Author: Ophelia Benson

  • Mo Says a Prayer

    Oh ye of little faith.

  • Redundant

    Nigel Warburton interviews Richard Norman and asks why he rejects the idea that God exists. Norman gives a good clear succinct answer that would cut through a lot of the disputes that keep turning up like clumps of dust under beds.

    I believe that the onus is on those who believe in the existence of a god to provide reasons for that belief. (This is a point which the philosopher Antony Flew has well made.) I can’t prove that there is no god, but in the absence of good reasons for believing that a god exists, I live my life without belief in a god. In particular, the success of scientific explanations of the natural world makes religious explanations redundant. It’s in that sense that there is a tension between science and religion. The two are not logically incompatible, but the more we succeed in discovering well-founded scientific explanations of the origins of the cosmos, the origins of living species, and so on, the more the explanations in terms of a divine creator become redundant. They add nothing.

    There. Quite simple really. We can’t prove there is no god, but in the absence of good reasons for believing there is one, we don’t. There are good explanations of the natural world, so the religious ones are redundant. They add nothing. So – we do without them. That’s all.

  • Well, yes and no

    Ken Livingstone offered a Millian version of multiculturalism in the Indy yesterday.

    Multiculturalism versus its opponents is simply one manifestation of the age-long struggle between liberty and its opponents. It is not about personal differences of opinion but between the values of an open and a closed society.

    Yes but which side is for the values of the open society and which is for those of the closed? Things don’t necessarily line up the way Livingstone claims.

    The foundations of liberalism and multiculturalism were outlined with great clarity in what is justifiably the most famous political essay in British history, John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty…Every individual who exists is unique, and wishes to pursue their life in a different way. The individual must be able to choose for themselves…Multiculturalism has nothing to do with an assertion that there are no universal values. The very statement that people should be able to do only such things that do not interfere with others is clearly an assertion of a universal value. It merely states that insofar as they do not interfere with others, people should be able to choose freely which values they wish to pursue and they may not have these imposed on them…What is prohibited is one group or person imposing their will on others…Female genital mutilation is another such imposed act of violence and equally should not be tolerated.

    Good; admirably clear and forthright; but that’s not actually what everyone understands by multiculturalism, and that’s why multiculturalism has opponents who are in fact not enemies of the open society. There are cultures – and they are neither few nor obscure – which do not agree that all individuals must be able to choose for themselves; on the contrary. That being the case, multiculturalism does not have quite the same freedom-loving ring to it that Livingstone seems to think it does.

    Update: article in Guardian about Livingstone’s attack on Trevor Phillips.

  • More on atheist appreciation of religious art

    Nigel Warburton has a very interesting guest post by Richard Norman on the ‘Whether Atheists Can Appreciate Religious Art’ topos. Norman talks about Piero della Francesca’s ‘The Resurrection,’ which his comment caused me to look at again. It’s a terrifically interesting painting; I already thought so, but the discussion intensifies that thought (as such discussions tend to do, which is one huge reason art criticism and literary criticism are not footling wastes of time); it also made me think about why.

    Some of what Norman said:

    The assumption here is that the truth presented by a religious work of art must itself be a religious truth. That is what I want to question. Of course Piero’s painting is a depiction of the resurrection, but it does not give us any reason for believing the claim that Jesus rose from the dead. How could it do so? (It’s not as though it were photographic evidence or anything of that sort.) The truths which it conveys are human truths, truths which help us in the understanding of our human condition…And that is specifically a truth about human beings, because the features of the work which convey it are the recognisable human characteristics of the figure rising from the tomb.

    Yeh. I’ve been claiming something similar in the earlier thread on atheists and appreciation of art – that paintings about some part of the story of Jesus interest us or move us for human reasons rather than specifically religious ones. As an atheist I am in fact left cold by paintings of Mary ascending into heaven amid blasts of trumpets (yes, those are painted blasts), for instance, but not, as I mentioned last week, by the supper at Emmaus, which is very human.

    Piero’s painting is enthralling in somewhat the same way as ‘Las Meninas’ – maybe partly for the same reason – Jesus fixes us with his cold straight gaze in just the way Velasquez does in Las Meninas. We feel seen: pinned: examined: weighed in the balance and found – we know not what. He’s uncomfortable to look at – in fact he looks slightly fanatical (well he would, after all that) – and perhaps that telltale reaction is exactly the wrong, ‘atheist’ one that does get in the way of my proper appreciation. But then again perhaps not, perhaps it’s just a variation in preference: I would surmise that a lot of religious people prefer their Jesus with a different expression. Some want him angry, militant, dividing the sheep and the goats; others want him meek and mild; others want him looking like a mensch. Is that religion or just de gustibus?

    Back to Richard Norman.

    The truths conveyed by The Resurrection are also to be found in the figures of the sleeping soldiers at the base of the tomb. Again the truths are conveyed in the significance of the poses and expressions of the human figures. They say something about the propensity of human beings to miss the miracles that are going on in the world around us – in this case, to be oblivious to the transformation and renewal of human life, and to the corresponding transformation and renewal of the natural world, as represented by the change from the bare trees on the left of the picture to the new growth on the right…The general point is that the truths conveyed by great religious works of art are human truths.

    I’ve always loved the sleeping soldiers – slouched and snoring away while miracles happen all around. We’re all the soldiers, crumpled, shapeless, all anyhow, of the earth earthy, while Jesus is almost rectangular in his uprightness and straight-aheadness and his chilly stare. I can appreciate the painting (I think), despite being an atheist, in the same way I can appreciate the presence of the ghost in Hamlet despite not being a ghostist. They work almost like thought experiments, such works; we have to (and we do, at least we can) think our way into them. It has to do with imagination. The Romantics would probably have thoght it was downright heresy to think imagination has no power to help atheists appreciate religious art.

  • Are we rational self-interested choosers?

    The fact is that most of the people engaged in political violence today—from the Basque country to the Philippines—are not fighting for individual rights, nor for that matter are they fighting to establish an Islamist caliphate. Most are fighting for a national homeland for the ethnic nation to which they belong. For most human beings other than deracinated north Atlantic elites, the question of the unit of government is more important than the form of government, which can be settled later, after a stateless nation has obtained its own state. And as the hostility towards Israel of democratically elected governments in Palestine, Iraq and Lebanon shows, democracy can express, even inflame, pre-existing national hatreds and rivalries; it is not a cure for them.

    Michael Lind, ‘The World After Bush’, Prospect, November 2006

    I’ve linked a nice article from the current issue of Prospect on the end of, what the author calls, the neo-conservative and neo-liberal dreams of the 1990s. Most of his analyses and predictions seem plausible and much of what he predicts seems ok. The unipolar world envisaged by neo-cons, with the US running the show, he predicts is not going to happen. I’m ok with that. Laissez-faire capitalism will not take over. I’m definitely ok with that.

    It’s the suggestion that the ethnic-based nation-state will remain the aspiration for most human beings “other than deracinated north Atlantic elites” that sticks in my craw. Clearly this is currently the case. But one hopes that eventually it will not be so. At least the line I’m running is that deracination is the ideal for which we should strive so that, ideally, everyone will approximate the idea of this north Atlantic elite.

    Now the question becomes: given that most of the world’s population has very different aspirations from us, the deracinated, cosmopolitan elite, on what grounds can we argue that they ought to become more like us? Why not de gustibus: they like ethnicity–we like deracination; we’re individualists–they’re communitarians; they say “tom-ay-to”–we say “tom-ah-to”? Here is an argument though.

    There are no communitarians–at least not on the ground (as distinct from the Ivory Tower). Everyone is after individual rights. It is just that in most circumstances the only way people can secure individual rights is by getting a national homeland for the ethnic nation to which they belong. Most people are tribal: they live under a social contract according to which everyone takes care of their own and no one is expected to take care of anyone else. They expect their tribes-mates to provide hospitality, hire them, provide patronage when in power and charity if need be and recognize an obligation to do the same for tribes-mates. They don’t recognize any obligation to look after “strangers” in this way or expect “strangers” to look after them. Indeed, treating outsiders like family or putting the interests of others ahead of the interests of your own breaks the social contract. Once an individual breaks his contract he’s no longer trustworthy: his tribes-mates can no longer assume that he’ll meet his obligations to them and so no longer have any compelling reason to take care of him.

    Among the north Atlantic elite, it doesn’t matter very much whether the nation to which we belong has its own state because we recognize an obligation to take care of everyone and expect others to take care of us through impersonal social mechanisms. The state will provide benefits to us, regardless of race, creed or color; employers will hire on the basis of merit–or at least this is the official view–and those who discriminate will be dealt with by the state. When it comes to patronage, politicians will take care of their constituents, whether or not they’re members of the same tribe so these days ethnic bloc voting has largely disappeared: we don’t have to vote for tribes-mates to insure that our interests will be promoted.

    It is very different in tribal societies like Iraq, Kenya, or Northern New Jersey–at least when I was growing up. There, it is essential for your well-being that your tribe have turf or, failing that, power. If you are a member of a minority tribe on someone else’s turf you will not be taken care of by members of the dominant tribe who control government, business, unions, the Mob and other amenities. If your tribe is sufficiently powerful there will be log-rolling and deals will be cut–political positions will be reserved for your tribes-mates who will dispense patronage to their own. If members of your tribe own businesses you may be hired; if they control unions you may be apprenticed. If however your tribe has no power or if such deals aren’t cut on behalf of your tribe then you, as an individual, will not be taken care of because everyone takes care of his own unless deals are cut. Of course this means that you have to vote in and otherwise support your tribes-mates to see to it that they have the power to pull for you. However it’s best for you as an individual if your tribe has its own turf since, in the tribal system, only tribal power and turf can guarantee individual rights. Therefore as a rational self-interested chooser, in the interest of securing individual rights, you support your tribe.

    The problem is that the tribal mechanism for supporting individual rights is inefficient. Unless we want to revert to a world of isolated hunter-gather bands, or at best, isolated self-sufficient villages, it isn’t practical for every tribe to have its own turf, the wheeling-dealing involved in tribal log-rolling is very expensive and lots of people fall through the cracks. Moreover, tribal warfare is always a real and present danger and demagogues can exploit it to gain power–like Southern segregationists in the bad old days turning working class whites against working class blacks, Kenyan politicians conjuring up “tribal clashes,” or nativists pumping up anti-immigrant sentiment to promote their own interests. Tribalism is self-perpetuating–people get caught in an evil net–but when people have the choice most prefer deracinated, cosmopolitan societies.

    That last is an empirical claim and a claim about what most people prefer. There will always be Romantics, nostalgic for tribalism, especially for idealized versions of tribalism that never existed and the progress from tribalism to universalism is uneven–ratcheting up, and falling back–but overall, the trend is from tribalism to universalism, from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft, from smaller to larger social units. Very few people want to go back and and people who’ve had it both ways almost always prefer modernity to tribalism. I grew up in a tribal society and I can vouch for that. I can also vouch for the fact that of the many Romantics I know who fantisize about the joys of tribalism, not one of them has experienced it first hand from the inside as I did. It’s all very well to sentimentalize about “My Big, Fat Greek Wedding,” Samoa as misdescribed by Margaret Mead, the Middle Ages, the hunter-gatherers of the Amazon or any of the other tribal societies, real or imagined, that are part of the public mythos. Those of us who’ve known tribal societies from the inside and gotten out know just how completely awful they are and would never, never want to go back.

    That is why, I argue, it would be better if tribalism were obliterated: if it’s feasible for people to live like the deracinated north Atlantic elite, ceteris paribus, that’s what they prefer. Modern societies, non-tribal arrangements, are just a lot better at getting people what they want.

    This article was first published at The Enlightenment Project and is republished here by permission. H E Baber teaches philosophy at the University of San Diego; she is completing a book on multiculturalism to be published by Prometheus Press.

  • Nigel Warburton Interviews Stephen Law

    Consider the relationship between sentimentality and Christmas.

  • Scott McLemee on the Yale Book of Quotations

    Billie Holliday and Bob Dylan, worth the space, but ‘Plop plop fizz fizz’?

  • How to Train a Computer to Think Like a Person

    Intelligence Augmentation uses human beings as part of computer programs.

  • Ronald Dworkin Reviews Peter Kramer’s Freud

    ‘Freudian analysis is not science; it is fashion, totally dependent on public acclaim.’

  • Why Arendt Matters

    Arendt blurred categories; a philosopher who offered notes on the very latest world affairs.

  • Michael Walzer on the Utilitarianism of Extremity

    When our deepest values are radically at risk, the constraints lose their grip.

  • Oral History Bumps into Regulation

    With colleges wary of potential lawsuits, oral historians find their work caught up in regulatory reviews.

  • Nigel Warburton Interviews Richard Norman

    ‘The success of scientific explanations of the natural world makes religious explanations redundant.’

  • Sharia Law Spreading in the UK

    ‘Some lawyers welcomed the advance of what has become known as “legal pluralism”.’

  • Taliban Tear Teacher to Pieces; He Taught Girls

    He was part-disembowelled and then torn apart with his arms and legs tied to motorbikes.

  • Misery of Women in Afghanistan

    ‘We were very happy. Rawa came and talked about how they could help us. But that has stopped now.’

  • Oxfam Says Most Afghan Children Not in School

    Girls are particularly losing out: 1 in 5 girls in primary, 1 in 20 in secondary school.

  • Oxfam Report on Education in Afghanistan

    Seven million Afghan children are out of school while five million children attend school.

  • Ken Livingstone on Multiculturalism

    ‘What is prohibited is one group or person imposing their will on others.’ Tell that to al Qaradawi.

  • Where this ends and that begins

    From Geoffrey Nunberg’s new book Talking Right page 134.

    In the 1920s, the [Wall Street] Journal warned against the threats to freedom that were implicit in minimum wage laws [and] the child-labor amendment to the Constitution (“an assault upon the economic independence of the family…”)

    I’ll get to my point, but first I’ll clear up a detail. I frowned in puzzlement when I read that, thinking ‘The – ? I didn’t know there was a child-labor amendment to the Constitution. Ignorant me.’ So I looked it up, and there isn’t; Nunberg apparently meant attempts to pass a child-labor amendment, which (no doubt with the help of the WSJ) failed.

    But my point is that that is another example of the kind of thing I was talking about in that comment on Michael Bérubé’s book (What’s Liberal About the Liberal Arts). It’s another example of tensions among the freedoms, entitlements, rights, wants, and needs of different people; another example of the fact that a protective law for one person may be an interference with the freedom of action of another person; and that this situation isn’t even all that rare or hard to find. We don’t think about the child labor example much in the US now, because even reactionaries mostly don’t want to defend child labor any more; like slavery, that idea is pretty dead. But there was a time when the WSJ framed child labor laws as an assault upon the economic independence of the family, which of course it is. And a good thing too, but not everyone thinks so and not everyone has always thought so.

    Michael replied to my comment last week, at the end of a longer reply to a review by Jodi Dean. He found my point (cough) reasonable (that’s his cough, but I’ll cough too, because I might as well). We agree that it is a problem, indeed the problem.