Is an award to Stephen King a symptom of dumbing down? Or is Bloom just cranky.
Author: Ophelia Benson
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Wit, Blather and Screwiness
Carlin Romano goes to the World Congress of Philosophy in Istanbul.
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Political Rhetoric
How does rhetoric differ from argument? Crooked Timber discusses the matter.
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No Death By Stoning
Blow to cultural relativists as liberal values prevail. Sort of.
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Edward Said
New York Times obituary.
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Edward Said
The Guardian obituary.
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News Flash
Let’s re-invent the wheel again. How many times do we need to learn that democracy is not the same thing as freedom, that the majority will does not necessarily (in fact almost certainly doesn’t) represent the will of absolutely everyone, that in fact majorities are perfectly capable of deciding to oppress minorities? John Stuart Mill seems to be widely read, judging by the number of copies of On Liberty one sees in used bookstores, and yet we still go on telling each other with an air of innocent surprise that democracy in Iraq could possibly mean that people will vote in an oppressive fundamentalist Islamic government. Well yes, it could mean exactly that.
Nicholas Kristof pointed this out in the New York Times a few weeks ago:
Paradoxically, a more democratic Iraq may also be a more repressive one; it may well be that a majority of Iraqis favor more curbs on professional women and on religous minorities. As Fareed Zakaria notes in his smart new book, “The Future of Freedom,” unless majority rule is accompanied by legal protections, tolerance and respect for minorities, the result can be populist repression.
It’s not really even paradoxical. Just for a start, the U.S. democracy elected pro-slavery president after pro-slavery president in the 19th century. Of course majority rules needs to be accompanied by legal protections in order to avoid populist repression. For that matter, we don’t always entirely avoid it even with those protections, do we.
[Another recycle.]
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Ya Big Meanie
The Chronicle of Higher Education had an interesting story in June – interesting albeit peculiar. So many people arguing so back-to-front – I don’t like this/this is offensive/this hurts my feelings, therefore this has to be wrong. Not that it’s exactly a news flash that people do argue that way – it’s even possible that I’ve been known to argue that way myself – but there is so much of it in this story it does get one’s attention.
Other scholars and activists have blasted the book for reinforcing inaccurate stereotypes.
Hmm. Why do I suspect that those scholars and activists would still have ‘blasted’ the book even if the stereotypes had been accurate? Why do I wonder if they bothered to investigate whether the stereotypes are really inaccurate or not? Why do I think they probably just assumed from the outset that the stereotypes were inaccurate, and ‘blasted’ accordingly?
Despite the draw he has on the campus, many of the descriptions of Mr. Bailey and his new book that have appeared on Web sites and in interviews have been ugly. “Cocky,” “insensitive,” “lurid,” “condescending,” and “mean-spirited” are just some of the designations used.
Notice how all those designations desribe the putative character of the researcher and his attitude but say nothing about the accuracy of the book or the reliability of his methods, and then when you’ve noticed that, notice how back-to-front that is. The book may or may not be dead wrong, but calling the author a big meanie doesn’t prove that it is. Peer review is an excellent institution, and it does not function by peers calling each other mean-spirited and insensitive. No, peers have to do better than that.
But no doubt Mr. Bailey is used to this sort of thing; he ran into it as an undergraduate.
Instead, he pursued an interest in Freudian psychology that was piqued by an undergraduate history course on the topic. “Freud was into all this dark and sexy stuff with the unconscious and how people’s motives are usually hidden,” says Mr. Bailey. “I thought, ‘I can become a psychoanalyst.’” But at Texas he quickly grew annoyed with the clinical-psychology program. “The people doing it were not really researchers. They were more like an authoritarian cult: Believe this or else,” he says. He was more attracted to scholars who were “being hard-headed and asking questions,” and even considering unpopular possibilities, like a link between IQ and genes.
Yes, believe this or else. Or else we’ll say strange things like this:
“He is looking to the body for truth, as opposed to social and cultural frameworks,” says Lane Fenrich, a senior lecturer in the history department who teaches gay and lesbian history and the history of the AIDS epidemic. “It’s in many ways no different from the way in which people were trying to look for the alleged basis of racial differences in people’s bodies.”
Imagine, he’s looking to the body for truth about things that happen in the body. How very shocking. When everyone knows that social and cultural frameworks operate in a complete vacuum, and should be studied that way. Otherwise, people will start making dark references to looking for the alleged basis of racial differences, and if that doesn’t shut you up, what will? Belive this or else we’ll call you inthenthitive and mean-thpirited, and then you’ll be sorry!
[If you’ve been reading B&W for awhile and this seems familiar, that’s because it is: it’s a slightly re-worded version of a N&C that disappeared when the server crashed in July.]
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Sauce for the Gander
So, as if to prove my point, here is an article that gives some idea of the kind of thing the Competitive Enterprise Institute gets up to. Helping the Bush White House to ‘play down’ research on global warming that could have consequences the CEI wouldn’t like, for example.
White House officials wanted the CEI’s help to play down the impact of a report last summer by the government’s Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in which the US admitted for the first time that humans are contributing to global warming…The email discusses possible tactics for playing down the report and getting rid of EPA officials, including its then head, Christine Whitman…The CEI is suing another government climate research body that produced evidence for global warming.
Interesting. On the one hand we have an article from someone at the CEI who cites malfeasance by two count them two scientists, but talks about ‘the scientific community’ and ‘environmental scientists’ as if there were no difference between two scientists and all scientists. On the other hand we have the CEI colluding with the Bush administration to ‘play down’ (it’s not clear from the article whose language ‘play down’ is, whether it’s actually in the email in question or it’s the reporter’s paraphrase) scientific findings they don’t like.
And then…it’s interesting that Iain Murray draws our attention to one speech by a scientist and one article by another, but doesn’t draw our attention to the way Bush’s staff suppressed and re-worded whole sections of an EPA report on climate change.
A temperature record covering 1,000 years was also deleted, prompting the EPA memo to note: ‘Emphasis is given to a recent, limited analysis [which] supports the administration’s favoured message.’ White House officials added numerous qualifying words such as ‘potentially’ and ‘may’, leading the EPA to complain: ‘Uncertainty is inserted where there is essentially none.’…When the report was finally published, however, the EPA had removed the entire global warming section to avoid including information that was not scientifically credible.
What price the ideals of science or ‘science as an objective tool in public policy decisions’ now, eh?
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Help For The Disadvantaged?
Should university admissions procedures take social circumstances into account?
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British Public Are Scaredy-Cats
GM crops and self-selecting samples.
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Shapiro on Kermode on Literature
The discussions of old battles over French theory fail to thrill, but the rest does.
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Are All Religions Identical?
Are all religions identical? Many people seem to think so, especially if they’ve taken a world religion course in college or read a Joseph Campbell book. They will tell you that all religions teach us to value life, to refrain from harming others, and to renounce selfishness. Therefore, so the thinking goes, all religions are identical in both content and purpose. The corollary assumption is that there can never be legitimate conflicts between religious beliefs, therefore all disagreements between followers of different religions must be fundamentally illegitimate. These conflicts allegedly stem from simple misunderstandings or unwillingness to admit common ground.
Such a view is certainly comforting, since it suggests that religious factions need only to listen to each other to find out they’re not so different after at all. Then, as trendy therapists might say, the healing can begin. The only problem with this tidy, conciliatory view is that it is utterly incorrect. A little knowledge of world religious traditions might convince us that they are identical, but a lot of knowledge tends to convince us that they are very different.
Many people who believe all religions are identical pay special attention to the similarities between Judaism, Christianity and Islam, or between ancient myths such as the Epic of Gilgamesh and the Biblical flood story included in Genesis. All of these describe the actions of a powerful deity who created the world by conquering the forces of chaos. But why is this similarity so surprising? All of these religions arose in the same tiny sliver of the world known as the Fertile Crescent, and their development often overlapped. The Babylonian Code of Hammurabi almost certainly inspired the Jewish Ten Commandments, which later found their way into both Christianity and Islam as those religions absorbed and reinterpreted Judaic religious concepts. Thus, it’s hardly newsworthy that Near Eastern religions tend to resemble each other to some degree.
Still, resemblance does not imply equality, and the common religious concepts of the three major monotheistic faiths have not prevented them from making violently contradictory claims. To a Christian, Jesus represents the incarnation of God on earth, and his sayings carry a corresponding moral authority. Muslims hold Jesus to be a great prophet, but believe Muhammad to have provided a more accurate record of God’s intentions. Jews, of course, believe Christians have given the Judaic concept of the messiah a meaning it never should have possessed, and reject any suggestions that Jesus was anything more than a man. These differences, among others, have led to very real disputes between adherents of these three religions. Someone seeking to reconcile these differences might explain them as simple misunderstandings, but he would also be explaining away the very convictions that make each of these religions so meaningful to its followers.
In addition to the conflicts among these three faiths, there have also been conflicts within them. There have been standoffs between Catholics and Protestant Christians, Sunni and Shi’a Muslims, and Orthodox and modern Jews. These frequently bloody confrontations did not arise from simple misunderstandings, but from contradictory convictions about the nature of the divine. After all, Jesus was either a being of pure spirit lacking a human body (as some Gnostic Christians claimed), or he possessed a physical body of flesh and blood. Both of these claims cannot be correct.
Things only look worse for “all religions are the same” hypothesis when we examine world religions originating outside the Fertile Crescent. Religions uninfluenced by Islam, Christianity or Judaism lack concepts of a future apocalypse or a messiah, and posit very different models of ultimate reality. Religions such as Hinduism see the lifespan of the universe as essentially eternal and cyclical, a view at odds with the time-bound and directionally evolving world of the Judeo-Christian tradition. In some Eskimo traditions, grafting the souls of artic sea birds onto their own can cure a person with a troubled soul. And anyone who has seen Soulymane Cissé’s great film Yeelen knows about the exotic world of African religion it shows – a world in which blacksmiths occupy high strata of social life and possess magical powers. What analogies for these beliefs exist in the three major monotheistic traditions?
Sometimes, those who posit the identity of all religions seek common ground in the nature of the mystical experience itself. They argue that the psychological experience of the transcendent shows uniformity across cultures and historical periods, and this similarity shows that religions spring from a common source. But what can we really make of this claim? If all mystical experiences were very similar, we still would not have grounds for thinking they resulted from contact with a higher spiritual reality. The feeling of hunger also seems constant across all cultures, but this constancy doesn’t prove it is anything more than a physiological phenomenon, or demonstrate the equality of hungry people everywhere. Cognitive research shows that many details of mystical experiences result from stimulation of particular areas of the brain. Researchers can reproduce these sensory experiences in controlled settings, and are learning more about the complex physiological responses associated with feelings of religious awe.
Like all sensory perceptions, mystical experiences can also vary significantly from one cultural setting to the next, whatever general similarities they may have. There are no sensory experiences completely separate from cultural and personal expectations. For instance, the physiological phenomena known as sleep paralysis or “night terrors” have many general similarities, such as feelings of immobility and awareness of a strange, ineffable presence in the room. Yet, a Satan-obsessed sixteenth century woman might interpret the hallucination as a demonic visitation, and a modern American might interpret the same kind of hallucination as an alien abduction experience. Mystical experiences follow a similar pattern. A Christian mystic may see hordes of angels and saints, while an Eastern mystic may find confirmation that the universe is either infinite or non-existent, depending on her particular beliefs.
Even if we accepted the proposition that mystical experiences were very similar, we still could not justifiably conclude that religions themselves were similar. Explaining religions in terms of common building blocks, or core experiences, does not reduce their differences any more than explaining objects in terms of atoms. All physical reality may be composed of atoms with similar properties, but the collection of atoms known as Adolf Hitler was very different from the collection of atoms known as Bertrand Russell. The moral is that superficial similarities among mystical experiences should not distract us from the fact that they lead to very different insights about the ultimate nature of reality.
We should also remember that all religions must be more than a feeling of awe to be meaningful. Religions use symbols and sacred stories to convey ideas and insights about human relationships, and the ties between mortal and divine realities. These insights are the very things the religious faithful cherish, and use as guidance in living a virtuous life. And the fact that most religions address questions of how people should live does not change the reality that the answers offered differ. An analogy with politics may clarify this point. In a general sense, all political thought explores strategies for governing society. But different political thinkers favor very different strategies. A Marxist believes in the redistribution of wealth, while a free-market capitalist wants to foster an open market with no restrictions on individual prosperity. Most people would agree that these strategies are not compatible. Why then do some of the same people believe that there are no genuine conflicts between the different moral principles of religions?
Many religions may command us to live a virtuous life, but their ideas of virtue tend to differ. A radical Muslim believes in the virtues of “protecting” the modesty of women by limiting their social and personal freedoms, and a liberal Muslim believes in the virtue of declaring the sanctity and equality of all human life. Each bases her view on a plausible reading of the Quran, but the views are irreconcilable. Looking across the religious spectrum, we see many further conflicts. A Manichean who believes the world is essentially evil will draw radically different moral lessons than a pantheist who finds God present everywhere in his creation. An extreme Zionist will reach different conclusions about the covenant between God and man than a follower of Reform Judaism or a Christian liberal. And few citizens of modern democracies would find much virtue in the Bible’s commandment to burn witches.
People who assume a common ethical code across all religions tend to think that only good things follow from real religious beliefs, and overlook any aspects of religions that don’t conform with modern moral standards. They define religion as equivalent to goodness and virtue, so it’s hardly surprising that all religions reflect these qualities back at them. This tautological view of matters prevents many people from asking if some religious beliefs might have inherent negative consequences as well as positive consequences. Christians, for example, do not often consider the possibility that monotheism may fuel intolerance of rival religious factions, and allow people to exterminate their neighbors in the name of piety. Christians often express sincere concern about events such as the Crusades and the Inquisition, but tend to see these events as aberrations of true Christianity rather than tendencies inherent within monotheism itself. Monotheism can also motivate good ethical conduct, of course, but that doesn’t negate the existence of the bad conduct. Both are real parts of the legacy of world religions, and responsible scholarship should not ignore one at the expense of the other.
What does all of this mean? Should we conclude that religions have nothing important to say to each other? No, we should not. Instead, we should remember that the goal of legitimate education should be to expose ourselves to views and ideas different from our own, rather than seeking false comfort in the belief that all ideas are equal. The notion that all religions are identical may sound admirably open-minded, but it really is dismayingly parochial. If we think all religions are the same, how likely are we to actually learn something about unfamiliar religious traditions? We are far more likely to see other religions as simply quaint variations of the beliefs we already know about, and will stop probing any further. In the name of openness, we close our minds to ideas that may challenge us to think just a little bit harder. Having decided in advance that religions are the same, we simply seek out the ideas that sound similar to our own and reject the rest. This hardly does justice to either the diversity of religious beliefs or the importance of religions to their followers.
Of course, most people in the “all religions are equal” camp do not intend anything harmful. On the contrary – they have the best of intentions. They are genuinely concerned about the effects of religious divisiveness in the modern world, and have arrived at a solution appealing to their sense of fairness. This solution seems to give all believers a firmer foundation for their beliefs in the wake of spreading secularism, while also lessening the tensions between different religious traditions. However, a false belief in the equality of religions will only lead to frustration when believers themselves continue to see their traditions as unique, and encourage failure to understand the ideas involved when religious conflicts occur.
All of us, secularists and theists alike, have a moral obligation to understand the role of religion in the world today. There is no possible understanding of humanity that does not include an understanding of religion, and no possible understanding of religion that does not include honest evaluation of different religious traditions. This is especially true today, when religion inspires not only terrorist hijackers but also those who help their victims. To understand how this is possible, we need to reject both the facile explanation that only good actions result from true religious belief, and the corresponding idea that all religions preach the same code of basic moral goodness. To cling to these simplistic ideas in the modern world is to fail to understand the problems facing us, and to abandon our highest moral responsibility to understand our fellow human beings in all their bewildering complexity.
Phil Mole frequently contributes to Skeptic and Skeptical Inquirer. He can
be reached at PhilipMole72@aol.com -
Bush Administration Suppresses Research
And considers suing the Environmental Protection Agency.
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When Democracies Fall Apart
It’s not the angry people but the elites who make it happen.
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Leaving Out Words
This is an interesting article that makes a useful point. I thought about posting it in News but then decided not to. The trouble is, there’s too much rhetoric and not enough evidence.
There is a crisis emerging in the scientific community. The ideals of science are being sacrificed to the god of political expediency. Environmental scientists are becoming so obsessed with the righteousness of their cause that they are damning those who wish to use science as an objective tool in public policy decisions.
But Iain Murray gives only two examples. One from 1989 and one new one. But that’s not ‘the scientific community’ or ‘environmental scientists’ as a group, obviously. So why write as if it were? In order to discredit all scientific as opposed to market-oriented discussion of environmental issues? That would seem to be a goal consistent with the outlook of the Competitive Enterprise Institute. Now, if someone from the CEI writes an article saying some scientists are unscrupulous about their public rhetoric, fine, we’ll put it in News. But if they leave out the ‘some’ then they are playing the same game they accuse ‘environmental scientists’ of playing, aren’t they.
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What Should Students Learn?
Especially at a time when ‘some theoreticians batter away at the universal truth claims of science.’
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Fads and Fallacies
Steven Goldberg calls for honest inquiry but doesn’t always offer enough evidence himself.
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Occidentalism
Enlightenment thinkers were a minority, it was the orthodox who fought them who had the power.
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Cultural Relativism, Again
Here is an interesting item. At least I think so. A blogger commenting on our In Focus article ‘Cultural Relativism’ and how the subject has exercised him since he arrived in China (where he lives and works, he’s not just visiting). Then he updates the entry with a link to an article in which the subject is absolutely central. A Norwegian journalist spent some months living with a middle-class family in Kabul and has written a book (now a best-seller) on what she learned there. What she learned, among other things, is that the nice urbane bookseller treats the women in his houshold ‘like dirt’. Now the furious bookseller himself has come to Europe determined to ‘drag Seierstad through the courts and campaign for the destruction of her book’.
The difficulties in cultural relativism show up in for instance the reaction of
Norwegian anthropologist and Middle East specialist Professor Unni Wikan, who doubts the authenticity of much of the book – ‘especially some of those bits she gives in quotation marks’. He said: ‘There is no way she could have possibly had such access to people’s hearts and minds. The moment I saw it in Norwegian, I thought it would be a catastrophe when it came out in English. She has revealed the secrets of the women, which is shameful and dishonourable. It will be regarded as an affront for its lack of respect for Afghans and Muslims.’
Lack of respect for Afghans and Muslims? Really? Is Professor Wikan not perhaps just conflating ‘Afghans and Muslims’ with ‘adult male Afghans and Muslims’? Ishtiaq Ahmed addressed this very issue in a column in the Daily Times of Pakistan a few weeks ago:
The problem is that the cultural relativists exaggerate the supposed consensus prevalent in a culture. Differences of class, sect, caste, gender, ethnic origin and so on are present in all cultures. What is usually defined as the culture of a people is in reality the interpretation and discourse put forth by the ruling class and its allied intellectual elite.
So there is the familiar difficulty. Tim Judah remarks in the Guardian article that ‘The case has opened serious questions about the ethics of journalists and authors from rich countries writing about people from poor countries with very different cultures,’ which may be so, but then what about the ethics of anthropologists from rich countries taking the side of men from poor countries who treat women and children badly? Is that so obviously morally preferable? If so, why, exactly? One has to wonder.
