Author: Paul R. Gross

  • Patience and Absurdity: How to Deal with Intelligent Design Creationism

    Physicists Matt Young and Taner Edis are the editors of a new volume whose contributors are working scholars in the sciences touched by the newest expression of “creation science”: Intelligent Design (ID) Theory. Why Intelligent Design Fails is a patient assessment of all the scientific claims made in connection with ID. The half dozen science-enabled spokesmen for ID are the indispensable core group of an international neo-creationist big tent. Goals of the American movement are sweeping: they begin with a highly visible, well-funded, nationwide effort to demean evolutionary science in American school (K-12) curricula. ID is offered as a better alternative. The hoped-for result is the addition of ID to, or even its substitution for, the teaching of evolution. Which would mean substituting early 19 th-century nature study for modern biology. The admitted ultimate goal of the ID movement is to topple natural science (they berate it as “materialism”) from its pedestal in Western culture and to replace it with “theistic science.”

    For several decades, similarly imperialistic goals of a coterie of cultural theorists have been achieved in many university departments of social sciences and humanities, including art history. One well-known art critic, Roger Kimball, has long been an analyst of their postmodern, postcolonial, gender-feminist chic. But now he admits to second thoughts about the value of patient analysis of its gaucheries. Painstaking analysis, applied to presentist posturing like that which now passes in some parts of the academy for art history, can be counterproductive. He worries, in a new book, that careful analysis of wishful absurdities can suggest, to onlookers innocent of academic high culture, that the absurdities are legitimate alternatives to the serious study of art—that the conflict is between equally meritorious interpretations. “Patient objections to the ludicrous,” he writes, “become ludicrous themselves.”1

    But this is a worry that goes beyond cultural studies, and it has now become acute in the evolutionary sciences. Patient analysis of creationist blunders and sham reasoning (definition: ostensible inquiry whose conclusion is fixed in advance) has as often done harm as good to the life sciences. Biologists are confronted endlessly with touring companies of debaters and religious charismatics who present the scripts of “scientific” creationism. Most evolutionists and other biologists who are aware of these performances take the easy way out: they ignore all religion-based commentary on science, justifying indifference by declaring that to argue would dignify absurdity. Or worse: they shrug off sham reasoning with a glib dismissal: “Nobody really believes that stuff.” The excuse is itself absurd: Vast numbers—indeed, a majority—of our countrymen do believe that stuff, even as they are ignorant of the real science.

    Still, refusal to dignify absurdity has some merit. The creationist position, especially this newest form of it, is pure Hollywood: There is No Such Thing As Bad Publicity. That this view is held by the ID leadership is fully documented in several recent studies of the movement. Thus, almost any careful examination of ID by qualified scientists, mathematicians, and philosophers—especially by those with strong credentials in evolution or cosmology—is likely to be advertised by ID publicists as proof of the scientific importance of ID. Any non-polemical response to it is described to the mass audience for anti-evolution as showing the revolutionary truth of ID, the fear and trembling it causes among Darwinists. That a few dedicated scientists take the trouble to answer ID “theory” in detail is regularly adduced—in ID books, editorials, opinion columns, talk shows, dedicated internet sites, and in a growing numbers of activist student organizations around the country—as signaling the collapse of Darwinism.

    The contributors to Why Intelligent Design Fails (WIDF) have risked being so used. But they decided, evidently, to accept this risk. They decided to examine every supposedly scientific (or mathematical, or epistemological) claim of ID, patiently, in detail, and to offer only those conclusions about the value of ID science—if any—that emerge clearly in the individual critiques and from their totality. Whether this risk was justified will be known only if and when the book is widely read, and then responded to (as inevitably it will be) at those many creationist web sites, meetings, talk shows, conferences, and clubs. If they do no more than to denounce the book and disparage its authors (as they began to do the day it was listed on Amazon.com), WIDF will have succeeded. If instead they proclaim it evidence for the scientific muscle of ID theory, the tables will, at least to some extent, have been turned. But about the quality of the critiques in this book, and of the totality, there is no doubt. This is honest, technically competent—patient—inquiry; the critique of the newest form of creation science is devastating.

    The Science of ID “Science”

    Those scare-quotes on “science” are in ironic honor of recent and current philosophers and sociologists of science who use them routinely to sabotage the value of any word they surround. Thus if you are a relativist, you write about “truth” to signal your discovery that there is no such thing. If you are convinced that objectivity is made impossible by an observer’s culture or ethnicity, then you write “objectivity.” WIDF is about the scientific claims of ID, not about its background, history, purposes, politics, and practices. All those are covered in other books and merely touched upon in the short introduction. The undertaking here is, rather, to examine and judge only those ID claims that have some original scientific (or mathematical) content. Therefore the book lacks any discussion of, for example, one of the iconic books of the movement, Jonathan Wells’s Icons of Evolution, which offers no science of its own but rather a litany of accusations against evolutionary biology, mined from the literature of creationism and applied to quotes dug up from internal arguments in the biological literature. Its burden is that evolution as taught is wrong or fraudulent, and must therefore not be presented to children without the strongest disclaimers. Wisely, the contributors to WIDF have ignored all this. It has already been dismantled, point by point and claim by claim, in lengthy treatments by scientists who are experts in all the fields involved. A check at www.ncseweb.org will unearth them all. There are, on the other hand, purportedly new arguments for ID: and those are the mainstay of its nationwide campaign. They fall loosely into three classes:

    • Primarily biological. The featured argument was offered by biochemist Michael Behe, who proposed in 1996 that at the sub-cellular level of molecular machines and chemical reaction pathways, important systems are “irreducibly complex” (IC). Such systems have multiple working parts, each of which is essential for function. Absence of any part would destroy the function. But, his argument goes, non-functioning systems are not subject to positive natural selection. Therefore complex functioning systems cannot have evolved gradually by any Darwinian mechanism, which requires that all intermediate stages have some function. They must have arisen in one fell swoop. Therefore (sic) they are the product of some designing agency—of intelligent design. All recent ID biological claims relate to this one, and the most widely exposed mathematical claim depends upon it too. A body of other, very old but regularly updated creationist claims comes along with ID, however. These are all versions of the young-earth creationist preoccupation: that while there may be some common descent at a very low level (contemporary species, perhaps, from the original basic kinds), the world’s biota are the products of God’s “kinds,” as per Genesis or in separate interventions.
    • Epistemological-Physical. These arguments challenge the logic or the formal plausibility of prevailing scientific accounts of universal origins and of the history of life on Earth. There are several threads of which these arguments are woven, some very old, some relatively new. The oldest are creationist canards from thermodynamics, for example: that since the entropy of a (closed) system either rises or remains constant, and its degree of order (complexity) must therefore remain constant or fall, the spontaneous (read “natural”) appearance of life-forms (which means increased order and complexity) is impossible. Something other than nature alone must have done it. Another class of arguments depends upon heuristic models—Michael Behe’s mousetrap, for example—as illustrations of irreducible complexity or the need for a purposeful designer. The more sophisticated arguments surfacing in ID ignore these old thermodynamics howlers and focus, instead, on supposed limitations of self-organizing processes or on the several anthropic principles (“the fine-tuning of the universe for life”) as indicators of supra-physical design in the universe.
    • Mathematical-Probabilistic-Computational. These are descendants of the primitive creationist claim of life’s improbability, as calculated. If, that is, the assembly of something necessary to life requires a coming together, at just the right time and place, of a large number of individual events or objects, each of which has its own (often low) probability, then the probability of the assembly occurring by chance is the product of all those constituent probabilities. If that product is small enough, then the likelihood of the assembly happening in any real time-interval is effectively zero. Again, the more sophisticated ID proponents shun this argument, steering away from the self-evident absurdity of such clearly inapplicable models. Nevertheless, the flawed basis in equi-probability and multiplication remains in the fancier versions. The achievement of William Dembski, the movement’s mathematician-theologian-philosopher, is to couple such arguments with a purely deductive device, an eliminative “design inference,” by which—he claims (but has never demonstrated)—the presence of design can be discovered as the cause of any supposedly natural process. This is to be done by considering the probabilities of chance and “regularity” (physical law) as causes, and then by the extent to which the still unexplained event or object has “specified complexity.”

    Judging ID Science

    WIDF analyses of these ID offerings are provided by a team of well-qualified contributors. For the biological claims, there are chapters from paleontologist Alan Gishlick, biologist-engineer Gert Korthof, molecular pharmacologist Ian Musgrave, and molecular biologist David Ussery. For logic, epistemology, physics, and cosmology, there are contributions from physicist (and editor) Taner Edis, taphonomist (the study of fossilization) Gary Hurd, bio-mathematician Istvan Karsai, physicist-engineer Mark Perakh, philosopher-biologist Niall Shanks, physicist Victor Stenger, and physicist (editor) Matt Young. Finally, the mathematical and probabilistic arguments are examined closely by zoologist-computer scientist Wesley Elsberry, physicist Mark Perakh, and mathematician-computer scientist Jeffrey Shallit.

    Result? Not one of the ID claims is sustained, let alone proven, in the massive output of ID to date. Most of the claims are shown to be simply bad science. The expository style of WIDF is for the most part respectful of the authors and claims analyzed. It is therefore very remarkable that those presumably qualified ID authors should have committed themselves, and to some extent their academic careers, to a relentless, public elaboration of soft claims, bad arguments, and plain mistakes. One can only guess that they are driven by motivation and sincere feelings other than simple dedication to doing the best possible science.

    A few examples, telegraphically stated, must suffice here. Irreducible complexity will do for most of the biology. Behe’s entire argument depends upon the implied necessity that every piece of a sub-cellular molecular machine—and most such “pieces” are proteins, which are encoded in genes—be provided for ab initio. That is, it requires that all the proteins of a supposedly irreducibly complex system are (or were) provided from the beginning, or that the genes for them were already there at the beginning but not necessarily being used. Examples he adduces of such systems are the blood clotting cascade and the bacterial flagellum, which functions as an outboard motor for the bacterial cell. But as the biologist-authors of WIDF show, there is no need for all the parts of any such system to be there, or to have been there as such, from the beginning. Behe made a simple, but bad, mistake. He overlooked gene duplication and the independent evolution of copies; and he forgot that many, perhaps most, proteins have multiple functions. He seems not to have thought through the startling redundancy of subcellular functions. Thus, in separate WIDF chapters, Ussery and Musgrave present unshakable evidence that systems Behe would consider IC have evolved by “Darwinian mechanisms”; and that relic intermediates for many of the steps in that evolution survive as the current, simpler version of the system in some contemporary organism.

    Gishlick, in an unexpected way, tops even those no-nonsense contributions. Taking the definition of IC at face value, he shows that there must be IC systems at the level of anatomy, as well as of biochemistry. One well-studied IC system of contemporary animal anatomy is the flight machine of birds: the wing. Gishlick sets out the special parts of the working wing and all its auxiliaries, from wrist bones to special, airfoil-producing flight feathers. He then shows that all those parts appeared during the long course of Avian evolution over geologic time, and that for most of that long stretch, those parts functioned usefully (therefore selectably) for somethingother than flight. Evolution of functional systems is almost always a story of co-optation, as evolutionists have known for nearly a century. Gishlick’s naming of known fossil species that had those intermediate states of the system as it evolved, is an overwhelming dismissal of the central claim from IC.

    Gert Korthof undertakes the modest job of examining descent with modification as viewed by the ID leaders. “Descent with modification” was Darwin’s own shorthand for the history of life on Earth, for the facts of evolution as he gathered them together (even in the absence of a workable idea about heredity). All the ID
    leaders equivocate about this. They do hesitate to state, if not to imply, the young-earth creationist absurdity that all species are “kinds,” and that all kinds were called into being by God. Biologist Behe, for example, concedes that descent with modification has occurred; but he indicates that it can’t account for IC, so that intelligent design must be at the heart of real species-formation—if and when that happens. Others among the ID leadership either deny any taxonomically significant descent with modification, or labor to create complex “alternate” taxonomies that allow species to proliferate, but only as products of basic families—the “kinds” of genesis. Korthof’s essay is a compact gem: he shows that none of these jury-rigged schemes can possibly explain the huge matrix of facts out of which modern evolutionary biology grows, and that they are severally illogical to boot.

    The part-epistemological, part-faux-thermodynamic ID claims to the effect that information-rich complexity cannot arise spontaneously in natural systems are addressed by several of these authors. But Shanks and Karsai describe such spontaneous complexities as the beautiful Benard (convection) cells that organize themselves in an asymmetrically-heated Petri dish, and the astonishing, ad hoc shaping of cellular structure in wasp nests, whose builders have no intelligent-design contingency book for nest structure. The last resort of ID proponents when defeated, as they have been in arguments about the need for designer-intervention in such historical processes as evolution and such contemporary processes as these discussed by Shanks and Karsai, is to invoke the strong anthropic principle. The universe is exquisitely fine-tuned, this says, as regards the values of its fundamental physical constants and the possible structures arising because of them—fine-tuned for “life as we know it,” for us. Therefore the universe must have been pre-loaded with the right information—the “complex specified information” that William Dembski and Behe and the others argue is the unfailing diagnostic of an intelligent designer. Victor Stenger, however, explains here why current theoretical and astro-physics, especially multiple-universes cosmological theory, is perfectly at home with a “fine-tuned” universe inhabited by ourselves, and with its having arisen spontaneously.

    Mark Perakh has taken great pains to study and analyze the claims of Dembski’s most influential theoretical book so far. That book presents an argument based upon certain induction-formalizing, optimizing theorems discovered by mathematicians David Wolpert and William MacReady in 1997. As Dembski exploits them, these so-called “No Free Lunch” theorems mean that the “the Darwinian mechanism,” taken to mean iterated algorithmic searches on a (biological) fitness landscape, cannot in general find the kinds of solution represented in the complexity of biological organisms—unless necessary information is incorporated beforehand in the algorithm itself. “Front-loading” again. But Perakh’s study shows that this conclusion results from a misunderstanding and misapplication of the No Free Lunch theorems. David Wolpert, co-discoverer of the theorems, dismissed Dembski’s prolix argument as “written in Jello.” Elsberry and Shallit, finally, provide a well-named essay, “Playing Games with Probability: Dembski’s Complex Specified Information.” In it they show that this most fundamental (and most obscure) of the formal elements of Intelligent Design Theory is simply incoherent.

    The editors, Young and Edis, contribute strong chapters of their own on a number of these points and also provide concise but useful background on the ID movement, on the epistemological issues, and on ID congeners elsewhere in the religious world (for example in Islam). Gary Hurd provides a very useful appendix on organizations and websites concerned with ID (pro and con).

    What’s Really Happening

    Much of this might appear to professional biologists to be nit-picking; and in a sense it is. But it is nit-picking because the claims of neo-creationism are mostly nits. They are quote-minings, trivially literal models such as mousetraps and painted bulls-eyes, or obscure mathematical-probabilistic arguments based upon unrealistic models of biological phenomena. Biologists who know what has been going on in evolutionary science the past decade or two can be, understandably, bemused. They know that there has been an explosion of progress in study of the central process of evolution: the formation of new species—speciation. They are aware of excellent recent books, popular (2) and professional, (3) recounting that progress, conveying what we know today of at least some of the real mechanisms by which speciation has occurred in the past and is happening all around us, now.

    They recognize that providing a fully detailed account of macroevolution is the daunting task yet before us, but that the fruitful marriage of molecular genetics and developmental evolutionary biology has already provided plausible answers to the basic question: how the proliferation of animal body plans happened, at least since they first fossilized well during the lower Cambrian. The forms demonstrated then heralded the eventual diversity. Evolutionists know now that the Cambrian “explosion” was not a literal explosion: that the rapid unfolding of body-plans in the lower Cambrian was inherited from ancestors: and some of those ancestors have been found. An ancestral Echinoderm (not yet an Echinoderm) has at last been discovered in the Chengjiang deposits of China. The Echinoderms did not appear explosively, by some act of special creation. They evolved. There is no reason to doubt that the same was true for the other phyla. One of the elusive, predicted, and long-awaited microscopic ancestors of all bilaterian animals has been found, fossilized, in the Doushanto formation in China. It dates to some 50 million years before the Cambrian.

    Every reasonably informed biologist knows that there are big problems in the history of life on Earth still to be solved, and the ways to their solutions are not transparently clear. But that is the way of all science; and so far, natural science has delivered testable and daily-confirmed explanations. No other “science,” theistic or otherwise, has. Every one of those informed and open-minded biologists therefore knows, as well as anything about the physical world can be known, that organic evolution happened on this planet. And he or she knows that current evolutionary theory, the product of 145 years of often besieged work, of testing and winnowing, is one of our surest scientific possessions.

    So it seems a trouble for busy scientists to give their time to truth-squads, examining (scrupulously, as do the WIDF contributors) the incessant nay-saying of creationists, and now of creationists who use the language of science and mathematics comfortably. But it must be done. There will be more anti-evolution, religiously motivated nay-saying, and there must be more books like WIDF. The stakes are high. Nothing less hangs in the balance than the hope that some fraction of the next generation—of our children—will get serious education in science, and that they will be capable of speaking truth not only to power, but to and for all their peers.

    Dr. Paul R. Gross is University Professor of Life Sciences, emeritus, at the University of Virginia. His baccalaureate and doctoral degrees are from the University of Pennsylvania. He is a developmental and molecular biologist who has taught at Brown, Rochester, MIT, and the University of Virginia. He is co-author with Norman Levitt of Higher Superstition (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), and with Barbara Forrest of Creationism’s Trojan Horse: The Wedge of Intelligent Design (Oxford University Press, 2003).

    References

    (1) Roger Kimball, The Rape of the Masters: How Political Correctness Sabotages Art. (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2004), 52.

    (2) Menno Schilthuizen, Frogs, Flies, and Dandelions: The Making of Species (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

    (3) Jerry A. Coyne and H. Allen Orr, Speciation (Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates, Inc., 2004).

    Why Intelligent Design Fails is published by Rutgers University Press, copyright 2004.

    Permission to print, distribute, and post with proper citation and acknowledgment. Copyright 2004 Michael Shermer, Skeptics Society, Skeptic magazine, e-Skeptic magazine. Opinions expressed are those of the authors, and not necessarily those of the Skeptics Society, its Board of Directors, or its members.

  • The Scales Fall From my Eyes

    Okay, I give in. I’ve had a conversion experience. I’ve recognized the error of my ways. All these people who have been telling me what a horrible elitist I am have worn me down. I’m convinced. It’s true, I am an elitist, and that makes me a terrible person, so I have to stop. Okay. I’ll stop. I’ll become a better person. I won’t like anything that is not extremely popular, and I won’t dislike anything that is extremely popular. (God, for instance.) I won’t do anything that lots of people don’t do, and I won’t refrain from doing anything that lots of people do. I’ll become as humble and modest and unassertive as the people who tell me what a horrible elitist I am – and they are very modest and humble and unassertive indeed, and never do anything at all that a majority of their fellow humans don’t also do. From this moment I shall take such people as my role model, and be just like them.

    So the first thing I have to do – even before I give away all my books and replace them with different ones (but perhaps I shouldn’t give them away? Perhaps that would only be passing the corruption on to other people, encouraging them to be elitist in my place? Perhaps I should simply throw them all in the bin?) – is stop making judgments between good and bad. Because that’s where the harm lies, I’m told. That’s where it gets me, that’s what makes an elitist a terrible person – it’s this business of making judgments. At least in aesthetic matters, and the like. In areas where judgments can’t be grounded. It’s okay (I take it) to say one hammer is better than another, because you can show that it does the job better (pounding the nail in, breaking the window, whatever). But you can’t say one poem or play or song or concerto is better than another because none of those things can pound nails or break windows – you can’t show a job that a good one can do better than a bad one, therefore when you say one is better than another you’re just hand-waving. Except you’re not just hand-waving, it’s worse than that, and that’s where the terrible person thing comes in. I’m told.

    Here’s how the argument goes, if I understand it correctly. Judgments of quality in aesthetic matters cannot be grounded, therefore they are simply rhetoric – there is nothing else they can be; therefore they are necessarily power plays. So, if that’s right, every time I say or even think that, say, Keats’ ‘Ode to a Nightingale’ or Marvell’s ‘To His Coy Mistress’ is better as poetry than, say, Pinter’s anti-war poem, I’m making a power play and nothing else.

    Now, I’ll admit, I resisted that idea at first. I thought it was wrong. In fact I was sure it was, because, if nothing else, of my own inner experience of the matter. Naturally that can’t be conclusive to anyone else, on account of how my mind is my mind and not anyone else’s, but it was convincing to me. My sense of the difference between poetry I think good and poetry I don’t think good doesn’t feel like a power play, it feels like something to do with thinking about the poetry as poetry. The truth is, it seemed to me that the act of telling me that my opinions are elitist power plays itself looked far more like a power play than my opinions do. In fact it kind of felt like a power play in the same way that a full-scale invasion by an army would, or a loud knock on the door at 3 a.m. followed by shouts of ‘Police! Open up!’ would. I felt quite skeptical that my mere opinions or reading habits could have quite the same effect.

    But that was then. As I say, I’ve had a conversion experience. I’ve realized that all this resistance and disbelief of mine is just a sign of how thoroughly corrupt all my thinking is. I’m considering entering a convent. But in the meantime there is much that I can do, starting, as I said, with ceasing to make judgments between good and bad.

    Of course, this will result in something of a change in the nature of B&W. I’ve realized it will mean I’ll have to stop writing these N&Cs, for one thing. That may seem a little drastic, but it’s not – because what I’ve realized is that it is quite impossible to write at all without constantly making an endless series of tiny imperceptible sub-aware judgments of quality. It’s obvious if you think about it. I mean, what else am I doing every time I use one word rather than another? Eh? I’m making a judgment! Oh, shit! Think of it! With every single word I type, I’m rejecting tens of thousands of other words I don’t write! Godalmighty – why have I never thought of this before? I’m so ashamed. All those hurt feelings, all those tens of thousands of words turning sobbing to their pillows every single time I type a word. Oh noooo – I’m so sorry guys. I’ll stop. I’ll just finish this one and then I’ll stop.

    And the words are just the beginning. There are ideas, thoughts, links; there’s organization, paragraph breaks, punctuation. One judgment after another. So you can see: N&C is quite impossible. And then News links will be different, because I will have to just pick them at random. And Articles will be different, because I won’t read them, I’ll just accept everything sight unseen, and of course I won’t do any editing or proofreading, because what does that involve other than judgments? Well I suppose I could proofread, because there are some rules one can follow. That needn’t be entirely subjective. But could I do it in a purely objective way? Could I do it without any element of judgment (and thus, remember, power play) creeping in? I’m not at all sure. Especially since I now realize I’m an almost insanely judgmental person. No, it’s too risky, I can’t proofread, and I certainly can’t edit. So Articles will just be whatever turns up in the Inbox. In Focus – I think I’d better just delete the whole of In Focus, because it’s completely corrupt, and I don’t see how I could do any new ones.

    And then there’s other editing work I do, which is also suffused with aesthetic judgments. I guess I’ll have to stop doing that too. And as for writing books – ! Well it’s obvious how hopeless that is. Okay…let’s see. I could be a janitor (and have in the past, so that’s cool). I could do yard work. No gardening, because that’s full of aesthetic judgments too, but I could cut grass. There are a lot of lawn-service outfits around here, I’ll just try one of them.

    I’m becoming less terrible already, I think. Hope you guys don’t mind too much about the changes to B&W. I’ll do it after work – will be much quicker now, without all that judging to do.

  • Encouragement

    Go, Manchester City. Go, Paula Radcliffe.

    Update. She went.

  • Radcliffe Wins New York Marathon

    One in the eye for those armchair marathoners who criticised.

  • Aaronovitch on the Election

    The spiritual politics-moral values thing has been exaggerated.

  • Hunt Protestors and Assassination Fears

    Deepening resentment towards the government could result in people being killed.

  • A Sunday Snicker with Stott

    ‘I was wearing classic Joseph tuxedo pants’ while nabbing table items from posh caffs. How eco!

  • Creationism in Wisconsin

    School district mandates the teaching of more than one theory of origin.

  • With the Devout

    Religion again. Or rather, still. It never does go away, does it. Funny how people keep urging us to have more of it when its consequences so often seem so very…unpleasant.

    Jonathan Derbyshire has a couple of posts on the subject – one about the fallacy that atheists and materialists lack a sense of wonder or awe and the other a review of what sounds like a very irritating book on atheism. Theists have the most remarkable way of assuming that only they are capable of an enormous range of human qualities and aspirations – morality, imagination, dreams, commitment, wonder, honesty, dedication, kindness, mercy, courage, putting the cap back on the toothpaste, virtue, monogamy, not picking their noses in public. Hey, I hate to tell you, but non-theists are capable of all those too, and in the meantime they don’t bore everyone to death talking about some non-existent geezer in the sky who tells everyone not to use condoms or not to let women leave the back room or not to let Adam and Steve get married. Two for the price of one. We can have good qualities and we don’t dress up all our sadistic controlling exploitive impulses by pretending God told us to beat the crap out of this woman or to shoot this Dutch guy six times and then cut his throat and run away.

    Garry Wills had an interesting Op-ed in the NY Times a couple of days ago.

    The secular states of modern Europe do not understand the fundamentalism of the American electorate. It is not what they had experienced from this country in the past. In fact, we now resemble those nations less than we do our putative enemies. Where else do we find fundamentalist zeal, a rage at secularity, religious intolerance, fear of and hatred for modernity? Not in France or Britain or Germany or Italy or Spain. We find it in the Muslim world, in Al Qaeda, in Saddam Hussein’s Sunni loyalists.

    Well, frankly, I don’t understand that fundamentalism either. At all. It’s beyond me. There are some aspects of religion that (I think) I do understand, but there are others I don’t. I knew a fundamentalist once – someone I worked with. He was one angry dude, man. All his religiosity seemed to express itself in rage at people who didn’t share it. (In fact he once got suspended for half a day for threatening to kill a co-worker for – well for saying exactly what I’m saying: ‘Jim, for a religious guy, you sure seem to have a lot of anger.’) That’s what religion seems to be for a lot of people – a hell of a good pretext to be in a frothing rage all the time. About what? About people who don’t share their loathsome narrow rage-filled punitive view of the world, that’s what.

    Maybe that’s not fair. Maybe in some circumstances and settings they are sweet and kind and compassionate. Only that’s not what the rest of us see – I suppose because we’re the spawn of Satan. But then that’s the problem. Religion is just another way of creating ingroups and outgroups, and it sanctions much worse treatment for the outgroups than is normally considered reasonable.

    A third post of Jonathan’s touches on this point.

    Now I was reminded of all that when I read this in Mark Schmitt’s post:

    “The right question, I think, is not whether religion has an undue influence, but why it is that the current flourishing of religious faith has, for the first time ever, virtually no element of social justice? Why is its public phase so exclusively focused on issues of private and personal behavior? Is this caused by trends in the nature of religious worship itself? Is it a displacement of economic or social pressures? Will that change? What are the factors that might cause it to change.”

    If Schmitt is right in his characterization of what he calls, following Robert Fogel, the “Fourth Great Awakening” in American Protestantism, what implications does this have for Sandel’s attempt to connect religious belief with a certain form of public life – with being a citizen with certain responsibilities?

    Good question. And no, I haven’t the faintest idea what the answer is.

    Here is a handy, or at least hilariously funny, page of atheist quotations. Well not all that funny, but it certainly made me burst out laughing.

  • Islam in Indonesia

    ‘On paper, Indonesia is a secular country, but it’s illegal not to have a religion there.’

  • More on van Gogh, Hirsi Ali, the Netherlands

    “I feel terribly guilty,” a shocked Hirsi Ali told Dutch media.

  • Garry Wills on Yearning for the Enlightenment

    Can a people that believes more fervently in the Virgin Birth than in evolution still be called an Enlightened nation?

  • Paying Too Much Attention

    I find the murder of Theo van Gogh quite disturbing, upsetting, disgusting, infuriating, etc. As I’m meant to, of course; as we all are – all we unrepentent atheists and secularists and women who wander around in the world without asking anyone’s permission. Killing him is meant precisely as a message – to people like him, to people like his co-producer of the film ‘Submission,’ Ayaan Hirsi Ali, to people who criticise or resist Islamism in general.

    Some of the coverage of the murder is slightly peculiar. It seems somewhat – cowed. Hesitant. Apologetic. It seems to want to say or signal that van Gogh kind of sort of asked for it. That he shouldn’t have said such mean things about Islamism. This article for example.

    People of Moroccan Muslim descent make up the largest single ethnic minority group in the Netherlands and their representatives had been on the frontline in van Gogh’s frequently harsh war of words on extremist Islam. This war reached a height with the recent broadcast on Dutch TV of his short film Submission, a film that protested van Gogh’s view of Muslim treatment of women…Co-produced by the Dutch MP Ayaan Hirsi Ali, an activist of Somali origin who has blamed Islamists for fostering repression and domestic violence in the Netherlands’ immigrant communities, the film provoked an outcry. Both Hirsi Ali and van Gogh received death threats.

    ‘Frequently harsh’…Well the reporter is there and I’m not, and I haven’t seen the movie, I haven’t seen van Gogh’s work. But I have to wonder. What’s wrong with saying ‘harsh’ words about ‘extremist Islam’. Why wouldn’t Ayaan Hirsi Ali blame Islamists for fostering repression and domestic violence (to put it more forthrightly, oppression of women)? Is it a secret that ferocious control of women is one of the chief goals of Islamism? Is that some sort of Western or Orientalist myth? Homa Arjomand and Maryam Namazie and their colleagues, women from Iran and other ‘Muslim’ countries, would say no, as would (and did) Ishtiaq Ahmed in this column a few weeks ago. So why the tip-toeing? Multiculturalism run amok or plain fear of another jihadi with a knife and a gun. Who knows. But it’s a tad creepy.

  • More on van Gogh, ‘Submission,’ Ayaan Hirsi Ali

    MP Ali has blamed Islamists for fostering repression and domestic violence; she and van Gogh were threatened.

  • UNESCO Condemns Murder of Theo van Gogh

    Though in an unfortunately apologetic way.

  • A Critical View of van Gogh in Index on Censorship

    Rohan Jayasekera says van Gogh’s work was abuse of his right to free speech.

  • British v French Enlightenment

    McLemee on Himmelfarb’s ‘sociology of virtue.’

  • Jonathan Derbyshire Reviews Silly Atheism Book

    Alister McGrath makes his case by mischaracterising atheism.

  • A Mistake in Arendt Biography Gets Repeated

    Edward Said repeated Young-Bruehl’s error in article, later reprinted, despite her correction.