‘Nobody can deny how central a part music plays in the life of most children and adolescents.’
Author: Ophelia Benson
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Nick Cohen on Bono and Being ‘Tax-efficient’
And humbug.
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Untruth in Advertising
‘Feminists for Life’ might as well be an office of the US Conference of Catholic Bishops.
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Religious Believers Will Just Have to Live With It
Pissed-off atheists are finding their voice in a debate set up and manipulated by religious forces.
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The Shorter History of God
First some history. The Hebrew tribes were a violent lot, not just because their literary enemies, like the 3rd century BCE historian Manetho, says they were, but violent even by their own reckoning. From Abraham’s fatwah on the cities of the plain, described gleefully by the author of Genesis (Genesis 19:12-29) as the first victory of Yahweh against his enemies, right down to the final humiliation of the God-forsaken people (their description) and the fall of the southern kingdom of Judaea (586 BCE), the love of war and the smell of blood dominates the Hebrew Bible.
Take for example this little story in the Book of Judges: A certain Levite takes a concubine, who deserts him. Outraged, the Levite drags her away, by night, from her father’s house – a bad move because thieves, brigands, and homosexuals are about after dark. Bypassing the chance for an overnight stay in Jebus, the Levite and his concubine find lodging with a Hebrew family of Benjamites in the village of Gibeah. When the aged householder refuses the demands of a band of rampaging youths, who want to have sex with the Levite traveler, the old man tosses out his daughter and the Levite’s girlfriend as substitutes. The young men of the city pack-rape the women throughout the night, and with vampire-like aversion for sunlight leave them for dead the next morning. Outraged that his concubine could not defend herself against the sex-starved youth of Gibeah, the wayfaring Hebrew chops her into “twelve pieces, limb by limb and sen[ds] the pieces throughout the whole of Israel.” The text is chillingly ambiguous whether the concubine is dead or still alive when the vivisection takes place. (Judges 19.)
Entertaining? You bet—almost Hollywood caliber horror. The only difference is, this horror story occurs in a book thought to be revealed by a God who is fundamentally good and eternally just, one who rewards whom he wants, humiliates when he wants, is jealous when he feels like it, and compassionate when he doesn’t feel like being jealous. He is a lot like the trolls your grandmother told you about, only he lives in the sky, not under a bridge, and he plays tricks on people rather than goats. This God proves his might by exalting his people over other people, except in those (frequent) cases when it becomes necessary for him to spank his elect so severely they perish at their enemies’ hands. Then their enemies, with his blessing, take away their land, destroy their temple, and send them penniless into dispersion. This God seldom brings you presents; almost always sticks and lumps of coal, for which nonetheless you have to say thank you.
The climax of this way of thinking, all deference to the maligned Mel Gibson, is the image of a God so brutal that he inflicts pain, bloody suffering, and death on his innocent son as a vicarious way of venting his anger against the sinfulness of his chosen people. Christian theology may try to disguise this bottom line, or find an ethical tradition to replace it. But it is the core teaching of the Bible that this is the way God acts; this is the way God is. The Christian bifurcation of the “angry” Old Testament God and the “forgiving” and compassionate God of the New systematically overlooks the fact that only in the Christian Bible does God evolve into an abusive father who arranges the death of his own son as an covert means of regaining the fealty of a race he sold into sin in the Garden of Eden. Nor am I exaggerating the traditional theology on this point; almost all the church fathers from the time of Irenaeus onward saw the sin of Adam as creating a game of chess which God could only win by resorting to deception: fashioning a second man, like Adam, who could cheat death of its right to his human soul by being quintessentially (but “invisibly”) divine. Bluntly, God “pays” the devil, who “owned” us after the fall, a human life to let us go (Irenaeus, V.1.1.); but the devil could not take the God-man and gets caught out by his greed. This is sometimes called the “ransom” theory of the atonement. It sees the devil as Shylock to God’s Portia, demanding more than his due and losing the whole jackpot—world, flesh and princely pomp—in the bargain. Translated: You have a neighbor who treats his teenage son abysmally, a father whose acts of cruelty are frequent, known, and unprovoked, and whose reason for beating the child is that, as a consequence of the boy’s disobedience, the father does not have the respect of his neighbors. To gain their respect he decides that his son must pay the price. So, convincing the son that the long-term benefits to reputation far outweigh any momentary pain, he shoots him at high noon on a Saturday within plain sight of a dozen of his neglectful friends. In a criminal case we should have no difficulty asking that the father to be locked up without parole. In theology, we argue that the Father loved the world so much he just had to do it.
Because the theology of violence and concomitant suffering—which theology dubs redemption and atonement—so permeates the ancient Semitic world, the Jews reacted appropriately, theologically speaking, to the Assyrian, the Babylonian, the Persian, the Greek-Macedonian, and the Roman assaults on their national identity. God could fight on whosoever side he chose, but there was always a reason, and the reason always had something to do with fidelity, and fidelity always with carrots and sticks. The worse the humiliation, the worse must have been “what was done in the sight of the Lord, who rewards good and punishes evil.” It is only when the whole political dream lay in smoke, as it did in April in the year 70 CE, that Hebrew theology can no longer accept the terms of the Abrahamic covenant in the same old way. After all, a god who promises a land, the miraculous increase of Abraham’s descendants (“as populous as the stars in the sky”), and the final victory over the enemies of God, but then who gives the land to strangers, sends his chosen people into Roman ghettoes and Syrian slavery, ensures their defeat in every battle with the goyim, might just be trying to tell you something. The idiot’s Guide to Messianism might suggest that this God enjoyed the company of fools or making fools of his customers, with every act of destruction attended by a false promise of restoration, renewal, refreshment. The whole fabric of messianic and apocalyptic expectation is drawn against a background of unhappiness and disappointment, against hope that can be measured in literary units but always ends with “not yet,” “later, “sometime next year.” The Jewish and later the Christian inability to acknowledge the disconfirmation of their messianic claims, their stubbornness in the face of defeat is the origin of ancient anti-Semitism, like that of Tacitus and the beleaguered Vespasian and the staple of early anti-Christian polemic by the likes of Celsus and Porphyry: “How terrible it would be if God the Creator should stand helplessly by and see the heavens melting away in a storm of fire—the stars falling, the earth dying. For no none has ever imagined anything more glorious than the beauty of the heavens.” (Porphyry, AC, Apoc. 4.24).
The disconfirmation of the apocalyptic and messianic God is a fact of history. He did not set fire to the world. He did not send a rescuer. He did not come again. Skeptics will say that these things were not done because this God does not exist anyway. But for dispersed Jews and newly legitimated imperial Christians of the fourth century, their changed circumstances required closing the book on this God, making him a figure of the past, a symbol of majesty, just as later, in the Enlightenment he could become a watchmaker, whose services were admirable but no longer required.
The God of a superceded Judaism and a triumphal Christianity may look different to the adherents of the competing traditions, even to scholars studying these traditions. Judaism retreated into mysticism and ethics. Christianity spun doctrines, invented a new kind of state to serve as his museum, and enshrined his brutal demands in more humane codes. But by and large, the Levite and the punishing god of hosts who counted his enemies by the tens of thousands was kept safely locked away in the Book, in languages sufficiently arcane that fewer and fewer could read the awful diary of his deeds. It took the Reformation to unlock it, to free him. But, as luck would have it, by the time he was freed, he found among his covenanted people, old and new, a Spinoza–later by not much a Voltaire, a Hume. Disobedient children all. And he had wasted the life of the only son he had to spare centuries before. –Sad really. If only he had been a better father.
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R. Joseph Hoffmann is Professor and Chair of Religious Studies at Wells College and a Senior Fellow at the Center for Inquiry International.
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Preference for Fairness
Did you read Jeremy’s article on justice? It’s very good.
One bit reminded me of something else I’d just read. Serendipity kind of thing. This bit reminded me.
If this is right, it does not follow that one cannot account for the existence of retributive feelings. Mackie, for example, employed Darwinian principles in order to explain their ubiquity and persistence. His argument was roughly this: individuals achieved an evolutionary advantage to the extent that resentment of injuries became a deeply ingrained psychological disposition in their personality structures; this disposition was then universalized for broadly sociological reasons, so that certain harms came to be cooperatively resented, which is the mark of retributivism generally.
It reminded me of this article in the New Yorker about the brain and psychology and behavioral economics and neuroeconomics. Especially this bit:
A good way to illustrate Cohen’s point is to imagine that you and a stranger are sitting on a park bench, when an economist approaches and offers both of you ten dollars. He asks the stranger to suggest how the ten dollars should be divided, and he gives you the right to approve or reject the division. If you accept the stranger’s proposal, the money will be divided between you accordingly; if you refuse it, neither of you gets anything. How would you react to this situation, which economists refer to as an “ultimatum game,” because one player effectively gives the other an ultimatum? Game theorists say that you should accept any positive offer you receive, even one as low as a dollar, or you will end up with nothing. But most people reject offers of less than three dollars, and some turn down anything less than five dollars.
See? It’s the same thing. Resentment of injuries, of perceived injustice, trumps economic benefit. I know damn well I’m like that. I’d happily spurn the two or three dollars for the sake of punishing the greedy unfair stranger on the bench. I would probably also pick up a nearby branch or tennis racket and smack the stranger with it then run away.
Cohen and several colleagues organized a series of ultimatum games in which half the players – the respondents – were put in MRI machines…When respondents received stingy offers – two dollars for them, say, and eight dollars for the other player – they exhibited substantially more activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, an area associated with reasoning, and in the bilateral anterior insula, part of the limbic region that is active when people are angry or in distress. The more activity there was in the limbic structure, the more likely the person was to reject the offer. To the researchers, it looked as though the two regions of the brain might be competing to decide what to do, with the prefrontal cortex wanting to accept the offer and the insula wanting to reject it…Maybe human beings have an intrinsic preference for fairness, and we get angry when that preference is violated—so angry that we punish the other player even at a cost to ourselves. Or perhaps people reject low offers because they don’t want to appear weak.
See? Same thing. It’s interesting. It’s why small children spend all their time measuring the size of each other’s pieces of cake to make sure they’re not getting stiffed – they’re making sure nobody’s dissing them.
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Grayling and Blackburn on Religion and Respect
Well this is what I keep saying.
It is time to reverse the prevailing notion that religious commitment is intrinsically deserving of respect, and that it should be handled with kid gloves and protected by custom and in some cases law against criticism and ridicule. It is time to refuse to tip-toe around people who claim respect, consideration, special treatment, or any other kind of immunity, on the grounds that they have a religious faith, as if having faith were a privilege-endowing virtue, as if it were noble to believe in unsupported claims and ancient superstitions.
That’s all. It’s quite simple. Faith is not a virtue, and it shouldn’t endow privilege. It’s not noble to believe in unsupported claims, especially in the guise of ancient superstitions. ‘Faith’ keeps insisting on throwing its weight around in public matters, so it can’t reasonably claim kid glove handling at the same time. It does claim exactly that; but not reasonably.
Grayling is forthright.
On the contrary: to believe something in the face of evidence and against reason – to believe something by faith – is ignoble, irresponsible and ignorant, and merits the opposite of respect. It is time to say so. It is time to demand of believers that they take their personal choices and preferences in these non-rational and too often dangerous matters into the private sphere, like their sexual proclivities. Everyone is free to believe what they want, providing they do not bother (or coerce, or kill) others; but no-one is entitled to claim privileges merely on the grounds that they are votaries of one or another of the world’s many religions.
Simon Blackburn said much the same in that article ‘Religion and Respect’ [pdf] that I commented on a year ago.
But, I argued to myself, why should I “respect” belief systems that I do not share? I would not be expected to respect the beliefs of flat earthers or those of the people who believed that the Hale-Bopp comet was a recycling facility for dead Californians, and killed themselves in order to join it. Had my host stood up and asked me to toast the Hale-Bopp hopefuls, or to break bread or some such in token of fellowship with them, I would have been just as embarrassed and indeed angry.
But the rules change for (established) religion. And they not only change, they creep.
People may start out by insisting on respect in the minimal sense, and in a generally liberal world they may not find it too difficult to obtain it. But then what we might call respect creep sets in, where the request for minimal toleration turns into a demand for more substantial respect, such as fellowfeeling, or esteem, and finally deference and reverence.
Or not finally; there’s another step: obedience and submission, along with silencing and censorship. In some places and on some subjects, we’re already there.
Grayling concludes:
But no organised religion, as an institution, has a greater claim to the attention of others in society than does a trade union, political party, voluntary organisation, or any other special interest group – for “special interest groups” are exactly what churches and organised religious bodies are. No one could dream of demanding that political parties be respected merely because they are political parties, or of protecting them from the pens of cartoonists; nor that their members should be. On the contrary. And so it should be for all interest groups and their members, without exception.
Yup. Time for the worm to turn.
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Ben Goldacre on Oliver Curry’s Fanciful Essay
Empty ‘science’ stories are being generated by PR companies who pay academics to produce some spurious piece of ‘research’.
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P Z Myers Reviews The God Delusion
Promotion of religion as a guide to absolute truth and substitute for scientific thinking is a bad idea.
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Jim Holt Reviews The God Delusion
Underestimate of difficult philosophical questions about religion makes it intellectually frustrating.
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Eagleton’s Review of The God Delusion
Now non-subscription at LRB.
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Shahid Malik MP Tells Azmi to Give Up Fight
Muslim parents in his constituency don’t want their children taught by veiled teacher.
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A C Grayling on What Merits Respect
Time to refuse to tip-toe around people who claim immunity on the grounds that they have a religious faith.
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Catching Up with Jesus and Mo
Hmph. I’ve been too busy lately – I’ve missed some great Jesus and Moze (it’s hard to make a plural Jesus and Mo in writing). Such as this one. Haw. What’s he going to do, sit on us? Haw!
And this one. I love the barmaid. Can I play the barmaid in the movie? Can I, huh, huh? I’d be perfect.
And this one. Catchy. Violent, and catchy.
And this one. ‘That laws-of-physics-defying explanation never even occurred to me.’ Try to keep up, Mo.
And the niqab one is brilliant. Oh, Mo, I feel so liberated.
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Participation on equal terms
Polly Toynbee says a secular state would be a good idea.
Here is a conflict between two principles – respect for a religious minority and respect for women’s equality…The veil turns women into things. It was shocking to find on the streets of Kabul that invisible women behind burkas are not treated with special respect. On the contrary, they are pushed and shoved off pavements by men, jostled aside as if almost subhuman without the face-to-face contact that recognises common humanity.
She’s right you know. That’s how it works. You can’t have the one without the other – you can’t have the concealment without the reification – the concealment is reification. That is essentially what it’s all about: erasure of every recognizable attribute of the human, leaving only anonymous amorphous colourless interchangeable blocks of fabric that look more like upended sofas or nonfunctional lampshades than like people. Well big surprise that they’re treated with contempt and hostility instead of respect. People who have to be buried in yards of upholstery so that they can’t be seen are, pretty obviously, objects of some form of loathing and suspicion, not of admiration and respect. Why else do we hate the things so much? Why do you think? It’s because they’re such an obvious, blatant, hyper-visible sign of intense ineradicable unappeasable loathing.
The veil is profoundly divisive – and deliberately designed to be. No one need be a Muslim to understand the ideology of the veil, because covering and controlling women has been a near-universal practice in Christian societies and in most cultures and religions the world over.
Of course the veil is divisive and designed to be. Dividing is what it does. It’s a portable form of gender segregation; segregation is, obviously, divisive. It’s only relatively recently that women haven’t been formally and informally segregated in ‘the West’ too; it’s only relatively recently that we’ve been allowed to mix with the world at large. We understand what segregation is, and most of us don’t want it reimposed, formally or informally.
No citizen’s face can be indecent because of gender…It was left to Harriet Harman to make the unequivocal case for women’s rights: “If you want equality, you have to be in society, not hidden away from it,” she said. “The veil is an obstacle to women’s participation on equal terms in society.”
Just so; because that’s what it’s for; that’s the point of portable segregation. It’s not just a neutral religious symbol, it’s not just a sign of devoutness, it’s not just a ‘choice,’ it’s a barrier between women and the wider world. That’s why sensitive liberals need to give up pretending otherwise.
Harman is astute about the way choice is culturally determined: do women really choose the female roles societies assign them? She is not alone in meeting Muslim woman who are appalled that their own daughters might adopt the veil as a political gesture. It’s a danger to other women’s “choice” if all “good” Muslims are forced to prove their faith by submission.
By submission to the imperative to be things. Don’t do it. Be people.
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Jesus and Mo Try Out the Niqab
Why should the girls have all the fun?
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Media Ignore MMR Correction
They were all over 2002 report, but now that new study suggests there were false positives – yawn.
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Parliamentary Motion on Science Education
Literature being sent to UK schools by ‘Truth in Science’ is full of scientific mistakes.
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Atheist Books Top Best-seller Lists
Publishers Weekly said the business has seen ‘a striking number of impassioned critiques of religion.’
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Jeff Weintraub on Salah Choudhury
He deserves solidarity and support from those of us who can say what we want without taking risks.
