Word of God. It is not supposed to be a box of chocolates where you pick out all the caramel and toffee ones and leave the disgusting coffee liquor ones for someone else.

    To say religious texts are just a mild allegorical set of tales rather than a set of strict literal codes is to say the whole of the Bible or Qur’an is nothing more than an extended fortune cookie or horoscope. Pick out the stuff that sounds good like the finding a new love and forget the bad stuff about financial problems.

    I can see the need or want for a more moderate approach to religion, but the references for a religion is a book and teachings that are anything but moderate. If they contain bits that a moderate finds reprehensible and unethical, then why still consider it your faith?

    Would you consider yourself a Stephen Spielberg fan if you only liked ET and thought all his other films bad? Probably not. Would you hail the virtues of the White Album if you only liked Helter Skelter and thought the rest of it pretentious art drivel? Again, probably not. Yet you can be “religious” when you feel the vast majority of the word of a god is wrong apart from a few nice bits.

    This, though, is not about the irony or contradiction contained in many religious beliefs. This isn’t pointing out that in Islam, Sharia Law is the only law to follow and if, as a Muslim, you live in a country that doesn’t operate according to Sharia Law, your faith specifically instructs you to leave that country.

    It is ironic then when fundamentalist Muslims resort to the infidel laws in operation within these infidel countries to claim breaches of the infidels’ views on human rights when a journalist writes some home truths or a school does not like headscarves. Obviously, the issue of the headscarf is much greater than the demand from Allah that you pack up and leave the country.

    No, this is about the way statements in faiths that demand you love your neighbour but hate your enemy; that you love those that Allah loves and hate those that Allah hates; that you sit and allow intolerable suffering on the basis that to kill under any circumstance is wrong; that you must suppress a woman’s worth and role in society.; that God also deals in real estate and told the truth when he said you could have that piece of land, but lying to the other lot when he told them the same thing and that homosexuality is an abomination. How, under such clear statements, can any religion become moderate without completely separating from the original source?

    Not one religious text allows for cherry picking of certain parts and the ignoring of others, the only variation is how extremely you interpret certain bits. To be a Christian means you have to accept and believe in the resurrection; any doubt about this does not mean you are a moderate, it means you cannot be a Christian.

    To be proud that your offspring have achieved something, even a victory in the egg and spoon race, is to commit the sin of pride. If you believe this is a bit harsh and perhaps does not justify eternal damnation, then you are saying that God is wrong. Just as he is wrong on slavery, homosexuality, war, rape, talking donkeys, infanticide, flooding the planet in a pique of throwing toys out the pram, and so on.

    As long as people keep going back to their version of the “good book” there will never be a place for moderates in religion, they will always remain a sect, simply because it is physically impossible to subscribe to a religion and then preach moderation. To be a moderate means you have to discard so much of the bad and ugly that all you are left with is a small pamphlet of good stuff.

    Sound principles though these may be, they don’t really require the existence of a god to bring them about (except when practitioners of sadomasochism read that bit about doing unto others as you wish to be done to you, we might need a god then).

    We cannot tolerate the intolerable and there is no middle ground on Stone Age or Dark Age religious texts. It may be a wonderful PR exercise for those who would want the world to believe theirs is a faith of peace, but the very material they consider true cannot in any way be interpreted as moderate.

    Posted July 27 2008

  • This Is An Annoyance-Free Zone (but tacky souvenirs welcome)

    It’s probably too much to hope the Parliament of New South Wales is hanging its head after a righteous scolding by the Federal Court of Australia[1]. After all, the government was bold enough to outlaw “annoying” the Catholic throngs descending on Sydney for a five-day Pope-a-Rama. Attempting to shame the Catholic Church is likewise futile; given its irony-free staging of the world’s biggest adolescent/clergy mixer, we must presume it innocent of that emotion.

    But let’s try anyway.

    Previously, on “World Youth Day. . .”

    The Vatican picked Sydney for its latest “pilgrimage of faith, where young people from diverse backgrounds meet and experience the love of God.” Events from July 15-20, 2008, will include spiritual favorites: multiple catechisms, on-site confession, the requisite snuff Passion Play; as well as more mundane diversions: “original high energy Christian praise” (read: Christian Rock on a lawn), coffee klatches, and the procession of the Popemobile. Like any responsible government preparing for an influx of thousands, the NSW Parliament enacted regulations to keep things tidy — ordinary matters such as street closures, police presence, and the like.

    But in its zeal to have the Best World Youth Day Ever, Parliament also enacted the extraordinary:

    7 Control of conduct within World Youth Day declared areas

    (1) An authorised person may direct a person within a World Youth
    Day declared area to cease engaging in conduct that:
    (a) is a risk to the safety of the person or others, or
    (b) causes annoyance or inconvenience to participants in a
    World Youth Day event. . .

    Reasonable people dedicated to the (sacred?) principle of free speech were shocked. Would they be arrested for noting that the Pope’s hat didn’t match his shoes? Would a whispered warning during mass — “Psst! Father – your purse is on fire!” — land one in the clink? And while we’re on fashion, could the police charge Amber Pike and Rachel Evans with criminal inconvenience for wearing T-shirts that forced the faithful to confront the Catholic Church’s vile obstruction of birth control and safe sex measures? After all, at least one of the faithful would surely find “The Pope is Wrong. Put on a Condom,” vexing.

    And now, the exciting conclusion. . . .

    As the NoToPope Coalition, Pike and Evans challenged provisions of the regulations that barred “caus[ing] annoyance or inconvenience to participants in a World Youth Day event,”[2] and that barred the sale or distribution (this is key) of items and merchandise. The Court agreed that annoying people, however annoying that might be, was protected speech. But it said the city could regulate the sale and distribution of articles and merchandise throughout the event. Apparently, Pike and Evans were concerned they wouldn’t be allowed to distribute stickers, badges, leaflets, and condoms with slogans including:

    • • I know condoms save lives – Is that annoying?
    • • I am not a Catholic! – Is that annoying?
    • • I know Gays are great – Is that annoying?
    • • I had premarital sex! Is that annoying?
    • • I don’t believe Mary was a virgin! Is that annoying?
    • • I don’t believe the Pope is infallible! Is that annoying?
    • • I have a condom on me! Is that annoying?
    • • I am gay! Is that annoying?

    Who could blame Pike and Evans for finding it unlikely that their items would pass muster? The WYD Regulation of 2008 required vendors to submit an application, a fee, and a sample of the items to the state seven days before distributing or selling “prescribed articles.”[3] So they challenged that provision of the law. And the court rejected that challenge.

    But wait — there’s a shock twist ending!

    The Court ruled that the state could limit the distribution (not just the sale) of “prescribed articles,” during WYD, but Pike and Evans needn’t worry, because the stuff they wanted to give out didn’t constitute stuff the state would prohibit. Not to be accused of parsimonious reasoning, the court teased out the subtle differences among various dry goods:

    In our view none of the classes of prescribed articles would include condoms . . .Similarly, symbolic coat-hangers such as the applicants propose to distribute do not fall within any of the classes prescribed. We are also of the opinion that leaflets and flyers which the applicants intend to distribute do not fall within any class of prescribed article. The applicants submitted that they might be regarded as “stationery” and therefore come within category (h). We do not accept this submission. Paper on which the leaflets and flyers are printed may have been “stationery”, but once printed it does not fall within that category. The position is more complex in relation to stickers and button badges [?], both of which are specifically mentioned as examples of “giftware”. Interestingly, the term “giftware” is not defined in either the Oxford English Dictionary or the Macquarie Dictionary. . .

    Enough of that.

    And what do we find on the approved list of merchandise and “prescribed articles” for sale during World Youth Day? A mercantile burlesque:

    Shoppers will be able to buy World Youth Day (WYD) souvenirs such as special WYD rosary beads, Pope Benedict XVI baseball caps, rugby jerseys and even teaspoons featuring a photograph of the pontiff. Sydney Archbishop Cardinal George Pell opened one of at least four merchandise stores to be erected in Sydney for the six-day WYDay event.[4]

    No one familiar with the aesthetics of the Catholic Church would be surprised, of course. The Pope has ever been Catholicism’s Liberace, bearing gold scepters and precious accessories in the worlds’ most expensive drag pageant. But one would think the New South Wales clergy might throw a scrap to those questioning this mash-up of the sacred and the profane (not to mention tawdry). No:

    “There’s nothing immoral with a little commercialism,” Cardinal Pell told reporters. “Our way of life is built on commercialism, on trade, on industry, on finance and people have got a right to make a living out of doing a good thing, which is spreading Christ’s message in a modern way.”

    God — deliver us from your merchandisers.

    Notes

    (1)The Federal Court of Australia’s judgment in Evans v. State of New South Wales

    (2) The World Youth Day Regulation of 2008

    (3) The NSW government’s application to sell or distribute merchandise.

    (4). “There’s nothing immoral with a little commercialism,” Cardinal Pell told reporters

  • The Animal Liberation Front and Intimidation

    On Tuesday October 18 2005, a member of the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) rang a hotel in Anaheim, California. A pharmaceuticals conference was taking place at the hotel. One of the delegates was Steve Ruckman of Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS), a company which uses animals in research and testing. A communiqué from the ALF dated October 25, which includes the warning “Associate with HLS and we will ruin your life,” reports the conversation this way:

    “ALF: Hello, I stayed in Room xxx recently and think I left something behind.

    Concierge: What is that?

    ALF: A bomb. You’ve allowed HLS to come into your hotel, now you will pay the price.

    Concierge: What was that?

    ALF: If Steven Ruckman from HLS takes the stage, everyone dies. Have a good day.”

    Not a conspicuously philosophical moment, one might think. But the communiqué can be read on the website of the North American Animal Liberation Press Office (NAALPO) – an organisation which is entirely separate from and independent of the ALF, but which publicises its activities. One of the co-founders (in December 2004) of NAALPO is Steven Best, a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas at El Paso. At the time of that communiqué he was a press officer for NAALPO himself.

    At the end of August, the Home Office declared it was banning Steven Best from the UK. Best had been planning to travel to Britain to join other animal rights campaigners in celebrating the closure of Darley Oaks Farm (which bred guinea pigs for research), but the home secretary, Charles Clarke, citing the government’s crackdown on “preachers of hate” in the wake of the July 7 bombings, denied Best permission to enter the country.

    Was this an infringement of Best’s academic freedom and right to free speech? Or can philosophers legitimately be restricted if they are judged to be publicising and defending groups that threaten, intimidate, and harass people?

    This wasn’t the first time the Home Office was concerned about Best: it considered banning him in 2004 (see TPM 28). On that occasion, however, though the Home Office did ban three other US animal rights activists – Dr Jerry Vlasak, Pamelyn Ferdin and Rod Coronado – they decided not to exclude Best. “I was somewhat embarrassed for not being militant enough to be considered a threat,” he wrote of the decision.

    Thus permitted to enter, Best attended the International Animal Rights Gathering 2005 at a secret location in Kent on July 17. The Sunday Telegraph reported him as saying there:

    “We are not terrorists, but we are a threat. We are a threat both economically and philosophically. […] We will break the law and destroy property until we win. We are abolitionists. We don’t want to reform them [vivisectionist companies], we want to wipe them off the face of the earth. We will fight, and die if necessary, to free the slaves.”

    Some five weeks later, on August 23, the owners of Darley Oaks Farm in Newchurch, Staffordshire, announced that they were closing down because of intimidation by animal activists. The farm had been breeding guinea pigs for medical research for more than thirty years, and the owners had been subjected to a six year campaign of abuse, according to the BBC, which reported that the owners and people connected with the business had received death threats. The Hall family, who owned the farm, said they hoped their decision to cease operations would prompt the return of the remains of Christopher Hall’s mother-in-law, Gladys Hammond, which had been stolen from a churchyard in October 2004.

    The Halls were subjected to hate mail, malicious phone calls, hoax bombs, and arson attacks. People who supplied the Halls were also subject to the campaign. Rod Harvey supplied fuel to the farm, and was targeted for four years as a result. He told the BBC he received threatening letters including one that accused him of being a paedophile, which was also sent to people he knew.

    The Home Office cited Best’s July 17 statement –“We don’t want to reform them [vivisectionist companies], we want to wipe them off the face of the earth” – when it announced its decision to ban him. Best said the phrase was taken out of context. I asked him via email to give a correct version of the quotation, but though he answered other questions, he didn’t answer that one.

    Best provides some of the philosophical context for NAALPO in an article, “The Myth of Free Speech”, on its website. He argues that the ALF does not harm anyone.

    “Unlike those who torture, exploit, and kill animals for profit and dubious ‘research’ purposes, the ALF does not fit any viable definition of terrorism. They will destroy the property of animal exploiters in order to weaken or eliminate their capacity to harm animals, but in over 30 years of action, the ALF has never harmed one of these exploiters.”

    But if being threatened and intimidated is a “harm” then the ALF does appear to have harmed people. Take for instance Cassandria Smith, a veterinarian at Los Angeles Animal Services. NAALPO published an ALF communiqué on September 17 which stated:

    “we hope Avery Smith likes brunettes, b/c 2 black hair ladies of the night were recently sent to the home of Cassandria ‘Dr. Death’ Smith [here they include her home address] at 5 in the morning. All along with several hundreds of dollars worth of pizza and a coroner to collect the body. That was just night one, The second night brought a taxi to the door step every hour on the hour starting at one. On night three her name and number was smeared online as a call girl service. that Friday night a party was thrown at her house with out her foreknowledge. Last but not least a ‘gangbanger’ looking for a ‘gangwhore’ was sent. Be careful Smith. the next night, might bring us. resign bitch now alf”

    Sending a “gangbanger” to her house seems like an action that could lead to straightforward physical harm, quite apart from the psychological and emotional harm of such tactics.

    Best told TPM last year, “’Because they attack property, and never life, the ALF is a non-violent organisation; non-violence is their core value. It is, consequently, no mistake that in over three decades of action across the globe, no human animal exploiter has ever been injured or killed.”

    But again, as with “harm,” this raises the question of what is meant by “injured”. It is at least arguable that being badly frightened can be both harm and injury. In fact on November 8 the Pentagon issued a new directive on Defense Department intelligence interrogations, as the Washington Post reported, “mandating that all questioning of detainees in US military custody include ‘humane’ treatment and banning ‘acts of physical or mental torture.’” If mental torture is an accepted category – accepted enough to be explicitly banned by Pentagon officials – then mental harm and injury seem like reasonable categories too. I asked Best about this issue, and whether he had any worries about the threatening language the ALF uses in its press releases.

    “First, I have no responsibility for these press releases at all, do you understand the function of the press office?” he replied. “We simply post the releases and do no more than a mainstream newspaper would in publishing them. As for the ‘violent’ character of the language, that depends on one’s definition of violence, obviously. The ALF commitment to non-violence is a vow to never cause physical injury to any animal exploiter, they do not define property destruction as violence, nor do they consider threatening language to be violent. The main point here to emphasise is that speciesist norms and laws categorically bar obscene injuries and death inflicted on billions of animals every year from the definition of violence, whereas destruction of property to bring justice to an oppressed group that cannot be attained through the legal system always is considered violence. I suggest we look at this problem from the other side, from the perspective of the animal, rather than the animal exploiter.”

    The claims that NAALPO has no responsibility at all for what it publishes and that it functions just like a mainstream newspaper are both highly questionable. That aside, Best’s response does not answer the question why the ALF does not consider threatening language to be violent, nor does it really grapple with the issue of the possible harm – the mental torture – caused by threats and intimidation. The moral philosopher Roger Crisp told me, “I do of course think that if we are using ‘violent’ in the ordinary way, then the activities of the ALF could not be described as ‘non-violent’. Serious damage to property can be violent. But I presume that Best’s point is that there is a big moral difference between those who seek to damage property alone, and those who seek physically to harm individuals. The difference isn’t all that clear, since damage to property can be very distressing, and distress is a form of harm.”

    Best suggested I read his article “Behind the Mask”, which is available on the website, as a source for his views on this subject. He there analyses the issue this way:

    “While the ALF renounces physical violence against human beings, it also rejects the claim that destroying property is ‘violence’ (see below). The ALF is grounded in the principle that laws protecting animal exploitation industries are unjust, and they break them in deference to the higher moral principle of animal rights… To be consistent to its principles, the ALF and other direct action groups must abide by the belief that however righteous their anger, no one must ever be harmed in the struggle for liberation of others; only property is to be damaged as a necessary means to the end of animal liberation. Despite zeal for its cause, the ALF is thus unlike radical anti-abortionists who kill their opponents, and the vast differences should never be conflated.”

    Not killing opponents is certainly an important difference compared to groups that do, but there is a lot of territory between not killing people, and not harming them at all. It is possible to refrain from killing people, and still harm them. If even the Pentagon concedes (however reluctantly, after media reports have exposed “pressure” techniques used on terror suspects) that mental torture is neither an empty category nor permissible, surely professors of philosophy don’t want to lag behind.

    In a more recent article, “Banned in the UK”, Best says, “It is important to emphasise that I am not a member of the ALF, that I have no connection to the ALF, that all of my own work for animal rights is strictly legal, and that I have never advocated or endorsed violence against anyone.”

    As far as I have seen, it is true that he has never advocated or endorsed violence against anyone, and yet, in defending “illegal actions necessary to win justice and freedom for animals” he describes them incompletely, omitting to mention the more personally frightening, mental-torture-causing actions.

    Best further says, “I define terrorism as any intentional act of violence toward an innocent sentient being in order to advance an ideological, political, and economic agenda. It is a strange kind of terrorist who has never injured a single person, who is compassionate toward the suffering of others, and who risks his or her own freedom to save another from harm, violence, and death.”

    But again, that depends on how one defines “injury” and “harm”, not to mention “compassionate” and “suffering”. A definition of harm that excludes the effects of fear, intimidation, threats, harassment, stalking and the like seems surprisingly narrow. One way to see this is via a simple thought experiment: imagine that the same tactics were being used on abortion doctors and people who worked with them or supplied them with clean linens. Or on civil rights campaigners, or gays, or human rights workers, or Médecins Sans Frontières , or women’s rights workers, or union organisers. The thought is far from outlandish, because just such tactics in fact are used on all those groups. It would be interesting to know what Best would think of that thought experiment, but unfortunately he opted not to answer my question on the subject.

    Best told TPM last year, “It is a moral imperative to first pursue peaceful methods of change to bring about justice for an oppressed group; if these channels are blocked, however, it is a defensible and legitimate alternative to pursue violent means of struggle to bring justice to an oppressed group. The reasoning here, as you will find in some of my articles, also is similar to ‘Just War’ theory, which analyses two key conditions where violence is legitimate and/or necessary.’”

    Whether or not Best’s fine distinctions stand up to scrutiny, there are good reasons to believe they are genuinely held rather than smoke screens. Indeed, a few days before this issue went to press, Best resigned his role as NAALPO press officer because, as he told me, of “criticisms I have of my colleague Dr Jerry Vlasak defending assassination in public forums.”

    However, in what he went on to say, it is clear that this does not mean he is against violence against persons in principle.

    “I believe there are numerous cases where violence in defence of animals is legitimate, just as for humans, but I have never taken the step from defending it philosophically in distinct cases (such as where the cause is just, all non-violence alternatives have been explored, and innocent lives are under attack) to advocating it, unlike Jerry who has taken this to a very public forum in the US Senate and on the “60 Minutes” TV program. All tactics and ideas should be discussed openly within our movement, but not necessarily before the Senate and on national TV. I do not think tactically Jerry’s appearances were a good idea, nor do I believe assassinations are the tactic this movement should be exploring or advocating at this point in time.”

    Is the Home Office therefore right to be worried about someone who says he wants to “wipe [vivisectionist companies] off the face of the earth” and that he “will fight, and die if necessary, to free the slaves”? It is not obvious that the worry is either irrational or unjust.

    This article was first published in The Philosopher’s Magazine Issue 33.

  • Identity is That Which is Given

    The anthropologist Margaret Mead once observed that in the 1930s, when she was busy remaking the idea of culture, the notion of cultural diversity was to be found only in the ‘vocabulary of a small and technical group of professional anthropologists’. Today, everyone and everything seems to have its own culture. From anorexia to zydeco, the American philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah has observed, there is little that we don’t talk about as the product of some group’s culture. In this age of globalisation many people fret about Western culture taking over the world. But the greatest Western export is not Disney or McDonalds or Tom Cruise. It is the very idea of culture. Every island in the Pacific, every tribe in the Amazon, has its own culture that it wants to defend against the depredation of Western cultural imperialism. You do not even have to be human to possess a culture. Primatologists tell us that different groups of chimpanzees each has its own culture. No doubt some chimp will soon complain that their traditions are disappearing under the steamroller of human cultural imperialism.

    We’re All Multiculturalists Now observed the American academic, and former critic of pluralism, Nathan Glazer in the title of a book. And indeed we are. The celebration of difference, respect for pluralism, avowal of identity politics – these have come to be regarded as the hallmarks of a progressive, antiracist outlook and as the foundation of modern liberal democracies. Ironically, culture has captured the popular imagination just as anthropologists themselves have started worrying about the very concept. After all, what exactly is a culture? What marks its boundaries? In what way is a 16-year old British born boy of Pakistani origin living in Bradford of the same culture as a 50-year old man living in Lahore? Does a 16-year white boy from Bradford have more in common culturally with his 50-year-old father than with that 16-year old ‘Asian’? Such questions have led most anthropologists today to reject the idea of cultures as fixed, bounded entities. Some reject the very idea of culture as meaningless. ‘Religious beliefs, rituals, knowledge, moral values, the arts, rhetorical genres, and so on’, the British anthropologist Adam Kuper suggests, ‘should be separated out from each other rather than bound together into a single bundle labelled culture’. ‘To understand culture’, he concludes, ‘we must first deconstruct it.

    Whatever the doubts of anthropologists, politicians and political philosophers press on regardless. The idea of culture, and especially of multiculturalism, has proved politically too seductive. Over the past two decades, nations such as Australia, Canada and South Africa have created legal frameworks to institutionalise their existence as multicultural societies. Other countries such as Britain have no formal recognition of their multicultural status but have nevertheless pursued pluralist policies in a pragmatic fashion. Even France, whose Republican tradition might seem to be the nemesis of multiculturalism, has flirted with pluralist policies. In 1986 the College de France presented the President with a report entitled ‘Proposals for the Education of the Future’. The first of ten principles to which modern schools should subscribe was ‘The unity of science and the plurality of cultures’: ‘A carefully fabricated system of education must be able to integrate the universalism inherent in scientific thought with the relativism of the social sciences, that is with disciplines attentive to the significance of cultural differences among people and to the ways people live, think and feel.’

    ‘There is a certain way of being human that is my way’, wrote the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor in his much discussed essay on ‘The Politics of Recognition’. ‘I am called upon to live my life in this way… Being true to myself means being true to my own originality’. This sense of being ‘true to myself’ Taylor calls ‘the ideal of “authenticity”’. The ideal of the authentic self finds its origins in the Romantic notion of the inner voice that expressed a person’s true nature. The concept was developed in the 1950s by psychologists such as Erik Erikson and sociologists like Alvin Gouldner into the modern notion of identity. Identity, they pointed out, is not just a private matter but emerges in dialogue with others.

    Increasingly identity came to be seen not as something the self creates but as something through which the self is created. Identity is, in sociologist Stuart Hall’s words, ‘formed and transformed continuously in relation to the ways in which we are represented or addressed in the cultural systems which surround us.’ The inner self, in other words, finds its home in the outer world by participating in a collective. But not just any collective. The world is comprised of countless groups – philosophers, truck drivers, football supporters, drinkers, train spotters, conservatives, communists and so on. According to the modern idea of identity, however, each person’s sense of who they truly are is intimately linked to only a few special categories – collectives defined by people’s gender, sexuality, religion, race and, in particular, culture. A Unesco-organised ‘World Conference on Cultural Policies’ concluded that ‘cultural identity… was at the core of individual and collective personality, the vital principle that underlay the most authentic decisions, behaviour and actions’.

    The collectives that appear significant to the contemporary sense of identity comprise, of course, very different kinds of groups and the members of each are bound together by very different characteristics. Nevertheless, what collectives such as gender, sexuality, religion, race and culture all have in common is that each is defined by a set of attributes that, whether rooted in biology, faith or history, is fixed in a certain sense and compels people to act in particular ways. Identity is that which is given, whether by nature, God or one’s ancestors. ‘I am called upon to live my life in this way’. Who or what does the calling? Apparently the culture itself. Unlike politically defined collectives, these collectives are, in philosopher John Gray’s words, ‘ascriptive, not elective… a matter of fate, not choice.’ The collectives that are important to the contemporary notion of identity are, in other words, the modern equivalents of what Herder defined as volks. For individual identity to be authentic, so too must collective identity. ‘Just like individuals’, Charles Taylor writes, ‘a Volk should be true to itself, that is its own culture.’ To be true to itself, a culture must faithfully pursue the traditions that mark out that culture as unique and rebuff the advances of modernity, pragmatism and other cultures.

    This view of culture and identity has transformed the way that many people understand the relationship between equality and difference. For the Enlightenment philosophes, equality required that the state should treat all citizens in the same fashion without regard to their race, religion or culture. This was at the heart of their arguments against the ancien regime and has been an important strand of liberal and radical thought ever since. For contemporary multiculturalists, on the other hand, people should be treated not equally despite their differences, but differently because of them. ‘Justice between groups’, as the political philosopher Will Kymlicka has put it, ‘requires that members of different groups are accorded different rights’.

    An individual’s cultural background frames their identity and helps define who they are. If we want to treat individuals with dignity and respect, many multiculturalists argue, we must also treat with dignity and respect the groups that furnish them with their sense of personal being. ‘The liberal is in theory committed to equal respect for persons’, the philosopher Bhikhu Parekh argues. ‘Since human beings are culturally embedded, respect for them entails respect for their cultures and ways of life.’ The British sociologist Tariq Madood takes this line of argument to make a distinction between what he calls the ‘equality of individualism’ and ‘equality encompassing public ethnicity: equality as not having to hide or apologise for one’s origins, family or community, but requiring others to show respect for them, and adapt public attitudes and arrangements so that the heritage they represent is encouraged rather than contemptuously expect them to wither away.’ We cannot, in other words, treat individuals equally unless groups are also treated equally. And since, in the words of the American scholar Iris Young, ‘groups cannot be socially equal unless their specific experience, culture and social contributions are publicly affirmed and recognised’, so society must protect and nurture cultures, ensure their flourishing and indeed their survival.

    One expression of such equal treatment is the growing tendency in some Western nations for religious law – such as the Jewish halakha and the Islamic sharia – to take precedence over national secular law in civil, and occasionally criminal, cases. Another expression can be found in Australia, where the courts increasingly accept that Aborigines should have the right to be treated according to their own customs rather than be judged by ‘whitefella law’. According to Colin McDonald, a Darwin barrister and expert in customary law, ‘Human rights are essentially a creation of the last hundred years. These people have been carrying out their law for thousands of years.’ Some multiculturalists go further, requiring the state to ensure the survival of cultures not just in the present but in perpetuity. Charles Taylor, for instance, suggests that the Canadian and Quebec governments should take steps to ensure the survival of the French language in Quebec ‘through indefinite future generations’.

    The demand that because a cultural practice has existed for a long time, so it should be preserved – or, in Charles Taylor’s version, the demand that because I am doing X so my descendants, through ‘indefinite future generations’, must also do X – is a modern version of the naturalistic fallacy, the belief that ought derives from is. For nineteenth century social Darwinists, morality – how we ought to behave – derived from the facts of nature – how humans are. This became an argument to justify capitalist exploitation, colonial oppression, racial savagery and even genocide. Today, virtually everyone recognises the falsity of this argument. Yet, when talking of culture rather than of nature, many multiculturalists continue to insist that is defines ought.

    In any case, there is something deeply inauthentic about the contemporary demand for authenticity. The kind of cultures that the Enlightenment philosophes wanted to consign to history were, in an important sense, different from the cultures that today’s multiculturalists wish to preserve. In the premodern world there was no sense of cultural integrity or authenticity. There were no alternatives to the ways of life that people followed. Cultures were traditional but in an unselfconscious fashion. Those who lived in such cultures were not aware of their difference, let alone that they should value it or claim it as a right. A French peasant attended Church, an American Indian warrior painted his face not because they thought ‘This is my culture, I must preserve it’ but for pragmatic reasons. As the political philosopher Brian Barry suggests, in the absence of some compelling reason for doing things differently, people went on doing them in the same way as they had in the past. Cultural inertia, in other words, preserved traditional ways because it was the easiest way to organise collective life.

    Multiculturalists, on the other hand, exhibit a self-conscious desire to preserve cultures. Such ‘self-consciousness traditionalism’, as Brian Barry calls it, is a peculiarly modern, post-Enlightenment phenomenon. In the modern view, traditions are to be preserved not for pragmatic reasons but because such preservation is a social, political and moral good. Maintaining the integrity of a culture binds societies together, lessens social dislocation and allows the individuals who belong to that culture to flourish. Such individuals can thrive only if they stay true to their culture – in other words, only if both the individual and the culture remains authentic.

    Modern multiculturalism seeks self-consciously to yoke people to their identity for their own good, the good of that culture and the good of society. A clear example is the attempt by the Quebecois authorities to protect French culture. The Quebec government has passed laws which forbid French speakers and immigrants to send their children to English-language schools; compel businesses with more than fifty employees to be run in French; and ban English commercial signs. So, if your ancestors were French you, too, must by government fiat speak French whatever your personal wishes may be. Charles Taylor regards this as acceptable because the flourishing and survival of French culture is a good. ‘It is not just a matter of having the French language available for those who might choose it’, he argues. Quebec is ‘making sure that there is a community of people here in the future that will want to avail itself of the opportunity to use the French language.’ Its policies ‘actively seek to create members of the community… assuring that future generations continue to identify as French-speakers.’

    An identity has become a bit like a private club. Once you join up, you have to abide by the rules. But unlike the Groucho or the Garrick it’s a private club you must join. Being black or gay, the philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah suggests, requires one to follow certain ‘life-scripts’ because ‘Demanding respect for people as blacks and gays can go along with notably rigid strictures as to how one is to be an African American or a person with same-sex desires.’ There will be ‘proper modes of being black and gay: there will be demands that are made; expectations to be met; battle lines to be drawn.’ It is at this point, Appiah suggests, that ‘someone who takes autonomy seriously may worry whether we have replaced one kind of tyranny with another.’ An identity is supposed to be an expression of an individual’s authentic self. But it can too often seem like the denial of individual agency in the name of cultural authenticity.

    ‘It is in the interest of every person to be fully integrated in a cultural group’, Joseph Raz has written. But what is to be fully integrated? If a Muslim woman rejects sharia law, is she demonstrating her lack of integration? What about a Jew who doesn’t believe in the legitimacy of the Jewish State? Or a French Quebecois who speaks only English? Would Galileo have challenged the authority of the Church if he had been ‘fully integrated’ into his culture? Or Thomas Paine have supported the French Revolution? Or Salman Rushdie written The Satanic Verses? Cultures only change, societies only move forwards because many people, in Kwame Appiah’s words, ‘actively resist being fully integrated into a group’. To them ‘integration can sound like regulation, even restraint’. Far from giving voice to the voiceless, in other words, the politics of difference appears to undermine individual autonomy, reduce liberty and enforce conformity. You will speak French, you will act gay, don’t rock the cultural boat. The alternatives, the French philosopher Alain Finkielkraut suggests, are simple: ‘Either people have rights or they have uniforms; either they can legitimately free themselves from oppression… or else their culture has the last word.’

    Part of the problem is a constant slippage in multiculturalism talk between the idea of humans as culture-bearing creatures with the idea that humans have to bear a particular culture. Clearly no human can live outside of culture. But then no human does. ‘It’s not easy to imagine a person, or people, bereft of culture’, observes Kwame Appiah. ‘The problem with grand claims for the necessity of culture’, he adds, ‘is that we can’t readily imagine an alternative. It’s like form: you can’t not have it.’ Culture, in other words, is like oxygen: no living human can do without it, but no living human does.

    To say that no human can live outside of culture is not to say they have to live inside a particular one. Nor is it to say that particular cultures must be fixed or eternal. To view humans as culture-bearing is to view them as social beings, and hence as transformative beings. It suggests that humans have the capacity for change, for progress, and for the creation of universal moral and political forms through reason and dialogue. To view humans as having to bear specific cultures is, on the contrary, to deny such a capacity for transformation. It suggests that every human being is so shaped by a particular culture that to change or undermine that culture would be to undermine the very dignity of that individual. It suggests that the biological fact of, say, Jewish or Bangladeshi ancestry somehow make a human being incapable of living well except as a participant of Jewish or Bangladeshi culture. This would only make sense if Jews or Bangladeshis were biologically distinct – in other words if cultural identity was really about racial difference.

    The relationship between cultural identity and racial difference becomes even clearer if we look at the argument that cultures must be protected and preserved. If a ‘culture is decaying’, the sociologists Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz argue, then ‘the options and opportunities open to its members will shrink, become less attractive, and their pursuit less likely to be successful.’ So society must step in to prevent such decay. Will Kymlicka similarly argues that since cultures are essential to peoples’ lives, so where ‘the survival of a culture is not guaranteed, and, where it is threatened with debasement or decay, we must act to protect it.’ For Charles Taylor, once ‘we’re concerned with identity’, nothing ‘is more legitimate than one’s aspiration that it is never lost’. Hence a culture needs to be protected not just in the here and now but through ‘indefinite future generations’.

    A century ago intellectuals worried about the degeneration of the race. Today we fear cultural decay. Is the notion of cultural decay any more coherent than that of racial degeneration? Cultures certainly change and develop. But what does it mean for a culture to decay? Or for an identity to be lost? Will Kymlicka draws a distinction between the ‘existence of a culture’ and ‘its “character” at any given moment’. The character of culture can change but such changes are only acceptable if the existence of that culture is not threatened. But how can a culture exist if that existence is not embodied in its character? By ‘character’ Kymlicka seems to mean the actuality of a culture: what people do, how they live their lives, the rules and regulations and institutions that frame their existence. So, in making the distinction between character and existence, Kymlicka seems to be suggesting that Jewish, Navajo or French culture is not defined by what Jewish, Navajo or French people are actually doing. For if Jewish culture is simply that which Jewish people do or French culture is simply that which French people do, then cultures could never decay or perish – they would always exist in the activities of people.

    So, if a culture is not defined by what its members are doing, what does define it? The only answer can be that it is defined by what its members should be doing. The African American writer Richard Wright described one of his finest creations Bigger Thomas, the hero of Native Son, as a man ‘bereft of a culture’. The Negro, Wright suggested, ‘possessed a rich and complex culture when he was brought to these alien shores’. But that culture was ‘taken from him’. Bigger Thomas’ ancestors had been enslaved. In the process of enslavement they had been torn from their ancestral homes, and forcibly deprived of the practices and institutions that they understood as their culture. Hence Bigger Thomas, and every black American, behaved very differently from his ancestors. Slavery was an abomination and clearly had a catastrophic impact on black Americans. But however inhuman the treatment of slaves and however deep its impact on black American life, why should this amount to a descendant of slaves being ‘bereft of a culture’ or having a culture ‘taken from him’? This can only be if we believe that Bigger Thomas should be behaving in certain ways that he isn’t, the ways that his ancestors used to behave. In other words, if we believe that what defines what you should be doing is the fact that your ancestors were doing it. Culture here has become defined by biological descent. And biological descent is a polite way of saying ‘race’. As the cultural critic Walter Benn Michaels puts it, ‘In order for a culture to be lost… it must be separable from one’s actual behaviour, and in order for it to be separable from one’s actual behaviour it must be anchorable in race.’

    The logic of the preservationist argument is that every culture has a pristine form, its original state. It decays when it is not longer in that form. Like racial scientists with their idea of racial type, some modern multiculturalists appear to hold a belief in cultural type. For racial scientists, a ‘type’ was a group of human beings linked by a set of fundamental characteristics which were unique to it. Each type was separated from others by a sharp discontinuity; there was rarely any doubt as to which type an individual belonged. Each type remained constant through time. There were severe limits to how much any member of a type could drift away from the fundamental ground plan by which the type was constituted. These, of course, are the very characteristics that constitute a culture in much of today’s multiculturalism talk. Many multiculturalists, like racial scientists, have come to think of human types as fixed, unchanging entities, each defined by its special essence.

    Kenan Malik is a writer, lecturer and broadcaster. His new book is Strange Fruit: Why both sides in the race debate are wrong (Oneworld, 2008), from which this article is taken.

  • The myth of Science in the Quran

    Introduction

    In 1976, a book was published which claimed that the Quran “..does not contain a single statement that is assailable from a modern scientific point of view”. The book: ‘The Bible, the Quran and Science’ [1] had been written by a French doctor, Maurice Bucaille, who became interested in Islam after he was appointed family physician to King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. In the early chapters, Bucaille proclaims articulately, enthusiastically and with apparent sincerity that the scientific accuracy of the Quran is such that “I could not find a single error…“ and that “…there can be no human explanation” for its contents.

    Such a claim was not new. Something similar had been expressed in the 13th century by the Islamic scholar Al-Qurtubi (see e.g. [2]), but here was an educated Western non-Muslim putting forward a detailed and, seemingly, carefully argued case that, more than 700 years after Al-Qurtubi, the science in the Quran still stood up to scrutiny. To the Islamic world, frustrated by centuries of failure to convince the non-Muslim world that the Quran was miraculous, the book was enthusiastically received. It became a best seller and its existence fuelled the growth of the ‘Science in the Quran’ movement, a movement which is supported today by the enthusiasm of countless individuals on the internet, each endeavouring to push the claim even further and to publicise new ‘discoveries’ of scientific predictions in the Quran’s enigmatic verses.

    As summarised above, the book itself does not make a feature of claiming that the Quran contains new information. It mostly promotes only the weaker claim that there is no contradiction between the Quran and modern science and so falls short of the claims of Bucaille’s many successors. Nevertheless, it is perhaps a surprise that such a claim can be made at all for a book nearly 1400 years old, so it is worth attempting to determine how at least the illusion of scientific compatibility came about. This article therefore presents a brief review of Bucaille’s approach and an assessment of selected Quranic statements. It is by no means the first critique of Bucaille’s work (e.g. [3,4]), but has been compiled without reference to previous reviews, so the thoughts below are at least original, if not particularly profound. This review also discusses the evidence in the book for Bucaille’s guilty secret, of which more later.

    Water

    The Quran contains many statements urging people to be grateful to (or fearful of) the Biblical God (‘God’) for various natural phenomena. Not surprisingly, given the desert location of Mecca and Medina, where Islam began, the Quran emphasises the importance of water in such verses as (Q39:21) (i.e. Quran, Sura (Chapter) 39, Verse 21):

    “Have you not seen that God sent water down from the sky and led it through sources into the ground? Then He caused sown fields of different colours to grow.”

    and (Q50:9-11):

    “We sent down from the sky blessed water whereby We caused to grow gardens, grains for harvest, tall palm-trees with their spathes…”

    with further references in (Q23:18,19), (Q36:34) and (Q56:68-70). It is evident that such verses remain true by being expressed as straightforward qualitative observational statements. Bucaille nevertheless contends that the work of a mere mortal would inevitably reveal errors, but that

    “In the passages from the Quran, there is no trace of the mistaken ideas [concerning the water cycle] that were current at the time of Muhammad”

    Nevertheless, consider the following:

    (Q25:53)”(God) is the One Who has let free the two seas, one is agreeable and sweet, the other salty and bitter. He placed a barrier between them, a partition that it is forbidden to pass.”

    (Q55:19) “He has loosed the two seas. They meet together. Between them there is a barrier which they do not transgress.”

    The two verses, taken together, show that the ‘two seas’ refers to bodies of fresh and of salt water. Although the first of the verses suggests that the ‘barrier’ may refer to the land, the second shows that this is not so: it is located where the two seas ‘meet together’. Bucaille interprets this meeting as taking place at the mouths of rivers, a view that is consistent with the translations of Shakir, Yusufali and Sarwar [5]. However, what point is being made by the verses? It is surely noting the singular fact that the sea does not turn the rivers salty, nor do the rivers turn the sea fresh.

    However, there is neither a physical nor a virtual barrier. The fresh water mixes fully with the sea and the status quo is maintained only because a similar quantity evaporates from the sea and falls as rain upstream. Therefore, the statement that a barrier exists is simply incorrect and disproves, if further disproof were needed, the notion that the Quran was authored by an all-knowing deity. In addition, Bucaille’s favourite get-out argument: that God adjusted his descriptions so as to be comprehensible to 7th century Arabs, is particularly inapplicable in this case, for there were then, as there are now, no rivers (at least, no permanent ones) in Arabia. Most of Muhammad’s compatriots must therefore have been mystified by the reference to the ‘two seas’.

    The lack of Arabian rivers explains why the description of the ‘two seas’ is so muddled for, surely, even an unschooled river-bank dweller would realise that the separation between fresh and salt waters exists because of the continuous downstream flow. Muhammad’s meagre knowledge must therefore have been based entirely on hearsay from travellers familiar with (for example) the huge deltas of major rivers such as the Nile and the Tigris-Euphrates. The Quran therefore does not demonstrate scientific knowledge of the water cycle; quite the opposite: it demonstrates nothing but a naive ignorance, an ignorance consistent with its authorship by an uneducated 7th century desert-dweller.

    The sky

    Though never unambiguously stating that the earth is flat, the Quran adopts a conventional pre-scientific geocentric stance and fails to distinguish adequately between ‘Heaven’ (where God is alleged to reside) and ‘the Heavens’ (space), so that a cryptic verse can be proclaimed as ‘scientific’ if it possesses an oblique resemblance to some finding within astronomy or cosmology, yet remain unassailable as ‘theology’ if it does not.

    On many occasions in his book, Maurice Bucaille displays considerable inventiveness in perceiving the poetic imagery of the Quran as divine wisdom, but this inventiveness reaches its peak in the chapters dealing with ‘the Heavens’. A number of verses are helped along by scientific-sounding translations, such as that of the sun and the moon ‘travelling in an orbit’ where the Arberry translation refers to them as ‘swimming in the sky’ (Q21:33) which, incidentally, the Quran verses below imply is some sort of physical object:

    (Q22:65) “(God) holds back the sky from falling on the earth unless by His leave . . .”

    (Q13:2) “God is He who raised up the heavens without pillars you can see…”

    As stated above, Bucaille takes the view that God expressed his concepts within the limited vocabulary of 7th Century Arabia and that therefore these concepts can now be freed from these constraints by means of the replacement of the original vocabulary by modern scientific terminology. This is a highly dubious process, and not just from a secular point of view. The idea that God was somehow prevented from expressing himself properly does not seem compatible with the Islamic notions that the Quran is perfect and that God is unlimited in his power. Furthermore, since (according to Islam) God chose both the time and the place for his revelation, it seems somewhat insolent to imply that this choice impaired the effectiveness of what he had to say. From the non-Islamic perspective, the manipulation of the wording in this way just looks like cheating.

    In addition to giving God a helping hand with the terminology, Bucaille makes the most extraordinary interpretations of some fairly vague statements, such as:

    (Q31:29) “Have you not seen how God merges the night into the day and merges the day into the night?”

    (Q39:5) “. . . He coils the night upon the day and He coils the day upon the night.”

    Bucaille states, obscurely: “This process of perpetual coiling, including the interpenetration of one sector by another is expressed in the Quran just as if the concept of the Earth’s roundness had already been conceived at the time-which was obviously not the case”. The statement, in addition to being largely incomprehensible, fails to note that the likelihood that the earth was a sphere had been appreciated for centuries. Eratosthenes (276 – 194 BC) had even made a remarkably accurate estimate of its diameter.

    Sura 15, verses 14 and 15, speak of the unbelievers in Mecca:

    “Even if We opened unto them a gate to Heaven and they were to continue ascending therein, they would say ‘Our sight is confused as in drunkenness. Nay, we are people bewitched.’”

    The verse clearly says only that unbelievers would not recognise Heaven even if it was right in front of them. Bucaille, however, states that “It describes the human reactions to the unexpected spectacle that travellers in space will see”.

    Of course, the author of the Quran is not to blame for Bucaille’s over-active imagination. However, Sura 36 contains verses which reveal the primitive level of understanding underlying them. Verse 38 states:

    “The Sun runs its course to a settled place. This is the decree of the All Mighty, the Full of Knowledge.”

    and Bucaille comments: “’Settled place’ is the translation of the word ‘mustaqarr’ and there can be no doubt that the idea of an exact place is attached to it”. The following recollection in the Bukhari Hadiths, along with the passage quoted above, suggest that Muhammad remained in complete ignorance about the true nature of the solar system:

    (B9:93:520) “I entered the mosque while Allah’s Apostle was sitting there. When the sun had set, the Prophet said, ‘O Abu Dharr! Do you know where this (sun) goes?’ I said, ‘Allah and His Apostle know best.’ He said, ‘It goes and asks permission to prostrate, and it is allowed, and (one day) it, as if being ordered to return whence it came, then it will rise from the west’”

    In discussing the following verse, Bucaille misses a most significant error:

    (Q36:40) “The sun must not catch up the moon, nor does the night outstrip the day….”

    Since the moon, along with the earth, orbits the sun, it is meaningless to speak of the sun actually ‘catching up’ with the moon, so the verse must refer to the apparent motion of the sun’s and moon’s disks across the sky. Because the moon orbits the earth in the same direction as the earth spins, its apparent speed across the sky is slightly less than that of the sun. The result is that the sun’s disk does indeed catch up and overtake that of the moon, an occurrence which can be clearly seen in sequences of photographs of a solar eclipse, of which there are a number of excellent examples on the internet. Furthermore, the sun overtakes the moon not just during eclipses (when they happen to line up with the Earth), but once a month, resulting in the familiar phenomenon of the new moon.

    The wording of (Q36:40) is sufficiently clear and unambiguous that no significant difference exists between the various English translations. Its meaning is, therefore, exactly as it appears. Even if, by some creative interpretation of the original Arabic, it could be argued that some other meaning than that suggested above was intended, it is evident that the suspicion raised by the dubious way that the verse is expressed is trivially avoidable. Had the first part been expressed as “The moon must not catch up the sun”, the astronomical interpretation would have been correct. Had it been omitted altogether, nothing would have been lost. To include it was the author’s decision and therefore the author’s error. Again, provincial ignorance, not divine knowledge, is evident in the verse.

    In addition to the remarks made above, it appears that the wording of the second part of the extract from (Q36:40): ‘..nor does the night outstrip the day..’ is superfluous. The following verse suggests a possible reason for its inclusion: that the author does not quite grasp the underlying causes of light and darkness:

    (Q25:45,46) “Have you not seen how thy Lord has spread the shade. If He willed, He could have made it stationary. Moreover We made the sun its guide and We withdraw it towards Us easily.”

    As a final observation: for a man selected to receive communications from God, Muhammad had a remarkably unsophisticated attitude to the harmless appearance of a solar eclipse. One of the Bukhari Hadiths (B1:8:423) reports that:

    “The sun eclipsed and Allah’s Apostle offered the eclipse prayer and said, ‘I have been shown the Hellfire (now) and I never saw a worse and horrible sight than the sight I have seen today.’”

    The earth

    As with the verses dealing with the sky and the water cycle, those mentioning the earth reflect an almost total lack of any understanding of natural processes. For example, the following verse tells us that valleys came before rivers, rather than the other way around:

    (Q27:61) “He Who made the earth an abode and set rivers in its interstices and mountains standing firm….”

    In fact, the Quran is rather keen to emphasise the ‘stability’ of mountains, for example:

    (Q79:30-33) “After that (God) spread the earth out. Therefrom He drew out its water and its pasture. And the mountains He has firmly fixed….”

    with similar sentiments expressed in (Q16:15), (Q21:31) (27:61) and (Q31:10). Bucaille, who is outside his field of expertise, asserts the following:

    “These verses express the idea that the way the mountains are laid out ensures stability and is in complete agreement with geological data.”

    Strangely, given the appearance of permanence that mountains provide, the opposite is true. Over geological timescales, mountains are transient things and symptoms of instability, rather than stability. They grow as a result of major crustal movement and, once the force giving rise to them has ceased to operate, they sink and erode. The Quran is even more in error when it becomes more specific:

    (Q78:6,7) “Have We not made the earth an expanse and the mountains stakes.”

    about which Bucaille says: “The stakes referred to are the ones used to anchor a tent in the ground”. The idea that mountains are like stakes, anchoring the earth’s surface to some sort of stable foundation, is an analogy which has probably never occurred to anyone with any knowledge of geology.

    Biology

    When Bucaille is within his intellectual comfort zone, he commits none of the howlers that he makes when dealing with astronomy or geology. However, he is forced to confront the realisation that some Quranic statements relating to mammal physiology appear to be complete nonsense. Bucaille then steps beyond the bounds of merely lending a helping hand to the vocabulary, to the point where he simply rejects the existing translations because the errors can no longer be ignored.

    In the undoctored versions of the Quran, there is a strange description of the region where human sperm originates:

    (Q86:5-7) “So let man consider of what he was created;
    he was created of gushing water
    issuing between the loins and the breast-bones” (Arberry translation)

    There are considerable variations of detail in the English translations for the last verse:

    “Proceeding from between the backbone and the ribs” (Yusufali)
    ”That issued from between the loins and ribs”. (Pickthal)
    ”Coming from between the back and the ribs.” (Shakir)

    There is also an equally inaccurate verse concerning the biology of mammalian milk production:

    (Q16:66) “And surely in the cattle there is a lesson for you; We give you to drink of what is in their bellies, between filth and blood, pure milk, sweet to drinkers” (Arberry)

    “ from what is within their bodies between excretions and blood…” (Yusufali)
    ” of that which is in their bellies, from betwixt the refuse and the blood….. “ (Pickthal)
    ” of what is in their bellies–from betwixt the faeces and the blood….” (Shakir)
    ” between dregs and blood, which is in their bellies…” (Rodwell)

    So, semen comes from between the backbone and the ribs and milk is formed in the bellies of cattle between faeces and blood, whatever that means. Bucaille now takes a step beyond the already dubious process of ‘modernising’ the Quran’s vocabulary. He now alters the sense of the text for no other reason than that it is wrong in its original form, expressing it as

    “ of what is inside their bodies, coming from a conjunction between the contents of the intestine and the blood”

    His justification for the alteration is that:

    “These translations are the work of highly eminent Arabists. It is a well known fact however, that a translator, even an expert, is liable to make mistakes in the translation of scientific statements, unless he happens to be a specialist in the discipline in question….From a scientific point of view, physiological notions must be called upon to grasp the meaning of this verse”

    whereas, in reality, they have been used to correct the verse. The translators, though not experts in the sciences, were in no worse a position than the millions of others who have tried to understand the Quran. It is therefore reasonable to suppose that what they expressed in their translations is pretty much what the Quran says.

    Creatures

    The Quran makes a number of dubious statements regarding the Earth’s animal life. For example:

    (Q16:79) “Do they not look at the birds subjected in the atmosphere of the sky? None can hold them up (in His Power) except God.”

    As with (Q36:40) above, all the translations say more or less the same thing, implying that there is no ambiguity in the original. The verse says that birds can fly only because God holds them up. Now, it is true that Muslims believe that all things happen by the ‘will of Allah’, so (Q16:79) could be interpreted as a purely theological statement. However, it looks suspiciously like the verse is drawing our attention to the evident ‘miracle’ of the flight of birds, which is attributed to God’s direct intervention rather than to the lift produced by the shape and motion of their wings. This again is a sign of human ignorance, rather than divine knowledge. Bucaille clearly also had difficulty with this verse since, in addition to the substitution of the scientific term ‘atmosphere’ instead of the mundane ‘air’, he feels it necessary to misdirect his readers by including an irrelevant discussion of the alternative ‘miracle’ of migration.

    Not surprisingly, Bucaille fails to include in his book the following account of one of King Solomon’s expeditions with his army. Starting with (Q27:17)

    “And his hosts were mustered to Solomon, jinn, men and birds, duly disposed…”

    The verse therefore claims that (a) Solomon’s army contained a division of birds (b) it contained another division of the Arab folklore beings called jinn who, according to (Q55:15), were created by God from “..a smokeless fire”. Incidentally, the previous verse, (Q55:14), gives the following information on the origin of humans: “He created man of a clay like the potter’s”.

    The question of the existence of jinn presents something of a problem for the modern Muslim. To assert that they exist not only flies in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary but also implies the remarkable coincidence that only the Arabs, out of all the Earth’s cultures, had managed to discern them prior to the delivery, also to the Arabs, of the Quran, where their existence was ‘confirmed’. It must be tempting to consider the alternative explanation that the Quran was composed by an Arab who had been brought up to believe in jinn. However, to deny their existence is to doubt the Quran, which entails apostasy ([6], Section o8.7): a capital offence. It is as if Irish law specified the death penalty for denying the existence of leprechauns.

    The account of Solomon’s journey does not get any more plausible, because the next verse tells us that

    “.. when they came on the Valley of Ants, an ant said, ‘Ants, enter your dwelling-places, lest Solomon and his hosts crush you, being unaware!’ “

    Solomon understood the local ant dialect [7], though his response was rather dismissive:

    “But he smiled, laughing at its words….”

    and he proceeded to ignore the ant, and to concentrate instead on a rather edgy discussion with one of his birds (Q27:22 onwards).

    The story of Solomon and the ant is an old Jewish legend [8]. Many of the Earth’s cultures have a variety of barmy folk tales but Islam is unusual in that, in effect, it stakes its life on its own stories being true. For if the account of Solomon and the ant is untrue, then the Quran contains errors and the whole basis of Islam is false. It is a heavy burden to place on the narrow shoulders of a talking ant.

    Muslim apologists are uncertain regarding the appropriate interpretation of the ant story. Those who prefer a rational explanation suggest that the inhabitants of the valley were a tribe called the ‘Naml’ (Arabic for ‘ant’), thereby avoiding the embarrassment of having to defend an indefensible position. However, the original Jewish story does indeed concern an actual ant, as the phrase “..lest Solomon and his hosts crush you, being unaware” implies. Furthermore, the ‘Naml’ explanation does not adequately deal with the subsequent implausible account of the man-bird dialogue.

    The more traditional explanations portray Solomon as a Bronze Age Dr. Dolittle, miraculously endowed with the ability to talk with creatures. Although such a claim is no more implausible than many others within this and other religions, it falls well short of explaining all the remarkable features of the story. Not only, according to the tale, did Solomon possess miraculous powers (including, presumably, very acute hearing), the ant itself achieved the feat of recognising Solomon from a distance and evidently already knew his name. Unless Solomon had previously dropped in for a chat from time to time, it is difficult to see how the ant could have come by this knowledge.

    The ant story is not the only Jewish legend which the Quran repeats uncritically:

    (Q29:14) “Indeed, We sent Noah to his people, and he tarried among them a thousand years, all but fifty…”

    Remind us of your conclusion, Maurice. Ah yes:

    “.. the Qur’an does not contain a single statement that is assailable from a modern scientific point of view”.

    Dr. Bucaille’s guilty secret

    There is a perception that Maurice Bucaille converted to Islam as a result of his studies and his book certainly encourages that view. However, is it true? In a 1992 interview with the online Islamic Bulletin [9], Bucailles himself states:

    “I knew then [i.e. during his studies] that the Quran was the “Work of Allah” and had not been authored by any human being.”

    However, when asked the straight question “Have you embraced Islam?”, Bucaille fails to give a straight answer. He first replies:

    “..when God guided me to undertake a study of the Quran, my inner soul cried out that Al-Quran was the Word of God revealed to his Last Prophet Mohammed”

    which looks almost, but not quite, like ‘yes’. However, he goes on to say

    “About my faith and belief, God knows what is in one’s heart. I am convinced that if I identify myself with any creed, people will invariably dub me as one belonging to such and such group”

    which sounds suspiciously like a ‘no’. Campbell (see [10]) has looked into this subject more thoroughly, and says

    “At a public lecture in Fez Morocco in either 1981 or 1983, a friend of mine asked during the question period whether Dr. Bucaille had become a Muslim. Dr. Bucaille said, “No”.

    And [10] also points out that the following passage occurred in the catalogue of the Islamic publisher and book distributor Pak Books in 1998:

    “Dr.Bucaille’s study of scientific information in scriptures gave him high regard for Qur’an and recognition of contradictions in Christian scriptures. Yet he remained a Christian.”

    So, what is the truth? Surprisingly, the answer can be found in Bucaille’s book, though it is carefully disguised by weasel words. He writes:

    “For me, there can be no human explanation to the Quran”.

    “..statements that simply cannot be ascribed to the thought of a man who lived more than fourteen centuries ago.”

    “Such statements….obviously do not lend themselves to a human explanation”

    “…the existence in the Qur’an of the verse referring to these concepts can have no human explanation on account of the period in which they were formulated.”

    These are words which are carefully crafted to convince Muslims that he had been won over by the Islamic view of the Quran, but equally carefully avoiding the explicit conclusion that its author was God. This he never states, so leaving open the question of what type of being he considers responsible for the text. Dr. Bucaille may not have embraced Islam, but he has certainly embraced the Islamic practice of dissimulation.

    Muslims should perhaps consider why someone who appears so rapturously convinced of the miraculous origin of the Quran would not convert to Islam, particularly since “..God guided me..” to carry out the study in the first place. Kasem [11] has no doubt about Bucaille’s motives:

    “This charlatan found a great opportunity to make good money out of this situation.”

    However, despite the fact that Bucaille achieved a good deal of fame in the Muslim world as a result of his book, and undoubtedly received large amounts of money, the idea that he planned a scam from the very start seems a little too good to be true. My own view of Bucaille’s motives is less damning than Kasem’s, though I would shed no tears if Kasem turned out to be right.

    I think that, for a long while during his studies, Bucaille did genuinely believe that the Quran was divinely authored: “..my inner soul cried out that Al-Quran was the Word of God”. However, I suspect that, at some point during his researches, Bucaille began to realise that this belief could not be sustained. The contrived special pleading that he was forced to make, time and time again, to support so many flagrantly poor descriptions of the natural world, must have had its effect.

    Nevertheless, to retract his nascent book was impossible. Too many close acquaintances were eagerly anticipating the glowing praise soon to be bestowed on the Quran by a Western scholar: people who included his distinguished employer, King Faisal, of whom Bucaille writes “The debt of gratitude I owe to the late King Faisal, whose memory I salute with deepest respect, is indeed very great.” So he decided to weaken his conclusions just a touch, publish anyway, and remain a Roman Catholic. Nevertheless, the conclusion seems inevitable: by the time he penned his final words, and though he didn’t dare to admit it, Bucaille had ceased to believe his own book.

    Summing up

    There are no verses in the Quran with any modern scientific content. Those of the Quran’s statements about the natural world which have survived unrefuted to the present day have done so not because they contain profound truths, but precisely because they contain no profound truths. Most are just everyday rustic observations; those which venture beyond the mundane often contain nothing more than an opaque mixture of poetic description, vagueness and mysticism. How did Muhammad largely avoid expounding a series of then-current but erroneous scientific ideas? Because he was interested only in theology, lived in an intellectual backwater and had not received a formal education, so knew nothing of them.

    There remains, however, a residue of statements in the Quran which are both clear enough to be understood and specific enough to be identified as erroneous. Even ignoring the simple errors and absurdities which Bucaille overlooks or tries to divert our attention from, the descriptions of natural phenomena in the Quran are often so poor that they cannot be the product of divine revelation, nor even of an educated mortal. There is no sense in which (Q36:38) is an adequate description of the motion of the sun, nor (Q78:6,7) an adequate description of the geology of mountains, nor (Q86:5-7) a competent account of human biology. Are Muslims really suggesting that the above was the best that an almighty, all-knowing deity could do? For anyone who believes that the descriptions quoted above are satisfactory, consider this: if you were marking an examination paper and you came across one of the above passages without realising it was a direct quote from the Quran, how many marks out of 10 would you give?

    And there is, of course, the problem of the talking ant. If anyone could suggest a reason why this story should not be regarded as absurd, it would be most interesting to hear it. Nevertheless, even if a plausible explanation of the account could be constructed, the problem remains that ‘God’ has included in the Quran a tale which appears ridiculous, with its resulting adverse effect on the book’s credibility. For an almighty being intent on the world’s conversion to Islam, this is a strange approach.

    The supposed existence of scientific references in the Quran, as with that of ‘inimitability’ [12], is a myth, born of wishful thinking and inflated by exaggerated repetition. The continuous ‘discovery’ of new interpretations resembles the ‘discovery’ of new predictions contained in the quatrains of Nostradamus. However, while the latter is a relatively inconsequential pastime for devotees, the former helps sustain the delusion that the Quran is miraculous, thereby giving support to the grim edifice of Islam itself.

    Finally, one cannot explain away the Quran’s 0% score in Science by claiming (as Bucaille does) that God adjusted his descriptions to suit the average uneducated 7th century Arab. According to Islam, God composed the Quran for all people, for all time, and was happy elsewhere to include ‘ambiguous’ (i.e. incomprehensible) verses about other subjects (see Q3:7). So why not include accurate descriptions about the natural world for the benefit of later generations, even if they could not necessarily be appreciated at the time? The Quran was not composed for a 7th century Arab, it was composed by a 7th century Arab.

    References

    [1] M. Bucaille. The Bible, The Quran and Science.

    [2] A. von Denffer. Introduction to the Quran.

    [3] W. Campbell. The Qur’an and the Bible in the light of history and science.

    [4] T. Edis. An Illusion of Harmony: Science and Religion in Islam.
    Prometheus Books 2007.

    [5] All the Quran translations cited here are easily found on the internet.

    [6] Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller: A Classic Manual of Islamic Sacred Law, (rev. ed., trans. Nuh Ha Mim Keller, Beltsville, Maryland: Amana, 1994)

    [7] G. Chapman, T. Jones. Let’s Talk Ant.

    [8] Jewish Encyclopedia.

    [9] Islamic Bulletin. Issue 6, January 1992.

    [10] Is Dr. Maurice Bucaille a Muslim?

    [11] A. Kasem. The tales of Bucaille and Moore, two occidental charlatans.

    [12] A. Reddy. Matchless Prose?

  • Honour crimes or terrorism against women

    Today all speakers talked about honour crimes as a widespread form of violence against women. What bewilders me is the name given to this horrendous crime: honour. Honour has a very positive connotation. Regardless of one’s world outlook and beliefs, the word honour has a good ring to one’s ear. When you hear this word, you fill up with positive and good feelings. The combination of these two completely opposite concepts to describe one phenomenon brings a lot of contradictions and confusion: “honour crimes!”

    I have given this phenomenon a great deal of thought. I posed this question: Why is this brutal act being described so positively? After reflecting on this issue for some time, I came to see a pattern. It is like crimes committed under the name of patriotism and nationalism. The more you kill, the more brutal you become, the more heroic your status. This is exactly the same. The more inhuman you become under the name of misogyny, the more elevated your status among the community.

    Misogynist crimes which are sanctified by religion and old traditions are called honour crimes, in order to be glorified, to be elevated to the position of heroic acts worthy of medals. Honour crimes are encouraged by traditional values, which are passed on from generation to generation. I will argue here that a certain ideology is behind justifying and glorifying crimes against women and by doing this not only promoting such crimes, but also fostering the dominance of religion and patriarchy. I will then conclude that one way to fight against such crimes is to shed all religious and cultural romanticism and taboos surrounding this brutal act. This is to say that our fight against honour crimes is not only an educative one or in the field of law and order, it is a political and ideological one as well. Misogynist ideology is a vital instrument in justifying and glorifying honour crimes.

    There may be an objection raised here and quite validly too: not all misogynist crimes are named honour crimes. True. However, those criminal acts committed against women and girls, because they dared violate the sacred codes of piousness of the community, are called honour crimes. Modern reformed misogyny has more or less come to terms with women’s ownership of their sexuality. Nevertheless, crimes categorized as crimes of passion, committed under the fury of jealousy still share that element of ownership of female sexuality by the male partner. It has only been privatized; it is an individual act punished by the law. But women’s rights organisations still struggle to have these crimes recognized as serious crimes, they still fight to get enough attention by the official institutions to these crimes that are mitigated or ignored by the fact they take place in the privacy of the home and in the confines of the sacred family. Our focus here is, however, on the first category.

    Ideology

    How is a value system formed? How are essential concepts and their definitions formed? How are we led to regard similar acts in so many different ways? How are we led to judge one act of violence as horrendous and inhuman, and the other one as heroic? Is this not a double standard? The answer to all of these is Ideology. Ideology is the means by which our minds are formed or manipulated to interpret the world, and thereby give different, and at times opposite meanings to similar actions. The dominant ideology is preserved and reproduced by the ruling classes in every given society. Religion is one of the main ingredients in dominant ideologies world wide.

    Let us examine this in a more concrete historical context. We will only dwell on examples that can be related to our subject. Killing for a justified cause or terrorism: this is the question put before us time and time again. Depending on our political inclinations or our ideological tendencies, we answer this question one way or the other. At times it is more challenging to come up with a straightforward answer. Our sympathies are divided, so our response is confused. There seems to be no other way to judge. As a rule, if we sympathize with a cause we tend to justify the action related to it or stemming from it.

    The African National Congress is a very good example to demonstrate how this dynamic works. The ANC was considered a terrorist organisation by the apartheid regime in South Africa and by some of its Western supporters. In the late seventies and early eighties this image changed. The ANC came to be recognized, universally, as a legitimate, progressive organization; its leader Nelson Mandela became an international hero and was awarded the Noble peace prize. Here we can see how an image or concept can change in people’s views, giving the political or ideological explanations.

    Let us look at a more controversial case. Suicide bombings committed by Palestinians against Israelis are regarded as a vile crime by Israelis and heroic sacrifice by Palestinians. By the same token, in any war killing the enemy wins a medal for the killer and hatred and vengeance by the other party. How do we come to form these views? They are political views formed by our world outlook and value system, that is, ideology.

    Misogyny is an old ideology and integrated into all religions. Passion and honour are names given by the official ideology to crimes against women by the men who are taught to believe women are their possessions, their properties.

    One way to fight these horrendous crimes is to challenge the prevailing ideology. Sexism and misogyny have been the subject of many debates and protest movements. One way to shake this old value system is to attack its basis. I believe the so-called honour crimes should be called terrorism against women, just the same way female circumcision came to be called female mutilation. This change of name had a great impact on shedding all the absurd cultural romanticism associated with this brutal abuse (which led well known feminists such as Germaine Greer to defend it.) This is not an attempt to inflate a reality for the sake of propaganda. In reality “honour crimes” are nothing but terrorist acts against women.

    What is terrorism?

    Action aimed at silencing, subduing and blackmailing certain people for a political aim is terrorism. Ideologies have been created in order to justify and/or glorify a terrorist act. Historically nationalist, and certain left groups have been categorized under this title, e.g. the IRA, the left groups in Italy and Germany in the seventies, and groups fighting for independence in so-called third world countries. In these fights a well-defined political cause dominates. At present, there is a political/ideological battle over whether you can call fighters for a “just” cause terrorists, regardless of the methods they use. A heated debate is over what to call Palestinian suicide bombers: are they terrorists or soldiers of a nationalist army fighting for their land and independence? We have gone as far as calling some states terrorist, and the war they wage state terrorism, such as the United States and Israel, or the Islamic republic of Iran.

    This is not the time or place to pass judgment on these above-mentioned cases. I merely stated these for the sake of argument, to demonstrate the similarities between these political cases and honour crimes, these seemingly unconnected acts. I believe there is a very strong common denominator between these acts, which bring them under the same category: terrorism. Honour crimes can be categorized under this term.

    If straightforward political conflicts that lead to terrorist acts can cause confusion as to how they should be judged, i.e. legitimate or murderous, and at times there are endless debates involved in the process of judgment-forming, there is no confusion regarding honour crimes. Except the fanatics who endorse or carry out such crimes, everyone else condemns honour crimes as abhorrent murders. Moreover, there is a common agreement among all, including the fanatics, over the purpose of these crimes: to subdue the female population, to show her rightful place in the home and the community, to suppress any thought of rebellion. “Honour crimes” wash away the shame from the family and the community, and teach a “good” lesson not only to women but to the whole society: women are the property of the men of the household; they should remain subdued, pious, and silent, and obey the laws and their owners.

    All the religious leaders who promote or condone honour crimes will testify to these, the elders, the youth steeped in this ideology, the mothers and the victims too will testify to this. We should conclude that honour crimes are carried out to put women in their place and prevent their rebellion or protest. Thus honour crimes are crimes with a political purpose: to foster or establish misogynist power relations in the society and the family. Moreover, they are not individual and isolated crimes. They are usually planned in the extended family. They are promoted by the “leaders” of the community. (Be it the leaders of a society in the case of societies under a backward religious state, or smaller communities in the West.) They are crimes sanctified by a community and carried out collectively. It is a crime with a socio-political cause and aim, justified by an ideology, carried out as a team. Hence, we have established the relation between a terrorist act and honour crimes.

    It is important that we spread this word around. Start a movement demanding that honour crimes should be called by their appropriate name: terrorism against women. It will help us fight more vigorously against these crimes and to alleviate the situation of women and young girls in such communities. It makes it easier to punish the criminals. It gives our campaign a momentum to mobilize more strongly and to attract more support to our cause. As a final point, I would like to make the parallel once more between this and the campaign to change the name of female circumcision to female genital mutilation. It did not take very long to establish in the public mind that female circumcision is actually mutilating women in order to inhibit their sexuality. By bringing this awareness all the cultural romanticism or taboo was torn from it. Hence, it became easier to fight against it. We should do the same to “honour” crimes. By calling it terrorism against women we facilitate the fight to root it out.

    This is based on two speeches made at 8 March conference in Gothenburg, Sweden and the conference in London to commemorate Dua, the young girl who was stoned to death in Iraq last year.

  • Pew Study Finds One in Five Atheists Believe in God

    Washington, DC – The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life released a second report from its U.S. Religious Landscape Survey on Monday concluding that Americans are highly religious and tolerant of other religions and that religion is politically relevant. While none of this is news, the study’s findings about nonreligious Americans are.

    Pew reported that 21 percent of atheists in their survey said they believed in God or a universal spirit, that six percent of them considered it a personal god, and that 40 percent of agnostics feel certain that God exists. Conversely, among respondents who say they are affiliated with a religious tradition (Catholic, Jewish, Protestant, Muslim, etc.), a surprising number said they actually do not believe in a god or universal spirit.

    “When atheists are telling you they believe in God and Catholics are admitting they don’t, that’s evidence of the stigma our society puts on nontheists,” said Lori Lipman Brown, Director of the Secular Coalition for America. “Americans repeatedly tell pollsters that an atheist is the last person they’d want their children to marry, the last person they’d vote for as President. This prejudice also appears in the widespread impression that atheists lack ethics and values.”

    A 2007 Newsweek study* indicates that surveys putting the number of Americans without a god belief at anywhere between 21 to 63 million are probably low: half of Newsweek’s respondents last year reported personally knowing an atheist. “Unless these small numbers of atheists have unusually vast social networks, those respondents tell us that nontheists make up a lot more than just eight or 12 percent of the U.S. population,” said Brown. “It says a lot about the difficulty of coming out of the closet, whether it’s to family, pollsters or fellow parishioners.”

    The Pew Center’s press release also announced that religion in America is politically relevant; however, says Brown, so is its absence. “When you look at the results, you see the secular vote is much larger and more up for grabs than other groups who receive an awful lot of attention from politicians and pollsters. And yet with both major parties pandering to religion, our constituency is feeling more and more like outcasts in our own democracy.”

    According to the Pew survey, there are more than twice as many atheists and agnostics (a combined 4.0 percent of all respondents) as there are Jews (1.7 percent), and about four times as many as there are Muslims (0.6 percent). Atheists and agnostics also have higher ratios of independent voters than most other groups in the study. The overall percentage of voters with no religious affiliation, which includes atheists, agnostics, and secular and religious unaffiliateds, too, is nearly equal (16.1) to the percentage who are mainline Protestant (18.1).

    The Secular Coalition for America represents nine national coalition partners who share the view that a secular government offers the best guarantee for freedom of thought and belief for all Americans. In this election year, the Coalition will continue to amplify the voices of atheists, agnostics, humanists and other nontheists, and will advocate for all secular voters and help boost their visibility even as pollsters, politicians and pundits are silent about their place in American public life. The Coalition’s website is www.secular.org.

    * Newsweek Magazine, April 9, 2007, “Is God Real?” by Jon Meacham.

  • Heat and Light: Christopher Hitchens and His Critics

    The case against Christopher Hitchens can be summarised, broadly, in a kind of comic list as done by the British satirical magazine Private Eye:

    He supported the Iraq war
    He likes a drink
    He smokes, as well
    He supported the war
    He tends to be aggressive in debate
    He likes a drink
    He supported the war
    Er…
    …That’s it.

    In a sense he needs no introduction. (His entry in the contributors’ biographies of this book simply reads: ‘Christopher Hitchens is Christopher Hitchens.’) He is one of the West’s most prolific journalists, speakers and essayists, with a love of literature and hatred for oppression and superstition everywhere. A one-time Marxist, Hitchens’s politics could be defined not so much as ideological but a broad opposition to establishment power and discourse, and solidarity with victims of cruelty. Crucially coupled with this is an independence of mind. As he says in Letters to a Young Contrarian: ‘Dammit, I have only one life to live and I won’t spend a moment of it on some dismal compromise.’[1]

    It was inevitable that, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, this combative intellectual would confront a Left that had become narrow-minded, reactionary, stagnant with ideological conformity and pious self-satisfaction. The occasion was the 2001 attack on New York orchestrated by a wealthy group of religious fanatics. Hitchens was outraged by the conventional left opinion that the attack was a reasonable consequence of past American crimes and that bin Laden’s suicide bombers represented the cry of oppressed Muslims:

    Now is as good a time as ever to revisit the history of the Crusades, or the sorry history of partition in Kashmir, or the woes of the Chechens and Kosovars. But the bombers of Manhattan represent fascism with an Islamic face, and there’s no point in any euphemism about it. What they abominate about ‘the West,’ to put it in a phrase, is not what Western liberals don’t like and can’t defend about their own system, but what they do like about it and must defend: its emancipated women, its scientific inquiry, its separation of religion from the state.[2]

    Hitchens went on to argue for the war in Afghanistan, and then for the war in Iraq. He based his support for the latter mainly on solidarity with Iraqi and Kurdish dissidents, who had no illusions about Bush’s motives but saw the invasion as their last and best chance to get rid of Saddam Hussein.

    This did not make Hitchens popular. The predominant opinion, from the pages of liberal broadsheets to far-left meeting rooms, was that the Bush administration was capitalising on the September 11 attacks to launch an imperialist project to destroy Islamic culture and control Middle Eastern oil supplies. The assumption was that no progressive case for war could be made.

    We shouldn’t be too hard on the left in general here because the main opposition to this lazy consensus came not from conservatives but other lefties: novelists, journalists, activists and bloggers willing to defend secularism and support comrades in the Arab world rather than the dictators and priesthoods they were forced to live under. These men and women were duly excommunicated and denounced as racists and neocons. But Hitchens made the first hairline crack of this historic schism.

    Christopher Hitchens and his Critics is a collection of Hitchens’s political writing over these vital years. There is also a range of critical responses to his arguments – not as wide a range as it could be because Noam Chomsky, Tariq Ali and many others refused to let their criticism of Hitchens be reprinted in the anthology. ‘It is a disheartening irony,’ the editors write, ‘that all the authors who refused permission are, or have been, robust defenders of free expression and the dialectical exchange of ideas.’[3]

    The language of apostasy dominates. Hitchens is perceived to have ‘changed sides’ after September 11; critics tend to focus on the act of changing sides rather than Hitchens’s reasons and arguments for doing so.

    In truth, there was no Damascean conversion in the Manhattan ruins. The editors rightly state that, on a range of issues from the Rushdie fatwa to the Clinton presidency, Hitchens’s relationship with the mainstream left was always ‘fraught and complicated’[4]. And it was natural that such a fierce secularist should respond to religious terrorism in the way Hitchens has.

    His problem with many on the left is that their reflexive opposition to the West has caused them to support any far-right theocratic movement as long as it occasionally targets Western soldiers. He calls them ‘fellow-travellers with fascism’[5] and the crew of frauds and demagogues in the back end of this volume seem to have been assembled to prove his point.

    First up is Norman Finkelstein, an academic who declared at the time of the Lebanon war that ‘for those who believe in freedom and dignity, we are all Hezbollah now.’[6] This year he met with the terrorist organisation and told reporters that ‘I think that the Hezbollah represents the hope. They are fighting to defend their homeland.’[7] As Hitchens says: ‘I am not sure I am ready to hear that it is I who have capitulated to the forces of reaction.’[8]

    Finklestein’s article is quoted enthusiastically by Richard Seymour, a British far-left activist who runs an unreadable blog called ‘Lenin’s Tomb.’ In a long, scatological closing essay, he reveals that Hitchens changes his mind a lot, and had doubts about the Iraq invasion as late as 2002. Fine. Naturally, if Hitchens had always argued for war, that would prove his bloodthirsty dogmatism.

    Seymour claims that the jihadis and ex-Baathists in Iraq are a ‘grassroots guerilla movement, one that has arisen because of the brutality of the occupation’[9] and although he concedes that ‘there is certainly an element that behaves in an abominable fashion, the bulk of resistance attacks are overwhelmingly directed against US troops, not civilians.’[10] His sources for this statement are the CIA (!) and a bunch of antiwar websites similar to his own. So, as well as believing that the murder of young working-class Americans is somehow understandable, we are supposed to perceive the killing of trade unionists[11] and aid workers[12] and the bombing of mosques[13] and UN buildings[14] as mere collateral damage. If you judge a man by his enemies, Hitchens comes off well.

    At least Finkelstein and Seymour engage with what Hitchens says. As Cottee and Cushman put it:

    Trawling through the endless critical commentary directed at Hitchens, one is struck not just by the outstanding ferocity of it all but also by the fact that the focal point of critical interest is virtually the same: the all-too-human Christopher Hitchens, and not his actual arguments.

    In particular, almost every critical article includes a snide allusion to his love of drinking. In a piece on Counterpunch, Jack McCarthy focuses entirely on Hitchens and alcohol, giggling that ‘you can’t help but conclude that the man gives new meaning to the phrase ‘a drunk in denial.’[15] Come on. Either Hitchens is an alcoholic or he isn’t. If he is, alcoholism is a disease and Hitchens needs help and support, not ridicule. If not, what you have written about him is libel. Which is it? It’s a sign of the left’s increasing puritanism that it makes such a fuss of dissenters’ drinking habits.

    I think Cottee and Cushman are wrong, though, to claim that Hitchens has not been ‘trenchant enough, at least in print, about the many failings of the Bush administration.’[16 ] In just part one of this volume I counted dozens of attacks, from the US alliance with the Saudi and Pakistan dictatorships (p50) to Bush’s subsidy of $43m to the Taliban, a few months before 9/11, to fight the war on drugs (p43).

    And yet there are valid criticisms of Hitchens’s approach. Reading through his pieces on the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, you can’t help but note his laughable optimism about casualty figures, his glib and premature triumphalism. The incompetence of the Bush administration was massively underestimated, and not just by Hitchens. Interventionists were made complacent by relatively easy campaigns in Kosovo and Sierra Leone and thought Saddam would be overthrown with a minimum of casualties.

    At what point do you admit that the whole thing might have been a mistake? When 100,000 are dead? Half a million? At what point in the bodycount does your support turn from principle to nightmare utopianism? It’s a shame that the editors only include Hitchens’s early pieces, when the war looked just about successful, and omit his later work, where he is increasingly disillusioned. (In particular, Hitchens’s piece about Mark Daily, a soldier killed in Iraq who was inspired to fight by Hitchens’s articles, is profound and moving.)[17]

    In the end, it’s hard not to agree with Johann Hari: ‘To rally the left to solidarity with the victims of Ba’athism and Islamism is an honourable cause; to do it with the weapon of neoconservatism was a catastrophic misjudgement.’[18] Hitchens is right in principle but as a strategist he has real problems.

    Another factor is his aggression. In a culture that prizes equivocation, compromise and ambiguity, Hitchens’s direct approach has been taken as intimidation, even bullying. Stefan Collini is quoted as saying:

    One gets the strongest possible sense of how much it matters to prove that one is and always has been right… There is a palpably macho tone to all this, as of alpha males competing for dominance and display.[19]

    It’s this tendency that has led to Hitchens being slapped with the tired label of ‘atheist fundamentalist’. He’s also seen as lacking the sense of the sanctity of life: there are quotes in this volume of Hitchens rejoicing at the deaths of jihadists, and his indifference to the demise of Christian fundamentalist Jerry Falwell shocked Fox News. (He has said that ‘I like it when bad people die.’[20])

    Yet this hate for his enemies, although it can be shocking, is not entirely dishonourable. The editors of this volume say that ‘From the perspective of Greek antiquity, there was nothing remotely odd or morally dubious about praising the merits of hatred.’ They then quote Aristotle: ‘Hatred of tyrants is inevitable, and contempt is also a frequent cause of their destruction.’[21]

    It’s a misconception that the absence of conflict is possible or desirable. One of Hitchens’s favourite aphorisms regards heat and light: people say that in discussion we need to generate light rather than heat, but basic physics tell us that it’s heat that generates light. That insight and truth spatter like sparks from the fires of aggression.

    It is the achievement of Christopher Hitchens to have kept these fires burning so brightly and for so long. Friend or enemy, you have to recognise that, and this anthology makes a fascinating introduction to this eloquent and tireless debater.

    Christopher Hitchens and His Critics: Terror, Iraq and the Left, ed. Simon Cottee and Thomas Cushman, New York University Press, 2008.

    Notes

    1. Letters to a Young Contrarian, Christopher Hitchens, Basic Books 2001, p 45
    2. Christopher Hitchens and His Critics: Terror, Iraq and the Left, ed. Simon Cottee and Thomas Cushman, New York University Press 2008, p46
    3. Ibid, p29
    4. Ibid, p35
    5. Ibid, p81
    6. From Finkelstein’s website, July 2006.

    7. Haaretz, January 8 2008.

    8. Hitchens, p252
    9. Ibid, p324
    10. Ibid, p323
    11. Hadi Saleh of the Iraqi Federation of Trade Unions was murdered in his Baghdad home on January 4 2005. This obituary states that: ‘His IFTU comrades described the killing as bearing all the hallmarks of the former security services. His union files and membership records were ransacked.’ Guardian, January 20 2005.

    12. Marla Ruzicka, a campaigner for compensation for civilians injured by the US military, was killed by a suicide bomber in Baghdad. Washington Post, April 18 2005.

    13. A typical attack on a Shia mosque killed fourteen people. BBC, January 21 2005.

    14. The explosives that destroyed the UN building in August 2003 ‘appeared to have come from Saddam Hussein’s pre-war arsenal.’ BBC, August 21 2003

    15. ‘Another Ad Hominem Attack on Christopher Hitchens,’ Jack McCarthy, Counterpunch, February 21 2003.

    16. Hitchens, p24-5.
    17. ‘A Death in the Family,’ Christopher Hitchens, Vanity Fair, November 2007.

    18. ‘The pro-war left’s disastrous misjudgment,’ Johann Hari, Independent, July 23 2007
    .
    19. Hitchens, p3
    20. Interview with Jage Toba, Plum TV, added to YouTube, January 31 2008.
    21. Hitchens, p6. I’m reminded of the Clinton Tyree character in Carl Hiaasen’s fabulous crime novels: ‘Nothing shameful about anger, boy. Sometimes it’s the only sane and logical and moral reaction.’ Sick Puppy, Pan 1999.

  • Forced marriages and Divorce…and kangaroo sharia courts

    I was asked to speak about forced marriages on a local radio show; I didn’t get to say a lot in a few minutes but there is a lot to be said under the current climate.

    I wasn’t actually ‘forced’ into an arranged marriage. I was slowly coerced, manipulated and brainwashed by my dad and his family members over a short period of time, when I went on holiday with him at the age of 16. Soon after arriving, I was given some clothes and a ring. My engagement was announced without my knowledge or consent. I thought it was just a gift from my uncle. He had taken me shopping. I chose the ring and clothes myself without any idea that they were gifts for my own engagement! My father, whom I loved very dearly, emotionally blackmailed me. Dad and his extended family had planned it for years behind my back and without my mother’s knowledge. She was dead against marriage to cousins and wanted me to study, but even she couldn’t win against the male hierarchy, even though she was a strong progressive-thinking woman. I want to emphasise that behind my teen marriage and that of many many Muslim marriages abroad, is the fact that we are used as a British Passport. I am ashamed to say that years ago, I sat through two forced marriages, knowing that the young British women involved did not want to marry their cousins. In both cases the men were relatives from Pakistan, and the women were emotionally blackmailed – forced to consent in the name of family honour. They had to ensure that the cousins gained a visa before any divorce proceedings went ahead, in order to get out of the marriage. I wish I had spoken up in hindsight but at the time I was one of the silent majority.

    I believe the divorce rate is much higher than assumed amongst British Muslim women, due to many escaping such marriages. Both these women refused to consummate the marriage; both divorced the cousins regardless of the pressure or ‘family honour’. In both situations the young women faced stigma, and suffered depression. One even faced threats and emotional and verbal abuse from her father.

    I would also like to state that the research and work I now do as a counter extremism/Jihad activist, involves acknowledging the roots of the problem. We now face an ideology, where Islamists attempt to reverse the mindset of the community back to medieval times, and continue subjugating Muslim women. Imams and clerics in many mosques are still teaching our men that in Islam it is permissible to marry off your daughter as soon as she reaches puberty or even slap a woman because God ordained it…Which then feeds into the oppression and abuse of Muslim teenagers and women.

    What needs to be highlighted is that these backward practices are damaging to the lives of Muslim women, as twisted theology is being used. In many cases I accept that it can be addressed as ‘culture’ but I argue otherwise for Muslim women. The fact that family honour depends on the behaviour and virginity of the Muslim females is deeply embedded into the mindset. We are expected to submit, remain silent, abstain from relationships with the opposite sex, reject ‘westernisation’ and sacrifice our own free will and choice – to be good Muslim women. There are so many true love stories of unrequited love and heartbreak because of this unreasonable practice and expectation.

    My marriage ended two years later after he was granted a visa. I simply did not love him. There was a clash between his cultural upbringing and mine..the clash between west and east mindset, so to speak. I left home after the death of my first-born. I was only 18. I knew I would not get support if I wanted a divorce, and the pressure was too much for me to deal with. I was abandoned, ex-communicated for a while, even though I was suffering from depression. Nobody supported me for my Islamic divorce although I was granted a decree nisi. Islamically I was still ‘married’ for another two years until the ex wanted to get married again. That was his way of gaining a permanent stay in the country. I endured the stigma of being a divorcée. Twenty four years on, I know I am not the only one to whom this has happened and that this systematic abuse persists. Schoolgirls are still taken out of school and taken on these so-called holidays. Even those who gain an education are still under pressure to marry a cousin. We face being stigmatised, abandoned and blacklisted for walking out, and making our own life choices. Love marriages can still be frowned upon, hence women can be victims of so called ‘honour’-based crime. And yet our culture, movies, music, poetry are all about love. It’s extremely sad.

    What isn’t being highlighted is how extremism feeds into the oppression of Muslim women. British laws have to acknowledge our plight and seek to protect our rights, not give in to Muslim appeasement and political correctness . We are more likely to be used as British passports for extended family to gain visas into the country, than to have a love marriage.

    It’s happening to young teenage lads too, forced into marriage with cousins from villages and then those same lads can commit polygamy. I have known it to happen. Young uneducated wives from abroad can be treated as ‘slaves’, controlled by extended family, abused by the mother-in-law; many endure domestic violence, depression and isolation.

    If child bride marriages, polygamy and domestic violence are against British Law, then why has our plight been ignored for over forty years? We do not live in Medieval times any more.

    My hero is Jaswinder Sanghera from Karma Nirvana. Jaswinder wrote her book Shame, that resonated with many Muslim women. It took a British Sikh woman to address the abuse Muslim women have silently endured, and she continues to highlight these serious issues . It was identified that 65 percent of the problem of forced or coerced marriages stemmed from the Pakistani and Bengali community. She has challenged the Muslim leaders who deny that forced marriage or honour crimes are a serious issue in our communities. Southall Black Sisters deserve an award and utmost respect for the work they have been doing for years on the same issues and yet their funding has been slashed.

    I will also state that men who are trying to implement Sharia law Councils in this country do not give a damn about the emancipation of Muslim women. They are planting the first seeds of Sharia law using the forced marriage situation and divorce plight of Muslim women. Many who seek their freedom are abandoned so one issue feeds into other related issues. Muslim mosque leaders and male-dominated organisations do nothing for the emancipation of Muslim women either. Take for instance Inayat Bunglawala from the MCB who always has to say something to camouflage or dispute our social realities and the truth. Now another organisation dominated by clerics, Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, are using the forced marriage issue in order to normalise their kangaroo sharia courts with ‘judges’. Islamists suddenly want to use our plight to establish Sharia law courts. What hasn’t been realised by Muslims and non Muslims is that members of MAT are influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood teachings. Men like Sheikh Faiz Siddqui want Sharia courts in Britain. Wahhabis like Sohail Hassan from Leyton Road mosque already use the divorce plight in order to establish sharia courts. This man once said on Newsnight, when advocating polygamy, ”what will women do, they will either become nuns, prostitutes or be left on the shelf”. I was so insulted as a lone parent. Sharia law is all about family law, the lone mother is absent from the Islamic conscience. These Islamists are not the men we should be turning to. A few men like Nazir Afzal and Dr Ghayauddin Saddiqui support the rights of Muslim women and speak up against honour crimes and forced marriages regardless of threats and intimidation. Our freedom, choices, and human rights have been ignored and unaddressed for over forty years in Britain..Any kind of Sharia court using our plight must be dismissed. Forced marriage is a crime and we don’t need clerics who are influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood to tell us that. We don’t need kangaroo sharia courts who use our plight so that they can manipulate their own political agenda.

    The fact is a backward wave is still dominating our lives and wherever there is extremism in a Muslim community, you will also find Muslim women who are oppressed, abused mentally and physically . Every aspect of their lives is controlled by what they wear, where they go, who they see. They are suppressed and abused not by strangers but by their own family members. But as Jaswinder once said in a meeting – we need to re claim our honour back as Women. How many more have to be killed or threatened, abused or humiliated in the name of family honour, religion or culture?

    That’s why I love my country Britain because ultimately I had alternative choices here: rights, security and freedom that I might not have had in the Muslim country my mother was from.

    Put it this way, when I was abandoned after escaping my situation, Britain, my Motherland, took care of me. I was given shelter, food, clothing and opportunities to train, educate myself, work and be independent twenty four years ago.

    Freedom to live as a full human being, to educate myself and live my own life independently on my own terms as an equal in a civilised democratic society…That’s something Muslim women in many Muslim state are denied. Remember that’s something Islamists and Jihadists abhor…the emancipation of Muslim women. All oppressed women have alternative choices in a democracy, they just need the courage and support to take the first steps to get out alive, it’s better than being buried alive.

  • Health Report From Zimbabwe

    ZADHR is deeply concerned about the continuing violent trauma being inflicted on the Zimbabwean population. The escalation in numbers and severity of cases of systematic violent assault and torture during May was of a scale which threatened to, and for brief periods did, overwhelm the capacity of health workers to respond. Both first line casualty officers and specialists, especially surgeons and anaesthetists, to whom patients were referred had great difficulty in adequately managing the burden of serious physical trauma.

    ZADHR commends the efforts of health professionals in Zimbabwe who continue to provide the highest possible quality of health care to victims of violence under extremely difficult circumstances.

    In addition to individuals with significant physical injuries, members of ZADHR saw over 300 displaced patients with medical conditions such as pneumonia or asthma, or psychiatric diagnoses, in particular anxiety and depression, and many with chronic conditions such as diabetes whose medication had been lost or destroyed when the patients were violently forced, by arson or the immediate probability of injury or death, from their homes.

    It is certain that a far greater number of patients will have been attended to by other members of the health professions, especially nurses, but will never have been near a doctor. Psychiatric and social problems may result in an even greater burden on health care workers than the frequently complicated but relatively clearcut diagnoses such as fractures.

    One thousand and seven patients were seen during the month of May. 119 patients sustained fractures, more than 50 of which were recorded as confirmed on x ray. The remainder were clinical diagnoses, either with clinically evident physical distortion or with the broken ends of bone protruding through an external wound (compound fracture). 36 patients had fractures of the ulna (the inner or medial bone of the forearm), 27 of the radius (the outer or lateral bone of the forearm). Of these 13 had fractures of both radius and ulna, 4 had fractures of the ulna bones of both arms, and one patient had both radius bones broken. Seventeen further cases of fractured wrist, forearm or elbow were recorded.

    Most of these fractures will have been sustained in attempts to defend the face and upper body from violent blows with a weapon such as a heavy stick or iron bar. As evidence for the sustained severity of the violence of many of the assaults there were several cases of multiple fractures to different areas of the body, for example one patient with fractures of the left ulna, right radius and a metatarsal (small bone of the foot), and another with a patella (knee cap) and bilateral ulna fractures. Three patients had skull fractures and 9 had broken ribs. Two of these cases had multiple rib fractures associated with haemothorax (bleeding into the space between the lungs and the chest wall, probably caused by penetration of the broken end of a rib, which can be rapidly fatal).

    Forty five cases of fractures of the small bones of the hands (31) or feet (12), both hands (1), or both hands and feet (1) were recorded. Many patients sustained fractures to several bones, again witness to the sustained brutality of the assaults, and consistent with reports of hands and feet being pounded by a pestle (mutswi) in a mortar (duri).

    At least two pregnant women, one 24 and the other 32 weeks gestation, were systematically beaten on the back and buttocks, resulting in extensive lacerations, bruising and haematoma formation. They were among the 312 cases classified as having severe soft tissue injury. This category includes widespread severe bruising, haematoma (collection of blood) formation, necrosis (tissue death), sepsis (infection, usually where there is extensive skin loss or abscess formation in a haematoma), or deep and extensive lacerations (cuts or wounds).

    One patient, beaten extensively on the shoulders, back, buttocks and thighs, was also struck in the face and suffered a leak of vitreous humour (the transparent gel-like substance behind the lens of the eye) resulting in blindness.

    There have been reports of over 53 violent deaths up to the end of May 2008. However although post-mortem examinations are legally mandatory in such cases, few are being undertaken and therefore cases are only rarely confirmed by doctors. However 7 of these deaths occurred in hospital following admission for injuries sustained during violent assault or torture and a further three did have post-mortem examinations. One confirmed a broken neck as the cause of death. A second died as a result of intracranial haemorrhage (bleeding inside the head) with extensive facial injury indicative of having been beaten on the head. The second died as a result of probable acute renal failure secondary to extensive myolysis (destruction of muscle) and soft tissue necrosis with evidence of falanga and widespread whipping type injuries. In the third case, the body was found several days after abduction, and although it was partially decomposed, the detailed post-mortem which was carried out did not reveal evidence of beating or torture. The estimated time of death (nearer to the time of abduction rather than when the body was found) and the witnessed method of abduction in which the head was forcibly extended, the face covered and, with the victim prone, several attackers putting their weight on his back, are consistent with death due to asphyxia.

    There has been a gross surge in both the quantity and severity of injury. Fracture cases alone increased three-fold in number from April to May. These documented cases speak for themselves in terms of the urgency of the need to stop the violence which is sweeping large areas of the country. ZADHR reiterates its call on all parties to cease the use of assault and torture intimidation, victimisation or retribution. In addition to cessation of violence there are other urgent needs for affected individuals including shelter, food and water for internally displaced persons and mental and physical rehabilitation for victims of violent trauma.

    Taken with permission from Normblog.

  • Time for a Paradigm Shift in Indian Higher Education

    Ever since the process of economic reforms began in the 1990s, we have been hearing pious noises about the urgent need to reform education also. Obviously, the linkage is pragmatically motivated: economic growth cannot be sustained over a long period without a suitably reformed education system. This is good as far as it goes. If a concern for sustaining economic growth can trigger reforms in education, we should embrace the opportunity.

    But it would be disastrous to hang education from the peg of economics, as seems to be happening, without considering the other larger reasons for restructuring it. The need to see the larger picture is urgent also because the dominant vision of economics in the country today is itself very narrow. This is a vision shaped predominantly by corporate interests and not inspired by a socially responsible economic philosophy.

    A worthwhile exercise in educational reforms, on the contrary, must take into account the larger role that education plays in contemporary societies. Particularly, it must grapple with the changes that have swept the world during recent decades and anticipate the issues that are likely to seize the world in the coming times. Otherwise education will no more than subserviently reflect temporary business trends.

    During a recent interaction with several educationists, I found very few responding to a simple question: Given complete freedom and every resource, how will you reorganize the classroom space? The silence of those who were otherwise even impressively aware and sharp was clearly not a sign of incompetence. It was the symptom of a deeper, systemic problem that we may understand if we consider the organizing rationality of our education system.

    It is usually said that the education system is collapsing. It would make sense to speak of a collapse if the system were only burdened with more than it could bear. The real problem, instead, is even more serious: the system is faced with what it cannot handle. The reason is that its organizing rationality is that of industrial society, whereas we have been already pushed into the post-industrial society.

    The real challenge, then, is how to free education from the constraints of the obsolescent industrial paradigm and reconfigure it in accord with the emerging post-industrial paradigm. And this will have to be done in such a way that the interests of all people are served and not just those of any privileged social group. So instead of lamenting the so-called collapse of education, we need to address ourselves to the crisis that the historic shift of the paradigm has induced on a global scale. Some societies have grasped the implications of the shift and are transforming their education systems. Others either have not grasped it, or do not possess the will to confront its challenges and use its opportunities. What these societies lack is a global sense of history, a lack reflected in the inability to take the measure of the changing times and imagine something radically different from the given and the inherited.

    A global sense of history is needed if we want to be able to see the larger picture in terms of both space and time. We need to see not only continuities but also discontinuities. We need to know what sets the present, with all its legacy of traces, radically apart from the past. Successful societies of the future will be those which have a global sense of history and which moreover have the knack for translating that sense into useful practices in the present.

    The spatial organization of the typical Indian classroom might have worked for the unilateral and instructive mode of knowledge transmission that the industrial society required. That, however, does not mean it will work in the post-industrial situation. The good old method of lecturing might be personally gratifying and even inspiring, yet it cannot be allowed to retain its monopoly in an age that demands participatory knowledge production. The old method still has its uses no doubt, but it must rediscover its place in a reconfigured academy. The new mode of knowledge production has to focus on open-ended innovation through shared use of the resources of creativity. The old mode was focused more on reproduction and on derivative applications of innovation. Fortunately, technologies are today available to facilitate the shift to the new mode, yet in our country these are put to little use other than as mere “aids” to lectures. This has to change.

    Change is frightening, and more so when it is a “switch-over” change. But we can at least begin by opening up small spaces for experimentation and innovation within our great Education Machine. The good lessons can be gradually assimilated and the reconfigured spaces expanded. We have opportunities today to reaffirm the forgotten tradition of participatory production of knowledge. And for the first time in history the scale of the participation can be actually boundless and the proportion of production significantly greater than that of reproduction. The chances to reinvent the world have never looked so good.

    But are we mentally prepared to suffer the agonies of change? Are we willing to move our Education Machine into cyberspace?

    The world is doing it. The issues of quality control in scholarly electronic publication, of academic exchange and collaboration in cyberspace, of plagiarism and authenticity and the like are being discussed and resolved with utmost urgency. In most of our universities however, we continue to regard the “printed” word with a special reverence that we hesitate to accord to the electronic text. Unless we go full steam ahead for digital archiving and for unhindered electronic access and dissemination, we shall not be able to make for ourselves a place in the emerging networks of knowledge production.

    Indeed the time has also come to upgrade democracy in the academy to the next level. For a long time we have lived with a higher education that is built around the myth of the non-existent “average” learner. The myth feeds off real, living students. Those who cannot keep pace with the system fall behind and suffer, while those who are capable of greater challenges find themselves under-tested. We need to make the system more democratic by making it both more inclusive and more adequate. For this purpose we would have to make the undergraduate and postgraduate courses multi-level. The students could then walk out of the university system with a basic degree or with an advanced degree of varied levels, depending on their inclinations, strengths and limitations.

    Those students who are good and want to pursue research in the humanities and social sciences often find themselves helpless to follow their dream. With hardly any funding available, they have no choice but to abandon their dream and join the workforce. If they could be retained in the academy, they would be able to give much more to society. With their premature exit from education, the society is faced with a looming scarcity of good researchers and teachers in these crucial areas. The interdisciplinary courses in the universities, proposed by the UGC, can be an opportunity to give teaching assignments to research scholars in these areas. The assignments will financially sustain them and there will be no strain on the fund-starved universities also. In fact, even in the prevailing dispensation it is possible to provide teaching assignments to young research scholars. They can be given two or three hours of teaching every day in the departments of engineering, law, etc. The regular teachers in the departments of humanities and social sciences will be spared the trouble of additional, though paid, work; the needy research scholars will get their bread and butter.

    At the same time, even as incentives are devised, we need to make research in the humanities and social sciences more rigorous. Universities should establish interdisciplinary centres for contemporary studies that would work at the forefront of research in all conceivable areas of contemporary society and culture. The students enrolled for Ph.D. programmes could be required to undergo a one-year course in these centres to enable them to plan their research projects in terms of emerging global trends and competencies. We often complain about the quality of research. Let us at least put together some infrastructure and give our young scholars a fair chance.

    April 20, 2008

    The writer teaches in the Department of English, Punjabi University, Patiala (Punjab). He may be reached at sharajesh@gmail.com.